54 lines
2.6 KiB
Markdown
54 lines
2.6 KiB
Markdown
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# security-host-03: AtsSecurity, GN-MGMT profile (sending side)
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Campaign (re-run of security-host-01 with the 2026-09-14 sources: p2pcd accessor patch, ITS time helper in the adapter and pool tool): `ports/esp_idf/tests/etsi_security_gn.cfg` (8 cases), host SUT
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`vidf_sut --security-pool ./certificates` (native Linux build,
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`VIDF_SECURITY=ON`), pool generated by `vidf_test_pool` (hashes in
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`result.json`, `pool_sha256`). The adapter enforces the framework's own
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verification of every IUT transmission (`enable_security_checks=1`, see
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`test.cfg`); a PASS therefore covers a signature the framework verified against
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`CERT_IUT_A_AT` from the pool, not only the message structure.
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| Case | Verdict | Cause |
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| --- | --- | --- |
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| TC_SEC_ITSS_SND_GENMSG_01..04, 06..08 | pass | secured beacons (psid 141), TS 103 097 clause 7.1.3 profile |
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| TC_SEC_ITSS_SND_GENMSG_05_BV | **fail** | ATS implementation defect, IUT-independent (below) |
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## TC_SEC_ITSS_SND_GENMSG_05_BV
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The testcase (pinned `ItsSecurity_TestCases.ttcn` line 7313) compares the
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signer certificate's `validityPeriod.start` (a `Time32`, seconds since
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2004-01-01) against a range built from `v_curTime` in **microseconds**:
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```
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match(v_signerIdentifier.certificate[0].toBeSigned.validityPeriod.start_,
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Time32:(v_curTime - c_timeLimit / 1000000 .. v_curTime + c_timeLimit / 1000000))
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```
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Only `c_timeLimit` is scaled to seconds; `v_curTime` (`f_getCurrentTime() *
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1000`) is not. Values from the MTC log of this run:
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| Quantity | Value | Unit |
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| --- | --- | --- |
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| `v_curTime` | 716425780437000 | µs |
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| range checked | 716425780436700 .. 716425780437300 | (µs magnitude) |
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| `validityPeriod.start_` | 716425702 | s |
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| `generationTime` | 716425785435539 | µs (= 716425785 s) |
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| `duration` | 24 | hours |
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No `Time32` can fall into a range of that magnitude, so the branch fails for
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every IUT. The test purpose quoted in the testcase header (TS 103 096-2:
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`X_START_VALIDITY <= GEN_TIME` and `duration > GEN_TIME - X_START_VALIDITY`)
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holds for the observed values: 716425702 s <= 716425785 s and the difference
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(83 s) is below 24 h. The current upstream head of the Security ATS
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(`forge.etsi.org/rep/ITS/ttcn/ats_sec_ts103096-3`, branch `master`, line 6672)
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carries the same expression. The verdict is retained as recorded; the testcase
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was not modified.
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## Time base note
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The framework's `base_time` derives ITS time from UTC without the five leap
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seconds inserted since 2004; the SUT clock driven by the adapter is TAI-based
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(IEEE 1609.2 `Time64`), hence the constant 5 s offset visible in the
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`generation time check` lines of `console.txt` (well inside the 30 s window the
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framework applies and the 5 min window of the testcases).
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