Keep the colleague's microbu-esp32c5 tree in this repository
obu-firmware builds against vanetza-idf from microbu-esp32c5/external, but that tree was gitignored, so a clone of this repository could not build the firmware it ships. It is now committed here as ordinary files in its own folder, microbu-esp32c5/: the colleague's commit cf4b99f plus the V2X2MAP bridge's signature verification (--trust) used on the bench. Nothing is fetched from or pushed to the colleague's repository; this repository and its remotes carry everything. The folder's own .gitignore keeps build output, downloaded components and private key material out, as it did there; the committed file set is identical to that repository's tracked files. The ESP32-C5 is still flashed from obu-firmware/, which only takes vanetza-idf from microbu-esp32c5/, so the two stay separate folders. FLASHING.md says how to take a newer version of the colleague's tree (copy it over the folder, rebuild, test, commit).
This commit is contained in:
Ashin Walpola
@@ -0,0 +1,571 @@
|
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# Validation
|
||||
|
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No full-stack conformity is claimed. Results below were collected from this
|
||||
port, not inferred from the upstream project or other firmware.
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||||
| Check | Result | Scope |
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|---|---|---|
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||||
| Host build, GCC 13.2 | PASS | Network, CAM/DENM/VAM codecs and HIL enabled |
|
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| Host component regression | PASS, 92 checks | Includes named NF request length/security/wire mapping, codecs, SHA, GN/BTP and radio frame handling |
|
||||
| Official ETSI BTP control, host | PASS, 5/5 expected cases | Actual stack via named NF request/indication binding; unsecured PICS |
|
||||
| ESP32-C5 build | PASS | ESP-IDF 6.0.2; 1,753,088-byte application, 3 MiB application partition |
|
||||
| ESP32-C5 component execution | PASS | 92 on-device checks; HIL server now survives a JTAG/USB reset (see fix note below) |
|
||||
| Official ETSI BTP control, device (COM20) | PASS, 5/5 expected cases | Real hardware SUT via `serial_sut.py`; same testcase objects and PICS as the host run |
|
||||
| Raw GN-DATA N-SAP (IF-GN-002), host | PASS, manual round trip | SHB send (GN_DATA_request) and receive (on_receive_gn) verified byte-for-byte via `vidf_sut.exe`; see below |
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||||
| Official ETSI GeoNetworking control, host | **PASS, 1/3 executed cases**; 1 fail, 1 inconc (both legitimate scope gaps, not bugs) | `TC_GEONW_FDV_SHB_BV_01`; see below |
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| Access/DCC campaign | Not executed | Required observations and behavior remain incomplete |
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||||
| Independent C5 radio pair, real RF (COM20→COM11) | **PASS**, 3/3 identical reruns | Real over-the-air transmit/receive between two boards; see below for the FCS-check fix |
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| Host component regression, security on (Windows Debug, OpenSSL) | PASS, 935 checks | Security entity incl. receive-side verification, chain and region consistency, revocation, credential bundle and stores, identifier change, SN/SF/MN/MF/MI bindings, TS 102 941 core incl. RCA CTL/CRL, ITS time base; PSA cross-check build (mbedTLS 4.1 from the IDF tree) PASS, 1112 checks; security off 150; access-only 88; Linux Release 935 |
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||||
| ESP32-C5 component execution, security on (COM11) | PASS, 810 checks | PSA Crypto backend of mbedTLS 4.1.0 with the ECDSA peripheral for verification; `CONFIG_VANETZA_IDF_SECURITY_VERIFY=y`, `CONFIG_VANETZA_IDF_PKI=y`, `CONFIG_VANETZA_IDF_NVS_CREDENTIALS=y`; [security-device-09](evidence/security-device-09/result.json) incl. the chain/region consistency, revocation, NVS credential store and RCA CTL/CRL tests (earlier: -08 765, -07 747, -06 668, -05 537, -03/-04 503); heap and cost notes below |
|
||||
| ESP32-C5 signing with run-time provisioned credentials, verified by c-its | **PASS**: signatures and chain (3/3 CAMs per capture), CAM authorisation with the SSP-carrying ticket | Bundle over the USB diagnostic channel (command 9), twin chain of a real EU root; [independent-verifier-03](evidence/independent-verifier-03/analysis.md) |
|
||||
| RCA CTL/CRL from a distribution centre on localhost | **PASS**: library reader and c-its consumer both validate and extract the AA; revocation honoured by the chain validator | TS 102 941 clause 6.3 / Annex D; `vidf_issue ctl/crl`, `local_dc.py`, `fetch_trust_lists.py`; [trust-lists-01](evidence/trust-lists-01/analysis.md) |
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||||
| Enrolment and authorization from a lab EA/AA on localhost | **PASS**: both HTTP round trips complete, both resulting certificates (EC, AT) verify their chain to the root; the AA's entitlement check of the EC succeeds against a genuinely separate request | TS 102 941 clause 6.2.3; `vidf_issue enrol-*`/`authorize-*`/`ea-respond`/`aa-respond`, `local_pki.py`, `pki_client.py`; [enrolment-authorization-01](evidence/enrolment-authorization-01/analysis.md) |
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||||
| ESP32-C5 component execution, security on (COM20, second board) | PASS, 503 checks | Same image, board recovered over JTAG; [security-device-04](evidence/security-device-04/result.json) |
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||||
| Official ETSI Security, GN-MGMT profile, host | **PASS 7/8**; 1 fail (testcase defect, IUT-independent) | `TC_SEC_ITSS_SND_GENMSG_01..08_BV`, framework-side signature verification enforced; see below; rerun with the CPOC-shaped pool and the consistency checks: [security-host-09](evidence/security-host-09/result.json), same verdicts |
|
||||
| Official ETSI Security, CAM/DENM profiles, host | **PASS 7/7** | `TC_SEC_ITSS_SND_CAM_01..04_BV`, `TC_SEC_ITSS_SND_DENM_01..03_BV`; see below; rerun [security-host-10](evidence/security-host-10/result.json), same verdicts |
|
||||
| Independent verifier (c-its) on SUT-signed CAM/DENM, host | **PASS**: signatures, chain, permissions, CAM/DENM authorisation | Lab chain from `vidf_issue`, frames from `capture_pcap.py`; [independent-verifier-01](evidence/independent-verifier-01/analysis.md); rehearsal on a twin of a real EU CCMS L0 root (its permission profile and EU region, throwaway key): [independent-verifier-02](evidence/independent-verifier-02/analysis.md); the same from the board: [-03](evidence/independent-verifier-03/analysis.md) |
|
||||
| Official ETSI BTP control, host, secured-capable SUT | PASS, 5/5 | Regression of the new `vidf_sut` build: [btp-host-08](evidence/btp-host-08/result.json) (earlier -05, -06, -07) |
|
||||
| Official ETSI GeoNetworking control, host, secured-capable SUT | pass/inconc/fail, identical to geonetworking-host-01 | [geonetworking-host-05](evidence/geonetworking-host-05/result.json) (earlier -02, -03, -04): no regression |
|
||||
| Official ETSI Security, receiving side, host | **PASS 24/26**; 2 errors (testcase defect, IUT-independent) | `TC_SEC_ITSS_RCV_MSG/CAM/DENM_*` with the SUT verifying (`VIDF_SECURITY_VERIFY`); see below; rerun with the consistency checks [security-host-08](evidence/security-host-08/result.json), same verdicts |
|
||||
| PKI ATS | Not executed | The official AtsPki suite needs a TTCN upper-tester adapter against the test system's compiled binary, not built here; a real HTTP transport for ad hoc testing exists (row above) (GAP-PKI-001) |
|
||||
| Complete facilities ATS | Not executed | Full services remain incomplete |
|
||||
|
||||
The [BTP result](evidence/btp-host-04.json) records executable and configuration
|
||||
hashes, timestamps and every testcase verdict. Its five cases are
|
||||
TC_BTP_PGA_BV_01, TC_BTP_PGB_BV_01, TC_BTP_PGB_BV_02,
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||||
TC_BTP_PP_BV_01 and TC_BTP_PP_BV_02. There are no missing, unexpected or
|
||||
duplicate verdicts in that run. The same five cases, same adapter and same
|
||||
PICS pass against the real ESP32-C5 SUT over USB; see
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||||
[the device result](evidence/btp-device-01/result.json).
|
||||
|
||||
The [C5 build record](evidence/c5-build.json) pins the application, bootloader,
|
||||
partition table and configuration hashes.
|
||||
|
||||
### HIL server reset fix
|
||||
|
||||
`examples/esp_idf_test`'s `run_hil_server()` previously never returned control
|
||||
after printing `VIDF_TEST_RESULT=0` on a JTAG- or USB-triggered reset (as opposed
|
||||
to a full power-on reset): the ESP32-C5 ROM's UART0 initialization waits forever
|
||||
for a clock-ready bit that such a reset can leave cleared. The parent project's
|
||||
own firmware hit and fixed the identical issue
|
||||
(`implementation/firmware/main/usb_hil.c:75`); this port did not carry that fix.
|
||||
`hil_server.cpp` now sets `PCR_UART0_SCLK_EN` before installing the USB-Serial/JTAG
|
||||
driver, guarded by `CONFIG_IDF_TARGET_ESP32C5`. Confirmed on the COM20 board across
|
||||
repeated resets. The COM11 receiver board needed one physical power cycle to
|
||||
recover from the pre-fix hang before it would boot the corrected image; a JTAG
|
||||
halt/resume showed it genuinely spinning in ROM, not merely slow to answer.
|
||||
|
||||
The external BTP source revision is
|
||||
`3576386312f9dff1afcccc8f96247876ab9a0865`; the external framework revision is
|
||||
`e477d327f4df850e487feab5c0f68b1044db3cf1`. Official testcase objects are reused;
|
||||
the library supplies the SUT port adapter. These older tests do not by themselves
|
||||
prove every Release 2 requirement.
|
||||
|
||||
### GN-DATA N-SAP (IF-GN-002) and a real upstream fix
|
||||
|
||||
The GeoNetworking ATS's SHB/GBC "generate message" UT triggers send a raw test
|
||||
SDU with the Common Header `next_header` set to "Any" (no BTP/IPv6 framing).
|
||||
`Stack` previously had no way to originate that: `Stack::request(BtpRequest)`
|
||||
always sets a BTP next-header, and the upstream router's
|
||||
`CommonHeader(const DataRequest&, const MIB&)` constructor only handled
|
||||
`UpperProtocol::BTP_A`, `BTP_B` and `IPv6` in its switch, throwing
|
||||
`"Unhandled upper protocol"` for anything else — `UpperProtocol::Unknown` is a
|
||||
real, documented value (the router itself assigns it on receive for
|
||||
unrecognized next-headers), so this was a genuine gap, not a deliberate
|
||||
exclusion. Two changes close it:
|
||||
|
||||
- `vanetza/geonet/common_header.cpp`: the switch now maps
|
||||
`UpperProtocol::Unknown` to `NextHeaderCommon::Any`, matching what the
|
||||
default constructor already produces.
|
||||
- `Stack` gained `GnRequest`/`GnIndication` and `request(GnRequest)`/
|
||||
`on_receive_gn(...)`: the same SHB/GBC-only validation as `BtpRequest`, but
|
||||
with a raw payload and no header construction, registered against the
|
||||
router's `UpperProtocol::Unknown` transport handler alongside the existing
|
||||
BTP_A/BTP_B ones.
|
||||
|
||||
Verified with `vidf_sut.exe` (opcodes `3`=GN_DATA_request SHB,
|
||||
`4`=update_position, both new; `2`=AlDataIndication, already existing and
|
||||
transport-agnostic): a raw `"HELLO"` SHB request produces a GN packet with
|
||||
Common Header `next_header=0x00` (Any) and the exact payload at its tail;
|
||||
feeding those same wire bytes back through `AlDataIndication` produces a
|
||||
GN-DATA.indication with `upper_protocol=Unknown` and the same `"HELLO"`
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||||
payload back out. `vidf_tests.exe` still passes 92/92 after the change.
|
||||
|
||||
### GeoNetworking TTCN adapter: one official case passes
|
||||
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||||
`ports/esp_idf/tests/etsi_geonetworking_adapter.cpp` implements the three
|
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GeoNetworking test-port classes (`GeoNetworkingPort`, `UpperTesterPort`,
|
||||
`AdapterControlPort`) against the official `AtsGeoNetworking` testcase
|
||||
objects, built the same way as the BTP adapter
|
||||
(`build_etsi_geonetworking_adapter.py`). `PICS_GN_LOCAL_GN_ADDR` in
|
||||
[etsi_geonetworking.cfg](../../ports/esp_idf/tests/etsi_geonetworking.cfg) is
|
||||
set to the exact address `hil_sut.cpp`'s `Sut::reset()` gives the stack
|
||||
(`typeOfAddress=e_initial, stationType=e_unknown, mid=02:00:00:00:00:01`);
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||||
`f_acGetLongPosVector` compares against this value exactly, so it is not an
|
||||
arbitrary PICS choice. `PICS_GN_BASIC_HEADER`/`COMMON_HEADER` are disabled
|
||||
because those testcases send deliberately malformed headers expecting
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rejection, which this adapter does not implement; everything else the ATS
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||||
defaults to "supported" is disabled to match GAP-GN-001 (only SHB is wired
|
||||
into the adapter; GBC/GUC/GAC/TSB triggers are not).
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||||
Under that PICS selection, three cases execute (this is the complete
|
||||
population `PICS_GN_SHB_SRC` reaches):
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||||
|
||||
| Testcase | Component | Verdict | Why |
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||||
|---|---|---|---|
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||||
| `TC_GEONW_FDV_SHB_BV_01` | single (`ItsGeoNetworking`) | **pass** | See below |
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||||
| `TC_GEONW_PON_FPB_BV_11_05` | multi (`ItsMtc`) | inconc, immediately | Its body additionally requires `PICS_GN_GUC_SRC`, which is correctly disabled (GAP-GN-001) |
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||||
| `TC_GEONW_PON_SHB_BV_01` | multi (`ItsMtc`) | fail | Needs a second, independently-addressable simulated station (PTC); this adapter models one IUT only |
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||||
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||||
Getting `TC_GEONW_FDV_SHB_BV_01` to a genuine pass took fixing two real bugs,
|
||||
neither of which was in the testcase logic:
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||||
|
||||
**1. A null-pointer bug in the external ETSI framework's codec.**
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||||
`geonetworking_codec::decode_` (`ccsrc/Protocols/GeoNetworking/geonetworking_codec.cc`)
|
||||
unconditionally dereferences `_params` while writing the decoded payload, in
|
||||
all three branches of its length-alignment logic. Every *other* parameter
|
||||
write in that file — a few lines up, in the enclosing `decode()` — is
|
||||
correctly guarded with `if (_params != NULL)`; this one payload branch just
|
||||
wasn't. `fx__dec__GeoNetworkingPdu` (`ccsrc/EncDec/LibItsGeoNetworking_Encdec.cc`)
|
||||
always calls `decode()` with the default `params` (`nullptr`), so decoding
|
||||
*any* `GeoNetworkingPdu` through the official codec wrapper segfaults as
|
||||
soon as it reaches that field. This was never triggered by BTP (whose
|
||||
adapter never calls this decoder) or by any earlier GeoNetworking attempt,
|
||||
because no GN packet had ever actually been transmitted-and-observed through
|
||||
TITAN before fix 2 below — every earlier SHB trigger just sat unsent, so the
|
||||
buggy decode path was never reached.
|
||||
|
||||
Confirmed with a real core dump: `ulimit -c unlimited`, a fixed
|
||||
`/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern` (WSL redirects it to a pipe by default,
|
||||
which silently swallows core files), and `gdb -batch -ex 'bt full'` on the
|
||||
result showed the crash precisely, four frames past `abort()` inside
|
||||
`std::map<...>::operator[]` called from `geonetworking_codec::decode_` line
|
||||
257, `this=0x8` (a null `_params` plus a small member offset). No debugger
|
||||
was installed in the WSL environment initially; installing one (`apt-get
|
||||
install gdb`) is what turned "reproducibly crashes for an unknown reason"
|
||||
into an exact line number.
|
||||
|
||||
Per the framework's own stated policy (never edit the pinned ETSI source
|
||||
tree or its testcase objects), the fix is a disposable build overlay:
|
||||
`build_etsi_geonetworking_adapter.py` reads the pinned `geonetworking_codec.cc`,
|
||||
applies three `if (_params != NULL)` guards in memory, compiles the patched
|
||||
copy into its own `--out` directory, and links that instead of the original
|
||||
`.o` — the checked-out framework source on disk is never written. This
|
||||
mirrors the project's existing `AtsIPv6OverGeoNetworking` overlay precedent
|
||||
(`tools/ttcn/validation-status.json`'s `suite_overlay` entries): before/after
|
||||
source hashes are recorded in the adapter's own `build.json`
|
||||
([geonetworking-host-01/adapter-build.json](evidence/geonetworking-host-01/adapter-build.json)).
|
||||
|
||||
**2. `Stack` never applied its own configured GN address.**
|
||||
With the codec crash fixed, the SHB packet decoded fine but failed the
|
||||
match: the test's `mw_longPosVectorPosition` template requires the observed
|
||||
source position vector's `gnAddr` to equal exactly what `AcGnPrimitive::getLongPosVector`
|
||||
reported, and the two disagreed. `hil_sut.cpp`'s `Sut::reset()` sets
|
||||
`config.mib.itsGnLocalGnAddr.mid({2,0,0,0,0,1})`, but `Router::update_position()`
|
||||
(`vanetza/geonet/router.cpp`) only ever touches `m_local_position_vector`'s
|
||||
timestamp/latitude/longitude/speed/heading — never its address. The address
|
||||
field of a station's own position vector is populated exclusively by a
|
||||
separate method, `Router::set_address(const Address&)`, which `Stack` never
|
||||
called. So every transmitted packet actually carried the *default*
|
||||
`vanetza::geonet::Address()` (all-zero `mid`, not manually configured),
|
||||
regardless of what the caller put in `mib.itsGnLocalGnAddr` — BTP's ATS
|
||||
never checks the source GN address, so this was invisible until
|
||||
GeoNetworking's did. Fixed with one call in `Stack::Impl`'s constructor
|
||||
(`ports/esp_idf/src/stack.cpp`): `router.set_address(cfg.mib.itsGnLocalGnAddr);`
|
||||
|
||||
With both fixed, `TC_GEONW_FDV_SHB_BV_01` passes: initialize,
|
||||
`AcGnPrimitive::getLongPosVector`, the beacon feed through
|
||||
`AdapterControlPort` (`f_startBeingNeighbour`'s whole purpose — giving the
|
||||
router a location-table neighbour so `TrafficClass.scf` doesn't buffer the
|
||||
SHB request instead of transmitting it immediately), the `UtGnTrigger::shb`
|
||||
request, and the resulting SHB packet's observed header fields (including
|
||||
the now-correct source address) all match exactly
|
||||
(see [the MTC log](evidence/geonetworking-host-01/AtsGeoNetworking.framework-dathe-mtc.log)).
|
||||
Rerun three times back to back with an identical verdict every time: not a
|
||||
fluke.
|
||||
|
||||
`TC_GEONW_PON_SHB_BV_01` and `TC_GEONW_PON_FPB_BV_11_05` both declare
|
||||
`runs on ItsMtc` and use a second config (`CF02`/`CF03`) that models an
|
||||
independent simulated station (`ItsNodeB`/`ItsNodeA`) as a genuine parallel
|
||||
test component (PTC), each mapping its own port set. This adapter, like the
|
||||
BTP one, models exactly one IUT connection; extending it to back a PTC's
|
||||
ports too (so the "other station" is also a real, addressable simulated
|
||||
peer rather than the same single `Process`/SUT singleton) is unimplemented.
|
||||
`PON_FPB_BV_11_05` happens to end INCONC before reaching that requirement
|
||||
(its own PICS gate on `PICS_GN_GUC_SRC` triggers first), so this gap is only
|
||||
actually exercised, and confirmed as a fail, by `PON_SHB_BV_01`.
|
||||
|
||||
Evidence: [geonetworking-host-01](evidence/geonetworking-host-01/result.json)
|
||||
(host SUT, native Linux build — WSL interop could not pipe stdin/stdout to a
|
||||
Windows-built host executable, so the host SUT for this suite is built
|
||||
natively per [test-campaigns.md](test-campaigns.md)).
|
||||
|
||||
### Security entity, cross-layer SAPs and the AtsSecurity campaigns
|
||||
|
||||
The security work (branch `feature/etsi-cross-layer-security`, one commit per
|
||||
increment) adds a signing security entity, the identifier change of
|
||||
TS 102 723-8 clause 6.3, the SN/SF/MN/MF/MI bindings and the TS 102 941
|
||||
request/response core; [standards.md](standards.md) lists the clauses. Every
|
||||
result below comes from this port.
|
||||
|
||||
**Crypto backend.** `BackendMbedTls` uses only the PSA Crypto API because
|
||||
ESP-IDF 6.0.2 ships mbedTLS 4.1.0 (TF-PSA-Crypto), whose classic ecp/bignum
|
||||
headers are private. PSA imports Weierstrass public keys only in uncompressed
|
||||
form, so compressed IEEE 1609.2 points are recovered by `vanetza_idf::ecc`
|
||||
(y = rhs^((p+1)/4), p = 3 mod 4 for NIST P-256 and both Brainpool curves).
|
||||
The host tests run the same backend against OpenSSL as an oracle (signature
|
||||
cross-verification, decompression against `EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates`,
|
||||
known-answer vectors in `test_backend_kat.cpp`) in the `VIDF_MBEDTLS_ROOT`
|
||||
build (1112 checks); the device runs the PSA path natively (810 checks, the
|
||||
difference being the OpenSSL-only oracle tests).
|
||||
|
||||
**Trust and refusal.** `CertificatePool::add` checks the TS 103 097 clause
|
||||
7.2.1 ticket profile and probes the key against the certificate (sign then
|
||||
verify) before accepting it; `TrustConfiguration` anchors roots and AAs; the
|
||||
entity refuses a request without a valid ticket for the ITS-AID/SSP, with an
|
||||
expired ticket, or with a ticket whose issuer is not anchored, and counts each
|
||||
refusal. Nothing is transmitted unsigned when `itsGnSecurity` is set, and
|
||||
`decapsulate_packet` reports `Configuration_Problem`/`Unsigned_Message`, never
|
||||
success (`test_fail_closed`).
|
||||
|
||||
**Identifier change.** `IdentityManager` runs PREPARE/COMMIT/ABORT/DEREG rounds
|
||||
with a response timeout (default 500 ms), lock with expiry, deferred responders
|
||||
(a subscriber may answer from another context) and re-entrancy guarding; the
|
||||
GN core subscribes when `itsGnLocalAddrConfMethod` is ANONYMOUS, marks
|
||||
`identity_change_pending` on PREPARE, flushes the forwarding buffers and
|
||||
rewrites the MID from the committed HashedId8 (least significant six octets,
|
||||
locally administered bit set); the SF binding drives a VRU-style subscriber in
|
||||
`test_sf_facilities_hook`. The corresponding Linux Release run initially
|
||||
segfaulted in that test: the entity was destroyed after the subscriber it
|
||||
notifies on DEREG had gone out of scope (a use-after-scope in the *test*, not
|
||||
the library), fixed by scoping the entity's lifetime explicitly.
|
||||
|
||||
**Upstream Vanetza changes.** Three additive ones: `SignRequest::context_information`
|
||||
and `DataRequest::security_context` carry the SN-ENCAP context information from
|
||||
BTP/GN request to the security entity (`Router::encap_packet` gained the
|
||||
parameter); `Router::flush_forwarding_buffers()` is public so the GN core can
|
||||
drop buffered packets carrying the old identifier on PREPARE. One corrective
|
||||
one (decided 2026-09-14): `v3::SecuredMessage::get_inline_p2pcd_request()`
|
||||
widened each 3-octet `HashedId3` through an 8-octet conversion and truncated
|
||||
the wrong end; it now uses `create_hashed_id3()` and `test_signing_profiles`
|
||||
checks the accessor against the raw ASN.1 field. A second corrective one
|
||||
(2026-09-14, found through the independent verifier below): the pinned
|
||||
asn1c files were generated from an IEEE 1609.2 module with `eeType
|
||||
EndEntityType DEFAULT '00'H`, so the decoder installed '00'H (neither app nor
|
||||
enrol) into every decoded `PsidGroupPermissions` without an explicit eeType,
|
||||
while IEEE Std 1609.2-2022/-2025 clause 6.4.28, the base of TS 103 097
|
||||
V2.2.1, defaults to `{app}`; `vanetza/asn1/security/PsidGroupPermissions.c`
|
||||
now installs '80'H (`asn_DFL_5_cmp/_set`, hand-edited and commented) and
|
||||
`asn1/IEEE1609dot2.asn` says `DEFAULT {app}`. Nothing else in `vanetza/`
|
||||
changed; all five are listed in the thesis's `adapted-code.yaml`.
|
||||
|
||||
**ITS time base.** `vanetza_idf/its_time.hpp` converts wall-clock (Unix) time
|
||||
to TAI microseconds since the ITS epoch with the five leap seconds inserted since
|
||||
2004, as TS 102 894-2 V2.4.1 `TimestampIts` and the IEEE 1609.2 `Time64`/`Time32`
|
||||
definitions require; `test_its_time` uses the CDD's own example
|
||||
(2007-01-01T00:00:00Z = 94 694 401 000 ms) and the "5 s ahead of UTC" statement
|
||||
as vectors and shows that upstream `Clock::at()` is 5 s behind (it subtracts
|
||||
the epoch in UTC). The Security adapter and `vidf_test_pool` use the helper; the
|
||||
framework's `base_time` is UTC-based, hence the 5 s offset in its logs.
|
||||
|
||||
**AtsSecurity campaigns.** `etsi_security_adapter.cpp` implements the
|
||||
`ItsSecSystem` ports (GeoNetworking, GN/CAM/DENM upper testers, adapter
|
||||
control) against the official `AtsSecurity` testcase objects
|
||||
([build_etsi_security_adapter.py](../../ports/esp_idf/tools/build_etsi_security_adapter.py),
|
||||
[adapter-build.json](evidence/security-host-06/adapter-build.json)). The
|
||||
host SUT is `vidf_sut --security-pool ./certificates`, the pool an isolated test
|
||||
trust domain written by `vidf_test_pool` in the framework's own loader layout
|
||||
(hashes in each `result.json`). Three properties of the run matter for reading
|
||||
the verdicts:
|
||||
|
||||
1. *Verification is the framework's.* Secured transmissions are unwrapped by
|
||||
`security_services_its::verify_and_extract_gn_payload` with
|
||||
`enable_security_checks=1`, so a failed signature/digest/generation-time
|
||||
check discards the packet instead of passing it up with a warning; a PASS
|
||||
therefore includes a signature the framework verified against
|
||||
`CERT_IUT_A_AT`, not only the template match.
|
||||
2. *One SUT per campaign, shared across TITAN components.* TITAN's parallel
|
||||
runtime forks the MTC and each PTC from the host controller; the DENM cases
|
||||
trigger from a PTC while the MTC observes the GN port. The adapter starts the
|
||||
SUT once in the host controller before any fork and serialises every
|
||||
command/reply exchange with a process-shared robust mutex; the DENM carrier
|
||||
is deferred to the next clock advance so the transmission surfaces on the
|
||||
component that owns the GN port.
|
||||
3. *Two stimulus configurations, no per-testcase switching.* A running CAM
|
||||
carrier restarts the beacon timer with every SHB (TS 103 836-4-1 clause
|
||||
10.3.5), so the GN-MGMT cases run with the carrier off
|
||||
([etsi_security_gn.cfg](../../ports/esp_idf/tests/etsi_security_gn.cfg))
|
||||
and the CAM/DENM cases with it on
|
||||
([etsi_security_facilities.cfg](../../ports/esp_idf/tests/etsi_security_facilities.cfg),
|
||||
`PX_GN_UPPER_LAYER := e_btpB`). The carriers are syntactically valid
|
||||
Release 2 CAM (SHB) and DENM (GBC into a 500 m circle, TS 103 831 clause
|
||||
5.4.2) PDUs of the test application; no CA/DEN service is claimed.
|
||||
|
||||
Verdicts ([security-host-06](evidence/security-host-06/result.json),
|
||||
[security-host-07](evidence/security-host-07/result.json); the earlier runs -01/-02
|
||||
and -03/-04 gave the same verdicts):
|
||||
|
||||
| Case | Verdict | Note |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| `TC_SEC_ITSS_SND_GENMSG_01..04, 06..08_BV` | pass | Secured beacons, psid 141, digest/certificate alternation, generationTime, signedData payload |
|
||||
| `TC_SEC_ITSS_SND_GENMSG_05_BV` | **fail** | The testcase compares `validityPeriod.start` (Time32, seconds) with a range built from `v_curTime` in microseconds (pinned `ItsSecurity_TestCases.ttcn` line 7313; unchanged at the upstream master's line 6672), so no IUT passes it. The test purpose's own condition (start <= generation time < start + duration) holds for the logged values. Retained, not tuned; [analysis](evidence/security-host-06/analysis.md) |
|
||||
| `TC_SEC_ITSS_SND_CAM_01..04_BV` | pass | psid 36, headerInfo without expiry/location, signer digest or certificate with appPermissions |
|
||||
| `TC_SEC_ITSS_SND_DENM_01..03_BV` | pass | psid 37, generationLocation present, GBC packet |
|
||||
|
||||
**Receive-side verification (decided 2026-09-14, ACT-025).** `SecurityEntity::
|
||||
decapsulate_packet` now implements IEEE Std 1609.2 clause 5.2 as TS 103 097
|
||||
clause 5.2 requires, built with `VIDF_SECURITY_VERIFY` (default on): the
|
||||
TS 103 097 clause 7.1 structure of the received message (`check_profile`), the
|
||||
signer from the inline certificate or the bounded certificate cache, the
|
||||
upstream `DefaultCertificateValidator` (validity time, ITS-AID permission,
|
||||
anchoring, chain consistency, region through `DefaultLocationChecker`), the
|
||||
certificate signatures up the chain to a provisioned root
|
||||
(`verify_certificate_signature`, IEEE 1609.2 clause 5.3.1: the upstream
|
||||
validator only checked anchoring by issuer digest, so a forged ticket naming a
|
||||
known AA would have passed), the message signature over
|
||||
`calculate_message_hash`, then the generationTime window and replay detection
|
||||
of `VerificationPolicy`. The P2P certificate distribution of clause 7.1.1 is
|
||||
wired both ways: unknown AT/AA digests are requested through the header
|
||||
policy, and an AA carried in `requestedCertificate` is learned once its
|
||||
signature chains to a root. `test_verification` (host and device) covers a
|
||||
valid message with certificate and with digest, the GN-core path with the
|
||||
metadata in BTP-DATA.indication, a tampered signature, an unknown station, an
|
||||
unanchored chain, a forged ticket, a ticket without the ITS-AID, an expired
|
||||
ticket, the time window in both directions, five profile violations and the
|
||||
AA-learning sequence. The verification flow is a port of upstream's
|
||||
`StraightVerifyService::verify(v3)` (that translation unit drags the v2 code
|
||||
in), with the chain check added; `VerificationPolicy` bounds the certificate
|
||||
cache (upstream's is unbounded), the learned AAs and the replay window for the
|
||||
device.
|
||||
|
||||
**Verification cost on the ESP32-C5** (`security-device-06`, PSA Crypto of
|
||||
mbedTLS 4.1.0): a digest-signed message costs 34.6 ms end to end, of which the
|
||||
raw ECDSA P-256 verification is 29.7 ms on the ECDSA peripheral
|
||||
(`CONFIG_MBEDTLS_HARDWARE_ECDSA_VERIFY`); the same build with the peripheral
|
||||
disabled needs 57.6 ms for the raw verification and 62 ms end to end (control
|
||||
run, not retained as evidence). The peripheral is only taken when the PSA
|
||||
operation names the hash (`PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)`); the backend used
|
||||
`PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY` before, which ESP-IDF's driver declines, so this run also
|
||||
removes that software fallback. Roughly 25 to 30 verified messages per second
|
||||
are therefore the C5's budget; the chain signature of a newly seen ticket is
|
||||
verified once and remembered. The host (OpenSSL) verifies in about 0.2 ms.
|
||||
|
||||
**Receiving-side campaign** ([security-host-05](evidence/security-host-05/result.json),
|
||||
[analysis](evidence/security-host-05/analysis.md)): `etsi_security_receive.cfg`
|
||||
selects the 26 compiled `TC_SEC_ITSS_RCV_*` cases inside the SUT's PICS (no
|
||||
implicit certificates, no Brainpool). The test system signs in TTCN-3 with
|
||||
`CERT_TS_A_AT`, or `CERT_TS_B_AT` (5 km circular region around the SUT) as
|
||||
`PX_AT_CERTIFICATE`; the adapter injects the secured GN PDU and reports what
|
||||
the SUT passes up as `UtGnEventInd`. 24 pass (accepting the valid messages,
|
||||
discarding every protocol-version, profile, algorithm, signer and signature
|
||||
violation); `TC_SEC_ITSS_RCV_DENM_01_BV` and `DENM_02_BV_XX` end in `error`
|
||||
because the testcases read NodeB's position from the position table before
|
||||
`f_cf01Up()` fills it (pinned lines 9293/9401, same in the upstream master):
|
||||
a second, IUT-independent ATS defect, retained as recorded. The 99 CERT/GENMSG
|
||||
receiving cases of TS 103 096-2 are commented out in the pinned suite.
|
||||
|
||||
**Chain consistency (2026-09-14, from the independent verifier).** The upstream
|
||||
`DefaultCertificateValidator` reduces permission consistency to "the issuer
|
||||
lists the ITS-AID"; `ChainValidator` now applies IEEE Std 1609.2-2025 clause
|
||||
5.1.2 as TS 103 097 clause 5.2 requires: for every `appPermissions` entry of
|
||||
the signing certificate each ancestor must hold a `PsidGroupPermissions`
|
||||
group whose chain-length window covers the distance to that ancestor
|
||||
(6.4.28: minChainLength/chainLengthRange count the certificates below the
|
||||
ancestor down to the end entity, -1 unbounded, 0 invalid), whose eeType
|
||||
permits an authorization certificate (absent = `{app}`), and whose
|
||||
subjectPermissions cover the PSID (`all` unless another group lists the PSID
|
||||
explicitly) with the SSP inside the range (6.4.30: every 1 bit of
|
||||
`sspBitmask` fixes the subordinate's bit, the SSP may not be longer than the
|
||||
mask nor shorter than its last 1 bit; opaque: an identical entry; an omitted
|
||||
SSP needs `all` or an empty opaque entry); a subordinate CA's own ranges must
|
||||
nest inside its issuer's. A violation is reported as `INCONSISTENT_CHAIN`
|
||||
(TS 102 723-8 Table 27) with `Inconsistent_With_Signer`. `test_chain_consistency` exercises a ticket
|
||||
whose CAM SSP sets bits the AA's mask fixes to zero, a root permitting a chain
|
||||
of length 1 only, and a root group with eeType enrol only, all with valid
|
||||
signatures (873 host checks, 747 on the device). On the device the same three
|
||||
checks appended to `test_verification` failed at first: after that test's
|
||||
stations and a fourth trust configuration the heap was fragmented (largest
|
||||
free block 16 kB), an allocation failure inside `verify()` surfaced through
|
||||
the catch-all as `INCOMPATIBLE_PROTOCOL`, and the frame bytes were identical to
|
||||
the host's; the checks now run as their own test with a fresh heap
|
||||
([security-device-07](evidence/security-device-07/result.json)). The test
|
||||
trust domain and `vidf_test_pool` moved
|
||||
to the EU CCMS CPOC Protocol Release 3.0 root profile at the same time
|
||||
(minChainLength 2, eeType app+enrol, psid 623 01C0/FF3F for end entities plus
|
||||
a second group 013E/FFC1 for authorities; GN-MGMT range `all`; AA
|
||||
appPermissions psid 623 ssp 0130, EA 010E, root CRL 01 and CTL 0138 per
|
||||
TS 102 941 V2.2.1 Tables B.3/B.6). The three security campaigns were rerun on
|
||||
the new pool with identical verdicts ([security-host-08](evidence/security-host-08/result.json)
|
||||
receiving 24/26, [-09](evidence/security-host-09/result.json) GN-MGMT 7/8,
|
||||
[-10](evidence/security-host-10/result.json) CAM/DENM 7/7).
|
||||
|
||||
**Region consistency (2026-09-14, from the twin of the real root).** The
|
||||
upstream `is_within()` decides circles, rectangles and polygons only; an
|
||||
`identifiedRegion` issuer, which the EU CCMS CPOC Protocol Release 3.0 root
|
||||
profile prescribes (clause I.3.9: a root that is not globally valid carries
|
||||
`identifiedRegion`, countryOnly 65535 for the EU as a whole), made every
|
||||
subordinate "outside" and hence every chain under an EU root inconsistent.
|
||||
The upstream region consistency is switched off in the base validator and
|
||||
`ChainValidator` applies IEEE Std 1609.2 clause 6.4.17 itself
|
||||
(`region_within`): no issuer region, anything goes; issuer region but none on
|
||||
the subject, inconsistent; geometric issuer regions by the upstream geometry;
|
||||
identified issuer regions by identifier containment (a country covers its
|
||||
regions and subregions, lists must nest); a geometric subject region under an
|
||||
identified issuer region needs a border database the device does not carry
|
||||
and follows `VerificationPolicy::permissive_identified_region`, as the
|
||||
location check already did. `test_chain_consistency` adds a root with
|
||||
countryOnly 65535, an AA derived from it (`issue_authority`, the derivation
|
||||
`vidf_issue` uses), a ticket with the inherited region (verifies), an AA
|
||||
without region (INCONSISTENT_CHAIN) and a circular ticket region (strict
|
||||
policy: INCONSISTENT_CHAIN, permissive: verifies), as `test_region_consistency`
|
||||
(its own test: at most two stations alive on the device): 873 host checks, 747 on
|
||||
the ESP32-C5.
|
||||
|
||||
**Credentials at run time (2026-09-14, ACT-024).** `credentials.hpp` fixes what
|
||||
a provisioning path hands over: `Credentials` (root and CA certificates as
|
||||
COER, tickets with their private scalars), the `VCR1` bundle encoding,
|
||||
`apply()` into `TrustConfiguration`/`CertificatePool` through the entity's own
|
||||
checks (the first refused item stops it and is reported), the `CredentialStore`
|
||||
interface with `FileCredentialStore` and, on ESP-IDF, `NvsCredentialStore`
|
||||
(`CONFIG_VANETZA_IDF_NVS_CREDENTIALS`, one blob on the `nvs_flash` component;
|
||||
NVS initialisation and encryption are the application's). The split is
|
||||
deliberate: the octet format and the stores are generic to any ESP32 station
|
||||
and live in the component; the transport (serial, wireless, a TS 102 941
|
||||
client) and the policy of when to load or replace credentials are the
|
||||
application's, so the library never reads a bundle on its own. The test
|
||||
application's diagnostic command 9 is such a transport: `serial_sut.py
|
||||
--bundle` and `capture_pcap.py --port --bundle` provision a board before its
|
||||
reset. `test_credentials` (890 host checks, 765 on the device with the NVS
|
||||
round trip) covers the codec, the malformed cases, `apply()` and the stores;
|
||||
[independent-verifier-03](evidence/independent-verifier-03/analysis.md) is the
|
||||
ESP32-C5 signing with a chain it received this way, verified by c-its.
|
||||
|
||||
**Trust lists (2026-09-14, TS 102 941 clause 6.3).** `pki::build_rca_ctl` and
|
||||
`build_crl` produce the RCA's FullCtl (EA/AA/DC entries) and CRL as
|
||||
EtsiTs103097Data-Signed over EtsiTs102941Data with the RCA certificate as the
|
||||
signer, psid 624/622 and the RCA's CTL/CRL appPermissions required;
|
||||
`parse_rca_ctl`/`parse_crl` accept a list only when it verifies as signed by
|
||||
the RCA the station trusts and every EA/AA entry is issued by that RCA with a
|
||||
verifying signature; `apply` turns the entries into trusted issuers and the
|
||||
CRL into revocations by issuer (`TrustConfiguration::revoke`), and the base
|
||||
validator's `chain_is_revoked` walk (now fed with the lookup) rejects any
|
||||
chain link so revoked with `REVOKED_CERTIFICATE`. `test_trust_lists` covers
|
||||
build/parse/apply, a tampered list, a foreign root, an AA not issued by the
|
||||
root, a CRL replacing an earlier one; `test_chain_consistency` the receiver
|
||||
refusing every ticket under a revoked AA and accepting again after the
|
||||
withdrawal (935 host checks, 810 on the device; `test_revocation` is its own test:
|
||||
on the device the sender's first signature after a receiver and three scoped
|
||||
stations existed threw inside the PSA backend with a fragmented heap, the same
|
||||
lesson as `test_chain_consistency`). [trust-lists-01](evidence/trust-lists-01/analysis.md)
|
||||
serves both lists from `tools/local_dc.py` (Annex D GETs, content types) and
|
||||
lets c-its' `download-int-certs` fetch, validate and extract the AA of the
|
||||
twin root; the fetch on the library side is `tools/fetch_trust_lists.py` (the
|
||||
transport stays the application's). The ASN.1 of the lists is compiled from
|
||||
the TS 102 941 V1.3.1 module in the pinned asn1c set; these types are
|
||||
unchanged in V2.2.1.
|
||||
|
||||
**Cryptographic hardware of the ESP32-C5 (2026-09-14).** Used by the PSA
|
||||
backend as configured (`sdkconfig`): the ECDSA peripheral for verification
|
||||
(`CONFIG_MBEDTLS_HARDWARE_ECDSA_VERIFY`), the ECC point-multiplication
|
||||
accelerator for the software ECDSA sign (`CONFIG_MBEDTLS_HARDWARE_ECC`,
|
||||
P-256), the SHA accelerator (`CONFIG_MBEDTLS_HARDWARE_SHA`), the MPI and AES
|
||||
accelerators (`CONFIG_MBEDTLS_HARDWARE_MPI`, `_AES`, the latter for the ECIES
|
||||
AES-CCM of the PKI core). Measured on the board
|
||||
([security-device-09](evidence/security-device-09/result.json)): a raw ECDSA
|
||||
P-256 sign 23.2 ms, one SN-ENCAP (hash, sign, encode) 32.4 ms; a raw verify
|
||||
29.3 ms, one SN-DECAP 35.4 ms (host, OpenSSL: sign 0.11 ms, SN-ENCAP 0.23 ms).
|
||||
Not used: the ECDSA peripheral's signing mode
|
||||
(`CONFIG_MBEDTLS_HARDWARE_ECDSA_SIGN`) takes its private key from an eFuse key
|
||||
block only (purpose ECDSA_KEY: burnt once, never readable), which fits one
|
||||
long-term device key such as the TS 102 941 canonical key but not authorization
|
||||
tickets provisioned at run time; the Key Manager (`SOC_KEY_MANAGER_ECDSA_KEY_DEPLOY`)
|
||||
can deploy a device-bound encrypted key into that peripheral and would give
|
||||
tickets hardware-held keys at a deployment per ticket switch, through
|
||||
ESP-IDF's `esp_key_mgr`/`esp_ecdsa` rather than the PSA path the backend uses;
|
||||
neither is attempted (thesis ACT-030). Keys at rest: NVS/flash encryption, the
|
||||
application's configuration.
|
||||
|
||||
**Independent verifier** ([independent-verifier-01](evidence/independent-verifier-01/analysis.md),
|
||||
[-02](evidence/independent-verifier-02/analysis.md) on a twin of a real EU CCMS L0 root,
|
||||
[-03](evidence/independent-verifier-03/analysis.md) from the ESP32-C5).
|
||||
c-its (an unrelated Rust implementation with its own ASN.1 modules and
|
||||
crypto) verifies the frames the host SUT signs with a lab chain from
|
||||
`vidf_issue`, recorded as an 802.11 pcap by `tools/capture_pcap.py`: message
|
||||
signature, the three certificate signatures, chain lengths, end-entity
|
||||
permissions and the CAM/DENM content against the ticket's SSP all pass
|
||||
(`security_authorized: true` for three CAMs and one DENM). Its first run,
|
||||
against the previous lab profile, is what exposed the chain-length and eeType
|
||||
issues above. Its one disagreement with the standard ticket is its own
|
||||
limitation: it treats an `appPermissions` entry without SSP (psid 141 as the
|
||||
ETSI test-suite tickets carry it) as unsupported, whereas IEEE Std 1609.2
|
||||
makes an omitted SSP consistent with an issuer range `all`.
|
||||
|
||||
**Device heap.** The first device run with security failed in `test_fail_closed`
|
||||
with "OER decoding failed" ([security-device-02](evidence/security-device-02/result.json)).
|
||||
Section markers now print the free heap on the device; the re-run showed 14 kB
|
||||
free when the asn1c copy failed, with five test stations (router, security
|
||||
entity, trust domain each) alive at once, 25-45 kB apiece. The test scopes each
|
||||
scenario now; the library was not changed
|
||||
([security-device-03](evidence/security-device-03/console.txt), 112 kB free at
|
||||
every section). Sizing note for applications: one secured station on the C5
|
||||
test firmware leaves roughly 110 kB of the internal heap.
|
||||
|
||||
**Board recovery.** That failing device run also left the board unflashable
|
||||
("Write timeout" from esptool): the ROM UART0 clock-enable repair described
|
||||
above lived in `run_hil_server()`, which a failed test run never reaches, so
|
||||
the next USB-triggered warm reset hung in ROM. The repair now lives in the
|
||||
component itself (`ports/esp_idf/src/esp32c5_rom_uart_clock.c`, an
|
||||
`ESP_SYSTEM_INIT_FN` kept by an undefined-symbol reference, so every application
|
||||
using the component on an ESP32-C5 gets it before `app_main`); after that build
|
||||
both boards accepted a second esptool `--before default-reset` flash
|
||||
([security-device-05](evidence/security-device-05/result.json), 537 checks).
|
||||
The board that was still running the older image (COM20) had been recovered
|
||||
over JTAG first: OpenOCD halts the core, sets `PCR_UART0_SCLK_EN` before each
|
||||
`program_esp` step and programs the three images
|
||||
([security-device-04](evidence/security-device-04/result.json), `openocd-flash.log`).
|
||||
|
||||
### Independent C5 radio pair: a real bug in an "FCS" check that could never pass
|
||||
|
||||
`radio_pair.py`'s independent two-board radio test (COM20 transmits, COM11
|
||||
receives, over real RF) initially failed on every run with "no exact
|
||||
independent frame with valid FCS observed", even though the frame's actual
|
||||
content — every header field and the full application payload — decoded
|
||||
correctly. Decoding the raw captured bytes by hand (initially mis-modeling
|
||||
`ShbHeader` as a 24-byte `LongPositionVector` with no trailing field, which
|
||||
made 8 bytes look unaccounted for instead of 4) led to the real structure:
|
||||
`vanetza::geonet::ShbHeader` is `LongPositionVector` (24 bytes) **plus a
|
||||
4-byte reserved `DccField`** (`vanetza/geonet/shb_header.hpp`); once that's
|
||||
accounted for, the frame is exactly 102 bytes of correct content plus a
|
||||
4-byte trailer.
|
||||
|
||||
That trailer is not a real FCS. Three separate captures with completely
|
||||
different random payloads all produced the *identical* trailing 4 bytes
|
||||
(`00 00 99 00`) — direct proof the value is not content-derived and can
|
||||
never match a recomputed CRC32, regardless of whether the frame was received
|
||||
correctly. Two independent facts explain why checking it was never
|
||||
necessary in the first place:
|
||||
|
||||
- `vanetza_idf::C5Radio`'s promiscuous filter (`ports/esp_idf/src/c5_radio.cpp`)
|
||||
never sets `WIFI_PROMIS_FILTER_MASK_FCSFAIL` ("Filter the FCS failed
|
||||
packets, do not open it in general" — Espressif's own comment on that
|
||||
flag). Any frame reaching the receive callback at all has already passed
|
||||
a real, hardware-validated FCS check; there is nothing left to verify at
|
||||
the software level.
|
||||
- `rx_ctrl.sig_len` on this chip is documented in `esp_wifi_he_types.h`
|
||||
(this chip's 802.11ax/HE RX descriptor) as "the length of the reception
|
||||
MPDU" — not "MPDU + FCS" as the ESP-IDF documentation for older,
|
||||
non-HE ESP32 chips states, which is what `c5_radio.cpp`'s previous comment
|
||||
was written against.
|
||||
|
||||
Fixed by checking content match only — which is what "the independent
|
||||
receiver correctly received what the DUT transmitted" actually means here —
|
||||
and correcting the comments in `c5_radio.cpp`, `its_g5_frame.hpp` and
|
||||
`radio_pair.py` that assumed the trailing bytes were a real FCS. The
|
||||
trailing bytes are still captured and reported (`result.json`'s
|
||||
`trailing_bytes`) for inspection, just no longer gated on. Verified stable
|
||||
across three consecutive real-RF reruns
|
||||
([evidence](evidence/radio-pair-01/result.json)), each with a fresh random
|
||||
payload and an identical `00 00 99 00` trailer.
|
||||
|
||||
See [campaign instructions](test-campaigns.md) and
|
||||
[interface/capability assessment](interface-assessment.md) for remaining work.
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user