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Keep vanetza-idf in obu-firmware, so a plain clone builds the firmware

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obu-firmware builds against the vanetza-idf C-ITS library, which until now
came from the colleague's microbu-esp32c5 tree beside the repository and was
not tracked here, so a clone of this repository could not build the firmware
it ships. The library alone is now part of obu-firmware, as
obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf: their external/vanetza-idf at commit
cf4b99f, unchanged (9775 files; see its PROVENANCE.md). CMake takes it from
there by default; -DVANETZA_IDF_DIR still points the build elsewhere.

The rest of the colleague's tree (their own VAM firmware, PKI tooling,
station-link Python tools, the V2X2MAP bridge) stays out of this repository
and gitignored; nothing is pushed to their repository. NOTES.md, docs/06,
TODO.md and the pcap verifier's usage line point at the new location.
This commit is contained in:
Ashin Walpola
2026-09-24 10:56:05 +02:00
parent 2f60623e18
commit d107534eb2
9781 changed files with 1560475 additions and 17 deletions
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obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf/docs/idf/evidence/security-host-03/analysis.md
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# security-host-03: AtsSecurity, GN-MGMT profile (sending side)
Campaign (re-run of security-host-01 with the 2026-09-14 sources: p2pcd accessor patch, ITS time helper in the adapter and pool tool): `ports/esp_idf/tests/etsi_security_gn.cfg` (8 cases), host SUT
`vidf_sut --security-pool ./certificates` (native Linux build,
`VIDF_SECURITY=ON`), pool generated by `vidf_test_pool` (hashes in
`result.json`, `pool_sha256`). The adapter enforces the framework's own
verification of every IUT transmission (`enable_security_checks=1`, see
`test.cfg`); a PASS therefore covers a signature the framework verified against
`CERT_IUT_A_AT` from the pool, not only the message structure.
| Case | Verdict | Cause |
| --- | --- | --- |
| TC_SEC_ITSS_SND_GENMSG_01..04, 06..08 | pass | secured beacons (psid 141), TS 103 097 clause 7.1.3 profile |
| TC_SEC_ITSS_SND_GENMSG_05_BV | **fail** | ATS implementation defect, IUT-independent (below) |
## TC_SEC_ITSS_SND_GENMSG_05_BV
The testcase (pinned `ItsSecurity_TestCases.ttcn` line 7313) compares the
signer certificate's `validityPeriod.start` (a `Time32`, seconds since
2004-01-01) against a range built from `v_curTime` in **microseconds**:
```
match(v_signerIdentifier.certificate[0].toBeSigned.validityPeriod.start_,
Time32:(v_curTime - c_timeLimit / 1000000 .. v_curTime + c_timeLimit / 1000000))
```
Only `c_timeLimit` is scaled to seconds; `v_curTime` (`f_getCurrentTime() *
1000`) is not. Values from the MTC log of this run:
| Quantity | Value | Unit |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `v_curTime` | 716425780437000 | µs |
| range checked | 716425780436700 .. 716425780437300 | (µs magnitude) |
| `validityPeriod.start_` | 716425702 | s |
| `generationTime` | 716425785435539 | µs (= 716425785 s) |
| `duration` | 24 | hours |
No `Time32` can fall into a range of that magnitude, so the branch fails for
every IUT. The test purpose quoted in the testcase header (TS 103 096-2:
`X_START_VALIDITY <= GEN_TIME` and `duration > GEN_TIME - X_START_VALIDITY`)
holds for the observed values: 716425702 s <= 716425785 s and the difference
(83 s) is below 24 h. The current upstream head of the Security ATS
(`forge.etsi.org/rep/ITS/ttcn/ats_sec_ts103096-3`, branch `master`, line 6672)
carries the same expression. The verdict is retained as recorded; the testcase
was not modified.
## Time base note
The framework's `base_time` derives ITS time from UTC without the five leap
seconds inserted since 2004; the SUT clock driven by the adapter is TAI-based
(IEEE 1609.2 `Time64`), hence the constant 5 s offset visible in the
`generation time check` lines of `console.txt` (well inside the 30 s window the
framework applies and the 5 min window of the testcases).