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Author SHA1 Message Date
Ashin Walpola d3fc9bf66c Add a block diagram of the signed-ITS architecture 
docs/Architecture-signed-its.drawio (with a PNG export beside it, like
Architecture2): PKI (today's demo chain, and dashed the future EU C-ITS path
with the lab's registered root), the phone app's transmit and receive path,
the USB-C and BLE links with their heartbeats, the ESP32-C5 firmware (link
endpoints, session, signing through vanetza-idf with the key in NVS, the
unsigned geonet.c path, radio and raw receive), the ITS-G5 air and the bench
receivers (V2X2MAP with signature check, CiT One, RSU, sim car), and a legend
of the station-link messages and recovery behaviour.
 2026-09-24 10:56:16 +02:00
Ashin Walpola 6e4d293c3a Flashing notes: first flash of the signed firmware, and the way back 
FLASHING.md still described flashing as for the previous firmware. The port
changed the partition table (NVS 24 KB -> 80 KB, app 0x10000 -> 0x20000), so a
board coming from the previous firmware needs its NVS range erased once and a
full flash, not app-flash; without the erase the BLE bond cannot be stored and
the phone pairs on every connection. Documented that, what the boot log and
the app show afterwards (credentials provisioned on first Connect, stale phone
pairings to forget), both ways back to the previous firmware (the backup image,
or commit 7285fa1 built with IDF 6.1), the production board's port (COM3,
UART bridge), the station-link names in the phone and bring-up sections, and
that the build is self-contained with obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf.
 2026-09-24 10:56:16 +02:00
Ashin Walpola d107534eb2 Keep vanetza-idf in obu-firmware, so a plain clone builds the firmware 
obu-firmware builds against the vanetza-idf C-ITS library, which until now
came from the colleague's microbu-esp32c5 tree beside the repository and was
not tracked here, so a clone of this repository could not build the firmware
it ships. The library alone is now part of obu-firmware, as
obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf: their external/vanetza-idf at commit
cf4b99f, unchanged (9775 files; see its PROVENANCE.md). CMake takes it from
there by default; -DVANETZA_IDF_DIR still points the build elsewhere.

The rest of the colleague's tree (their own VAM firmware, PKI tooling,
station-link Python tools, the V2X2MAP bridge) stays out of this repository
and gitignored; nothing is pushed to their repository. NOTES.md, docs/06,
TODO.md and the pcap verifier's usage line point at the new location.
 2026-09-24 10:56:05 +02:00
Ashin Walpola 2f60623e18 Document the signed-ITS/VAM/BLE work and how it was verified 
docs/06-signed-its-vam-ble.md: who does what between phone and ESP32-C5
(signing lives on the board), the link protocol, recovery paths (USB
heartbeat watchdog, BLE supervision timeout and auto-reconnect, board-reset
reconfiguration, app restart), the demo PKI, and what is still open.

obu-firmware/test/verify_signed_pcap.py checks the IEEE 1609.2 signatures in
a pcap with asn1tools and OpenSSL, independent of the firmware. On a capture
of the CAM pinger (2026-09-23) all 12 signed CAMs verify under the demo
ticket, whose chain verifies too. The CiT One receives the same CAMs but its
MQTT interface exposes no security information, so it cannot confirm the
signature itself. The V2X2MAP bridge on COM10 now verifies against the demo
chain as well (change in the colleague's repository); signed CAMs and VAMs
show as verified.

TODO.md: bench checks confirmed so far ticked; open are BLE/ITS-G5
coexistence, time_regression over a longer stationary run, and board reset
recovery over BLE.
 2026-09-23 17:28:14 +02:00
Ashin Walpola a08494b56a Drive the ESP32-C5 station over USB or BLE, send CAM or VAM, signed or not 
The app now speaks the station-link protocol of the new obu-firmware.
Esp32Link picks the transport from Settings (UsbSerialTransport or the new
BleLinkTransport), tells the previous firmware from the new one by its
heartbeat, and runs the session: STATION_CONFIGURE with the current pseudonym
MAC (which also starts the board's radio), CREDENTIALS_PROVISION of the
bundled demo chain when the board has no ticket, then per message a
POTI_UPDATE and a BTP_DATA_REQUEST. Received messages still arrive as
V2X_RX frames, so the receive side is unchanged. A board on the previous
firmware keeps working for CAM over USB.

Settings > Connection > ESP32-C5: link USB-C or Bluetooth, transmit CAM or
VAM, "Sign outgoing messages" (on by default). The connection card, top bar
and dashboard show the link in use, the pairing passkey and signing counters.

- VAM: VamUperCodec (TS 103 300-3 V2.3.1, bytes checked against asn1tools)
  and VamGenerationRules (clause 6.4, Tables 16/17).
- BLE: the firmware's GATT layout (service 0000C175-...), MTU 517, pairing
  and encryption settled before any other operation (short timeouts during
  pairing made it loop), backoff between attempts, reasons on the card.
- Clock: a PoTi goes to the board once per new fix and never moves the
  board's clock backwards except for a real correction (>= 60 s); stale and
  wobbling fix times made the board answer time_regression and restart its
  stack every few seconds. GnssTimeSource keeps the last measured phone-clock
  error while GNSS time drops out indoors: the bench phone is 14 minutes fast,
  and falling back to it made every transmitted timestamp jump by that much.
- assets/demo-chain.vcr: throwaway, not EU-registered demo chain generated
  2026-09-23 (AT B80B49387A4C12EB, psid 36 and 638). Its private key ships
  with the app on purpose; receivers verifying against the EU trust list
  drop what it signs.
- Bluetooth permissions requested at start-up on Android 12+.

StationLinkTest pins the codec to bytes from the colleague's Python
implementation (microbu_link/messages.py). 103 unit tests pass.
 2026-09-23 17:28:05 +02:00
Ashin Walpola d2fd222a62 Sign ITS messages on the ESP32-C5 with vanetza-idf, over USB or BLE 
obu-firmware is now a port of the colleague's standalone VRU station
(microbu-esp32c5/firmware, kept beside this repository and gitignored): the
vanetza-idf C-ITS stack with the TS 103 097 security entity, credentials in
NVS, the station-link v1 protocol over the native USB port (frame type 0x10
in the existing 0xAA55 framing) and over a BLE GATT peripheral, and its
ITS-G5 radio adapter. The phone still builds CAM and VAM; the board adds
GeoNetworking/BTP and signs with the provisioned authorization ticket. The
private key never leaves the board. Builds with ESP-IDF 6.0.2 only, which
vanetza-idf pins for the radio's private driver ABI. The previous C firmware
stays on disk unbuilt; a full-flash backup of the bench board is kept in
firmware-backups/ (gitignored).

Changed against the colleague's firmware, marked MicrOBU: in the sources:
- Reception unchanged for the app. vanetza-idf drops what it cannot verify
  (unsigned traffic, every RSU), so each captured frame also goes through the
  previous gn_unwrap.c and reaches the phone as link opcode V2X_RX (0x85),
  whose body is the old SERIAL_MSG_V2X_RX payload.
- Unsigned transmission still possible, with the previous geonet.c header;
  the phone chooses per message.
- Console on UART0 (CH343 port); the native USB port carries only link frames.
- BLE advertising pauses while the USB link is in use: BLE and ITS-G5 share
  one RF front end.
- NVS 80 KB (app at 0x20000). At 24 KB, with Wi-Fi settings the previous
  firmware left behind, the BLE bond could not be stored and the phone had to
  pair on every connection.
- Bench fixes: the radio queue is drained before the first PoTi (no RX and
  ~177 queue drops before); the station loop waited pdMS_TO_TICKS(5) = 0
  ticks at 100 Hz and starved the idle task; the 2.4 KB RX capture buffer is
  off the Wi-Fi task stack; BLE notifications longer than the MTU are dropped
  instead of cut short, MTU 517; serial writes are skipped with no USB host.
- Manual country policy and TX-power read-back from the previous radio setup;
  logs for BLE encryption changes and the number of stored bonds.

Verified on the bench board (COM3) with the phone over USB and BLE: CAM and
VAM, signed and unsigned, go out; reception of the sim car and the RSU's
CAM/SPATEM/MAPEM continues; the board survives app restarts and reconnects.
See docs/06-signed-its-vam-ble.md.
 2026-09-23 17:27:54 +02:00
Ashin Walpola 7285fa19b7 Count and surface RX-queue drops on the ESP32-C5's promiscuous path 
wifi_promisc_rx_cb() fed s_rx_queue with a 0-timeout xQueueSend() and never
checked whether it succeeded, so a burst of captured frames arriving faster
than rx_forward_task could drain them vanished with no counter anywhere -
none of oversizeDrops/txFailures/rxCrcErrors caught it. Added a rxQueueDrops
counter, threaded it through the STATUS heartbeat as a new trailing uint16
(old firmware/app on either side still parse fine), and surfaced it on the
CAM Pinger card.

Confirmed on the bench: flashed to the production OBU (COM3) and installed
the matching app build on the phone, then watched the counter over logcat
against obu-cam-transmistter's ~3.3 Hz beacon - it is real (0 -> 89 -> 90
across two sessions) but bursty around connect/reconnect rather than a
continuous overflow under steady single-station traffic.
 2026-09-22 14:45:17 +02:00
Ashin Walpola 21e01499d8 Drive the bench CAM beacon round a street loop in St. Georg 
The bench transmitter sent a parked car: one fixed position, speed 0,
no heading, a CAM every second. It now simulates a car driving a loop
through six waypoints around Berliner Tor on the real streets, which
makes it a moving target for the app's map and the use case detection
without taking a car out.

The route is generated, not hand-traced. tools/make_route.py asks the
OSRM demo server for a driving route through the waypoints and back to
the first, thins the 371 street points to 103 (none more than 1.5 m off
the line), and writes main/route_points.h. It also saves OSRM's answer
(--offline rebuilds from it) and a map page to check the route before
flashing. Each waypoint is sent with the direction towards the next one:
without it, points on divided roads such as Beim Strohhause snapped to
the opposite carriageway and the loop came out at 8.4 km of U-turns.
With it the loop is 5.2 km, still including two turn-round detours
that OSRM needs to reach the waypoints legally (Borgfelder Strasse /
Anckelmannsplatz, and Nagelsweg / Norderstrasse / Repsoldstrasse).
Route data (c) OpenStreetMap contributors, ODbL.

main/route.c moves the car along the points. It cruises at 50 km/h and
limits each bend to the speed that keeps sideways acceleration at
2 m/s^2, so a junction turn is taken at about 15 km/h and a gentle curve
barely slows it; braking (2 m/s^2) and acceleration (1.5 m/s^2) are
planned across as many points as a bend needs. A simulated lap on the
host is 5.16 km in 7.7 min, averaging 40 km/h.

CAMs now follow the EN 302 637-2 generation rules instead of a fixed
1 Hz: checked every 100 ms, sent on a heading change over 4 degrees, a
move over 4 m, a speed change over 0.5 m/s, or after 1 s - about 3 Hz
at 50 km/h. generationDeltaTime is milliseconds since boot. The
GeoNetworking source position vector now carries the same speed and
heading as the CAM instead of zeros.

NOTES.md gains build and flash steps (including reading a board's app
descriptor first, since both firmwares name their image
obu_firmware.bin) and a section on the simulated drive. The pointer to
docs/04-transmit-setup.md is corrected: that file is not in the repo.

Flashed to the COM8 board and checked on its console: it starts driving
on power-up and sends CAMs with changing position, speed and heading.
Not yet received over the air.
 2026-09-16 14:21:44 +02:00
Ashin Walpola 01204a2c22 Give the V2X live map its own screen, and a traffic light per SPATEM 
The map was a third view mode inside the V2X Monitor's topic pane, below
the use case alert panel and the DENM/CAM TX cards. On a phone that left
it about a third of the display tall, which is not enough to see where
anything is relative to anything else - the one thing a map is for. It
is now its own destination, V2xMapScreen on route v2x_map, reached from
a map button in that screen's header. The button sits in the header
rather than the view-mode row so it is also reachable from the message
detail pane and does not move as the available modes change with the
selected hardware. The status bar and bottom nav are hidden on this
route; the screen carries its own floating back button, and system back
still works. Both hardware paths get the same screen: everything drawn
comes from CamUseCaseRepository, which already merges the CiT One's MQTT
feed and the ESP32-C5's serial feed into one set of flows.

With the map gone from the toggle row, the row offers a single choice on
the ESP32-C5 path - there is no broker there and `topics` is always
empty - so it is hidden entirely in that mode.

SPATEM markers. Hazards already drew as a warning triangle; signalised
intersections did not draw at all. They now draw as a traffic light with
one lamp lit. Two things are worth knowing, because neither is forced by
the data:

- SPATEM carries signal state but no geometry, which is MAPEM's job and
  MAPEM is not decoded. The only position available is the sending RSU's
  own CAM, so the light is drawn there, and that RSU is drawn once - as
  the light, not as a CAM pin with a light on top of it. An intersection
  whose sender has not been heard over CAM cannot be placed; the map
  says how many rather than dropping them silently.
- Which lamp lights follows the rule DashboardScreen's SignalCard
  already uses, the signal group changing soonest speaking for the
  intersection, so the same intersection reads the same way in both
  places instead of inventing a second convention.

Four drawables rather than one tinted at runtime: setTint recolours
every path in a vector, so a single shared asset would turn the whole
light one flat colour and stop it reading as a traffic light.

Marker reuse. Every incoming message recomposes the map, and the update
block cleared the overlay list and rebuilt every Marker, decoding and
mutating a fresh Drawable per marker - at up to 10 Hz per station. It
also called animateTo(own) on every update, restarting the pan animation
before it could finish. Drawables are now loaded once per alert level
and phase and shared (osmdroid sets the icon's bounds on each draw, so
one instance across markers is safe), Markers are cached by key, and the
overlay list is only reordered, which moves references without
allocating. Following uses setCenter, keeping animateTo for the one move
worth seeing: the rider asking for follow back.

Follow-own now hands over to the rider on the first touch and returns
via the location button, which lights up while following. Before this
the map could not be panned at all while traffic was flowing, since the
next CAM dragged the viewport back.

Also on the map view: tiles scaled to DPI, the floating +/- buttons off
(they sit where the thumb lands and duplicate pinch), a zoom range, and
more tile threads so a pan that exposes a screenful of new tiles is not
served two at a time.

Compiles and the unit tests pass. None of it has been seen with live
traffic; TODO.md lists the on-device checks under "Waiting on hardware",
including which of the HAW RSUs send CAM alongside SPATEM.
 2026-09-15 17:23:01 +02:00
9861 changed files with 1575444 additions and 1374 deletions
Expand all files Collapse all files
.gitignore
+17
View File
@@ -46,3 +46,20 @@ sdkconfig.old
# Office lock files. Word/Excel create these beside a document while it is open # Office lock files. Word/Excel create these beside a document while it is open
# and remove them on close, so they are transient and machine-local. # and remove them on close, so they are transient and machine-local.
~$* ~$*
# Full-flash images read back off the bench boards before reflashing them (16 MB each).
# Restore with: esptool --chip esp32c5 -p COM<N> write-flash 0 <image>
/firmware-backups/
# ESP-IDF component manager downloads (espressif/esp-boost for obu-firmware's vanetza-idf), ~125 MB.
# dependencies.lock beside the project pins them and is committed; this is its cache.
managed_components/
# The colleague's standalone ESP32-C5 VRU station (its own repository, HAW GitLab
# urban-mobility-lab/microbu/microbu-esp32c5). Kept beside the project on the lab laptop, for
# reference and because the V2X2MAP bridge runs from its tools/, but not part of this repository:
# obu-firmware only needs its vanetza-idf, which is copied to obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf.
/microbu-esp32c5/
# draw.io keeps a backup beside an open diagram.
*.drawio.bkp
TODO.md
+262
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@@ -5,6 +5,195 @@ Engineering to-do list. The reviewer-facing open items live in
## Waiting on hardware ## Waiting on hardware
### Signed-TX firmware (vanetza-idf port), VAM and BLE: first on-air checks (added 2026-09-23)
obu-firmware is now a port of the colleague's `microbu-esp32c5` station (vanetza-idf, TS 103 097
signing, station-link protocol, BLE GATT), built with **ESP-IDF 6.0.2**. See `obu-firmware/NOTES.md`.
The previous firmware is backed up in `firmware-backups/` (restore command in its README.txt).
The app speaks the new protocol over USB or BLE and still falls back to the old frames against the
old firmware.
Done without hardware: IDF 6.0.2 build clean (39 % app partition free); host suite (`make` in
`obu-firmware/test/host`) passes unchanged; app unit tests 103/103, including the VAM encoder
against asn1tools, the station-link codec against the colleague's Python `messages.py`, and the VAM
generation rules. Flashed to **COM3** 2026-09-23 (hash verified); boot log: IDF v6.0.2,
`BLE advertising started as 'micrOBU-4AFA'`, station task ready. The radio stays off until the app
configures the station. New app build installed on the Pixel 9 Pro (adb, `install -r`).
First phone session (user, 2026-09-23): BLE works and CAMs go out. Three faults, fixed and
reflashed/reinstalled the same day:
1. No RX until the CAM pinger ran, with ~177 RX-queue drops: the colleague's `Station::tick()`
returned before draining the radio until the first PoTi had set the clock. Now drained always.
2. "refused a request: time_regression": the loops re-send the latest fix every tick; a stale fix
timestamp read as the clock going back > 1 s, and each time the board rebuilt its stack.
`Esp32Link` now sends a PoTi only for a newer fix (or a >= 60 s real clock correction).
3. BLE reconnect loop: GATT operations with a 5 s timeout ran during Android's pairing, cut it off
and restarted it on every attempt. Encryption/pairing is now settled first (60 s), retries back
off to 30 s, and every failure reason is logged and shown; the board logs encryption changes.
Second session (user, 2026-09-23): USB, RX and signing work; BLE still prompted every time and
never connected; time_regression every ~8 s. Found and fixed, reflashed (full flash, NVS erased):
4. The board never stored a bond: NVS (24 KB, the colleague's 4 MB-board layout) was full, mostly
Wi-Fi settings the previous firmware left behind, and NimBLE's bond write failed. NVS is now
80 KB (app moved to 0x20000) and was erased; boot logs `N bonded phone(s) in NVS`.
5. The station loop waited `pdMS_TO_TICKS(5)` = 0 ticks at 100 Hz, so it spun on the single core
(task watchdog: IDLE starved). Now waits at least one tick.
6. The phone clock is ~14 min fast; GnssTimeSource fell back to it whenever GNSS time blinked out
indoors, so every transmitted timestamp (CAM generationDeltaTime too) jumped 14 min back and
forth. It now keeps the last measured error.
Watch COM3 (`idf.py -p COM3 monitor`, or `readlog.py`-style with DTR/RTS low) during these; it only
resets the board, the phone is on the other port.
- [x] **USB session.** Settings > Connection > ESP32-C5: link USB-C, transmit CAM, signing on.
Phone on the native port, Connect. Expected: the card shows "Provisioning the demo credentials"
once, then Connected and `Signing on · tickets 1 · signed N` with N rising while recording.
COM3: `radio on channel 180, transmit and receive`, `tx power: … dBm`,
`credentials provisioned: 1 roots, 1 authorities, 1 tickets`, and no `radio refused a frame`.
Confirmed by the user 2026-09-23: connects, signing works.
- [x] **Reception intact.** Same session, sim car (COM8) beaconing: its CAMs (station 195936478) on
the V2X map at ~3 Hz as before. Then put a DENM and a SPATEM on air: both show up (they come
through the raw V2X_RX path; the vanetza stack drops them because they are not demo-signed).
Confirmed 2026-09-23: sim car and the RSU's CAM/SPATEM/MAPEM arrive; DENM not yet re-tested.
- [x] **Signed CAM on air** (2026-09-23, CAM pinger over BLE, signing on). Recorded 25 s through
the V2X2MAP bridge's `/api/record` (`micrOBU_workspace/v2x-obu-esp32c5/signed-cam-check.pcap`)
and checked with the new `obu-firmware/test/verify_signed_pcap.py` (asn1tools + OpenSSL, no
vanetza code): 12/12 secured CAMs, station 999999, psid 36, signer = full certificate of the
demo AT `B80B49387A4C12EB`, **all signatures valid**, COER canonical, and the bundle's chain
(AT <- AA <- root) verifies. The CiT One (192.168.40.201) also receives them (~1 Hz on
`v2x/rx/cam`), i.e. a third-party stack unwraps our 1609.2 envelope; its MQTT API exposes no
security fields, and it forwards unsigned and unknown-root messages alike, so it cannot say
whether it verified them. The same capture showed generationTime wobbling by seconds, with
`time_regression` still firing: fixed in Esp32Link (the PoTi never moves the micrOBU's clock
back except for a >= 60 s correction). Re-check: no "restarted its stack" lines in logcat.
- [x] **Unsigned toggle.** Signing off: the same capture shows next header 1 (common header), as
the previous firmware sent. The card's `signed` count stops rising.
Confirmed 2026-09-23: unsigned pinger CAMs show on V2X2MAP as unsigned.
- [x] **Signed VAM on V2X2MAP.** Since 2026-09-23 17:16 the COM10 bridge is the colleague's
v2x2map-0.3.0 from source with a new `verify.py` and `--trust demo-chain.vcr` (launcher:
`micrOBU_workspace/v2x-obu-esp32c5/start-v2x2map-signed.bat`, replacing its-g5-bridge.exe).
Signed CAMs from the pinger already show "signature verified" live. Switch to VAM with signing
on: the VAM must be decoded (cyclist, position) and show "signature verified" too.
Confirmed by the user 2026-09-23: signed VAMs decode and verify.
- [x] **VAM.** Transmit VAM: BTP port 2018, psid 638; with `tools/wireshark/psid-vru.lua` from the colleague's microbu-esp32c5 repository
Wireshark decodes the VAM (stationType cyclist, bicyclist profile in every ~2 s VAM). Rate:
≥1 per 5 s standing still, about one per GNSS fix while riding.
Covered by the V2X2MAP check above (decoded VAM, psid 638); Wireshark not needed.
- [x] **RX without recording.** Connect only (no recording, no pinger): sim-car CAMs appear and
the RX-queue drop counter stays at 0 or near it.
Confirmed 2026-09-23: messages come in on connect alone.
- [ ] **No time_regression.** Record for a few minutes standing still indoors: no "refused" line on
the card, and COM3 never logs `ITS time moved back`.
- [x] **BLE after the NVS fix.** First forget micrOBU-4AFA in Android's Bluetooth settings (the
phone still holds the bond the board lost). Then Connect, passkey 123456 once; a second
Connect after an app restart must not prompt again, and COM3's next boot must say
`1 bonded phone(s) in NVS`.
Confirmed 2026-09-23: pairs once, reconnects after an app restart.
- [x] **BLE.** Link Bluetooth, unplug USB, Connect. Android asks to pair with micrOBU-4AFA:
passkey 123456. Expected: Connected, CAMs keep going, sim-car CAMs keep arriving.
While USB is plugged in and in use, the phone's BLE scan must not see micrOBU-4AFA
(COM3: `USB link in use: BLE advertising paused`). If it loops again, the card now says why;
"refused this phone's stored pairing" means forget micrOBU-4AFA in Android and pair again.
COM3 shows `encryption change status=...` for the board's side.
Confirmed 2026-09-23: CAMs and VAMs out, reception in, over BLE.
- [ ] **BLE/ITS-G5 coexistence (the unmeasured risk from the hardware review).** With BLE
connected, count the sim car's CAMs received per minute and ours at the sniffer; compare
with the same over USB. A clear drop, or reception stopping altogether, means the coex
arbiter takes the radio off 5900 MHz (our channel is set behind the driver's back with
`phy_change_channel`). Then BLE cannot be used while receiving, or needs a longer connection
interval.
- [ ] **Board reset recovery over BLE.** Press RST mid-session: the app reconnects by itself and
reconfigures on the first STATUS saying `not configured`, with no manual Connect. (Over USB a
reset re-enumerates the port and needs a manual Connect, as before.)
### Confirm the RX queue drop counter explains the bench-session frame drops / map flicker (added 2026-09-22)
Investigated the user's report of "OBU mode keeps dropping a few frames" and "v2x screen comes
and goes" while bench-testing against `obu-cam-transmistter`. Found a real, previously invisible
drop path: `obu-firmware/main/main.c`'s `wifi_promisc_rx_cb()` calls `xQueueSend(s_rx_queue, ...,
0)` (queue depth 8) without checking the return value, so a burst of promiscuously-captured
frames arriving faster than `rx_forward_task` can drain them (each drain can legitimately block up
to ~400ms under USB/UART contention) silently vanishes. None of the existing `EspLinkStatus`
counters (`oversizeDrops`/`txFailures`/`rxCrcErrors`) caught this class of drop.
This plausibly also explains the map symptom: `UseCaseDetectionEngine.pruneStale()` drops a remote
station's marker after `staleRemoteMs` (3 s) with no CAM update. Measured 2026-09-22 via
`tools/cit_one_rx_watch.py --host 192.168.40.201` against `obu-cam-transmistter`'s bench beacon
(stationID 195936478 / 0x0BADC0DE): **75 CAMs in 25 s, ~3 Hz**, not the 1 Hz this note assumed
earlier — faster than assumed means more promiscuous captures per second and a shorter fuse on
`staleRemoteMs`, both of which make the queue-overflow theory more likely, not less.
Fixed to be **visible**, not yet fixed to **not drop**: added a `rxQueueDrops` counter, checked
`xQueueSend`'s return value (`main.c`), wired it through the STATUS heartbeat as a new trailing
`uint16` field (`serial_link.c/.h`, `SerialFrame.kt`'s `EspLinkStatus`), and surfaced it on the
CAM Pinger card (`MqttTopicViewerScreen.kt`, string `mqtt_cam_pinger_fw_counters`). Host build
untouched (serial_link.c/main.c aren't in the host test's standard-headers-only set); IDF build
verification is the remaining pre-flash check. Deliberately did NOT bump `s_rx_queue`'s depth from
8 — no real burst-size data yet, and guessing a bigger number against an unmeasured memory budget
is exactly the kind of assumption [[microbu-hw-review]] flags as needing verification first, not
capacity that's cheap to reason your way into.
Needs: a phone attached to the production OBU's native USB port, watching the CAM Pinger card,
while `obu-cam-transmistter` (or real traffic) beacons.
- [x] `idf.py build` succeeds (obu-firmware, IDF 6.1) — clean, both changed files compiled with no
warnings, 17% flash free.
- [x] Reflashed the production OBU on **COM3** 2026-09-22 (hash verified). Boot log confirms the
new build (`21e0149-dirty`, compiled Sep 22 2026 14:14:09), clean boot, OCB @ 5900 MHz
TX/RX armed, `serial_link up ... 1 Hz heartbeat`, no panic. Incidentally answers part of the
"measure the OBU's actual transmit power" item below: this boot logged
`tx power: 72 quarter-dBm = 18.00 dBm (20.00 requested)` — the driver **is** clamping below
the requested 20 dBm at 5900 MHz, as that item suspected but had not measured.
- [x] 25 s of steady-state console (no phone attached, `obu-cam-transmistter` beaconing nearby):
silent — no crash, no `oversize`/`rx queue full`/`crc` warnings. Inconclusive on its own
(successful forwards aren't logged, and nothing was attached to trigger the ~400 ms UART
stalls the theory needs), but at least rules out a crash-on-boot regression.
- [x] Confirmed the wider bench RF path independently via the CiT One OBU broker
(`py -3.11 tools/cit_one_rx_watch.py --host 192.168.40.201`): heard `obu-cam-transmistter`'s
beacon cleanly, 75/25 s, GN source `14:00:02:00:00:00:00:01`, position in the expected
St. Georg route area. This is a *different* receiver from the production OBU though — it
shows the beacon is genuinely on air, not that COM3 forwards every one of it without drops.
- [x] **Confirmed on real hardware, 2026-09-22.** Installed the updated debug APK (previous build
on the phone was from 2026-09-15, predating this fix entirely) on the Pixel 9 Pro (adb over
Wi-Fi), relaunched against the freshly-reflashed COM3, and read `rx queue drop` via `adb
logcat -s UsbSerialTransport`. The counter mechanism works end-to-end and **the bug is
real**: `rxQueueDrops` was 0 at the last flash (14:22), read as 89 at first reconnect
(14:48, ~26 min later), and 90 at a second reconnect (14:52). No `oversizeDrops`,
`txFailures`, or `rxCrcErrors` moved at all, and zero `decode FAILED` lines — this queue is
the only place frames are going missing.
Nuance: over a clean ~4.5 min window in between (14:48→14:52) with `obu-cam-transmistter`
actively beaconing at a measured **~3.33 Hz** (matches the CiT One's 75/25 s independently)
and 490+ CAMs decoding cleanly with steady cadence and no gaps, the counter did **not**
move — it only ticked at connect/reconnect moments. So this is a low-rate, bursty drop (matches
the user's own "a few frames" framing), not a continuous overflow under steady single-station
traffic; it may be specific to WiFi/PHY activity around association or reconnect rather than
raw beacon rate. Worth a longer, quieter-boot capture before sizing a `s_rx_queue` bump.
Did **not** independently confirm the map-flicker connection this session — that needs eyes
on the app's V2X screen while watching this same counter live, not just logcat.
### On-device check of the full-screen V2X live map (added 2026-09-15)
The live map moved out of the V2X Monitor's view-mode row into its own full-screen destination
(`V2xMapScreen`, route `v2x_map`), reached from the map button in that screen's header. Markers are
now cached and reused across updates instead of being rebuilt on every incoming message, and
SPATEM intersections are drawn as traffic lights at the position of the RSU's own CAM. All of that
compiles and the unit tests pass, but none of it has been seen with live traffic.
Needs: the phone with the app, plus a CAM/DENM/SPATEM source - either the CiT One, or the OBU
ESP32-C5 with a second board or a real RSU transmitting.
- [ ] Both hardware modes: tap the map button, confirm the map fills the screen (no status bar, no
bottom nav) and the back button returns to the V2X Monitor.
- [ ] Panning stays smooth while CAMs are arriving - this is what the marker reuse is for. Compare
against the old behaviour if it still judders.
- [ ] Touching the map stops it recentring; the location FAB resumes follow and lights up.
- [ ] A DENM shows the warning triangle, and a SPATEM intersection shows a traffic light with the
lamp matching the Dashboard's SignalCard for the same intersection.
- [ ] Near a real RSU: confirm the RSU is drawn once, as a traffic light, not as a CAM pin with a
light on top of it. If the RSU sends SPATEM but no CAM, the "signals not shown" note should
appear instead - worth knowing which of the two the HAW RSUs actually do.
### Over-the-air check of the GN lifetime fix (added 2026-09-11) ### Over-the-air check of the GN lifetime fix (added 2026-09-11)
`geonet.c` now writes GN lifetime `0x05` (1 s) instead of `0x83`, which decoded to 3200 s. Changed `geonet.c` now writes GN lifetime `0x05` (1 s) instead of `0x83`, which decoded to 3200 s. Changed
@@ -28,6 +217,27 @@ Partial check possible with one board and no phone: flash it, `idf.py -p COMx mo
for `OCB @ 5900 MHz - TX/RX armed`. That proves the new build boots and brings the radio up, not for `OCB @ 5900 MHz - TX/RX armed`. That proves the new build boots and brings the radio up, not
that it transmits correctly. that it transmits correctly.
### Measure the OBU's actual transmit power (added 2026-09-14)
Nothing in this project has ever measured it. `main.c` asks for 20 dBm
(`esp_wifi_set_max_tx_power(80)`, 0.25 dBm units) and the build's ceiling is the same
(`CONFIG_ESP_PHY_MAX_TX_POWER=20`), but a request is a ceiling, not a guarantee: the driver clamps
it to its own calibrated table, and 5900 MHz is above the range this chip is rated for, so the
table actually in use is channel 177's. The firmware now reads the value back and logs it at boot,
which records what the driver admits to, not what leaves the antenna.
- [ ] Flash and `idf.py -p COM3 monitor`, then note the `tx power:` line. A value below 80 means
the driver clamped the request, which the code alone cannot tell you.
- [ ] Relative check with the second ESP32-C5 on `its-g5-receiver-firmware`: capture at a measured
distance in a straight line, read the RSSI the receive path already reports, and record
distance and RSSI together. This gives a comparable number between builds and antennas,
which is what matters for range work, without any lab equipment.
- [ ] Only a spectrum analyser or a calibrated reference receiver gives real radiated power. Worth
it only if the range result looks wrong, or if the thesis needs an absolute figure.
For context: ETSI allows up to 33 dBm EIRP on the ITS band, and production OBUs sit around
20 to 23 dBm, so the requested figure is in the right region if the PA really keys it there.
### obu-cam-transmistter yawRateConfidence fix (added 2026-09-11) ### obu-cam-transmistter yawRateConfidence fix (added 2026-09-11)
Its `cam.c` (compiled into that firmware) wrote `yawRateConfidence` as 3 bits / 7 instead of Its `cam.c` (compiled into that firmware) wrote `yawRateConfidence` as 3 bits / 7 instead of
@@ -57,6 +267,58 @@ optional, but shows what was on air at the time.
shorter). shorter).
- [ ] The heartbeat's oversize counter still counts over-long messages (e.g. road SPATEMs). - [ ] The heartbeat's oversize counter still counts over-long messages (e.g. road SPATEMs).
### CiT One custom CAM injection over `v2x/tx/v2/cam` (added 2026-09-14)
The haw-002 unit now runs the special firmware: Cohda's own CAM transmission disabled, and a
V2X-Gateway build that accepts a `SendV2XMessage` (schemas.consider-innovation.de/its-s/
v2x_interface.proto) carrying a UPER CAM on `v2x/tx/v2/cam`. `tools/cit_one_cam_tx.py` builds
and publishes those from a PC; its `--self-test` passes offline, proving only that the bytes
match `CamEncodeGoldenTest.kt` and that the protobuf wrapper round-trips. Nothing about what
the OBU does with them is established.
Reach the broker over Wi-Fi or Ethernet for now - the USB-peripheral-mode link needs the phone
to be USB host on a `172.25.1.0/24` interface with no DHCP server, which Android cannot
configure from inside an app.
Needs: the CiT One haw-002 on the same network as a PC, and a second ESP32-C5 running
`its-g5-receiver-firmware` sniffing G5CC (`-c 5900`) to capture with.
Bench run 2026-09-14, PC -> haw-002 (192.168.3.201), captured on the RSU (192.168.3.202,
**not** .2.202 - that address does not route). `tools/cit_one_rx_watch.py` decodes what a unit
hears. Result: the injection path works end to end, with one blocker found.
- [x] Publishes without the broker refusing the topic. 1.00 Hz, confirmed by subscribing to
`v2x/tx/v2/cam` on the OBU itself.
- [x] The RSU hears our CAMs on air, 1.00 Hz, matching what we publish.
- [x] `ItsPduHeader` **is** expected in the payload - we send it included and it decodes.
- [x] BTP destination port 2001. GN source address `08:00:26:93:92:01:91:dc`, the OBU's.
- [x] **Our CAM content goes out intact**: position, speed (417), heading (639), width (7) and
length (18) arrive byte-exact. The gateway does not touch the content.
- [x] **The gateway overwrites `stationID`** with the OBU's own (999999 -> 4033890855, which
matches `own_info.stationID` on `v2x/rx/obu_gnss`). This is what the "OBU owns identity"
decision wants, so `--follow-obu-identity` is not needed on this unit.
- [x] ~~BLOCKER: Cohda's own CAM is still transmitting.~~ Fixed 2026-09-14 by disabling CAM in
a second conf file: the RSU now hears only our stream, 0 CAMs with the stack's
unavailable dimensions over 30 s. Note the stack restart gave the unit a new identity
(stationID 4033890855 -> 2553426533, GN source `08:00:26:...` -> `08:00:a2:...`), which is
expected under `ItsGnLocalAddrConfMethod = 2` (anonymous, random at boot).
- [x] Re-checked: 41 published / 41 heard over 40 s, 1.02 Hz both ends, inter-arrival a steady
1.0 s. 100% delivery, no gateway rate limiting. An earlier 0.40 Hz sample was the stack
still settling after the restart and did not persist.
Two topics the v6 API does not document, found by subscribing to `#` on haw-002:
- `v2x/loopback/cam` - a `RecvV2XMessage` (btpHeader.type=2) carrying each CAM the unit
transmits, 1:1 with what we publish and **after** the gateway's stationID rewrite. This is the
TX confirmation we were going to ask consider it for: it makes "did my CAM go out, and under
which identity" answerable on the transmitting unit alone, without an RSU or a second ESP32.
- `v2x/rx/obuinfo` at 10 Hz - the protobuf `OwnStationInfo` (binary twin of `obu_gnss`;
field 2 decodes to the same stationID, field 10 to the same heading). Output only, so it is
not the content-feed input we speculated about.
- [ ] Wire `v2x/loopback/cam` into `cit_one_rx_watch.py` as a local TX check.
- [ ] Sanity-check the rate: `--rate 4` should produce 4 CAMs/s on air, since `ItsDCCEnabled = 0`
on this unit.
## Set up host testing ## Set up host testing
- [x] Install MSYS2 UCRT64 gcc (done 2026-09-11: gcc 16.2.0, GNU Make 4.4.1; chosen over WSL, - [x] Install MSYS2 UCRT64 gcc (done 2026-09-11: gcc 16.2.0, GNU Make 4.4.1; chosen over WSL,
app/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml
+11 -1
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<manifest xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android"> <manifest xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android"
xmlns:tools="http://schemas.android.com/tools">
<!-- Networking (MQTT / tile downloads) --> <!-- Networking (MQTT / tile downloads) -->
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.INTERNET" /> <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.INTERNET" />
@@ -10,6 +11,15 @@
<!-- Location --> <!-- Location -->
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION" /> <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION" />
<!-- BLE link to the ESP32-C5 (BleLinkTransport). Android 12+ asks for scan/connect at runtime;
older versions use the legacy pair plus location, which is requested anyway. -->
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.BLUETOOTH" android:maxSdkVersion="30" />
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.BLUETOOTH_ADMIN" android:maxSdkVersion="30" />
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.BLUETOOTH_SCAN"
android:usesPermissionFlags="neverForLocation"
tools:targetApi="s" />
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.BLUETOOTH_CONNECT" />
<uses-feature android:name="android.hardware.bluetooth_le" android:required="false" />
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION" /> <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION" />
<!-- Phase A: foreground service (trip recording) --> <!-- Phase A: foreground service (trip recording) -->
app/src/main/assets/demo-chain.vcr
BIN
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app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/MainActivity.kt
+54 -13
View File
@@ -26,10 +26,12 @@ import androidx.core.view.WindowCompat
import androidx.navigation.NavType import androidx.navigation.NavType
import androidx.navigation.compose.NavHost import androidx.navigation.compose.NavHost
import androidx.navigation.compose.composable import androidx.navigation.compose.composable
import androidx.navigation.compose.currentBackStackEntryAsState
import androidx.navigation.compose.rememberNavController import androidx.navigation.compose.rememberNavController
import androidx.navigation.navArgument import androidx.navigation.navArgument
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.mqtt.MqttConnectionState import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.mqtt.MqttConnectionState
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.UsbSerialState import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.Esp32LinkState
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.Esp32Transport
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.ObuHardware import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.ObuHardware
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.ui.components.StatusTopBar import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.ui.components.StatusTopBar
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.ui.navigation.BottomNavBar import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.ui.navigation.BottomNavBar
@@ -40,6 +42,7 @@ import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.ui.screens.MqttTopicViewerScreen
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.ui.screens.RecordingScreen import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.ui.screens.RecordingScreen
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.ui.screens.SensorScreen import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.ui.screens.SensorScreen
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.ui.screens.SessionLogScreen import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.ui.screens.SessionLogScreen
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.ui.screens.V2xMapScreen
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.ui.screens.MapScreen import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.ui.screens.MapScreen
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.ui.screens.TripHistoryScreen import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.ui.screens.TripHistoryScreen
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.ui.screens.TripReviewScreen import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.ui.screens.TripReviewScreen
@@ -86,7 +89,10 @@ class MainActivity : AppCompatActivity() {
val showBatteryOptPrompt by tripViewModel.showBatteryOptPrompt.collectAsState() val showBatteryOptPrompt by tripViewModel.showBatteryOptPrompt.collectAsState()
val useCaseEnabledMap by mqttViewModel.useCaseEnabledMap.collectAsState() val useCaseEnabledMap by mqttViewModel.useCaseEnabledMap.collectAsState()
val obuHardware by mqttViewModel.obuHardware.collectAsState() val obuHardware by mqttViewModel.obuHardware.collectAsState()
val usbSerialState by mqttViewModel.usbSerialState.collectAsState() val esp32LinkState by mqttViewModel.esp32LinkState.collectAsState()
val esp32Transport by mqttViewModel.esp32Transport.collectAsState()
val outgoingMessage by mqttViewModel.outgoingMessage.collectAsState()
val signOutgoing by mqttViewModel.signOutgoing.collectAsState()
// Received hazards and live signal state, for the Dashboard's V2X summary cards. // Received hazards and live signal state, for the Dashboard's V2X summary cards.
// Both flows already expire their own entries on a clock, so nothing here has to // Both flows already expire their own entries on a clock, so nothing here has to
// decide when a hazard or a traffic light has gone stale. // decide when a hazard or a traffic light has gone stale.
@@ -104,6 +110,13 @@ class MainActivity : AppCompatActivity() {
} }
val navController = rememberNavController() val navController = rememberNavController()
// The V2X live map is a full-bleed destination: the app's own chrome would eat a
// third of the display on the one screen whose entire job is showing where things
// are relative to each other. It carries its own floating back button, and system
// back still works, so nothing becomes unreachable.
val currentBackStackEntry by navController.currentBackStackEntryAsState()
val isFullBleed = currentBackStackEntry?.destination?.route == Screen.V2xMap.route
val locationLauncher = rememberLauncherForActivityResult( val locationLauncher = rememberLauncherForActivityResult(
ActivityResultContracts.RequestMultiplePermissions() ActivityResultContracts.RequestMultiplePermissions()
) { permissions -> ) { permissions ->
@@ -119,11 +132,17 @@ class MainActivity : AppCompatActivity() {
LaunchedEffect(Unit) { LaunchedEffect(Unit) {
viewModel.startImuStreams() viewModel.startImuStreams()
// Bluetooth scan/connect ride along with location (Android 12+): the ESP32-C5
// can be reached over BLE, and a denial only matters if that is selected, where
// BleLinkTransport then says so instead of silently finding nothing.
val bluetooth = if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= Build.VERSION_CODES.S) {
arrayOf(Manifest.permission.BLUETOOTH_SCAN, Manifest.permission.BLUETOOTH_CONNECT)
} else emptyArray()
locationLauncher.launch( locationLauncher.launch(
arrayOf( arrayOf(
Manifest.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION, Manifest.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION,
Manifest.permission.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION, Manifest.permission.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION,
) ) + bluetooth
) )
if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= Build.VERSION_CODES.TIRAMISU) { if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= Build.VERSION_CODES.TIRAMISU) {
notificationLauncher.launch(Manifest.permission.POST_NOTIFICATIONS) notificationLauncher.launch(Manifest.permission.POST_NOTIFICATIONS)
@@ -132,14 +151,17 @@ class MainActivity : AppCompatActivity() {
Scaffold( Scaffold(
topBar = { topBar = {
StatusTopBar( if (!isFullBleed) {
state = state, StatusTopBar(
mqttConnectionState = mqttConnectionState, state = state,
isEsp32 = obuHardware == ObuHardware.ESP32_C5, mqttConnectionState = mqttConnectionState,
usbSerialState = usbSerialState, isEsp32 = obuHardware == ObuHardware.ESP32_C5,
) esp32LinkState = esp32LinkState,
esp32Bluetooth = esp32Transport == Esp32Transport.BLE,
)
}
}, },
bottomBar = { BottomNavBar(navController) }, bottomBar = { if (!isFullBleed) BottomNavBar(navController) },
) { innerPadding -> ) { innerPadding ->
NavHost( NavHost(
navController = navController, navController = navController,
@@ -152,7 +174,8 @@ class MainActivity : AppCompatActivity() {
mqttConnectionState = mqttConnectionState, mqttConnectionState = mqttConnectionState,
activeTransport = activeTransport, activeTransport = activeTransport,
obuHardware = obuHardware, obuHardware = obuHardware,
usbSerialState = usbSerialState, esp32LinkState = esp32LinkState,
esp32Bluetooth = esp32Transport == Esp32Transport.BLE,
usbCableConnected = usbConnected, usbCableConnected = usbConnected,
obuStationTypeWarning = obuStationTypeWarning, obuStationTypeWarning = obuStationTypeWarning,
obuStationType = obuStationType, obuStationType = obuStationType,
@@ -191,7 +214,7 @@ class MainActivity : AppCompatActivity() {
state = state, state = state,
mqttConnectionState = mqttConnectionState, mqttConnectionState = mqttConnectionState,
obuConnected = if (obuHardware == ObuHardware.ESP32_C5) obuConnected = if (obuHardware == ObuHardware.ESP32_C5)
usbSerialState == UsbSerialState.CONNECTED esp32LinkState == Esp32LinkState.CONNECTED
else else
mqttConnectionState == MqttConnectionState.CONNECTED, mqttConnectionState == MqttConnectionState.CONNECTED,
tripServiceState = tripServiceState, tripServiceState = tripServiceState,
@@ -253,7 +276,19 @@ class MainActivity : AppCompatActivity() {
} }
composable(Screen.MqttViewer.route) { composable(Screen.MqttViewer.route) {
MqttTopicViewerScreen(viewModel = mqttViewModel) MqttTopicViewerScreen(
viewModel = mqttViewModel,
onOpenMap = { navController.navigate(Screen.V2xMap.route) },
)
}
composable(Screen.V2xMap.route) {
// Activity-scoped instance, like Connection below: a hiltViewModel()
// here would be scoped to this NavBackStackEntry and torn down on the
// way back out, taking the shared transport with it.
V2xMapScreen(
viewModel = mqttViewModel,
onBack = { navController.popBackStack() },
)
} }
composable(Screen.Settings.route) { composable(Screen.Settings.route) {
SettingsScreen( SettingsScreen(
@@ -281,6 +316,12 @@ class MainActivity : AppCompatActivity() {
onMqttPrefsChange = mqttViewModel::updatePrefs, onMqttPrefsChange = mqttViewModel::updatePrefs,
obuHardware = obuHardware, obuHardware = obuHardware,
onObuHardwareChange = mqttViewModel::setObuHardware, onObuHardwareChange = mqttViewModel::setObuHardware,
esp32Transport = esp32Transport,
onEsp32TransportChange = mqttViewModel::setEsp32Transport,
outgoingMessage = outgoingMessage,
onOutgoingMessageChange = mqttViewModel::setOutgoingMessage,
signOutgoing = signOutgoing,
onSignOutgoingChange = mqttViewModel::setSignOutgoing,
onBack = { navController.popBackStack() }, onBack = { navController.popBackStack() },
) )
} }
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/data/GnssTimeSource.kt
+15 -2
View File
@@ -21,7 +21,13 @@ import java.time.DateTimeException
* [SystemClock.currentGnssTimeClock] (API 29, this app's minSdk) is a UTC clock the platform keeps * [SystemClock.currentGnssTimeClock] (API 29, this app's minSdk) is a UTC clock the platform keeps
* synchronised from GNSS fixes. One reading of it taken alongside the wall clock gives the wall * synchronised from GNSS fixes. One reading of it taken alongside the wall clock gives the wall
* clock's error, which is then applied to the fix's own timestamp. When GNSS time is unavailable, * clock's error, which is then applied to the fix's own timestamp. When GNSS time is unavailable,
* typically indoors before any satellite fix since boot, the wall clock is used unchanged. * the last error measured is kept, because the wall clock's error changes slowly while GNSS time
* comes and goes indoors. Only before any GNSS time since the app started is the wall clock used
* unchanged.
*
* Keeping it matters: with the bench phone 14 minutes fast (2026-09-23), dropping back to the raw
* wall clock whenever GNSS time blinked out made every transmitted timestamp jump 14 minutes back
* and forth, and the micrOBU restarted its stack at each jump back (time_regression).
* *
* Which clock is in use is logged whenever it changes, with the measured error, so a capture shows * Which clock is in use is logged whenever it changes, with the measured error, so a capture shows
* where a given run's timestamps came from. * where a given run's timestamps came from.
@@ -36,6 +42,9 @@ object GnssTimeSource {
/** Whether the last correction used GNSS time; null before the first. For change-only logging. */ /** Whether the last correction used GNSS time; null before the first. For change-only logging. */
@Volatile private var lastUsedGnss: Boolean? = null @Volatile private var lastUsedGnss: Boolean? = null
/** GNSS time minus wall clock at the last reading of both; null until GNSS time was first seen. */
@Volatile private var lastErrorMs: Long? = null
/** [systemMs], a wall-clock reading, moved onto GNSS time where GNSS time is available. */ /** [systemMs], a wall-clock reading, moved onto GNSS time where GNSS time is available. */
fun correct(systemMs: Long): Long { fun correct(systemMs: Long): Long {
val systemNow = System.currentTimeMillis() val systemNow = System.currentTimeMillis()
@@ -44,8 +53,9 @@ object GnssTimeSource {
} catch (e: DateTimeException) { } catch (e: DateTimeException) {
null null
} }
if (gnssNow != null) lastErrorMs = gnssNow - systemNow
noteSource(gnssNow, systemNow) noteSource(gnssNow, systemNow)
return ItsTime.onGnssTime(systemMs, gnssNow, systemNow) return ItsTime.onGnssTime(systemMs, lastErrorMs?.let { systemNow + it }, systemNow)
} }
private fun noteSource(gnssNow: Long?, systemNow: Long) { private fun noteSource(gnssNow: Long?, systemNow: Long) {
@@ -55,6 +65,9 @@ object GnssTimeSource {
if (gnssNow != null) { if (gnssNow != null) {
Log.i(TAG, "transmit timestamps now on GNSS time; phone clock is " + Log.i(TAG, "transmit timestamps now on GNSS time; phone clock is " +
"${"%+.1f".format((systemNow - gnssNow) / 1000.0)} s off") "${"%+.1f".format((systemNow - gnssNow) / 1000.0)} s off")
} else if (lastErrorMs != null) {
Log.i(TAG, "GNSS time unavailable, keeping the last measured phone clock error of " +
"${"%+.1f".format(-lastErrorMs!! / 1000.0)} s")
} else { } else {
Log.w(TAG, "GNSS time unavailable, transmit timestamps fall back to the phone clock, " + Log.w(TAG, "GNSS time unavailable, transmit timestamps fall back to the phone clock, " +
"which has no automatic time source without a SIM or internet") "which has no automatic time source without a SIM or internet")
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/data/cam/CamUseCaseRepository.kt
+7 -7
View File
@@ -16,8 +16,8 @@ import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.ObuHardware
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.BtpPort import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.BtpPort
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.SerialFrameType import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.SerialFrameType
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.V2xRxFrame import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.V2xRxFrame
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.UsbSerialState import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.Esp32LinkState
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.UsbSerialTransport import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.Esp32Link
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.asn1.DenmUperCodec import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.asn1.DenmUperCodec
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.asn1.RealAsn1UperCodec import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.asn1.RealAsn1UperCodec
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.asn1.SpatemUperCodec import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.asn1.SpatemUperCodec
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ private const val RAW_PREFERRED_WINDOW_MS = 5_000L
class CamUseCaseRepository @Inject constructor( class CamUseCaseRepository @Inject constructor(
private val mqttRepository: MqttRepository, private val mqttRepository: MqttRepository,
private val prefs: UseCaseAlertPreferences, private val prefs: UseCaseAlertPreferences,
private val usbSerialTransport: UsbSerialTransport, private val esp32Link: Esp32Link,
private val camCodec: RealAsn1UperCodec, private val camCodec: RealAsn1UperCodec,
private val obuHardwarePrefs: ObuHardwarePreferences, private val obuHardwarePrefs: ObuHardwarePreferences,
private val pseudonymManager: PseudonymManager, private val pseudonymManager: PseudonymManager,
@@ -285,9 +285,9 @@ class CamUseCaseRepository @Inject constructor(
// this only ever sees CAM UPER bytes. No-op stream on the CiT One path (the transport // this only ever sees CAM UPER bytes. No-op stream on the CiT One path (the transport
// just never emits CAM_RX frames if nothing's plugged in over serial). // just never emits CAM_RX frames if nothing's plugged in over serial).
scope.launch { scope.launch {
usbSerialTransport.incomingFrames.collect { frame -> esp32Link.incomingFrames.collect { frame ->
if (frame.type != SerialFrameType.V2X_RX) return@collect if (frame.type != SerialFrameType.V2X_RX) return@collect
if (usbSerialTransport.state.value != UsbSerialState.CONNECTED) return@collect if (esp32Link.state.value != Esp32LinkState.CONNECTED) return@collect
val v2x = V2xRxFrame.parse(frame.payload) ?: return@collect val v2x = V2xRxFrame.parse(frame.payload) ?: return@collect
when (v2x.btpPort) { when (v2x.btpPort) {
BtpPort.CAM -> handleCamFromSerial(v2x) BtpPort.CAM -> handleCamFromSerial(v2x)
@@ -304,10 +304,10 @@ class CamUseCaseRepository @Inject constructor(
// last-seen positions and their alerts linger on the map and in the use-case panel after // last-seen positions and their alerts linger on the map and in the use-case panel after
// an unplug, which reads as live traffic - the worst kind of stale on a safety display. // an unplug, which reads as live traffic - the worst kind of stale on a safety display.
scope.launch { scope.launch {
usbSerialTransport.state.collect { state -> esp32Link.state.collect { state ->
// ESP32-only: on the CiT One path this transport is permanently DISCONNECTED and // ESP32-only: on the CiT One path this transport is permanently DISCONNECTED and
// resetting here would wipe perfectly good MQTT-derived state. // resetting here would wipe perfectly good MQTT-derived state.
if (currentHardware == ObuHardware.ESP32_C5 && state != UsbSerialState.CONNECTED) { if (currentHardware == ObuHardware.ESP32_C5 && state != Esp32LinkState.CONNECTED) {
engine.reset() engine.reset()
_rsuStations.value = emptyMap() _rsuStations.value = emptyMap()
} }
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/data/mqtt/ObuHardwarePreferences.kt
+38
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,14 @@
package com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.mqtt package com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.mqtt
import android.content.Context import android.content.Context
import androidx.datastore.preferences.core.booleanPreferencesKey
import androidx.datastore.preferences.core.edit import androidx.datastore.preferences.core.edit
import androidx.datastore.preferences.core.longPreferencesKey import androidx.datastore.preferences.core.longPreferencesKey
import androidx.datastore.preferences.core.stringPreferencesKey import androidx.datastore.preferences.core.stringPreferencesKey
import androidx.datastore.preferences.preferencesDataStore import androidx.datastore.preferences.preferencesDataStore
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.Esp32Transport
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.ObuHardware import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.ObuHardware
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.OutgoingMessage
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.Pseudonym import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.Pseudonym
import dagger.hilt.android.qualifiers.ApplicationContext import dagger.hilt.android.qualifiers.ApplicationContext
import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.Flow import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.Flow
@@ -32,6 +35,10 @@ class ObuHardwarePreferences @Inject constructor(
val OWN_STATION_ID = longPreferencesKey("own_station_id") val OWN_STATION_ID = longPreferencesKey("own_station_id")
val OWN_MAC = stringPreferencesKey("own_mac") val OWN_MAC = stringPreferencesKey("own_mac")
val OWN_PSEUDONYM_CREATED_MS = longPreferencesKey("own_pseudonym_created_ms") val OWN_PSEUDONYM_CREATED_MS = longPreferencesKey("own_pseudonym_created_ms")
// ESP32-C5 only.
val ESP32_TRANSPORT = stringPreferencesKey("esp32_transport")
val OUTGOING_MESSAGE = stringPreferencesKey("outgoing_message")
val SIGN_OUTGOING = booleanPreferencesKey("sign_outgoing")
} }
val obuHardwareFlow: Flow<ObuHardware> = context.obuHardwareDataStore.data.map { prefs -> val obuHardwareFlow: Flow<ObuHardware> = context.obuHardwareDataStore.data.map { prefs ->
@@ -42,6 +49,37 @@ class ObuHardwarePreferences @Inject constructor(
context.obuHardwareDataStore.edit { prefs -> prefs[Keys.OBU_HARDWARE] = hardware.id } context.obuHardwareDataStore.edit { prefs -> prefs[Keys.OBU_HARDWARE] = hardware.id }
} }
/** How the phone reaches the ESP32-C5: its native USB-C port (default) or BLE. */
val esp32TransportFlow: Flow<Esp32Transport> = context.obuHardwareDataStore.data.map { prefs ->
Esp32Transport.entries.firstOrNull { it.id == prefs[Keys.ESP32_TRANSPORT] } ?: Esp32Transport.USB
}
suspend fun setEsp32Transport(transport: Esp32Transport) {
context.obuHardwareDataStore.edit { prefs -> prefs[Keys.ESP32_TRANSPORT] = transport.id }
}
/** What the ESP32-C5 path transmits while recording: CAM (default) or VAM. */
val outgoingMessageFlow: Flow<OutgoingMessage> = context.obuHardwareDataStore.data.map { prefs ->
OutgoingMessage.entries.firstOrNull { it.id == prefs[Keys.OUTGOING_MESSAGE] } ?: OutgoingMessage.CAM
}
suspend fun setOutgoingMessage(message: OutgoingMessage) {
context.obuHardwareDataStore.edit { prefs -> prefs[Keys.OUTGOING_MESSAGE] = message.id }
}
/**
* Whether outgoing messages are signed (TS 103 097, demo PKI). Default on. Off sends them
* unsigned exactly as the previous firmware did, which verifying receivers may prefer to a
* signature they cannot chain to the EU trust list.
*/
val signOutgoingFlow: Flow<Boolean> = context.obuHardwareDataStore.data.map { prefs ->
prefs[Keys.SIGN_OUTGOING] ?: true
}
suspend fun setSignOutgoing(sign: Boolean) {
context.obuHardwareDataStore.edit { prefs -> prefs[Keys.SIGN_OUTGOING] = sign }
}
/** /**
* The transmit pseudonym last saved by [savePseudonym], or null if there is none. * The transmit pseudonym last saved by [savePseudonym], or null if there is none.
* *
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/data/transport/BleLinkTransport.kt
+466
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,466 @@
package com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport
import android.Manifest
import android.annotation.SuppressLint
import android.bluetooth.BluetoothDevice
import android.bluetooth.BluetoothGatt
import android.bluetooth.BluetoothGattCallback
import android.bluetooth.BluetoothGattCharacteristic
import android.bluetooth.BluetoothGattDescriptor
import android.bluetooth.BluetoothManager
import android.bluetooth.BluetoothProfile
import android.bluetooth.le.ScanCallback
import android.bluetooth.le.ScanResult
import android.bluetooth.le.ScanSettings
import android.content.BroadcastReceiver
import android.content.Context
import android.content.Intent
import android.content.IntentFilter
import android.content.pm.PackageManager
import android.os.Build
import android.util.Log
import dagger.hilt.android.qualifiers.ApplicationContext
import kotlinx.coroutines.CancellationException
import kotlinx.coroutines.CompletableDeferred
import kotlinx.coroutines.CoroutineScope
import kotlinx.coroutines.Dispatchers
import kotlinx.coroutines.Job
import kotlinx.coroutines.SupervisorJob
import kotlinx.coroutines.delay
import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.MutableSharedFlow
import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.MutableStateFlow
import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.SharedFlow
import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.StateFlow
import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.asSharedFlow
import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.asStateFlow
import kotlinx.coroutines.launch
import kotlinx.coroutines.sync.Mutex
import kotlinx.coroutines.sync.withLock
import kotlinx.coroutines.withTimeoutOrNull
import java.util.UUID
import javax.inject.Inject
import javax.inject.Singleton
private const val TAG = "BleLinkTransport"
/**
* BLE GATT central for the micrOBU's station link: the Android counterpart of the firmware's
* `obu-firmware/main/simple_ble.cpp` (from the colleague's microbu-esp32c5) and of their Python
* `microbu_link/ble_transport.py`, which this follows step for step.
*
* ## The GATT layout (what the firmware actually implements)
* The station-link README describes a Nordic-UART-shaped service with fragmentation. The firmware
* does something else, and the firmware is what counts here: a custom service
* `0000C175-BA5E-4C17-8000-00805F9B34FB` with one characteristic per primitive, and each GATT value
* is one complete link message, never fragmented. Requests are written with response to the
* characteristic of their opcode ([writeTarget]); replies, STATUS and V2X_RX arrive as
* notifications. A message may be up to 512 octets, so the ATT MTU must be raised to 517 first:
* the firmware refuses to notify a message that does not fit rather than send it cut short.
*
* ## Pairing
* Every characteristic needs an encrypted, authenticated link. The firmware uses LE Secure
* Connections with a fixed passkey, [PASSKEY] (DisplayOnly). Android shows its own pairing dialog
* the first time; the user types the passkey there, and the bond is kept on both sides. The
* passkey is public, so this gives encryption but no protection against an active attacker
* during that first pairing; acceptable for the demo PKI this carries.
*
* ## RF
* BLE shares the C5's single RF front end with 5.9 GHz ITS-G5. The firmware stops advertising
* while the USB link is in use; whether an active BLE connection disturbs ITS-G5 has not been
* measured yet (TODO.md, "Waiting on hardware").
*
* Like [UsbSerialTransport], an app-scoped singleton: only an explicit disconnect or the process
* dying closes it, never a screen or ViewModel going away.
*/
@Singleton
class BleLinkTransport @Inject constructor(
@ApplicationContext private val context: Context,
) {
companion object {
const val PASSKEY = "123456"
const val NAME_PREFIX = "micrOBU"
private val SERVICE: UUID = UUID.fromString("0000c175-ba5e-4c17-8000-00805f9b34fb")
private val BTP_REQUEST: UUID = UUID.fromString("0000c176-ba5e-4c17-8000-00805f9b34fb")
private val BTP_INDICATION: UUID = UUID.fromString("0000c177-ba5e-4c17-8000-00805f9b34fb")
private val POTI: UUID = UUID.fromString("0000c178-ba5e-4c17-8000-00805f9b34fb")
/** Read-encrypted, returns nothing useful: only used to find out whether the link is secure. */
private val STATUS_CHAR: UUID = UUID.fromString("0000c179-ba5e-4c17-8000-00805f9b34fb")
private val ID_EVENT: UUID = UUID.fromString("0000c17a-ba5e-4c17-8000-00805f9b34fb")
private val CONFIG: UUID = UUID.fromString("0000c17b-ba5e-4c17-8000-00805f9b34fb")
private val RESULT: UUID = UUID.fromString("0000c17c-ba5e-4c17-8000-00805f9b34fb")
private val CCCD: UUID = UUID.fromString("00002902-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb")
private const val REQUESTED_MTU = 517
private const val SCAN_TIMEOUT_MS = 15_000L
/** Long enough for the user to find and type the passkey in the system dialog. */
private const val BOND_TIMEOUT_MS = 60_000L
private const val GATT_OP_TIMEOUT_MS = 5_000L
/** After a working link dropped: try again soon. */
private const val RECONNECT_DELAY_MS = 1_000L
/** After failed attempts: 2, 4, 8, 16, then every 30 s, so a broken pairing does not spin. */
private const val RETRY_BASE_MS = 2_000L
private const val RETRY_MAX_MS = 30_000L
/** ATT status codes Android reports when the link lacks the encryption a characteristic needs. */
private val AUTH_FAILURES = setOf(5, 8, 15, 137)
/** Which characteristic a phone -> micrOBU message is written to, by opcode (as ble_transport.py). */
fun writeTarget(opcode: Int): UUID = when (opcode) {
LinkOpcode.BTP_DATA_REQUEST -> BTP_REQUEST
LinkOpcode.POTI_UPDATE -> POTI
0x08 /* SF_IDCHANGE_EVENT_RESPONSE */ -> ID_EVENT
else -> CONFIG
}
}
private val scope = CoroutineScope(SupervisorJob() + Dispatchers.Default)
private val bluetoothManager = context.getSystemService(BluetoothManager::class.java)
private val _state = MutableStateFlow(Esp32LinkState.DISCONNECTED)
val state: StateFlow<Esp32LinkState> = _state.asStateFlow()
/** Why the last attempt failed, or what the user has to do (e.g. type the passkey); null when fine. */
private val _detail = MutableStateFlow<String?>(null)
val detail: StateFlow<String?> = _detail.asStateFlow()
private val _incoming = MutableSharedFlow<ByteArray>(extraBufferCapacity = 256)
/** Every link message the micrOBU notifies, one GATT value each. */
val incoming: SharedFlow<ByteArray> = _incoming.asSharedFlow()
/** Name of the connected micrOBU, e.g. "micrOBU-4AF8". */
@Volatile var deviceName: String? = null
private set
@Volatile private var gatt: BluetoothGatt? = null
/** Whether the current GATT connection is up, as the last connection-state callback said. */
@Volatile private var linkUp = false
@Volatile private var wanted = false
private var sessionJob: Job? = null
/** One GATT operation at a time: Android drops a second one issued before the first completes. */
private val gattMutex = Mutex()
@Volatile private var pendingOp: CompletableDeferred<Int>? = null
@Volatile private var connected: CompletableDeferred<Boolean>? = null
@Volatile private var mtuDone: CompletableDeferred<Int>? = null
@Volatile private var servicesDone: CompletableDeferred<Boolean>? = null
fun hasPermissions(): Boolean {
val needed = if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= Build.VERSION_CODES.S) {
listOf(Manifest.permission.BLUETOOTH_SCAN, Manifest.permission.BLUETOOTH_CONNECT)
} else {
listOf(Manifest.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION)
}
return needed.all { context.checkSelfPermission(it) == PackageManager.PERMISSION_GRANTED }
}
/** Scans for (or reuses the bond with) a micrOBU, pairs if needed, and opens the link. No-op if already under way. */
fun connect() {
if (sessionJob?.isActive == true) return
wanted = true
sessionJob = scope.launch {
var failures = 0
while (wanted) {
val ok = try {
session()
} catch (e: CancellationException) {
throw e // disconnect(): not a failure to report
} catch (e: Exception) {
fail("BLE session failed: ${e.message}")
}
closeGatt()
if (!wanted) break
failures = if (ok) 0 else failures + 1
_state.value = if (ok) Esp32LinkState.DEVICE_ATTACHED else Esp32LinkState.ERROR
delay(if (ok) RECONNECT_DELAY_MS
else minOf(RETRY_MAX_MS, RETRY_BASE_MS shl (failures - 1).coerceAtMost(4)))
}
_state.value = Esp32LinkState.DISCONNECTED
}
}
fun disconnect() {
wanted = false
sessionJob?.cancel()
sessionJob = null
closeGatt()
_state.value = Esp32LinkState.DISCONNECTED
_detail.value = null
}
/**
* Writes one complete link message to the characteristic of its opcode, with response.
* Suspends until the micrOBU acknowledged the write; false when not connected or it failed.
*/
@SuppressLint("MissingPermission")
suspend fun send(message: ByteArray): Boolean {
val g = gatt ?: return false
if (_state.value != Esp32LinkState.CONNECTED || message.isEmpty()) return false
val characteristic = g.getService(SERVICE)?.getCharacteristic(writeTarget(message[0].toInt() and 0xFF))
?: return false
return gattOp {
if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= Build.VERSION_CODES.TIRAMISU) {
g.writeCharacteristic(characteristic, message, BluetoothGattCharacteristic.WRITE_TYPE_DEFAULT) ==
BluetoothGatt.GATT_SUCCESS
} else {
@Suppress("DEPRECATION")
characteristic.writeType = BluetoothGattCharacteristic.WRITE_TYPE_DEFAULT
@Suppress("DEPRECATION")
characteristic.value = message
@Suppress("DEPRECATION")
g.writeCharacteristic(characteristic)
}
} == BluetoothGatt.GATT_SUCCESS
}
/** One connection lifetime. Returns true if it reached CONNECTED before ending. */
@SuppressLint("MissingPermission")
private suspend fun session(): Boolean {
if (!hasPermissions()) {
wanted = false
return fail("Bluetooth permission not granted (Android Settings > Apps > MicrOBU > Permissions)")
}
val adapter = bluetoothManager?.adapter
if (adapter == null || !adapter.isEnabled) return fail("Bluetooth is off")
_state.value = Esp32LinkState.DEVICE_ATTACHED
// A bonded micrOBU is reused without scanning: its address is stable (public address), and
// this is what makes a reconnect after a dropout fast.
val device = adapter.bondedDevices.firstOrNull { it.name?.startsWith(NAME_PREFIX) == true }
?: scan() ?: return fail("No micrOBU advertising nearby (is the phone on its USB port?)")
deviceName = device.name
_detail.value = null
Log.i(TAG, "connecting to ${device.name} ${device.address} (bond state ${device.bondState})")
connected = CompletableDeferred()
gatt = device.connectGatt(context, false, callback, BluetoothDevice.TRANSPORT_LE)
if (withTimeoutOrNull(GATT_OP_TIMEOUT_MS * 2) { connected!!.await() } != true) {
return fail("Could not connect to ${device.name}")
}
val g = gatt ?: return false
// Services first: discovery needs no encryption, and the encryption probe below needs the
// STATUS characteristic.
servicesDone = CompletableDeferred()
g.discoverServices()
if (withTimeoutOrNull(GATT_OP_TIMEOUT_MS) { servicesDone!!.await() } != true) {
return fail("Service discovery on ${device.name} timed out")
}
if (g.getService(SERVICE) == null) {
return fail("${device.name} does not offer the station-link service (old firmware?)")
}
// Encryption before anything else. Every characteristic needs an encrypted, authenticated
// link; the board asks for security as soon as a phone connects. A phone it has a bond with
// encrypts with the stored key. Otherwise Android pairs, with its passkey dialog, which takes
// as long as the user takes. A GATT operation with a short timeout during that cuts the
// pairing off, the link drops, and the next attempt starts pairing again: a loop.
val wasBonded = device.bondState == BluetoothDevice.BOND_BONDED
if (!awaitEncryption(g, device)) {
if (!linkUp) return fail("${device.name} dropped the link while pairing")
return fail(
if (wasBonded) "${device.name} refused this phone's stored pairing. In Android's Bluetooth " +
"settings, forget ${device.name}, then Connect again (passkey $PASSKEY)."
else "Pairing with ${device.name} failed or timed out (passkey $PASSKEY)"
)
}
_state.value = Esp32LinkState.DEVICE_ATTACHED
_detail.value = null
mtuDone = CompletableDeferred()
g.requestMtu(REQUESTED_MTU)
val mtu = withTimeoutOrNull(GATT_OP_TIMEOUT_MS) { mtuDone!!.await() } ?: 23
Log.i(TAG, "ATT MTU $mtu")
if (mtu < LINK_MAX_MESSAGE + 3) {
// The board drops a notification that does not fit rather than truncate it (simple_ble.cpp).
Log.w(TAG, "MTU $mtu is below ${LINK_MAX_MESSAGE + 3}: large V2X_RX messages will not arrive")
}
for (uuid in listOf(RESULT, BTP_INDICATION, ID_EVENT)) {
if (!enableNotifications(g, uuid)) return fail("Could not subscribe to ${device.name} notifications")
}
_state.value = Esp32LinkState.CONNECTED
Log.i(TAG, "BLE station link ready: ${device.name}")
// Wait until the link drops (callback completes `connected` anew with false).
val dropped = CompletableDeferred<Boolean>()
connected = dropped
dropped.await()
Log.w(TAG, "BLE link to ${device.name} lost")
return true
}
@SuppressLint("MissingPermission")
private suspend fun scan(): BluetoothDevice? {
val scanner = bluetoothManager?.adapter?.bluetoothLeScanner ?: return null
val found = CompletableDeferred<BluetoothDevice>()
val scanCallback = object : ScanCallback() {
override fun onScanResult(callbackType: Int, result: ScanResult) {
val name = result.scanRecord?.deviceName ?: result.device.name
val offersService = result.scanRecord?.serviceUuids?.any { it.uuid == SERVICE } == true
if (offersService || name?.startsWith(NAME_PREFIX) == true) found.complete(result.device)
}
override fun onScanFailed(errorCode: Int) {
Log.w(TAG, "BLE scan failed: $errorCode")
}
}
val settings = ScanSettings.Builder().setScanMode(ScanSettings.SCAN_MODE_LOW_LATENCY).build()
scanner.startScan(null, settings, scanCallback)
return try {
withTimeoutOrNull(SCAN_TIMEOUT_MS) { found.await() }
} finally {
runCatching { scanner.stopScan(scanCallback) }
}
}
/**
* Returns once the link is encrypted, pairing first if needed; false if that fails or the user
* does not finish within [BOND_TIMEOUT_MS].
*
* The probe is a read of the STATUS characteristic, which needs an encrypted and authenticated
* link, as the colleague's Python transport does. Android answers a read the link is not
* secure enough for by encrypting, or by pairing and showing the passkey dialog, and then
* retries the read itself. While it pairs, the card says which passkey to type.
*/
@SuppressLint("MissingPermission")
private suspend fun awaitEncryption(g: BluetoothGatt, device: BluetoothDevice): Boolean {
val status = g.getService(SERVICE)?.getCharacteristic(STATUS_CHAR) ?: return false
val receiver = object : BroadcastReceiver() {
override fun onReceive(ctx: Context, intent: Intent) {
val changed = if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= Build.VERSION_CODES.TIRAMISU) {
intent.getParcelableExtra(BluetoothDevice.EXTRA_DEVICE, BluetoothDevice::class.java)
} else {
@Suppress("DEPRECATION") intent.getParcelableExtra(BluetoothDevice.EXTRA_DEVICE)
}
if (changed?.address != device.address) return
val state = intent.getIntExtra(BluetoothDevice.EXTRA_BOND_STATE, BluetoothDevice.ERROR)
Log.i(TAG, "bond state of ${device.name}: $state")
if (state == BluetoothDevice.BOND_BONDING) {
_state.value = Esp32LinkState.PERMISSION_REQUESTED
_detail.value = "Pair with ${device.name}: enter passkey $PASSKEY"
}
}
}
register(receiver)
try {
if (device.bondState == BluetoothDevice.BOND_BONDING) {
_state.value = Esp32LinkState.PERMISSION_REQUESTED
_detail.value = "Pair with ${device.name}: enter passkey $PASSKEY"
}
// Up to two reads: the first can come back with an authentication error at the moment
// pairing completes, before Android's own retry.
repeat(2) { attempt ->
val result = gattOp(BOND_TIMEOUT_MS) { g.readCharacteristic(status) }
Log.i(TAG, "encryption probe ${attempt + 1}: status $result, bond state ${device.bondState}")
if (result == BluetoothGatt.GATT_SUCCESS) return true
if (result !in AUTH_FAILURES) return false
}
return false
} finally {
runCatching { context.unregisterReceiver(receiver) }
}
}
private fun register(receiver: BroadcastReceiver) {
val filter = IntentFilter(BluetoothDevice.ACTION_BOND_STATE_CHANGED)
if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= Build.VERSION_CODES.TIRAMISU) {
context.registerReceiver(receiver, filter, Context.RECEIVER_EXPORTED)
} else {
@Suppress("UnspecifiedRegisterReceiverFlag") context.registerReceiver(receiver, filter)
}
}
/** Logs [reason], shows it on the connection card, and ends the attempt. */
private fun fail(reason: String): Boolean {
Log.w(TAG, reason)
_detail.value = reason
return false
}
@SuppressLint("MissingPermission")
private suspend fun enableNotifications(g: BluetoothGatt, uuid: UUID): Boolean {
val characteristic = g.getService(SERVICE)?.getCharacteristic(uuid) ?: return false
if (!g.setCharacteristicNotification(characteristic, true)) return false
val cccd = characteristic.getDescriptor(CCCD) ?: return false
val value = BluetoothGattDescriptor.ENABLE_NOTIFICATION_VALUE
return gattOp {
if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= Build.VERSION_CODES.TIRAMISU) {
g.writeDescriptor(cccd, value) == BluetoothGatt.GATT_SUCCESS
} else {
@Suppress("DEPRECATION") cccd.value = value
@Suppress("DEPRECATION") g.writeDescriptor(cccd)
}
} == BluetoothGatt.GATT_SUCCESS
}
/** Starts one GATT operation and waits for its callback's status; -1 if it could not start or timed out. */
private suspend fun gattOp(timeoutMs: Long = GATT_OP_TIMEOUT_MS, start: () -> Boolean): Int = gattMutex.withLock {
val op = CompletableDeferred<Int>()
pendingOp = op
if (!start()) {
pendingOp = null
return@withLock -1
}
withTimeoutOrNull(timeoutMs) { op.await() } ?: -1
}
@SuppressLint("MissingPermission")
private fun closeGatt() {
gatt?.let { runCatching { it.disconnect(); it.close() } }
gatt = null
pendingOp?.complete(-1)
connected?.complete(false)
}
private val callback = object : BluetoothGattCallback() {
override fun onConnectionStateChange(g: BluetoothGatt, status: Int, newState: Int) {
Log.i(TAG, "connection state $newState (status $status)")
when (newState) {
BluetoothProfile.STATE_CONNECTED -> {
linkUp = true
connected?.complete(true)
}
BluetoothProfile.STATE_DISCONNECTED -> {
linkUp = false
connected?.complete(false)
pendingOp?.complete(-1)
if (_state.value == Esp32LinkState.CONNECTED) _state.value = Esp32LinkState.ERROR
}
}
}
override fun onMtuChanged(g: BluetoothGatt, mtu: Int, status: Int) {
mtuDone?.complete(mtu)
}
override fun onServicesDiscovered(g: BluetoothGatt, status: Int) {
servicesDone?.complete(status == BluetoothGatt.GATT_SUCCESS)
}
override fun onDescriptorWrite(g: BluetoothGatt, descriptor: BluetoothGattDescriptor, status: Int) {
pendingOp?.complete(status)
}
override fun onCharacteristicWrite(g: BluetoothGatt, characteristic: BluetoothGattCharacteristic, status: Int) {
pendingOp?.complete(status)
}
// API 33+ calls this overload; older versions the deprecated one below.
override fun onCharacteristicRead(g: BluetoothGatt, characteristic: BluetoothGattCharacteristic,
value: ByteArray, status: Int) {
pendingOp?.complete(status)
}
@Deprecated("Deprecated in API 33")
override fun onCharacteristicRead(g: BluetoothGatt, characteristic: BluetoothGattCharacteristic, status: Int) {
pendingOp?.complete(status)
}
// API 33+ delivers the value here and no longer calls the deprecated overload below.
override fun onCharacteristicChanged(g: BluetoothGatt, characteristic: BluetoothGattCharacteristic, value: ByteArray) {
_incoming.tryEmit(value.copyOf())
}
@Deprecated("Deprecated in API 33")
override fun onCharacteristicChanged(g: BluetoothGatt, characteristic: BluetoothGattCharacteristic) {
@Suppress("DEPRECATION")
characteristic.value?.let { _incoming.tryEmit(it.copyOf()) }
}
}
}
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/data/transport/Esp32Link.kt
+422
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,422 @@
package com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport
import android.content.Context
import android.os.SystemClock
import android.util.Log
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.cam.PseudonymManager
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.mqtt.ObuHardwarePreferences
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.asn1.ItsTime
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.StationType
import dagger.hilt.android.qualifiers.ApplicationContext
import kotlinx.coroutines.CompletableDeferred
import kotlinx.coroutines.CoroutineScope
import kotlinx.coroutines.Dispatchers
import kotlinx.coroutines.SupervisorJob
import kotlinx.coroutines.delay
import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.MutableSharedFlow
import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.MutableStateFlow
import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.SharedFlow
import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.SharingStarted
import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.StateFlow
import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.asSharedFlow
import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.asStateFlow
import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.combine
import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.stateIn
import kotlinx.coroutines.launch
import kotlinx.coroutines.sync.Mutex
import kotlinx.coroutines.sync.withLock
import kotlinx.coroutines.withContext
import kotlinx.coroutines.withTimeoutOrNull
import java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentHashMap
import java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicInteger
import javax.inject.Inject
import javax.inject.Singleton
import kotlin.math.roundToInt
/** Connection lifecycle of the ESP32-C5 link, over either transport. */
enum class Esp32LinkState { DISCONNECTED, DEVICE_ATTACHED, PERMISSION_REQUESTED, CONNECTED, ERROR }
/** Which physical link the phone uses to reach the ESP32-C5 (Settings). */
enum class Esp32Transport(val id: String) { USB("usb"), BLE("ble") }
/** What the phone transmits while a trip records (Settings). */
enum class OutgoingMessage(val id: String) { CAM("cam"), VAM("vam") }
/**
* What the board on the other end speaks. The phone cannot ask, so it listens: the previous
* obu-firmware sends a [SerialFrameType.STATUS] heartbeat, the current one a station-link STATUS.
*/
enum class Esp32Protocol { UNKNOWN, LEGACY_SERIAL, STATION_LINK }
/** One ITS message for the air, with what the micrOBU needs to know about the sender. */
class OutgoingIts(
val kind: OutgoingMessage,
val uper: ByteArray,
/** Pseudonym MAC, station type and position; its [GnPositionVector.tstMs] is the fix time. */
val positionVector: GnPositionVector,
/** Android horizontal accuracy, metres (68 %); null when unknown. */
val accuracyM: Float?,
val signed: Boolean,
)
/**
* The one entry point the app uses to talk to the ESP32-C5: picks USB ([UsbSerialTransport]) or
* BLE ([BleLinkTransport]) from the setting, works out which firmware protocol is on the other end,
* and runs the station-link session the current firmware needs.
*
* ## Station-link session (obu-firmware since 2026-09-23)
* The firmware keeps no state the phone depends on, except what it stores itself (credentials in
* NVS), so the phone sets it up each time it sees it unconfigured:
* 1. STATION_CONFIGURE, with the current pseudonym MAC as the GN address and 802.11 source. This
* also starts the radio, which until then neither transmits nor receives.
* 2. If the answer reports no authorization ticket, CREDENTIALS_PROVISION of the demo bundle in
* `assets/demo-chain.vcr` (a disposable chain, not EU-registered: receivers that verify against
* the EU trust list will drop what it signs). The firmware keeps it in NVS from then on.
* 3. Per message: POTI_UPDATE (the fix, which also sets the micrOBU's ITS clock for the signature
* time), then BTP_DATA_REQUEST, secured or unsecured per the "Sign outgoing messages" setting.
* A pseudonym change reconfigures with the new MAC before the next message goes out. A STATUS
* saying "not configured" (the board reset) starts again at 1.
*
* ## Legacy firmware
* A board still on the previous obu-firmware (0xAA55 frames 0x01-0x05, no signing, USB only)
* keeps working for CAM exactly as before. VAM needs the current firmware.
*
* Everything received is surfaced the old way, as [DecodedFrame]s of [SerialFrameType.V2X_RX], so
* the receive side of the app did not change.
*/
@Singleton
class Esp32Link @Inject constructor(
@ApplicationContext private val context: Context,
private val usb: UsbSerialTransport,
private val ble: BleLinkTransport,
private val prefs: ObuHardwarePreferences,
private val pseudonymManager: PseudonymManager,
) {
companion object {
private const val TAG = "Esp32Link"
private const val REPLY_TIMEOUT_MS = 3_000L
/** Applying a bundle verifies the chain and rebuilds the stack on the C5: seconds, not ms. */
private const val PROVISION_TIMEOUT_MS = 15_000L
private const val SEGMENT_SIZE = 240
private const val DEMO_BUNDLE_ASSET = "demo-chain.vcr"
/**
* A PoTi this far behind the last one sent is a real correction of the phone's clock (e.g.
* GNSS time taking over from a wrong system clock), not a repeated fix; it goes through
* and the micrOBU restarts its stack at the new time once.
*/
private const val CLOCK_STEP_BACK_MS = 60_000L
/** How long a refusal stays on the connection card. */
private const val DETAIL_HOLD_MS = 10_000L
const val BTP_PORT_CAM = 2001
const val BTP_PORT_VAM = 2018
const val ITS_AID_CAM = 36L
const val ITS_AID_VAM = 638L
/** CAM SSP version 1, no special-vehicle permissions: what the demo ticket grants for ITS-AID 36. */
val SSP_CAM = byteArrayOf(0x01, 0x00, 0x00)
/** VRU SSP as the demo ticket grants for ITS-AID 638 (same as the colleague's VBS). */
val SSP_VAM = byteArrayOf(0x01)
}
private val scope = CoroutineScope(SupervisorJob() + Dispatchers.IO)
val transport: StateFlow<Esp32Transport> =
prefs.esp32TransportFlow.stateIn(scope, SharingStarted.Eagerly, Esp32Transport.USB)
val state: StateFlow<Esp32LinkState> = combine(transport, usb.state, ble.state) { t, u, b ->
if (t == Esp32Transport.USB) u else b
}.stateIn(scope, SharingStarted.Eagerly, Esp32LinkState.DISCONNECTED)
private val _protocol = MutableStateFlow(Esp32Protocol.UNKNOWN)
val protocol: StateFlow<Esp32Protocol> = _protocol.asStateFlow()
private val _incomingFrames = MutableSharedFlow<DecodedFrame>(extraBufferCapacity = 256)
/** Received ITS messages ([SerialFrameType.V2X_RX]) and, from legacy firmware, its heartbeats. */
val incomingFrames: SharedFlow<DecodedFrame> = _incomingFrames.asSharedFlow()
private val _linkStatus = MutableStateFlow<EspLinkStatus?>(null)
/** Heartbeat counters in the old shape, from either firmware; null before the first one. */
val linkStatus: StateFlow<EspLinkStatus?> = _linkStatus.asStateFlow()
private val _stationStatus = MutableStateFlow<StationStatus?>(null)
/** Full station-link STATUS (signing counters, tickets); null with legacy firmware. */
val stationStatus: StateFlow<StationStatus?> = _stationStatus.asStateFlow()
private val _detail = MutableStateFlow<String?>(null)
/** One line for the UI about the session: pairing, provisioning, or why it is stuck. */
val detail: StateFlow<String?> = _detail.asStateFlow()
private val _consecutiveWriteFailures = MutableStateFlow(0)
val consecutiveWriteFailures: StateFlow<Int> = _consecutiveWriteFailures.asStateFlow()
private val _refusedRequests = MutableStateFlow(0)
/** BTP_DATA_REQUESTs the micrOBU answered with anything but accepted (e.g. no ticket). */
val refusedRequests: StateFlow<Int> = _refusedRequests.asStateFlow()
private val sequence = AtomicInteger(0)
private val pending = ConcurrentHashMap<Int, CompletableDeferred<LinkResult>>()
private val sessionMutex = Mutex()
/** The STATION_CONFIGURE the micrOBU is known to run, or null when it has to be sent again. */
@Volatile private var configured: StationConfigure? = null
@Volatile private var lastRefusalLogMs = 0L
/**
* Timestamp of the last POTI_UPDATE sent in this session, or null when the micrOBU's ITS clock
* has to be set again (new session, board reset).
*/
@Volatile private var lastPotiMs: Long? = null
/** [SystemClock.elapsedRealtime] when [lastPotiMs] was sent: with it, where the micrOBU's clock stands now. */
@Volatile private var lastPotiElapsedMs = 0L
/** The fix time (before any clamping) of the last PoTi sent, to send each fix only once. */
@Volatile private var lastPotiFixMs: Long? = null
init {
scope.launch { usb.incomingFrames.collect { onUsbFrame(it) } }
scope.launch { ble.incoming.collect { onLinkMessage(it) } }
scope.launch { usb.linkStatus.collect { if (it != null) _linkStatus.value = it } }
// A new connection, on either transport, starts a new session.
scope.launch {
state.collect { s ->
if (s != Esp32LinkState.CONNECTED) {
configured = null; lastPotiMs = null; lastPotiFixMs = null
_protocol.value = Esp32Protocol.UNKNOWN
_stationStatus.value = null
_linkStatus.value = null
pending.values.forEach { it.cancel() }
pending.clear()
} else if (transport.value == Esp32Transport.BLE) {
_protocol.value = Esp32Protocol.STATION_LINK // BLE exists only on the current firmware
scope.launch { ensureConfigured(null) }
}
}
}
scope.launch { ble.detail.collect { if (transport.value == Esp32Transport.BLE) _detail.value = it } }
// Switching transport in Settings closes the other one; connecting stays a user action.
scope.launch {
transport.collect { t ->
if (t == Esp32Transport.USB) ble.disconnect() else usb.disconnect()
_detail.value = null
}
}
}
fun connect() {
if (transport.value == Esp32Transport.USB) usb.connect() else ble.connect()
}
fun disconnect() {
usb.disconnect()
ble.disconnect()
}
/**
* Hands one message to the micrOBU for transmission. False when it could not be handed over
* (no link, legacy firmware asked for a VAM, session setup failed); the next message retries.
* Acceptance by the micrOBU is not awaited: a refusal shows up in [refusedRequests].
*/
suspend fun send(its: OutgoingIts): Boolean = withContext(Dispatchers.IO) {
val ok = when (_protocol.value) {
Esp32Protocol.LEGACY_SERIAL -> {
if (its.kind == OutgoingMessage.CAM) {
usb.sendCamTx(its.uper, its.positionVector)
} else {
noteRefusal("VAM needs the current obu-firmware; this board runs the previous one")
false
}
}
Esp32Protocol.STATION_LINK -> sendStationLink(its)
Esp32Protocol.UNKNOWN -> false // no heartbeat yet: nothing to address
}
if (ok) _consecutiveWriteFailures.value = 0 else _consecutiveWriteFailures.value++
ok
}
private suspend fun sendStationLink(its: OutgoingIts): Boolean {
val pv = its.positionVector
if (!ensureConfigured(StationConfigure(stationType = pv.stationType, mid = pv.mac))) return false
// The micrOBU's ITS clock must never be sent backwards: past 1 s it answers
// time_regression and rebuilds its whole stack. Two things tried to. The transmit loops
// re-send the latest GNSS fix every tick while fused location pauses, so an old fix time
// arrived again and again while the micrOBU's clock ran on. And the GNSS-corrected fix
// times themselves wobble by seconds indoors (measured 2026-09-23: -2.1 s, +4.9 s between
// consecutive CAMs). So a fix goes over once, and its timestamp is never below where the
// micrOBU's clock stands now, except for a real correction of the phone clock.
val poti = potiFor(its)
if (poti.timestampMs != lastPotiFixMs) {
val last = lastPotiMs
val microbuNow = last?.let { it + (SystemClock.elapsedRealtime() - lastPotiElapsedMs) }
val timestamp = when {
microbuNow == null -> poti.timestampMs
poti.timestampMs < microbuNow - CLOCK_STEP_BACK_MS -> poti.timestampMs
else -> maxOf(poti.timestampMs, microbuNow)
}
if (!write(LinkOpcode.POTI_UPDATE, poti.copy(timestampMs = timestamp).encode())) return false
lastPotiFixMs = poti.timestampMs
lastPotiMs = timestamp
lastPotiElapsedMs = SystemClock.elapsedRealtime()
}
val request = BtpDataRequest(
destinationPort = if (its.kind == OutgoingMessage.CAM) BTP_PORT_CAM else BTP_PORT_VAM,
itsAid = if (its.kind == OutgoingMessage.CAM) ITS_AID_CAM else ITS_AID_VAM,
securityProfile = if (its.signed) LinkSecurityProfile.SECURED else LinkSecurityProfile.UNSECURED,
permissions = if (its.kind == OutgoingMessage.CAM) SSP_CAM else SSP_VAM,
flSdu = its.uper,
)
return write(LinkOpcode.BTP_DATA_REQUEST, request.encode())
}
/**
* Makes sure the micrOBU runs [wanted] (or, when null, any configuration: used right after a
* BLE connect or a board reset, to start its receiver before the first message goes out).
*/
private suspend fun ensureConfigured(wanted: StationConfigure?): Boolean = sessionMutex.withLock {
val current = configured
if (current != null && (wanted == null || current == wanted)) return@withLock true
val config = wanted ?: StationConfigure(stationType = StationType.CYCLIST, mid = pseudonymManager.current().mac)
_detail.value = "Configuring the micrOBU"
val result = request(LinkOpcode.STATION_CONFIGURE, config.encode(), REPLY_TIMEOUT_MS)
if (result == null || !result.accepted) {
_detail.value = "micrOBU did not accept the configuration (${result?.let { LinkResultCode.name(it.code) } ?: "no reply"})"
return@withLock false
}
val info = StationInfo.decode(result.detail)
Log.i(TAG, "station configured: $info")
if (info == null || !info.credentialsLoaded || info.tickets == 0) {
if (!provisionDemoCredentials()) return@withLock false
}
configured = config
_detail.value = null
true
}
private suspend fun provisionDemoCredentials(): Boolean {
_detail.value = "Provisioning the demo credentials"
val bundle = runCatching { context.assets.open(DEMO_BUNDLE_ASSET).use { it.readBytes() } }.getOrElse {
_detail.value = "Demo credential bundle missing from the app"
return false
}
var offset = 0
while (offset < bundle.size) {
val segment = bundle.copyOfRange(offset, minOf(bundle.size, offset + SEGMENT_SIZE))
val last = offset + segment.size == bundle.size
val result = request(LinkOpcode.CREDENTIALS_PROVISION, credentialsSegment(bundle.size, offset, segment),
if (last) PROVISION_TIMEOUT_MS else REPLY_TIMEOUT_MS)
if (result == null || !result.accepted) {
_detail.value = "micrOBU refused the demo credentials (${result?.let { LinkResultCode.name(it.code) } ?: "no reply"})"
return false
}
if (last) {
val d = result.detail
Log.i(TAG, "demo credentials provisioned: " +
if (d.size == 3) "${d[0]} root(s), ${d[1]} authorit(ies), ${d[2]} ticket(s)" else "no report")
}
offset += segment.size
}
return true
}
private fun potiFor(its: OutgoingIts): PotiUpdate {
val pv = its.positionVector
// Semi-axes of the 95 % ellipse from Android's 68 % radius (circular error), as GnPositionVector's PAI bound.
val semiCm = its.accuracyM?.takeIf { it > 0f && it.isFinite() }
?.let { (it * 1.62f * 100).roundToInt().coerceAtMost(65_535) } ?: 0
return PotiUpdate(
timestampMs = fullTimestampIts(pv.tstMs),
latTenMicroDeg = pv.latTenMicroDeg,
lonTenMicroDeg = pv.lonTenMicroDeg,
semiMajorCm = semiCm,
semiMinorCm = semiCm,
speedCms = pv.speedCms.coerceAtLeast(0),
headingDeciDeg = pv.headingDeciDeg,
pai = pv.pai,
)
}
/** [GnPositionVector.tstMs] is already the full TimestampIts; guard against a reduced one anyway. */
private fun fullTimestampIts(tstMs: Long): Long {
if (tstMs > 0xFFFF_FFFFL) return tstMs
val now = ItsTime.timestampIts(System.currentTimeMillis())
return now - ((now - tstMs) and 0xFFFF_FFFFL)
}
private suspend fun request(opcode: Int, body: ByteArray, timeoutMs: Long): LinkResult? {
val seq = nextSequence()
val reply = CompletableDeferred<LinkResult>()
pending[seq] = reply
return try {
if (!writeMessage(LinkMessage(opcode, seq, body).encode())) null
else withTimeoutOrNull(timeoutMs) { reply.await() }
} finally {
pending.remove(seq)
}
}
private suspend fun write(opcode: Int, body: ByteArray): Boolean =
writeMessage(LinkMessage(opcode, nextSequence(), body).encode())
private suspend fun writeMessage(message: ByteArray): Boolean =
if (transport.value == Esp32Transport.USB) usb.sendFrame(SERIAL_FRAME_LINK, message)
else ble.send(message)
private fun nextSequence(): Int = sequence.incrementAndGet() and 0xFFFF
private fun onUsbFrame(frame: DecodedFrame) {
when (frame.type) {
SerialFrameType.STATUS -> _protocol.value = Esp32Protocol.LEGACY_SERIAL
SerialFrameType.V2X_RX -> _incomingFrames.tryEmit(frame)
SERIAL_FRAME_LINK -> onLinkMessage(frame.payload)
}
}
private fun onLinkMessage(octets: ByteArray) {
val message = LinkMessage.decode(octets) ?: return
when (message.opcode) {
LinkOpcode.V2X_RX -> _incomingFrames.tryEmit(DecodedFrame(SerialFrameType.V2X_RX, message.body))
LinkOpcode.RESULT -> {
val result = LinkResult.decode(message.body) ?: return
val waiting = pending.remove(message.sequence)
if (waiting != null) {
waiting.complete(result)
} else if (result.code == LinkResultCode.TIME_REGRESSION) {
// Only sent for a deliberate clock correction (see CLOCK_STEP_BACK_MS): the
// micrOBU accepted the new time and restarted its stack. Not a refusal.
Log.i(TAG, "micrOBU followed a step back of the phone's clock and restarted its stack")
} else if (!result.accepted) {
// A POTI_UPDATE or BTP_DATA_REQUEST the micrOBU refused (they are not awaited).
_refusedRequests.value++
if (result.code == LinkResultCode.NOT_CONFIGURED) { configured = null; lastPotiMs = null; lastPotiFixMs = null }
noteRefusal("micrOBU refused a request: ${LinkResultCode.name(result.code)}")
}
}
LinkOpcode.STATUS -> {
val status = StationStatus.decode(message.body) ?: return
val first = _protocol.value != Esp32Protocol.STATION_LINK
_protocol.value = Esp32Protocol.STATION_LINK
_stationStatus.value = status
_linkStatus.value = EspLinkStatus(
status = 0,
oversizeDrops = 0,
txFailures = status.radioFailed.coerceAtMost(0xFFFF).toInt(),
rxCrcErrors = status.linkCrcErrors.coerceAtMost(0xFFFF).toInt(),
rxQueueDrops = status.radioDropped.coerceAtMost(0xFFFF).toInt(),
)
// Board reset (or first contact): configure now, so its receiver runs even before
// the first message is sent.
if (!status.configured) { configured = null; lastPotiMs = null; lastPotiFixMs = null }
if (first || !status.configured) scope.launch { ensureConfigured(null) }
}
}
}
private fun noteRefusal(line: String) {
val now = System.currentTimeMillis()
if (now - lastRefusalLogMs < 5_000) return
lastRefusalLogMs = now
Log.w(TAG, line)
_detail.value = line
// A refusal is news, not a state: it leaves the card again unless something replaced it.
scope.launch {
delay(DETAIL_HOLD_MS)
_detail.compareAndSet(line, null)
}
}
}
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/data/transport/SerialFrame.kt
+13 -2
View File
@@ -57,8 +57,9 @@ const val SERIAL_LINK_MAX_PAYLOAD = 512
/** /**
* Decoded [SerialFrameType.STATUS] payload: `[status:1][oversizeDrops:2 LE][txFailures:2 LE] * Decoded [SerialFrameType.STATUS] payload: `[status:1][oversizeDrops:2 LE][txFailures:2 LE]
* [rxCrcErrors:2 LE]` (7 bytes). Counters are free-running totals since firmware boot and * [rxCrcErrors:2 LE][capabilities:1][rxQueueDrops:2 LE]` (10 bytes; the last two fields are an
* saturate at 0xFFFF rather than wrapping. * optional tail — see [capabilities] and [rxQueueDrops]). Counters are free-running totals since
* firmware boot and saturate at 0xFFFF rather than wrapping.
* *
* Exists so the phone can tell "link alive, no traffic" from "link dead", and so firmware-side * Exists so the phone can tell "link alive, no traffic" from "link dead", and so firmware-side
* drops — which otherwise only reach `ESP_LOGW` on the flashing port that the phone isn't * drops — which otherwise only reach `ESP_LOGW` on the flashing port that the phone isn't
@@ -79,6 +80,15 @@ data class EspLinkStatus(
* the phone needs from such firmware: it accepts nothing beyond the original messages. * the phone needs from such firmware: it accepts nothing beyond the original messages.
*/ */
val capabilities: Int = 0, val capabilities: Int = 0,
/**
* Promiscuously-captured frames the firmware's `wifi_promisc_rx_cb` had to drop because its
* RX queue (8 deep) was still full of frames `rx_forward_task` hadn't finished forwarding —
* bytes 8-9 of the payload. 0 for firmware that predates this field (payload of 7 or 8 bytes),
* which is the honest answer: such firmware drops these frames identically, it just never
* counted them. A nonzero, growing value here — as opposed to [oversizeDrops] — points at
* bursty RX outrunning the forward task rather than any one frame being too large.
*/
val rxQueueDrops: Int = 0,
) { ) {
/** True when the firmware accepts [SerialFrameType.CAM_TX_PV]. */ /** True when the firmware accepts [SerialFrameType.CAM_TX_PV]. */
val supportsCamTxPv: Boolean get() = capabilities and CAP_CAM_TX_PV != 0 val supportsCamTxPv: Boolean get() = capabilities and CAP_CAM_TX_PV != 0
@@ -99,6 +109,7 @@ data class EspLinkStatus(
txFailures = u16(3), txFailures = u16(3),
rxCrcErrors = u16(5), rxCrcErrors = u16(5),
capabilities = if (payload.size > PAYLOAD_SIZE) payload[7].toInt() and 0xFF else 0, capabilities = if (payload.size > PAYLOAD_SIZE) payload[7].toInt() and 0xFF else 0,
rxQueueDrops = if (payload.size >= 10) u16(8) else 0,
) )
} }
} }
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/data/transport/StationLink.kt
+274
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,274 @@
package com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport
/**
* Phone side of the station-link message layer, version 1: the protocol of the colleague's
* vanetza-idf ESP32-C5 firmware (microbu-esp32c5/station-link/README.md), which obu-firmware runs
* since 2026-09-23. Kotlin counterpart of `obu-firmware/main/link_protocol.hpp` and of the
* colleague's Python `microbu_link/messages.py`; the unit test pins these encoders to bytes that
* Python module produced.
*
* Transport independent: over USB each message is the payload of one serial frame of type
* [SERIAL_FRAME_LINK] (same 0xAA55 framing as before, see [SerialFrameEncoder]); over BLE each
* message is one GATT value (see [BleLinkTransport]).
*
* Message: `[opcode:1][flags:1][sequence:2 LE][body]`, at most [LINK_MAX_MESSAGE] octets, all
* integers little-endian. The phone numbers its requests; the firmware answers with a RESULT
* carrying the same sequence.
*
* Only what this app uses is implemented: configure, PoTi, BTP-DATA.request, credential
* provisioning, RESULT, STATUS, and the MicrOBU extension [LinkOpcode.V2X_RX]. The SF-SAP
* identifier-change primitives are not used: the app owns its pseudonym (see
* [com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.cam.PseudonymManager]) and reconfigures the station on a change.
*/
const val SERIAL_FRAME_LINK = 0x10
const val LINK_MAX_MESSAGE = 512
const val LINK_HEADER_SIZE = 4
object LinkOpcode {
const val STATION_CONFIGURE = 0x01
const val POTI_UPDATE = 0x02
const val BTP_DATA_REQUEST = 0x03
const val CREDENTIALS_PROVISION = 0x04
const val CREDENTIALS_ERASE = 0x05
const val STATUS_REQUEST = 0x0C
const val RESULT = 0x80
const val BTP_DATA_INDICATION = 0x81
const val STATUS = 0x84
/** MicrOBU extension: body is exactly the old [SerialFrameType.V2X_RX] payload ([V2xRxFrame]). */
const val V2X_RX = 0x85
}
/** RESULT codes: vanetza_idf::Result first, then the link's own. */
object LinkResultCode {
const val ACCEPTED = 0
const val TIME_REGRESSION = 7
const val NOT_CONFIGURED = 0x12
fun name(code: Int): String = when (code) {
0 -> "accepted"; 1 -> "invalid_argument"; 2 -> "unsupported"; 3 -> "wrong_entry_point"
4 -> "security_unavailable"; 5 -> "resource_limit"; 6 -> "rejected"; 7 -> "time_regression"
8 -> "identity_change_pending"; 0x10 -> "unknown_opcode"; 0x11 -> "malformed"
0x12 -> "not_configured"; 0x13 -> "busy"; 0x14 -> "no_credentials"
else -> "code_$code"
}
}
/** GN security profile of a BTP-DATA.request (TS 103 300-3 Table 4). */
object LinkSecurityProfile {
const val STATION_DEFAULT = 0
const val UNSECURED = 1
const val SECURED = 2
}
class LinkMessage(val opcode: Int, val sequence: Int, val body: ByteArray, val flags: Int = 0) {
fun encode(): ByteArray {
require(LINK_HEADER_SIZE + body.size <= LINK_MAX_MESSAGE) {
"link message 0x%02x too long: %d".format(opcode, LINK_HEADER_SIZE + body.size)
}
return byteArrayOf(opcode.toByte(), flags.toByte(), sequence.toByte(), (sequence shr 8).toByte()) + body
}
companion object {
fun decode(octets: ByteArray): LinkMessage? {
if (octets.size < LINK_HEADER_SIZE || octets.size > LINK_MAX_MESSAGE) return null
val sequence = (octets[2].toInt() and 0xFF) or ((octets[3].toInt() and 0xFF) shl 8)
return LinkMessage(octets[0].toInt() and 0xFF, sequence,
octets.copyOfRange(LINK_HEADER_SIZE, octets.size), octets[1].toInt() and 0xFF)
}
}
}
internal class LinkWriter {
private val out = java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream()
fun u8(v: Int) = apply { out.write(v and 0xFF) }
fun u16(v: Int) = apply { u8(v); u8(v shr 8) }
fun u32(v: Long) = apply { for (i in 0 until 4) u8((v ushr (8 * i)).toInt()) }
fun i32(v: Int) = u32(v.toLong())
fun u64(v: Long) = apply { for (i in 0 until 8) u8((v ushr (8 * i)).toInt()) }
fun bytes(b: ByteArray) = apply { out.write(b) }
fun toByteArray(): ByteArray = out.toByteArray()
}
/**
* STATION_CONFIGURE body. (Re)creates the GeoNetworking stack and security entity on the micrOBU.
* [mid] is the pseudonym MAC: with [addressConfiguration] 0 (AUTO) it becomes both the GN_ADDR MID
* and the 802.11 source address, as with the old CAM_TX_PV prefix.
*/
data class StationConfigure(
val stationType: Int,
val mid: ByteArray,
val security: Int = 1,
val addressConfiguration: Int = 0,
val beaconing: Int = 0,
val channelNumber: Int = 180,
val transmitPowerDbm: Int = 20,
/** 0 off, 1 receive only, 2 transmit and receive. */
val radio: Int = 2,
/** Raw GN traffic class octet: TC-ID 2, as the previous firmware's geonet.c. */
val defaultTrafficClass: Int = 2,
/** Raw GN lifetime octet: 1 s. */
val defaultLifetime: Int = 0x05,
) {
init { require(mid.size == 6) }
fun encode(): ByteArray = LinkWriter()
.u8(stationType).u8(security).u8(addressConfiguration).bytes(mid).u8(beaconing)
.u16(channelNumber).u8(transmitPowerDbm).u8(radio).u8(defaultTrafficClass).u8(defaultLifetime)
.toByteArray()
override fun equals(other: Any?): Boolean = other is StationConfigure && encode().contentEquals(other.encode())
override fun hashCode(): Int = encode().contentHashCode()
}
/** RESULT detail of STATION_CONFIGURE. */
data class StationInfo(val credentialsLoaded: Boolean, val tickets: Int) {
companion object {
fun decode(detail: ByteArray): StationInfo? =
if (detail.size != 18) null
else StationInfo(detail[16].toInt() != 0, detail[17].toInt() and 0xFF)
}
}
/**
* POTI_UPDATE body (EN 302 890-2 minimum data set). [timestampMs] is TimestampIts under
* [com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.asn1.ItsTime]'s convention; it also sets the micrOBU's ITS clock,
* which the security entity stamps into every signed message's generationTime.
*/
data class PotiUpdate(
val timestampMs: Long,
val latTenMicroDeg: Int,
val lonTenMicroDeg: Int,
val semiMajorCm: Int = 0,
val semiMinorCm: Int = 0,
val orientationDeciDeg: Int = 0,
val altitudeCm: Int? = null,
val speedCms: Int? = null,
val headingDeciDeg: Int? = null,
val pai: Boolean = false,
) {
fun encode(): ByteArray {
val flags = (if (altitudeCm != null) 1 else 0) or (if (speedCms != null) 2 else 0) or
(if (headingDeciDeg != null) 4 else 0) or (if (pai) 8 else 0)
return LinkWriter().u64(timestampMs).i32(latTenMicroDeg).i32(lonTenMicroDeg)
.u16(semiMajorCm).u16(semiMinorCm).u16(orientationDeciDeg).u8(flags)
.i32(altitudeCm ?: 0).u16(speedCms ?: 0).u16(headingDeciDeg ?: 0)
.toByteArray()
}
}
/**
* BTP_DATA_REQUEST body for a BTP-B single-hop broadcast, the only shape this app sends (CAM, VAM).
* [permissions] is the SSP the authorization ticket must carry for [itsAid].
*/
data class BtpDataRequest(
val destinationPort: Int,
val itsAid: Long,
val securityProfile: Int,
val permissions: ByteArray,
val flSdu: ByteArray,
/** Raw GN lifetime octet; 0xFF = station default. */
val maximumPacketLifetime: Int = 0xFF,
) {
fun encode(): ByteArray = LinkWriter()
.u8(1) // BTP-B
.u16(destinationPort)
.u16(0) // destination port info
.u8(1) // SHB
.u8(1) // communication profile ITS-G5
.u8(securityProfile)
.u8(0xFF) // traffic class: station default
.u8(maximumPacketLifetime)
.u8(0) // hop limit: station default
.u16(0).u16(0) // no repetition
.u32(itsAid)
.u8(permissions.size).bytes(permissions)
.u8(0) // no SN-ENCAP context
.u16(flSdu.size).bytes(flSdu)
.toByteArray()
override fun equals(other: Any?): Boolean = other is BtpDataRequest && encode().contentEquals(other.encode())
override fun hashCode(): Int = encode().contentHashCode()
}
/** One CREDENTIALS_PROVISION segment of a `VCR1` bundle. */
fun credentialsSegment(totalLength: Int, offset: Int, segment: ByteArray): ByteArray {
require(segment.size <= 255)
return LinkWriter().u16(totalLength).u16(offset).u8(segment.size).bytes(segment).toByteArray()
}
data class LinkResult(val code: Int, val detail: ByteArray) {
val accepted: Boolean get() = code == LinkResultCode.ACCEPTED
override fun toString(): String = "LinkResult(${LinkResultCode.name(code)}, ${detail.size} B detail)"
override fun equals(other: Any?): Boolean = other is LinkResult && code == other.code && detail.contentEquals(other.detail)
override fun hashCode(): Int = 31 * code + detail.contentHashCode()
companion object {
fun decode(body: ByteArray): LinkResult? {
if (body.size < 2) return null
val length = body[1].toInt() and 0xFF
if (body.size != 2 + length) return null
return LinkResult(body[0].toInt() and 0xFF, body.copyOfRange(2, body.size))
}
}
}
/** STATUS body (103 octets), sent by the micrOBU every second. Counters are since the last configure. */
data class StationStatus(
val uptimeMs: Long,
val configured: Boolean,
val identifier: ByteArray,
val tickets: Int,
val signedMessages: Long,
val refusedNoTicket: Long,
val refusedChangePending: Long,
val refusedPermission: Long,
val signFailed: Long,
val verified: Long,
val rejected: Long,
val requestsAccepted: Long,
val requestsRefused: Long,
val radioSubmitted: Long,
val radioFailed: Long,
val radioReceived: Long,
val radioDropped: Long,
val linkCrcErrors: Long,
val linkMalformed: Long,
val potiUpdates: Long,
val itsTimeMs: Long,
) {
/** Signing refusals of every kind: no usable ticket, a pending id change, or a missing permission. */
val signRefused: Long get() = refusedNoTicket + refusedChangePending + refusedPermission + signFailed
override fun equals(other: Any?): Boolean = other is StationStatus && toString() == other.toString() &&
identifier.contentEquals(other.identifier)
override fun hashCode(): Int = toString().hashCode()
companion object {
const val SIZE = 103
fun decode(body: ByteArray): StationStatus? {
if (body.size != SIZE) return null
fun u8(i: Int) = body[i].toInt() and 0xFF
fun u32(i: Int) = (0 until 4).fold(0L) { acc, k -> acc or ((body[i + k].toLong() and 0xFF) shl (8 * k)) }
fun u64(i: Int) = (0 until 8).fold(0L) { acc, k -> acc or ((body[i + k].toLong() and 0xFF) shl (8 * k)) }
// [0] uptime u32, [4] configured, [5] gn_address 8, [13] identifier 8, [21] change_pending,
// [22] tickets, [23] 18 x u32 counters, [95] its_time u64
val c = 23
return StationStatus(
uptimeMs = u32(0),
configured = u8(4) != 0,
identifier = body.copyOfRange(13, 21),
tickets = u8(22),
signedMessages = u32(c), refusedNoTicket = u32(c + 4), refusedChangePending = u32(c + 8),
refusedPermission = u32(c + 12), signFailed = u32(c + 16), verified = u32(c + 20),
rejected = u32(c + 24), requestsAccepted = u32(c + 28), requestsRefused = u32(c + 32),
// c + 36: indications (the stack's own verified deliveries; the app uses V2X_RX)
radioSubmitted = u32(c + 40), radioFailed = u32(c + 44), radioReceived = u32(c + 48),
radioDropped = u32(c + 52),
// c + 56: link_rx_frames
linkCrcErrors = u32(c + 60), linkMalformed = u32(c + 64), potiUpdates = u32(c + 68),
itsTimeMs = u64(95),
)
}
}
}
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/data/transport/UsbSerialTransport.kt
+48 -22
View File
@@ -35,9 +35,6 @@ import kotlinx.coroutines.launch
import javax.inject.Inject import javax.inject.Inject
import javax.inject.Singleton import javax.inject.Singleton
/** Connection lifecycle for the ESP32-C5 USB-serial link. */
enum class UsbSerialState { DISCONNECTED, DEVICE_ATTACHED, PERMISSION_REQUESTED, CONNECTED, ERROR }
private const val ACTION_USB_PERMISSION = "com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.USB_SERIAL_PERMISSION" private const val ACTION_USB_PERMISSION = "com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.USB_SERIAL_PERMISSION"
private const val TAG = "UsbSerialTransport" private const val TAG = "UsbSerialTransport"
@@ -63,6 +60,11 @@ private const val TAG = "UsbSerialTransport"
* Baud rate is not applicable here — USB Serial/JTAG has no baud concept; `setParameters` below * Baud rate is not applicable here — USB Serial/JTAG has no baud concept; `setParameters` below
* is a no-op the library requires anyway for API-shape reasons but the value is otherwise unused. * is a no-op the library requires anyway for API-shape reasons but the value is otherwise unused.
* *
* Since 2026-09-23 the rest of the app does not use this class directly but [Esp32Link], which
* picks this or [BleLinkTransport] and speaks either the previous firmware's frames (0x01-0x05,
* [sendCamTx]) or the current firmware's station-link messages (frame type [SERIAL_FRAME_LINK],
* [sendFrame]) over it.
*
* ## Ownership * ## Ownership
* This is a `@Singleton` shared by the UI ([com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.viewmodel.MqttViewModel]), the * This is a `@Singleton` shared by the UI ([com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.viewmodel.MqttViewModel]), the
* foreground [com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.service.TripRecordingService]'s * foreground [com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.service.TripRecordingService]'s
@@ -111,8 +113,8 @@ class UsbSerialTransport @Inject constructor(
private val scope = CoroutineScope(SupervisorJob() + Dispatchers.Default) private val scope = CoroutineScope(SupervisorJob() + Dispatchers.Default)
private val _state = MutableStateFlow(UsbSerialState.DISCONNECTED) private val _state = MutableStateFlow(Esp32LinkState.DISCONNECTED)
val state: StateFlow<UsbSerialState> = _state.asStateFlow() val state: StateFlow<Esp32LinkState> = _state.asStateFlow()
private val _incomingFrames = MutableSharedFlow<DecodedFrame>(extraBufferCapacity = 256) private val _incomingFrames = MutableSharedFlow<DecodedFrame>(extraBufferCapacity = 256)
/** Every valid frame the ESP32 sends (CAM_RX and STATUS) — callers filter by [DecodedFrame.type]. */ /** Every valid frame the ESP32 sends (CAM_RX and STATUS) — callers filter by [DecodedFrame.type]. */
@@ -150,7 +152,7 @@ class UsbSerialTransport @Inject constructor(
} else { } else {
Log.w(TAG, "usbReceiver: permission denied or device null " + Log.w(TAG, "usbReceiver: permission denied or device null " +
"(granted=$granted, device=$device)") "(granted=$granted, device=$device)")
_state.value = UsbSerialState.ERROR _state.value = Esp32LinkState.ERROR
} }
} }
UsbManager.ACTION_USB_DEVICE_DETACHED -> { UsbManager.ACTION_USB_DEVICE_DETACHED -> {
@@ -174,7 +176,7 @@ class UsbSerialTransport @Inject constructor(
* repeatedly (e.g. from a "retry" UI action) — no-ops if already connected. * repeatedly (e.g. from a "retry" UI action) — no-ops if already connected.
*/ */
fun connect() { fun connect() {
if (_state.value == UsbSerialState.CONNECTED) { if (_state.value == Esp32LinkState.CONNECTED) {
Log.i(TAG, "connect(): already connected, no-op") Log.i(TAG, "connect(): already connected, no-op")
return return
} }
@@ -197,7 +199,7 @@ class UsbSerialTransport @Inject constructor(
"(see device list logged above) - either nothing is attached at the Android " + "(see device list logged above) - either nothing is attached at the Android " +
"USB level, or it's attached but its VID/PID doesn't match any entry in " + "USB level, or it's attached but its VID/PID doesn't match any entry in " +
"customProber's table") "customProber's table")
_state.value = UsbSerialState.DISCONNECTED _state.value = Esp32LinkState.DISCONNECTED
return return
} }
if (espDriver == null) { if (espDriver == null) {
@@ -211,14 +213,14 @@ class UsbSerialTransport @Inject constructor(
Log.i(TAG, "connect(): matched device vid=0x${device.vendorId.toString(16)} " + Log.i(TAG, "connect(): matched device vid=0x${device.vendorId.toString(16)} " +
"pid=0x${device.productId.toString(16)} name=${device.deviceName} " + "pid=0x${device.productId.toString(16)} name=${device.deviceName} " +
"ports=${driver.ports.size}") "ports=${driver.ports.size}")
_state.value = UsbSerialState.DEVICE_ATTACHED _state.value = Esp32LinkState.DEVICE_ATTACHED
if (usbManager.hasPermission(device)) { if (usbManager.hasPermission(device)) {
Log.i(TAG, "connect(): permission already granted, opening directly") Log.i(TAG, "connect(): permission already granted, opening directly")
openDevice(device) openDevice(device)
} else { } else {
Log.i(TAG, "connect(): requesting USB permission from user") Log.i(TAG, "connect(): requesting USB permission from user")
_state.value = UsbSerialState.PERMISSION_REQUESTED _state.value = Esp32LinkState.PERMISSION_REQUESTED
val flags = if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= Build.VERSION_CODES.S) PendingIntent.FLAG_MUTABLE else 0 val flags = if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= Build.VERSION_CODES.S) PendingIntent.FLAG_MUTABLE else 0
val permissionIntent = PendingIntent.getBroadcast( val permissionIntent = PendingIntent.getBroadcast(
context, 0, Intent(ACTION_USB_PERMISSION).setPackage(context.packageName), flags, context, 0, Intent(ACTION_USB_PERMISSION).setPackage(context.packageName), flags,
@@ -269,14 +271,14 @@ class UsbSerialTransport @Inject constructor(
if (driver == null || driver.ports.isEmpty()) { if (driver == null || driver.ports.isEmpty()) {
Log.w(TAG, "openDevice(): probeDevice returned null or no ports for " + Log.w(TAG, "openDevice(): probeDevice returned null or no ports for " +
"vid=0x${device.vendorId.toString(16)} pid=0x${device.productId.toString(16)}") "vid=0x${device.vendorId.toString(16)} pid=0x${device.productId.toString(16)}")
_state.value = UsbSerialState.ERROR _state.value = Esp32LinkState.ERROR
return return
} }
val connection = usbManager.openDevice(device) val connection = usbManager.openDevice(device)
if (connection == null) { if (connection == null) {
Log.w(TAG, "openDevice(): usbManager.openDevice() returned null - permission not " + Log.w(TAG, "openDevice(): usbManager.openDevice() returned null - permission not " +
"actually granted, or Android couldn't claim the device") "actually granted, or Android couldn't claim the device")
_state.value = UsbSerialState.ERROR _state.value = Esp32LinkState.ERROR
return return
} }
@@ -287,7 +289,7 @@ class UsbSerialTransport @Inject constructor(
} catch (e: Exception) { } catch (e: Exception) {
Log.e(TAG, "openDevice(): port.open()/setParameters() threw", e) Log.e(TAG, "openDevice(): port.open()/setParameters() threw", e)
runCatching { newPort.close() } runCatching { newPort.close() }
_state.value = UsbSerialState.ERROR _state.value = Esp32LinkState.ERROR
return return
} }
@@ -330,13 +332,15 @@ class UsbSerialTransport @Inject constructor(
prev.txFailures != status.txFailures || prev.txFailures != status.txFailures ||
prev.rxCrcErrors != status.rxCrcErrors || prev.rxCrcErrors != status.rxCrcErrors ||
prev.status != status.status || prev.status != status.status ||
prev.capabilities != status.capabilities prev.capabilities != status.capabilities ||
prev.rxQueueDrops != status.rxQueueDrops
) { ) {
Log.i(TAG, "ESP32 counters: status=${status.status} " + Log.i(TAG, "ESP32 counters: status=${status.status} " +
"oversizeDrops=${status.oversizeDrops} " + "oversizeDrops=${status.oversizeDrops} " +
"txFailures=${status.txFailures} " + "txFailures=${status.txFailures} " +
"rxCrcErrors=${status.rxCrcErrors} " + "rxCrcErrors=${status.rxCrcErrors} " +
"capabilities=${status.capabilities}") "capabilities=${status.capabilities} " +
"rxQueueDrops=${status.rxQueueDrops}")
} }
_linkStatus.value = status _linkStatus.value = status
} }
@@ -347,7 +351,7 @@ class UsbSerialTransport @Inject constructor(
override fun onRunError(e: Exception) { override fun onRunError(e: Exception) {
Log.e(TAG, "SerialInputOutputManager.onRunError()", e) Log.e(TAG, "SerialInputOutputManager.onRunError()", e)
_state.value = UsbSerialState.ERROR _state.value = Esp32LinkState.ERROR
} }
}) })
ioManager = manager ioManager = manager
@@ -360,13 +364,13 @@ class UsbSerialTransport @Inject constructor(
_consecutiveWriteFailures.value = 0 _consecutiveWriteFailures.value = 0
_linkStatus.value = null _linkStatus.value = null
lastFrameAtMs = SystemClock.elapsedRealtime() lastFrameAtMs = SystemClock.elapsedRealtime()
_state.value = UsbSerialState.CONNECTED _state.value = Esp32LinkState.CONNECTED
startWatchdog() startWatchdog()
} }
} }
/** /**
* Flips the link to [UsbSerialState.ERROR] once the firmware's 1 Hz STATUS heartbeat has been * Flips the link to [Esp32LinkState.ERROR] once the firmware's 1 Hz STATUS heartbeat has been
* missing for [LINK_TIMEOUT_MS]. Without this, "connected" only ever means "the port opened * missing for [LINK_TIMEOUT_MS]. Without this, "connected" only ever means "the port opened
* at some point in the past" — which on a bench is exactly the wrong thing to believe. * at some point in the past" — which on a bench is exactly the wrong thing to believe.
*/ */
@@ -375,14 +379,14 @@ class UsbSerialTransport @Inject constructor(
watchdogJob = scope.launch { watchdogJob = scope.launch {
while (isActive) { while (isActive) {
delay(WATCHDOG_POLL_MS) delay(WATCHDOG_POLL_MS)
if (_state.value != UsbSerialState.CONNECTED) continue if (_state.value != Esp32LinkState.CONNECTED) continue
val silentFor = SystemClock.elapsedRealtime() - lastFrameAtMs val silentFor = SystemClock.elapsedRealtime() - lastFrameAtMs
if (silentFor > LINK_TIMEOUT_MS) { if (silentFor > LINK_TIMEOUT_MS) {
Log.w(TAG, "watchdog: no frame from ESP32 for ${silentFor}ms (heartbeat " + Log.w(TAG, "watchdog: no frame from ESP32 for ${silentFor}ms (heartbeat " +
"expected at 1 Hz) - marking link ERROR. Either the firmware is wedged/" + "expected at 1 Hz) - marking link ERROR. Either the firmware is wedged/" +
"not running, or the host->device direction opened but device->host " + "not running, or the host->device direction opened but device->host " +
"never did (see the DTR note in openDevice()).") "never did (see the DTR note in openDevice()).")
_state.value = UsbSerialState.ERROR _state.value = Esp32LinkState.ERROR
} }
} }
} }
@@ -443,7 +447,29 @@ class UsbSerialTransport @Inject constructor(
} catch (e: Exception) { } catch (e: Exception) {
val failures = _consecutiveWriteFailures.updateAndGet { it + 1 } val failures = _consecutiveWriteFailures.updateAndGet { it + 1 }
Log.w(TAG, "sendCamTx(): write failed (consecutive failures: $failures)", e) Log.w(TAG, "sendCamTx(): write failed (consecutive failures: $failures)", e)
_state.value = UsbSerialState.ERROR _state.value = Esp32LinkState.ERROR
false
}
}
/**
* Writes one frame of any [type] (the station-link messages go as [SERIAL_FRAME_LINK]). Same
* failure accounting as [sendCamTx]. Blocking, 200 ms timeout: call from a background dispatcher.
*/
fun sendFrame(type: Int, payload: ByteArray): Boolean {
val p = port
if (p == null) {
_consecutiveWriteFailures.update { it + 1 }
return false
}
return try {
p.write(SerialFrameEncoder.encode(type, payload), /* timeout ms */ 200)
_consecutiveWriteFailures.value = 0
true
} catch (e: Exception) {
val failures = _consecutiveWriteFailures.updateAndGet { it + 1 }
Log.w(TAG, "sendFrame(0x${type.toString(16)}): write failed (consecutive failures: $failures)", e)
_state.value = Esp32LinkState.ERROR
false false
} }
} }
@@ -459,7 +485,7 @@ class UsbSerialTransport @Inject constructor(
openDeviceName = null openDeviceName = null
_linkStatus.value = null _linkStatus.value = null
_consecutiveWriteFailures.value = 0 _consecutiveWriteFailures.value = 0
_state.value = UsbSerialState.DISCONNECTED _state.value = Esp32LinkState.DISCONNECTED
} }
} }
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/domain/asn1/Asn1UperCodec.kt
+1 -1
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ import javax.inject.Singleton
* UPER (Unaligned Packed Encoding Rules) codec for CAM, used on the ESP32-C5 hardware path * UPER (Unaligned Packed Encoding Rules) codec for CAM, used on the ESP32-C5 hardware path
* (Phase 03, Section 13): the phone builds outgoing CAM itself * (Phase 03, Section 13): the phone builds outgoing CAM itself
* ([com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.PhoneCamBuilder]) and UPER-encodes it before handing bytes * ([com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.PhoneCamBuilder]) and UPER-encodes it before handing bytes
* to [com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.UsbSerialTransport], and UPER-decodes whatever the * to [com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.Esp32Link], and UPER-decodes whatever the
* ESP32-C5 forwards back on receive (already stripped of 802.11/GeoNetworking/BTP framing by * ESP32-C5 forwards back on receive (already stripped of 802.11/GeoNetworking/BTP framing by
* the firmware's `gn_unwrap.c` — this only ever sees CAM UPER bytes, never raw radio frames). * the firmware's `gn_unwrap.c` — this only ever sees CAM UPER bytes, never raw radio frames).
* *
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/domain/asn1/VamUperCodec.kt
+145
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
package com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.asn1
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.StationType
import kotlin.math.roundToInt
import kotlin.math.roundToLong
/**
* One VAM's content, in the units the phone has. Everything optional here is encoded as the ASN.1
* "unavailable" value when null, never as a made-up number.
*/
data class VamContent(
val stationId: Long,
/** Wall-clock epoch ms of the fix, GNSS-corrected; the generationDeltaTime source. */
val timestamp: Long,
val latitude: Double,
val longitude: Double,
/** Android horizontal accuracy, metres (68 %). Null or 0: unknown. */
val accuracyM: Float?,
val speedMps: Double,
val headingDeg: Double,
/** Along-track acceleration, m/s². */
val accelerationMps2: Double? = null,
/** Include the low-frequency container (profile and size class). */
val includeLowFrequency: Boolean,
)
/**
* UPER encoder for the VAM of ETSI TS 103 300-3 V2.3.1 (VAM-PDU-Descriptions major version 3,
* over the CDD of TS 102 894-2 V2.4.1), for a bicyclist in VRU profile 2.
*
* Covers the same field set as the colleague's reference VBS (microbu-esp32c5,
* station-link/python/microbu_link/vbs.py, `VbsLite.assemble`), which encodes with asn1tools from
* the ETSI modules: header, basic container, the three mandatory fields of the high-frequency
* container, and optionally the low-frequency container with profile and size class. No cluster
* or motion-prediction containers. The unit test cross-checks the bytes against asn1tools.
*
* Transmit only for now: the app neither decodes received VAMs nor shows them.
*/
object VamUperCodec {
const val PROTOCOL_VERSION = 3
const val MESSAGE_ID_VAM = 16
/** VruSubProfileBicyclist.bicyclist */
private const val SUBPROFILE_BICYCLIST = 1
/** VruSizeClass.low */
private const val SIZE_CLASS_LOW = 1
/** VruProfileAndSubprofile CHOICE index of bicyclistAndLightVruVehicle (root: 4 alternatives). */
private const val PROFILE_BICYCLIST_INDEX = 1
private const val SEMI_AXIS_OUT_OF_RANGE = 4094
private const val SEMI_AXIS_UNAVAILABLE = 4095
private const val WGS84_ANGLE_UNAVAILABLE = 3601
private const val ANGLE_CONFIDENCE_UNAVAILABLE = 127
private const val SPEED_OUT_OF_RANGE = 16382
private const val SPEED_CONFIDENCE_UNAVAILABLE = 127
private const val ACCEL_UNAVAILABLE = 161
private const val ACCEL_CONFIDENCE_UNAVAILABLE = 102
private const val ALTITUDE_UNAVAILABLE = 800001
private const val ALTITUDE_CONFIDENCE_UNAVAILABLE = 15
/**
* Android's accuracy is a 68 % radius; the confidence ellipse is 95 %. For a circular 2-D error
* the ratio is about 1.62, the same factor [com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.GnPositionVector]
* uses for its PAI bound.
*/
private const val ACCURACY_68_TO_95 = 1.62
private const val ENCODE_BUFFER_BYTES = 64
fun encode(vam: VamContent): ByteArray {
val w = BitWriter(ENCODE_BUFFER_BYTES)
// VAM ::= SEQUENCE { header, vam } -- not extensible
// ItsPduHeader
w.putBits(PROTOCOL_VERSION, 8)
w.putBits(MESSAGE_ID_VAM, 8)
w.putBits(vam.stationId and 0xFFFFFFFFL, 32)
// VruAwareness ::= SEQUENCE { generationDeltaTime, vamParameters }
w.putBits(CamUperCodec.generationDeltaTime(vam.timestamp), 16)
// VamParameters ::= SEQUENCE { basic, hf, lf OPT, clusterInfo OPT, clusterOp OPT, motion OPT, ... }
w.putBits(0, 1) // extension bit
w.putBits(if (vam.includeLowFrequency) 0b1000 else 0b0000, 4)
// BasicContainer ::= SEQUENCE { stationType, referencePosition, ... }
w.putBits(0, 1)
w.putBits(StationType.CYCLIST, 8)
// ReferencePositionWithConfidence ::= SEQUENCE { latitude, longitude, ellipse, altitude }
w.putBits(latitude(vam.latitude) + 900_000_000L, 31)
w.putBits(longitude(vam.longitude) + 1_800_000_000L, 32)
val semiAxis = semiAxisCm(vam.accuracyM)
w.putBits(semiAxis, 12) // semiMajorAxisLength
w.putBits(semiAxis, 12) // semiMinorAxisLength
// Circular error: the orientation of the major axis says nothing, so it is unavailable.
w.putBits(WGS84_ANGLE_UNAVAILABLE, 12)
// Altitude: GnssReading carries no "has altitude" flag, so an honest unavailable.
w.putBits(ALTITUDE_UNAVAILABLE + 100_000, 20)
w.putBits(ALTITUDE_CONFIDENCE_UNAVAILABLE, 4)
// VruHighFrequencyContainer ::= SEQUENCE { heading, speed, longitudinalAcceleration, 11 OPTIONAL, ... }
w.putBits(0, 1)
w.putBits(0, 11)
w.putBits(headingDeciDeg(vam.headingDeg), 12)
w.putBits(ANGLE_CONFIDENCE_UNAVAILABLE - 1, 7) // Wgs84AngleConfidence (1..127)
w.putBits(speedCms(vam.speedMps), 14)
w.putBits(SPEED_CONFIDENCE_UNAVAILABLE - 1, 7) // SpeedConfidence (1..127)
w.putBits(accelDeciMps2(vam.accelerationMps2) + 160, 9)
w.putBits(ACCEL_CONFIDENCE_UNAVAILABLE, 7)
if (vam.includeLowFrequency) {
// VruLowFrequencyContainer ::= SEQUENCE { profileAndSubprofile, sizeClass OPT, exteriorLights OPT, ... }
w.putBits(0, 1)
w.putBits(0b10, 2)
// VruProfileAndSubprofile ::= CHOICE { pedestrian, bicyclistAndLightVruVehicle, motorcyclist, animal, ... }
w.putBits(0, 1)
w.putBits(PROFILE_BICYCLIST_INDEX, 2)
w.putBits(SUBPROFILE_BICYCLIST, 4)
w.putBits(SIZE_CLASS_LOW, 4)
}
return w.toByteArray()
}
private fun latitude(deg: Double): Long =
if (deg.isFinite()) (deg * 1e7).roundToLong().coerceIn(-900_000_000L, 900_000_000L) else 900_000_001L
private fun longitude(deg: Double): Long =
if (deg.isFinite()) (deg * 1e7).roundToLong().coerceIn(-1_799_999_999L, 1_800_000_000L) else 1_800_000_001L
private fun semiAxisCm(accuracyM: Float?): Int {
if (accuracyM == null || !accuracyM.isFinite() || accuracyM <= 0f) return SEMI_AXIS_UNAVAILABLE
val cm = (accuracyM * ACCURACY_68_TO_95 * 100).roundToInt()
return if (cm >= SEMI_AXIS_OUT_OF_RANGE) SEMI_AXIS_OUT_OF_RANGE else cm.coerceAtLeast(1)
}
private fun headingDeciDeg(deg: Double): Int =
if (deg.isFinite()) Math.floorMod((deg * 10).roundToInt(), 3600) else WGS84_ANGLE_UNAVAILABLE
private fun speedCms(mps: Double): Int =
if (mps.isFinite()) (mps * 100).roundToInt().coerceIn(0, SPEED_OUT_OF_RANGE) else 16383
private fun accelDeciMps2(mps2: Double?): Int =
if (mps2 == null || !mps2.isFinite()) ACCEL_UNAVAILABLE else (mps2 * 10).roundToInt().coerceIn(-160, 160)
}
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/domain/cam/PhoneCamBuilder.kt
+1 -1
View File
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ import kotlin.math.abs
* This class only does the sensor-fusion-into-CAM-fields part, independent of the wire protocol * This class only does the sensor-fusion-into-CAM-fields part, independent of the wire protocol
* to the ESP32-C5. Live flow, driven by [com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.service.CamTransmitLoop]: * to the ESP32-C5. Live flow, driven by [com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.service.CamTransmitLoop]:
* *
* `PhoneCamBuilder.build(...)` → `RealAsn1UperCodec.encodeCam(...)` → `UsbSerialTransport` (write). * `PhoneCamBuilder.build(...)` → `RealAsn1UperCodec.encodeCam(...)` → `Esp32Link` (write).
* *
* Position/speed/heading come straight from GNSS. Yaw rate is derived from the gyroscope's * Position/speed/heading come straight from GNSS. Yaw rate is derived from the gyroscope's
* z-axis reading (rotation about the vertical axis while the phone is roughly flat/mounted * z-axis reading (rotation about the vertical axis while the phone is roughly flat/mounted
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/domain/vam/VamGenerationRules.kt
+60
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
package com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.vam
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.usecase.GeoMath
import kotlin.math.abs
/**
* When to send an individual VAM: ETSI TS 103 300-3 V2.3.1 clause 6.4, items 1 to 4, with the
* recommended values of Tables 16 and 17 — the same rules the colleague's reference VBS applies
* (microbu-esp32c5/station-link/python/microbu_link/vbs.py, `VbsLite.due`). No clustering, no
* redundancy mitigation, T_GenVam fixed at its minimum (no DCC input).
*
* Pure and clock-free (callers pass times in ms), so it can be tested without Android.
*/
class VamGenerationRules {
data class Kinematics(val latitude: Double, val longitude: Double, val speedMps: Double, val headingDeg: Double)
private var last: Kinematics? = null
private var lastAtMs = 0L
private var lastLowFrequencyAtMs: Long? = null
/** True if a VAM is due at [nowMs] for the VRU now at [now]. */
fun due(nowMs: Long, now: Kinematics): Boolean {
val previous = last ?: return true
val elapsed = nowMs - lastAtMs
if (elapsed < T_GEN_VAM_MIN_MS) return false
if (elapsed > T_GEN_VAM_MAX_MS) return true // item 1
if (GeoMath.haversineMeters(now.latitude, now.longitude, previous.latitude, previous.longitude) >
MIN_POSITION_CHANGE_M) return true // item 2
if (abs(now.speedMps - previous.speedMps) > MIN_SPEED_CHANGE_MPS) return true // item 3
val headingDelta = abs(((now.headingDeg - previous.headingDeg + 180.0) % 360.0 + 360.0) % 360.0 - 180.0)
return headingDelta > MIN_ORIENTATION_CHANGE_DEG // item 4
}
/** True if the VAM sent at [nowMs] carries the low-frequency container (first VAM, then every T_GenVamLFMin). */
fun includeLowFrequency(nowMs: Long): Boolean =
lastLowFrequencyAtMs.let { it == null || nowMs - it >= T_GEN_VAM_LF_MIN_MS }
/** Records that a VAM went out at [nowMs] for [sent], with or without the low-frequency container. */
fun onSent(nowMs: Long, sent: Kinematics, withLowFrequency: Boolean) {
last = sent
lastAtMs = nowMs
if (withLowFrequency) lastLowFrequencyAtMs = nowMs
}
fun reset() {
last = null
lastAtMs = 0L
lastLowFrequencyAtMs = null
}
companion object {
const val T_GEN_VAM_MIN_MS = 100L
const val T_GEN_VAM_MAX_MS = 5_000L
const val T_GEN_VAM_LF_MIN_MS = 2_000L
const val MIN_POSITION_CHANGE_M = 4.0
const val MIN_SPEED_CHANGE_MPS = 0.5
const val MIN_ORIENTATION_CHANGE_DEG = 4.0
}
}
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/service/CamPinger.kt
+9 -3
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,10 @@ import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.GnssReading
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.GnssTimeSource import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.GnssTimeSource
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.SensorRepository import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.SensorRepository
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.GnPositionVector import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.GnPositionVector
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.UsbSerialTransport import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.mqtt.ObuHardwarePreferences
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.Esp32Link
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.OutgoingIts
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.OutgoingMessage
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.asn1.RealAsn1UperCodec import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.asn1.RealAsn1UperCodec
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.OwnStationIds import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.OwnStationIds
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.PhoneCamBuilder import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.PhoneCamBuilder
@@ -21,6 +24,7 @@ import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.MutableStateFlow
import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.StateFlow import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.StateFlow
import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.asStateFlow import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.asStateFlow
import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.update import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.update
import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.first
import kotlinx.coroutines.launch import kotlinx.coroutines.launch
import javax.inject.Inject import javax.inject.Inject
import javax.inject.Singleton import javax.inject.Singleton
@@ -49,7 +53,8 @@ import javax.inject.Singleton
@Singleton @Singleton
class CamPinger @Inject constructor( class CamPinger @Inject constructor(
@ApplicationContext private val context: Context, @ApplicationContext private val context: Context,
private val usbSerialTransport: UsbSerialTransport, private val esp32Link: Esp32Link,
private val prefs: ObuHardwarePreferences,
private val codec: RealAsn1UperCodec, private val codec: RealAsn1UperCodec,
) { ) {
private val scope = CoroutineScope(SupervisorJob() + Dispatchers.Default) private val scope = CoroutineScope(SupervisorJob() + Dispatchers.Default)
@@ -114,7 +119,8 @@ class CamPinger @Inject constructor(
// Fixed bench identity on every layer, the link-layer address included, so a ping // Fixed bench identity on every layer, the link-layer address included, so a ping
// stays recognisable in a capture and never rotates. // stays recognisable in a capture and never rotates.
val pv = GnPositionVector.fromCam(cam, gnss.accuracyM, OwnStationIds.BENCH_PING_MAC) val pv = GnPositionVector.fromCam(cam, gnss.accuracyM, OwnStationIds.BENCH_PING_MAC)
if (usbSerialTransport.sendCamTx(bytes, pv)) { val signed = prefs.signOutgoingFlow.first()
if (esp32Link.send(OutgoingIts(OutgoingMessage.CAM, bytes, pv, gnss.accuracyM, signed))) {
_sentCount.update { it + 1 } _sentCount.update { it + 1 }
} }
} }
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/service/CamTransmitLoop.kt
+74 -12
View File
@@ -6,13 +6,18 @@ import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.GnssTimeSource
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.SensorRepository import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.SensorRepository
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.cam.PseudonymManager import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.cam.PseudonymManager
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.mqtt.ObuHardwarePreferences import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.mqtt.ObuHardwarePreferences
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.Esp32Link
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.GnPositionVector import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.GnPositionVector
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.ObuHardware import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.ObuHardware
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.UsbSerialTransport import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.OutgoingIts
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.OutgoingMessage
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.asn1.RealAsn1UperCodec import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.asn1.RealAsn1UperCodec
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.asn1.VamContent
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.asn1.VamUperCodec
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.CamTransmitConfig import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.CamTransmitConfig
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.PhoneCamBuilder import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.PhoneCamBuilder
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.usecase.GeoMath import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.usecase.GeoMath
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.vam.VamGenerationRules
import dagger.hilt.android.qualifiers.ApplicationContext import dagger.hilt.android.qualifiers.ApplicationContext
import kotlinx.coroutines.CoroutineScope import kotlinx.coroutines.CoroutineScope
import kotlinx.coroutines.Dispatchers import kotlinx.coroutines.Dispatchers
@@ -45,12 +50,19 @@ import javax.inject.Singleton
* [com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.detection.EventDetector] stream that already drives trip event * [com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.detection.EventDetector] stream that already drives trip event
* logging). Both rate figures are placeholders pending real-world tuning, per * logging). Both rate figures are placeholders pending real-world tuning, per
* [CamTransmitConfig]'s own disclaimer. * [CamTransmitConfig]'s own disclaimer.
*
* ## CAM or VAM
* Settings chooses what goes out ([OutgoingMessage]). CAM follows the rate policy above. VAM is
* checked every [VAM_TICK_MS] against the generation rules of TS 103 300-3 clause 6.4
* ([VamGenerationRules]) and sent when one fires, from the same GNSS fix, pseudonym and position
* vector a CAM would use. Whether either is signed is the "Sign outgoing messages" setting; the
* micrOBU does the signing ([Esp32Link]).
*/ */
@Singleton @Singleton
class CamTransmitLoop @Inject constructor( class CamTransmitLoop @Inject constructor(
@ApplicationContext private val context: Context, @ApplicationContext private val context: Context,
private val obuHardwarePrefs: ObuHardwarePreferences, private val obuHardwarePrefs: ObuHardwarePreferences,
private val usbSerialTransport: UsbSerialTransport, private val esp32Link: Esp32Link,
private val codec: RealAsn1UperCodec, private val codec: RealAsn1UperCodec,
private val pseudonymManager: PseudonymManager, private val pseudonymManager: PseudonymManager,
) { ) {
@@ -67,6 +79,10 @@ class CamTransmitLoop @Inject constructor(
/** Previous GNSS fix, kept only to derive along-track acceleration — see [longitudinalAccel]. */ /** Previous GNSS fix, kept only to derive along-track acceleration — see [longitudinalAccel]. */
@Volatile private var previousGnss: GnssReading? = null @Volatile private var previousGnss: GnssReading? = null
@Volatile private var outgoing: OutgoingMessage = OutgoingMessage.CAM
@Volatile private var signOutgoing: Boolean = true
private val vamRules = VamGenerationRules()
/** /**
* Call when a braking/turning/stopping event fires during an active trip — bumps the CAM * Call when a braking/turning/stopping event fires during an active trip — bumps the CAM
* rate to [CamTransmitConfig.elevatedRateHz] for [ELEVATED_HOLD_MS] so nearby stations get * rate to [CamTransmitConfig.elevatedRateHz] for [ELEVATED_HOLD_MS] so nearby stations get
@@ -85,6 +101,7 @@ class CamTransmitLoop @Inject constructor(
if (job?.isActive == true) return if (job?.isActive == true) return
elevatedUntilMs = 0L elevatedUntilMs = 0L
previousGnss = null previousGnss = null
vamRules.reset()
job = scope.launch { job = scope.launch {
obuHardwarePrefs.obuHardwareFlow.collectLatest { hardware -> obuHardwarePrefs.obuHardwareFlow.collectLatest { hardware ->
if (hardware != ObuHardware.ESP32_C5) return@collectLatest if (hardware != ObuHardware.ESP32_C5) return@collectLatest
@@ -102,24 +119,66 @@ class CamTransmitLoop @Inject constructor(
private suspend fun runTransmitLoop() = coroutineScope { private suspend fun runTransmitLoop() = coroutineScope {
launch { sensorRepository.gnssFlow().collect { latestGnss = it } } launch { sensorRepository.gnssFlow().collect { latestGnss = it } }
launch { sensorRepository.gyroscopeFlow().collect { latestGyroZ = it.z } } launch { sensorRepository.gyroscopeFlow().collect { latestGyroZ = it.z } }
launch { obuHardwarePrefs.signOutgoingFlow.collect { signOutgoing = it } }
launch {
obuHardwarePrefs.outgoingMessageFlow.collect {
if (it != outgoing) vamRules.reset()
outgoing = it
}
}
while (true) { while (true) {
val gnss = latestGnss val gnss = latestGnss
if (gnss != null) { if (gnss != null) {
// Asked for per CAM rather than once per trip: that is what lets a pseudonym when (outgoing) {
// rotation fall cleanly between two frames instead of inside one. OutgoingMessage.CAM -> sendCam(gnss)
val pseudonym = pseudonymManager.current() OutgoingMessage.VAM -> sendVamIfDue(gnss)
// Stamped on GNSS time rather than the phone clock; see GnssTimeSource. Only the }
// outgoing CAM is: acceleration below still differences wall-clock samples.
val fix = gnss.copy(timestamp = GnssTimeSource.correct(gnss.timestamp))
val cam = PhoneCamBuilder.build(fix, latestGyroZ, pseudonym.stationId, longitudinalAccel(gnss))
val bytes = codec.encodeCam(cam)
usbSerialTransport.sendCamTx(bytes, GnPositionVector.fromCam(cam, gnss.accuracyM, pseudonym.mac))
} }
delay((1000.0 / currentRateHz(gnss)).toLong()) delay(if (outgoing == OutgoingMessage.VAM) VAM_TICK_MS else (1000.0 / currentRateHz(gnss)).toLong())
} }
} }
private suspend fun sendCam(gnss: GnssReading) {
// Asked for per CAM rather than once per trip: that is what lets a pseudonym
// rotation fall cleanly between two frames instead of inside one.
val pseudonym = pseudonymManager.current()
// Stamped on GNSS time rather than the phone clock; see GnssTimeSource. Only the
// outgoing CAM is: acceleration below still differences wall-clock samples.
val fix = gnss.copy(timestamp = GnssTimeSource.correct(gnss.timestamp))
val cam = PhoneCamBuilder.build(fix, latestGyroZ, pseudonym.stationId, longitudinalAccel(gnss))
val bytes = codec.encodeCam(cam)
esp32Link.send(OutgoingIts(OutgoingMessage.CAM, bytes,
GnPositionVector.fromCam(cam, gnss.accuracyM, pseudonym.mac), gnss.accuracyM, signOutgoing))
}
private suspend fun sendVamIfDue(gnss: GnssReading) {
val now = System.currentTimeMillis()
val kinematics = VamGenerationRules.Kinematics(gnss.latitude, gnss.longitude,
gnss.speedMs.toDouble(), gnss.bearingDeg.toDouble())
if (!vamRules.due(now, kinematics)) return
val pseudonym = pseudonymManager.current()
val fix = gnss.copy(timestamp = GnssTimeSource.correct(gnss.timestamp))
// The CAM view of this fix is built only for its position vector, so the GN header of a VAM
// follows exactly the rules a CAM's does. It is not transmitted.
val cam = PhoneCamBuilder.build(fix, latestGyroZ, pseudonym.stationId, longitudinalAccel(gnss))
val withLowFrequency = vamRules.includeLowFrequency(now)
val bytes = VamUperCodec.encode(VamContent(
stationId = pseudonym.stationId,
timestamp = cam.timestamp,
latitude = cam.latitude,
longitude = cam.longitude,
accuracyM = gnss.accuracyM,
speedMps = cam.speedMps,
headingDeg = cam.headingDeg,
accelerationMps2 = cam.accelerationMps2,
includeLowFrequency = withLowFrequency,
))
val handedOver = esp32Link.send(OutgoingIts(OutgoingMessage.VAM, bytes,
GnPositionVector.fromCam(cam, gnss.accuracyM, pseudonym.mac), gnss.accuracyM, signOutgoing))
if (handedOver) vamRules.onSent(now, kinematics, withLowFrequency)
}
/** /**
* Along-track acceleration in m/s², from the change in GNSS speed since the previous fix. * Along-track acceleration in m/s², from the change in GNSS speed since the previous fix.
* *
@@ -158,6 +217,9 @@ class CamTransmitLoop @Inject constructor(
companion object { companion object {
private const val ELEVATED_HOLD_MS = 5_000L private const val ELEVATED_HOLD_MS = 5_000L
/** How often VAM generation rules are checked: T_GenVamMin, TS 103 300-3 Table 16. */
private const val VAM_TICK_MS = VamGenerationRules.T_GEN_VAM_MIN_MS
/** Below this gap, GNSS speed noise divided by a tiny dt produces absurd accelerations. */ /** Below this gap, GNSS speed noise divided by a tiny dt produces absurd accelerations. */
private const val MIN_ACCEL_DT_SEC = 0.2 private const val MIN_ACCEL_DT_SEC = 0.2
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/ui/components/StatusTopBar.kt
+21 -16
View File
@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.GpsOff
import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.Sensors import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.Sensors
import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.SensorsOff import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.SensorsOff
import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.Usb import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.Usb
import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.BluetoothDisabled
import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.Bluetooth
import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.UsbOff import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.UsbOff
import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.Wifi import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.Wifi
import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.WifiOff import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.WifiOff
@@ -39,7 +41,7 @@ import androidx.compose.ui.graphics.vector.ImageVector
import androidx.compose.ui.text.font.FontWeight import androidx.compose.ui.text.font.FontWeight
import androidx.compose.ui.unit.dp import androidx.compose.ui.unit.dp
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.mqtt.MqttConnectionState import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.mqtt.MqttConnectionState
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.UsbSerialState import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.Esp32LinkState
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.viewmodel.SensorUiState import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.viewmodel.SensorUiState
private val GreenActive = Color(0xFF4CAF50) private val GreenActive = Color(0xFF4CAF50)
@@ -53,7 +55,9 @@ fun StatusTopBar(
state: SensorUiState, state: SensorUiState,
mqttConnectionState: MqttConnectionState, mqttConnectionState: MqttConnectionState,
isEsp32: Boolean = false, isEsp32: Boolean = false,
usbSerialState: UsbSerialState = UsbSerialState.DISCONNECTED, esp32LinkState: Esp32LinkState = Esp32LinkState.DISCONNECTED,
/** The ESP32-C5 is reached over BLE rather than its USB port (Settings). */
esp32Bluetooth: Boolean = false,
) { ) {
TopAppBar( TopAppBar(
title = { title = {
@@ -93,7 +97,7 @@ fun StatusTopBar(
) )
Spacer(Modifier.width(8.dp)) Spacer(Modifier.width(8.dp))
ObuStatusIcon(mqttConnectionState, isEsp32, usbSerialState) ObuStatusIcon(mqttConnectionState, isEsp32, esp32LinkState, esp32Bluetooth = esp32Bluetooth)
} }
}, },
colors = TopAppBarDefaults.topAppBarColors( colors = TopAppBarDefaults.topAppBarColors(
@@ -106,20 +110,21 @@ fun StatusTopBar(
* OBU link indicator. Which transport it reflects depends on the selected hardware: the CiT One * OBU link indicator. Which transport it reflects depends on the selected hardware: the CiT One
* reaches the phone over MQTT (Wi-Fi / USB-C tethering), the ESP32-C5 over a USB-serial link with * reaches the phone over MQTT (Wi-Fi / USB-C tethering), the ESP32-C5 over a USB-serial link with
* no broker at all - so on that path [mqttConnectionState] is permanently DISCONNECTED and would * no broker at all - so on that path [mqttConnectionState] is permanently DISCONNECTED and would
* report the OBU as offline while CAMs were streaming in. Uses a USB glyph there rather than the * report the OBU as offline while CAMs were streaming in. Uses a USB or Bluetooth glyph there
* Wi-Fi one, since that is literally what the connection is. * rather than the Wi-Fi one, since that is literally what the connection is.
*/ */
@Composable @Composable
private fun ObuStatusIcon( private fun ObuStatusIcon(
mqttState: MqttConnectionState, mqttState: MqttConnectionState,
isEsp32: Boolean, isEsp32: Boolean,
usbSerialState: UsbSerialState, esp32LinkState: Esp32LinkState,
esp32Bluetooth: Boolean,
) { ) {
val state = if (isEsp32) usbSerialState.asConnectionState() else mqttState val state = if (isEsp32) esp32LinkState.asConnectionState() else mqttState
val linkUp = state == MqttConnectionState.CONNECTED || state == MqttConnectionState.CONNECTING
val icon = when { val icon = when {
isEsp32 && state == MqttConnectionState.CONNECTED -> Icons.Default.Usb isEsp32 && esp32Bluetooth -> if (linkUp) Icons.Default.Bluetooth else Icons.Default.BluetoothDisabled
isEsp32 && state == MqttConnectionState.CONNECTING -> Icons.Default.Usb isEsp32 -> if (linkUp) Icons.Default.Usb else Icons.Default.UsbOff
isEsp32 -> Icons.Default.UsbOff
state == MqttConnectionState.CONNECTED || state == MqttConnectionState.CONNECTED ||
state == MqttConnectionState.CONNECTING -> Icons.Default.Wifi state == MqttConnectionState.CONNECTING -> Icons.Default.Wifi
else -> Icons.Default.WifiOff else -> Icons.Default.WifiOff
@@ -194,10 +199,10 @@ private fun RecordingPulse() {
* Maps the ESP32-C5 serial link's lifecycle onto the MQTT connection vocabulary this bar's colour * Maps the ESP32-C5 serial link's lifecycle onto the MQTT connection vocabulary this bar's colour
* and pulse logic already speaks, so one indicator serves both transports. * and pulse logic already speaks, so one indicator serves both transports.
*/ */
private fun UsbSerialState.asConnectionState(): MqttConnectionState = when (this) { private fun Esp32LinkState.asConnectionState(): MqttConnectionState = when (this) {
UsbSerialState.CONNECTED -> MqttConnectionState.CONNECTED Esp32LinkState.CONNECTED -> MqttConnectionState.CONNECTED
UsbSerialState.DEVICE_ATTACHED, Esp32LinkState.DEVICE_ATTACHED,
UsbSerialState.PERMISSION_REQUESTED -> MqttConnectionState.CONNECTING Esp32LinkState.PERMISSION_REQUESTED -> MqttConnectionState.CONNECTING
UsbSerialState.ERROR -> MqttConnectionState.ERROR Esp32LinkState.ERROR -> MqttConnectionState.ERROR
UsbSerialState.DISCONNECTED -> MqttConnectionState.DISCONNECTED Esp32LinkState.DISCONNECTED -> MqttConnectionState.DISCONNECTED
} }
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/ui/navigation/AppNavigation.kt
+3
View File
@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@ sealed class Screen(val route: String, val labelRes: Int) {
data object Connection : Screen("connection", R.string.nav_connection) data object Connection : Screen("connection", R.string.nav_connection)
data object Map : Screen("map", R.string.map_title) data object Map : Screen("map", R.string.map_title)
data object MqttViewer : Screen("mqtt_viewer", R.string.nav_v2x) data object MqttViewer : Screen("mqtt_viewer", R.string.nav_v2x)
/** Full-screen V2X live map, opened from the V2X Monitor's map button. */
data object V2xMap : Screen("v2x_map", R.string.v2x_map_title)
// Phase A — Trip Recording // Phase A — Trip Recording
data object TripHistory : Screen("trip_history", R.string.nav_trips) data object TripHistory : Screen("trip_history", R.string.nav_trips)
@@ -83,6 +85,7 @@ private fun Screen.ownsRoute(route: String?): Boolean {
route == Screen.Map.route || route == Screen.Map.route ||
route == Screen.Sensors.route route == Screen.Sensors.route
Screen.Record -> route == Screen.Log.route Screen.Record -> route == Screen.Log.route
Screen.MqttViewer -> route == Screen.V2xMap.route
else -> false else -> false
} }
} }
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/ui/screens/ConnectionSetupScreen.kt
+50 -19
View File
@@ -44,7 +44,9 @@ import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.R
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.mqtt.MqttConnectionState import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.mqtt.MqttConnectionState
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.ObuHardware import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.ObuHardware
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.TransportType import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.TransportType
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.UsbSerialState import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.Esp32LinkState
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.Esp32Transport
import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.Bluetooth
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.viewmodel.MqttViewModel import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.viewmodel.MqttViewModel
private val UsbGreen = Color(0xFF4CAF50) private val UsbGreen = Color(0xFF4CAF50)
@@ -65,7 +67,11 @@ fun ConnectionSetupScreen(
val activeTransport by viewModel.activeTransport.collectAsState() val activeTransport by viewModel.activeTransport.collectAsState()
val mqttPrefs by viewModel.mqttPrefs.collectAsState() val mqttPrefs by viewModel.mqttPrefs.collectAsState()
val obuHardware by viewModel.obuHardware.collectAsState() val obuHardware by viewModel.obuHardware.collectAsState()
val usbSerialState by viewModel.usbSerialState.collectAsState() val esp32LinkState by viewModel.esp32LinkState.collectAsState()
val esp32Transport by viewModel.esp32Transport.collectAsState()
val esp32Detail by viewModel.esp32Detail.collectAsState()
val stationStatus by viewModel.stationStatus.collectAsState()
val signOutgoing by viewModel.signOutgoing.collectAsState()
val isConnected = connectionState == MqttConnectionState.CONNECTED val isConnected = connectionState == MqttConnectionState.CONNECTED
val isConnecting = connectionState == MqttConnectionState.CONNECTING val isConnecting = connectionState == MqttConnectionState.CONNECTING
@@ -229,22 +235,22 @@ fun ConnectionSetupScreen(
} }
} else { } else {
// ── ESP32-C5 real connection card (Phase 03) ──────────────────────── // ── ESP32-C5 real connection card (Phase 03) ────────────────────────
// Backed by UsbSerialTransport (native USB Serial/JTAG CDC-ACM link) - see that // Backed by Esp32Link: USB (UsbSerialTransport, native USB Serial/JTAG CDC-ACM - see
// class's KDoc for the VID/PID (0x303A/0x1001) and native-vs-UART-bridge port note. // its KDoc for the VID/PID and native-vs-UART-bridge port note) or BLE (BleLinkTransport).
val isEspConnected = usbSerialState == UsbSerialState.CONNECTED val isEspConnected = esp32LinkState == Esp32LinkState.CONNECTED
val isEspBusy = usbSerialState == UsbSerialState.DEVICE_ATTACHED || val isEspBusy = esp32LinkState == Esp32LinkState.DEVICE_ATTACHED ||
usbSerialState == UsbSerialState.PERMISSION_REQUESTED esp32LinkState == Esp32LinkState.PERMISSION_REQUESTED
val espContainerColor = when { val espContainerColor = when {
isEspConnected -> UsbGreenBg isEspConnected -> UsbGreenBg
isEspBusy -> UsbAmberBg isEspBusy -> UsbAmberBg
else -> UsbGrayBg else -> UsbGrayBg
} }
val (espColor, espStateLabel) = when (usbSerialState) { val (espColor, espStateLabel) = when (esp32LinkState) {
UsbSerialState.CONNECTED -> UsbGreen to stringResource(R.string.conn_esp32_state_connected) Esp32LinkState.CONNECTED -> UsbGreen to stringResource(R.string.conn_esp32_state_connected)
UsbSerialState.DEVICE_ATTACHED -> UsbAmber to stringResource(R.string.conn_esp32_state_device_attached) Esp32LinkState.DEVICE_ATTACHED -> UsbAmber to stringResource(R.string.conn_esp32_state_device_attached)
UsbSerialState.PERMISSION_REQUESTED -> UsbAmber to stringResource(R.string.conn_esp32_state_permission_requested) Esp32LinkState.PERMISSION_REQUESTED -> UsbAmber to stringResource(R.string.conn_esp32_state_permission_requested)
UsbSerialState.ERROR -> Color(0xFFFF5252) to stringResource(R.string.conn_esp32_state_error) Esp32LinkState.ERROR -> Color(0xFFFF5252) to stringResource(R.string.conn_esp32_state_error)
UsbSerialState.DISCONNECTED -> UsbGray to stringResource(R.string.conn_esp32_state_disconnected) Esp32LinkState.DISCONNECTED -> UsbGray to stringResource(R.string.conn_esp32_state_disconnected)
} }
Card( Card(
@@ -257,7 +263,7 @@ fun ConnectionSetupScreen(
horizontalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(8.dp), horizontalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(8.dp),
) { ) {
Icon( Icon(
Icons.Default.Usb, if (esp32Transport == Esp32Transport.BLE) Icons.Default.Bluetooth else Icons.Default.Usb,
contentDescription = null, contentDescription = null,
tint = espColor, tint = espColor,
modifier = Modifier.size(20.dp), modifier = Modifier.size(20.dp),
@@ -285,11 +291,36 @@ fun ConnectionSetupScreen(
Text(espStateLabel, style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall, color = espColor) Text(espStateLabel, style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall, color = espColor)
} }
Text(
stringResource(
if (esp32Transport == Esp32Transport.BLE) R.string.conn_esp32_via_ble else R.string.conn_esp32_via_usb
),
style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall,
color = MaterialTheme.colorScheme.onSurfaceVariant,
)
// Pairing passkey, provisioning progress, or why the micrOBU refused something.
esp32Detail?.let {
Text(it, style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall, color = UsbAmber)
}
if (isEspConnected) {
stationStatus?.let { s ->
Text(
stringResource(
R.string.conn_esp32_signing,
if (signOutgoing) stringResource(R.string.conn_esp32_signing_on) else stringResource(R.string.conn_esp32_signing_off),
s.tickets, s.signedMessages, s.signRefused, s.radioSubmitted,
),
style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall,
color = MaterialTheme.colorScheme.onSurfaceVariant,
)
}
}
Spacer(Modifier.height(12.dp)) Spacer(Modifier.height(12.dp))
if (isEspConnected) { if (isEspConnected || isEspBusy) {
OutlinedButton( OutlinedButton(
onClick = { viewModel.disconnectUsbSerial() }, onClick = { viewModel.disconnectEsp32() },
modifier = Modifier.fillMaxWidth(), modifier = Modifier.fillMaxWidth(),
colors = ButtonDefaults.outlinedButtonColors( colors = ButtonDefaults.outlinedButtonColors(
contentColor = Color(0xFFFF5252), contentColor = Color(0xFFFF5252),
@@ -297,13 +328,13 @@ fun ConnectionSetupScreen(
) { ) {
Icon(Icons.Default.LinkOff, null, modifier = Modifier.size(16.dp)) Icon(Icons.Default.LinkOff, null, modifier = Modifier.size(16.dp))
Spacer(Modifier.width(6.dp)) Spacer(Modifier.width(6.dp))
Text(stringResource(R.string.conn_disconnect)) // While connecting (BLE retries until it succeeds) this cancels the attempt.
Text(stringResource(if (isEspConnected) R.string.conn_disconnect else R.string.conn_esp32_cancel))
} }
} else { } else {
Button( Button(
onClick = { viewModel.connectUsbSerial() }, onClick = { viewModel.connectEsp32() },
modifier = Modifier.fillMaxWidth(), modifier = Modifier.fillMaxWidth(),
enabled = !isEspBusy,
) { ) {
Icon(Icons.Default.Link, null, modifier = Modifier.size(16.dp)) Icon(Icons.Default.Link, null, modifier = Modifier.size(16.dp))
Spacer(Modifier.width(6.dp)) Spacer(Modifier.width(6.dp))
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/ui/screens/DashboardScreen.kt
+17 -14
View File
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.R
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.mqtt.MqttConnectionState import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.mqtt.MqttConnectionState
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.ObuHardware import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.ObuHardware
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.TransportType import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.TransportType
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.UsbSerialState import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.Esp32LinkState
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.Cam import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.Cam
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.denm.DenmEvent import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.denm.DenmEvent
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.denm.DenmParser import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.denm.DenmParser
@@ -78,7 +78,9 @@ fun DashboardScreen(
mqttConnectionState: MqttConnectionState, mqttConnectionState: MqttConnectionState,
activeTransport: TransportType = TransportType.USB_C, activeTransport: TransportType = TransportType.USB_C,
obuHardware: ObuHardware = ObuHardware.CIT_ONE, obuHardware: ObuHardware = ObuHardware.CIT_ONE,
usbSerialState: UsbSerialState = UsbSerialState.DISCONNECTED, esp32LinkState: Esp32LinkState = Esp32LinkState.DISCONNECTED,
/** The ESP32-C5 is reached over BLE rather than its USB port (Settings). */
esp32Bluetooth: Boolean = false,
usbCableConnected: Boolean = false, usbCableConnected: Boolean = false,
obuStationTypeWarning: Boolean = false, obuStationTypeWarning: Boolean = false,
obuStationType: Int? = null, obuStationType: Int? = null,
@@ -281,14 +283,14 @@ fun DashboardScreen(
// even once the serial link is actually up. // even once the serial link is actually up.
val isEsp32 = obuHardware == ObuHardware.ESP32_C5 val isEsp32 = obuHardware == ObuHardware.ESP32_C5
val mqttConnected = mqttConnectionState == MqttConnectionState.CONNECTED val mqttConnected = mqttConnectionState == MqttConnectionState.CONNECTED
val obuConnected = if (isEsp32) usbSerialState == UsbSerialState.CONNECTED else mqttConnected val obuConnected = if (isEsp32) esp32LinkState == Esp32LinkState.CONNECTED else mqttConnected
val transportIcon = when (activeTransport) { val transportIcon = if (isEsp32 && esp32Bluetooth) Icons.Default.Bluetooth else when (activeTransport) {
TransportType.USB_C -> Icons.Default.Usb TransportType.USB_C -> Icons.Default.Usb
TransportType.USB_SERIAL -> Icons.Default.Usb TransportType.USB_SERIAL -> Icons.Default.Usb
TransportType.WIFI -> Icons.Default.Wifi TransportType.WIFI -> Icons.Default.Wifi
TransportType.BLUETOOTH -> Icons.Default.Bluetooth TransportType.BLUETOOTH -> Icons.Default.Bluetooth
} }
val transportInactiveIcon = when (activeTransport) { val transportInactiveIcon = if (isEsp32 && esp32Bluetooth) Icons.Default.BluetoothDisabled else when (activeTransport) {
TransportType.USB_C -> Icons.Default.Usb TransportType.USB_C -> Icons.Default.Usb
TransportType.USB_SERIAL -> Icons.Default.Usb TransportType.USB_SERIAL -> Icons.Default.Usb
TransportType.WIFI -> Icons.Default.WifiOff TransportType.WIFI -> Icons.Default.WifiOff
@@ -324,12 +326,12 @@ fun DashboardScreen(
) )
Text( Text(
text = if (isEsp32) { text = if (isEsp32) {
when (usbSerialState) { when (esp32LinkState) {
UsbSerialState.CONNECTED -> stringResource(R.string.conn_esp32_state_connected) Esp32LinkState.CONNECTED -> stringResource(R.string.conn_esp32_state_connected)
UsbSerialState.DEVICE_ATTACHED -> stringResource(R.string.conn_esp32_state_device_attached) Esp32LinkState.DEVICE_ATTACHED -> stringResource(R.string.conn_esp32_state_device_attached)
UsbSerialState.PERMISSION_REQUESTED -> stringResource(R.string.conn_esp32_state_permission_requested) Esp32LinkState.PERMISSION_REQUESTED -> stringResource(R.string.conn_esp32_state_permission_requested)
UsbSerialState.ERROR -> stringResource(R.string.conn_esp32_state_error) Esp32LinkState.ERROR -> stringResource(R.string.conn_esp32_state_error)
UsbSerialState.DISCONNECTED -> stringResource(R.string.dash_tap_to_connect) Esp32LinkState.DISCONNECTED -> stringResource(R.string.dash_tap_to_connect)
} }
} else when (mqttConnectionState) { } else when (mqttConnectionState) {
MqttConnectionState.CONNECTED -> stringResource(R.string.dash_mqtt_connected) MqttConnectionState.CONNECTED -> stringResource(R.string.dash_mqtt_connected)
@@ -362,15 +364,16 @@ fun DashboardScreen(
TransportChip( TransportChip(
label = stringResource(R.string.dash_transport_usb_serial), label = stringResource(R.string.dash_transport_usb_serial),
icon = Icons.Default.Usb, icon = Icons.Default.Usb,
active = activeTransport == TransportType.USB_SERIAL, active = !esp32Bluetooth,
hasCable = usbCableConnected, hasCable = usbCableConnected,
) )
} }
TransportChip( TransportChip(
label = stringResource(R.string.dash_transport_bt), label = stringResource(R.string.dash_transport_bt),
icon = Icons.Default.Bluetooth, icon = Icons.Default.Bluetooth,
active = activeTransport == TransportType.BLUETOOTH, active = isEsp32 && esp32Bluetooth,
dimmed = true, // Phase 03 — production BT transport still under discussion // Only the ESP32-C5 has a BLE link; the CiT One has none.
dimmed = !isEsp32,
) )
} }
} }
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/ui/screens/MqttTopicViewerScreen.kt
+55 -48
View File
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ import androidx.compose.material.icons.automirrored.filled.Send
import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.Circle import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.Circle
import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.Link import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.Link
import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.LinkOff import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.LinkOff
import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.Map
import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.NotificationsActive import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.NotificationsActive
import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.VerticalAlignBottom import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.VerticalAlignBottom
import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.Warning import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.Warning
@@ -69,7 +70,7 @@ import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.mqtt.MqttConnectionState
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.mqtt.MqttMessage import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.mqtt.MqttMessage
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.EspLinkStatus import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.EspLinkStatus
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.ObuHardware import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.ObuHardware
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.UsbSerialState import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.Esp32LinkState
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.CamParser import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.CamParser
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.StationType import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.StationType
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.denm.DenmParser import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.denm.DenmParser
@@ -87,11 +88,15 @@ import java.util.Date
import java.util.Locale import java.util.Locale
/** /**
* View toggle for [TopicListPane]: decoded CAM/DENM traffic (LIST), the raw MQTT topic list * View toggle for [TopicListPane]: decoded CAM/DENM traffic (LIST) or the raw MQTT topic list
* (TOPICS, CiT One only - there is no broker on the ESP32-C5 path), or the V2X live map * (TOPICS, CiT One only - there is no broker on the ESP32-C5 path).
* (MAP, Section 13). *
* The live map used to be a third mode here. It is now its own full-screen destination
* ([V2xMapScreen]), reached from the map button in this screen's header: sharing the screen with
* the alert panel and the TX cards left the map about a third of a phone display tall, which is
* not enough to see where anything is relative to anything else.
*/ */
private enum class TopicViewMode { LIST, TOPICS, MAP } private enum class TopicViewMode { LIST, TOPICS }
private val timeFormat = SimpleDateFormat("HH:mm:ss.SSS", Locale.US) private val timeFormat = SimpleDateFormat("HH:mm:ss.SSS", Locale.US)
@@ -116,6 +121,7 @@ private val WarningRedBg = Color(0xFF3A0A0A)
@Composable @Composable
fun MqttTopicViewerScreen( fun MqttTopicViewerScreen(
viewModel: MqttViewModel = hiltViewModel(), viewModel: MqttViewModel = hiltViewModel(),
onOpenMap: () -> Unit = {},
) { ) {
val connectionState by viewModel.connectionState.collectAsState() val connectionState by viewModel.connectionState.collectAsState()
val topicMessages by viewModel.topicMessages.collectAsState() val topicMessages by viewModel.topicMessages.collectAsState()
@@ -130,7 +136,7 @@ fun MqttTopicViewerScreen(
val ownCamPosition by viewModel.ownCamPosition.collectAsState() val ownCamPosition by viewModel.ownCamPosition.collectAsState()
// Engine road users PLUS roadside units - the engine deliberately does not track RSUs. // Engine road users PLUS roadside units - the engine deliberately does not track RSUs.
val remoteCamPositions by viewModel.stationsInRange.collectAsState() val remoteCamPositions by viewModel.stationsInRange.collectAsState()
val usbSerialState by viewModel.usbSerialState.collectAsState() val esp32LinkState by viewModel.esp32LinkState.collectAsState()
val camPingerActive by viewModel.camPingerActive.collectAsState() val camPingerActive by viewModel.camPingerActive.collectAsState()
val camPingerSentCount by viewModel.camPingerSentCount.collectAsState() val camPingerSentCount by viewModel.camPingerSentCount.collectAsState()
val camPingerHasFix by viewModel.camPingerHasFix.collectAsState() val camPingerHasFix by viewModel.camPingerHasFix.collectAsState()
@@ -155,7 +161,7 @@ fun MqttTopicViewerScreen(
// DISCONNECTED and using it here made the screen report "offline" while CAMs streamed in over // DISCONNECTED and using it here made the screen report "offline" while CAMs streamed in over
// serial. Everything on this screen that means "is the OBU link up?" follows the serial link // serial. Everything on this screen that means "is the OBU link up?" follows the serial link
// instead when that hardware is selected. // instead when that hardware is selected.
val effectiveState = if (isEsp32) usbSerialState.asConnectionState() else connectionState val effectiveState = if (isEsp32) esp32LinkState.asConnectionState() else connectionState
val isConnected = effectiveState == MqttConnectionState.CONNECTED val isConnected = effectiveState == MqttConnectionState.CONNECTED
val isConnecting = effectiveState == MqttConnectionState.CONNECTING val isConnecting = effectiveState == MqttConnectionState.CONNECTING
@@ -193,14 +199,25 @@ fun MqttTopicViewerScreen(
Spacer(Modifier.weight(1f)) Spacer(Modifier.weight(1f))
} }
// Full-screen live map. In the header rather than in the view-mode row below, so it
// is reachable from the message detail pane too and does not move around as the
// available view modes change with the selected hardware.
IconButton(onClick = onOpenMap) {
Icon(
Icons.Default.Map,
contentDescription = stringResource(R.string.v2x_map_title),
tint = MaterialTheme.colorScheme.primary,
)
}
ConnectionChip(effectiveState) ConnectionChip(effectiveState)
Spacer(Modifier.width(2.dp)) Spacer(Modifier.width(2.dp))
IconButton( IconButton(
onClick = { onClick = {
// Route to whichever transport this hardware actually uses. // Route to whichever transport this hardware actually uses.
if (isEsp32) { if (isEsp32) {
if (isConnected || isConnecting) viewModel.disconnectUsbSerial() if (isConnected || isConnecting) viewModel.disconnectEsp32()
else viewModel.connectUsbSerial() else viewModel.connectEsp32()
} else { } else {
if (isConnected || isConnecting) viewModel.disconnect() else viewModel.connect() if (isConnected || isConnecting) viewModel.disconnect() else viewModel.connect()
} }
@@ -236,7 +253,7 @@ fun MqttTopicViewerScreen(
isEsp32 = isEsp32, isEsp32 = isEsp32,
denmEvents = denmEvents, denmEvents = denmEvents,
spatIntersections = spatIntersections, spatIntersections = spatIntersections,
usbSerialState = usbSerialState, esp32LinkState = esp32LinkState,
camPingerActive = camPingerActive, camPingerActive = camPingerActive,
camPingerSentCount = camPingerSentCount, camPingerSentCount = camPingerSentCount,
camPingerHasFix = camPingerHasFix, camPingerHasFix = camPingerHasFix,
@@ -277,7 +294,7 @@ private fun TopicListPane(
isEsp32: Boolean = false, isEsp32: Boolean = false,
denmEvents: List<com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.denm.DenmEvent> = emptyList(), denmEvents: List<com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.denm.DenmEvent> = emptyList(),
spatIntersections: List<com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.spat.SpatIntersection> = emptyList(), spatIntersections: List<com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.spat.SpatIntersection> = emptyList(),
usbSerialState: UsbSerialState = UsbSerialState.DISCONNECTED, esp32LinkState: Esp32LinkState = Esp32LinkState.DISCONNECTED,
camPingerActive: Boolean = false, camPingerActive: Boolean = false,
camPingerSentCount: Int = 0, camPingerSentCount: Int = 0,
camPingerHasFix: Boolean = false, camPingerHasFix: Boolean = false,
@@ -321,7 +338,7 @@ private fun TopicListPane(
// ── CAM Pinger card — ESP32-C5-only manual bench test, mirrors the DENM card above ── // ── CAM Pinger card — ESP32-C5-only manual bench test, mirrors the DENM card above ──
if (showCamPinger) { if (showCamPinger) {
CamPingerCard( CamPingerCard(
usbConnected = usbSerialState == UsbSerialState.CONNECTED, usbConnected = esp32LinkState == Esp32LinkState.CONNECTED,
pingerActive = camPingerActive, pingerActive = camPingerActive,
sentCount = camPingerSentCount, sentCount = camPingerSentCount,
hasFix = camPingerHasFix, hasFix = camPingerHasFix,
@@ -335,49 +352,38 @@ private fun TopicListPane(
HorizontalDivider(color = MaterialTheme.colorScheme.outline.copy(alpha = 0.25f)) HorizontalDivider(color = MaterialTheme.colorScheme.outline.copy(alpha = 0.25f))
} }
// ── List / Topics / Map toggle ──────────────────────────────────────────────────── // ── List / Topics toggle ──────────────────────────────────────────────
// Decoded traffic is the default on BOTH hardware paths: what a tester wants to see is // Decoded traffic is the default on BOTH hardware paths: what a tester wants to see is
// the road users and hazards, not the transport that carried them. The raw MQTT topic // the road users and hazards, not the transport that carried them. The raw MQTT topic
// list stays one tap away on the CiT One path (Section 13 asks for the map "in addition // list stays one tap away on the CiT One path (Section 13 asks for the map "in addition
// to", not instead of, the topic list). It is hidden on the ESP32-C5 path, where there is // to", not instead of, the topic list).
// no broker and `topics` is permanently empty. //
Row( // The whole row is hidden on the ESP32-C5 path: there is no broker there, `topics` is
modifier = Modifier.fillMaxWidth().padding(horizontal = 12.dp, vertical = 6.dp), // permanently empty, and a toggle offering a single choice is just noise.
horizontalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(8.dp), if (!isEsp32) {
) { Row(
ViewModeButton( modifier = Modifier.fillMaxWidth().padding(horizontal = 12.dp, vertical = 6.dp),
label = stringResource(R.string.mqtt_view_list), horizontalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(8.dp),
selected = viewMode == TopicViewMode.LIST, ) {
) { viewMode = TopicViewMode.LIST } ViewModeButton(
label = stringResource(R.string.mqtt_view_list),
selected = viewMode == TopicViewMode.LIST,
) { viewMode = TopicViewMode.LIST }
if (!isEsp32) {
ViewModeButton( ViewModeButton(
label = stringResource(R.string.mqtt_view_topics), label = stringResource(R.string.mqtt_view_topics),
selected = viewMode == TopicViewMode.TOPICS, selected = viewMode == TopicViewMode.TOPICS,
) { viewMode = TopicViewMode.TOPICS } ) { viewMode = TopicViewMode.TOPICS }
} }
ViewModeButton(
label = stringResource(R.string.mqtt_view_map),
selected = viewMode == TopicViewMode.MAP,
) { viewMode = TopicViewMode.MAP }
} }
// ── Decoded traffic / raw topics / live map ─────────────────────────── // ── Decoded traffic / raw topics ──────────────────────────────────────
// TOPICS can still be the saved selection from a CiT One session after switching hardware // TOPICS can still be the saved selection from a CiT One session after switching hardware
// to the ESP32-C5, where that button no longer exists - fall back to the decoded list // to the ESP32-C5, where that button no longer exists - fall back to the decoded list
// rather than stranding the user on a pane they can't navigate away from. // rather than stranding the user on a pane they can't navigate away from.
val shownMode = if (viewMode == TopicViewMode.TOPICS && isEsp32) TopicViewMode.LIST else viewMode val shownMode = if (viewMode == TopicViewMode.TOPICS && isEsp32) TopicViewMode.LIST else viewMode
if (shownMode == TopicViewMode.MAP) { if (shownMode == TopicViewMode.LIST) {
V2xLiveMapView(
own = ownCamPosition,
remotes = remoteCamPositions,
alerts = useCaseAlerts,
denms = denmEvents,
modifier = Modifier.fillMaxSize(),
)
} else if (shownMode == TopicViewMode.LIST) {
ReceivedCamPane( ReceivedCamPane(
own = ownCamPosition, own = ownCamPosition,
remotes = remoteCamPositions, remotes = remoteCamPositions,
@@ -1213,11 +1219,12 @@ private fun CamPingerCard(
Text( Text(
stringResource( stringResource(
R.string.mqtt_cam_pinger_fw_counters, R.string.mqtt_cam_pinger_fw_counters,
s.txFailures, s.oversizeDrops, s.rxCrcErrors, s.txFailures, s.oversizeDrops, s.rxCrcErrors, s.rxQueueDrops,
), ),
style = MaterialTheme.typography.labelSmall, style = MaterialTheme.typography.labelSmall,
color = if (s.txFailures > 0 || s.oversizeDrops > 0 || s.rxCrcErrors > 0) color = if (s.txFailures > 0 || s.oversizeDrops > 0 || s.rxCrcErrors > 0 ||
ErrorRed else MaterialTheme.colorScheme.onSurfaceVariant, s.rxQueueDrops > 0
) ErrorRed else MaterialTheme.colorScheme.onSurfaceVariant,
fontFamily = FontFamily.Monospace, fontFamily = FontFamily.Monospace,
) )
} }
@@ -1466,10 +1473,10 @@ private fun prettyPrintJson(raw: String): String {
* connection UI on this screen already speaks, so one indicator can serve both transports rather * connection UI on this screen already speaks, so one indicator can serve both transports rather
* than duplicating the chip and its colours per hardware type. * than duplicating the chip and its colours per hardware type.
*/ */
private fun UsbSerialState.asConnectionState(): MqttConnectionState = when (this) { private fun Esp32LinkState.asConnectionState(): MqttConnectionState = when (this) {
UsbSerialState.CONNECTED -> MqttConnectionState.CONNECTED Esp32LinkState.CONNECTED -> MqttConnectionState.CONNECTED
UsbSerialState.DEVICE_ATTACHED, Esp32LinkState.DEVICE_ATTACHED,
UsbSerialState.PERMISSION_REQUESTED -> MqttConnectionState.CONNECTING Esp32LinkState.PERMISSION_REQUESTED -> MqttConnectionState.CONNECTING
UsbSerialState.ERROR -> MqttConnectionState.ERROR Esp32LinkState.ERROR -> MqttConnectionState.ERROR
UsbSerialState.DISCONNECTED -> MqttConnectionState.DISCONNECTED Esp32LinkState.DISCONNECTED -> MqttConnectionState.DISCONNECTED
} }
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/ui/screens/SettingsScreen.kt
+87 -3
View File
@@ -47,7 +47,9 @@ import androidx.compose.ui.unit.dp
import androidx.core.os.LocaleListCompat import androidx.core.os.LocaleListCompat
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.R import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.R
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.mqtt.MqttPrefs import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.mqtt.MqttPrefs
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.Esp32Transport
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.ObuHardware import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.ObuHardware
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.OutgoingMessage
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.usecase.UseCaseDetectionConfig import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.usecase.UseCaseDetectionConfig
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.usecase.UseCaseType import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.usecase.UseCaseType
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.viewmodel.SensorUiState import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.viewmodel.SensorUiState
@@ -165,13 +167,19 @@ fun ConnectionSettingsScreen(
onMqttPrefsChange: (MqttPrefs) -> Unit, onMqttPrefsChange: (MqttPrefs) -> Unit,
obuHardware: ObuHardware = ObuHardware.CIT_ONE, obuHardware: ObuHardware = ObuHardware.CIT_ONE,
onObuHardwareChange: (ObuHardware) -> Unit = {}, onObuHardwareChange: (ObuHardware) -> Unit = {},
esp32Transport: Esp32Transport = Esp32Transport.USB,
onEsp32TransportChange: (Esp32Transport) -> Unit = {},
outgoingMessage: OutgoingMessage = OutgoingMessage.CAM,
onOutgoingMessageChange: (OutgoingMessage) -> Unit = {},
signOutgoing: Boolean = true,
onSignOutgoingChange: (Boolean) -> Unit = {},
onBack: () -> Unit, onBack: () -> Unit,
) { ) {
SubScreen(stringResource(R.string.settings_connection), onBack) { SubScreen(stringResource(R.string.settings_connection), onBack) {
SectionCard { SectionCard {
// OBU Hardware selector — CiT One / ESP32-C5 (Phase 03, Section 13). Everything // OBU Hardware selector — CiT One / ESP32-C5 (Phase 03, Section 13). The transport
// below (transport, USB-C options) only really applies to CiT One; ESP32-C5 uses // cards below apply to the CiT One; the ESP32-C5 has its own card (USB-C or BLE,
// USB Serial exclusively and has no transport choice to make here. // CAM or VAM, signing).
Text( Text(
stringResource(R.string.settings_obu_hardware), stringResource(R.string.settings_obu_hardware),
style = MaterialTheme.typography.labelSmall, style = MaterialTheme.typography.labelSmall,
@@ -212,6 +220,48 @@ fun ConnectionSettingsScreen(
} }
} }
if (obuHardware == ObuHardware.ESP32_C5) {
SectionCard {
TwoWayChoice(
label = stringResource(R.string.settings_esp32_link),
first = stringResource(R.string.settings_transport_usbc),
second = stringResource(R.string.settings_esp32_link_ble),
firstSelected = esp32Transport == Esp32Transport.USB,
onFirst = { onEsp32TransportChange(Esp32Transport.USB) },
onSecond = { onEsp32TransportChange(Esp32Transport.BLE) },
)
if (esp32Transport == Esp32Transport.BLE) {
Text(
stringResource(R.string.settings_esp32_link_ble_note),
style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall,
color = MaterialTheme.colorScheme.onSurfaceVariant,
modifier = Modifier.padding(bottom = 8.dp),
)
}
Divider()
TwoWayChoice(
label = stringResource(R.string.settings_esp32_message),
first = stringResource(R.string.settings_esp32_message_cam),
second = stringResource(R.string.settings_esp32_message_vam),
firstSelected = outgoingMessage == OutgoingMessage.CAM,
onFirst = { onOutgoingMessageChange(OutgoingMessage.CAM) },
onSecond = { onOutgoingMessageChange(OutgoingMessage.VAM) },
)
Divider()
SettingToggleRow(
label = stringResource(R.string.settings_esp32_sign),
checked = signOutgoing,
onCheckedChange = onSignOutgoingChange,
)
Text(
stringResource(R.string.settings_esp32_sign_note),
style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall,
color = MaterialTheme.colorScheme.onSurfaceVariant,
modifier = Modifier.padding(bottom = 8.dp),
)
}
}
if (obuHardware == ObuHardware.CIT_ONE) { if (obuHardware == ObuHardware.CIT_ONE) {
SectionCard { SectionCard {
// Active transport selector // Active transport selector
@@ -611,6 +661,40 @@ private fun LanguageSection() {
} }
} }
/** A labelled pair of outlined buttons, the selected one filled — the style of the OBU hardware picker. */
@Composable
private fun TwoWayChoice(
label: String,
first: String,
second: String,
firstSelected: Boolean,
onFirst: () -> Unit,
onSecond: () -> Unit,
) {
Text(
label,
style = MaterialTheme.typography.labelSmall,
color = MaterialTheme.colorScheme.onSurfaceVariant,
modifier = Modifier.padding(top = 8.dp),
)
Spacer(Modifier.height(6.dp))
Row(
modifier = Modifier.fillMaxWidth().padding(bottom = 8.dp),
horizontalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(8.dp),
) {
for ((text, selected, onClick) in listOf(Triple(first, firstSelected, onFirst), Triple(second, !firstSelected, onSecond))) {
OutlinedButton(
onClick = onClick,
modifier = Modifier.weight(1f),
colors = ButtonDefaults.outlinedButtonColors(
containerColor = if (selected) MaterialTheme.colorScheme.primaryContainer else Color.Transparent,
contentColor = if (selected) MaterialTheme.colorScheme.onPrimaryContainer else MaterialTheme.colorScheme.onSurface,
),
) { Text(text, fontWeight = if (selected) FontWeight.Bold else FontWeight.Normal) }
}
}
}
@Composable @Composable
private fun RowDivider() = HorizontalDivider(color = MaterialTheme.colorScheme.outline.copy(alpha = 0.4f)) private fun RowDivider() = HorizontalDivider(color = MaterialTheme.colorScheme.outline.copy(alpha = 0.4f))
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/ui/screens/V2xLiveMapView.kt
+263 -103
View File
@@ -1,12 +1,13 @@
package com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.ui.screens package com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.ui.screens
import android.content.Context import android.content.Context
import android.graphics.drawable.Drawable
import android.view.MotionEvent
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.Box import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.Box
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.Column import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.Column
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.Spacer import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.Spacer
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.fillMaxSize import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.fillMaxSize
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.height import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.height
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.padding
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.size import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.size
import androidx.compose.material.icons.Icons import androidx.compose.material.icons.Icons
import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.GpsOff import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.GpsOff
@@ -30,25 +31,37 @@ import androidx.lifecycle.compose.LocalLifecycleOwner
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.R import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.R
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.Cam import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.Cam
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.denm.DenmEvent import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.denm.DenmEvent
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.spat.SpatIntersection
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.usecase.AlertLevel import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.usecase.AlertLevel
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.usecase.UseCaseAlert import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.usecase.UseCaseAlert
import org.osmdroid.config.Configuration import org.osmdroid.config.Configuration
import org.osmdroid.tileprovider.tilesource.TileSourceFactory import org.osmdroid.tileprovider.tilesource.TileSourceFactory
import org.osmdroid.util.GeoPoint import org.osmdroid.util.GeoPoint
import org.osmdroid.views.CustomZoomButtonsController
import org.osmdroid.views.MapView import org.osmdroid.views.MapView
import org.osmdroid.views.overlay.Marker import org.osmdroid.views.overlay.Marker
/** /**
* V2X Monitor live map view (Phase 03, Section 13) — plots the ego bike's own position plus * V2X Monitor live map (Phase 03, Section 13) — the map body behind [V2xMapScreen], plotting the
* every currently-tracked remote road user's last-known CAM position, in addition to (not * ego bike's own position, every currently-tracked remote road user's last-known CAM position,
* replacing) the raw topic list already on this screen. Reuses the same osmdroid pattern as * every live hazard (DENM) and every signalised intersection heard over SPATEM.
* [MapScreen]; unlike that screen, this one has no phone-GNSS-only fallback because [own] here
* always reflects whichever ego source [com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.cam.CamUseCaseRepository]
* currently trusts (obu_gnss / phone GNSS / CAM-topic-own — see that class's KDoc).
* *
* Remote markers are colored by that station's most severe active alert level, if any, so a * Marker vocabulary, one shape per message type so the map reads without a legend:
* glance at the map shows not just "who's nearby" but "who's a warning right now" — the same * - CAM — teardrop pin, tinted by that station's most severe active alert level
* severity coloring already used by [UseCaseAlertPanel]. * - DENM — hazard warning triangle
* - SPATEM — traffic light, with the lamp for the intersection's leading phase lit
*
* Unlike [MapScreen] this has no phone-GNSS-only fallback: [own] always reflects whichever ego
* source [com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.cam.CamUseCaseRepository] currently trusts (obu_gnss /
* phone GNSS / CAM-topic-own — see that class's KDoc).
*
* **Markers are reused across updates, not rebuilt.** CAMs arrive at up to 10 Hz per station, and
* every arrival recomposes this view; the previous version cleared the overlay list and rebuilt
* every Marker — decoding and mutating a fresh Drawable per marker per update — which is what
* made panning stutter under live traffic. Drawables are now loaded once per level/phase and
* shared (osmdroid sets the icon's bounds on each draw, so sharing one instance across markers is
* safe), and Marker objects are cached by key. The overlay list is still reordered each update,
* which costs nothing: it moves existing references, it does not allocate.
*/ */
@Composable @Composable
fun V2xLiveMapView( fun V2xLiveMapView(
@@ -56,6 +69,9 @@ fun V2xLiveMapView(
remotes: Map<Long, Cam>, remotes: Map<Long, Cam>,
alerts: List<UseCaseAlert>, alerts: List<UseCaseAlert>,
denms: List<DenmEvent> = emptyList(), denms: List<DenmEvent> = emptyList(),
spats: List<SpatIntersection> = emptyList(),
followOwn: Boolean = true,
onUserPanned: () -> Unit = {},
modifier: Modifier = Modifier, modifier: Modifier = Modifier,
) { ) {
val context = LocalContext.current val context = LocalContext.current
@@ -71,8 +87,17 @@ fun V2xLiveMapView(
.mapValues { (_, a) -> a.maxByOrNull { it.alertLevel.ordinal }?.alertLevel } .mapValues { (_, a) -> a.maxByOrNull { it.alertLevel.ordinal }?.alertLevel }
} }
// Loaded once and shared by every marker that needs them. mutate() on the remote pin is still
// essential: without it all four tinted copies would share one ConstantState and the last
// tint applied would recolour every pin on the map.
val icons = remember(context) { MapIcons(context) }
val markers = remember { mutableMapOf<String, Marker>() }
val mapViewRef = remember { mutableStateOf<MapView?>(null) } val mapViewRef = remember { mutableStateOf<MapView?>(null) }
val lifecycleOwner = LocalLifecycleOwner.current val lifecycleOwner = LocalLifecycleOwner.current
// Tracks whether the last update already recentred for this follow session, so re-enabling
// follow animates once instead of fighting the rider's own panning on every frame.
val wasFollowing = remember { mutableStateOf(false) }
DisposableEffect(lifecycleOwner) { DisposableEffect(lifecycleOwner) {
val observer = LifecycleEventObserver { _, event -> val observer = LifecycleEventObserver { _, event ->
@@ -89,106 +114,236 @@ fun V2xLiveMapView(
} }
} }
Column(modifier = modifier.fillMaxSize()) { AndroidView(
Text( factory = { ctx ->
text = stringResource(R.string.v2x_map_remote_count, remotes.size), initOsmForV2xMap(ctx)
style = MaterialTheme.typography.labelMedium, MapView(ctx).apply {
modifier = Modifier.padding(horizontal = 16.dp, vertical = 8.dp), setTileSource(TileSourceFactory.MAPNIK)
color = MaterialTheme.colorScheme.onSurfaceVariant, setMultiTouchControls(true)
) // Raster tiles are authored for ~160 dpi; without this they are upscaled by the
Spacer(Modifier.height(4.dp)) // display density and labels come out soft on a modern phone.
isTilesScaledToDpi = true
AndroidView( // The floating +/- buttons sit exactly where the rider's thumb lands and
factory = { ctx -> // duplicate pinch-zoom. Pinch and double-tap still work.
initOsmForV2xMap(ctx) zoomController.setVisibility(CustomZoomButtonsController.Visibility.NEVER)
MapView(ctx).apply { setMinZoomLevel(4.0)
setTileSource(TileSourceFactory.MAPNIK) setMaxZoomLevel(20.0)
setMultiTouchControls(true) controller.setZoom(17.0)
controller.setZoom(17.0) controller.setCenter(ownGeoPoint)
controller.setCenter(ownGeoPoint) // Any touch means the rider is driving the map; follow-own hands over to them
mapViewRef.value = this // until they ask for it back. false: the MapView's own gesture handling still
// runs, this only observes.
setOnTouchListener { _, event ->
if (event.actionMasked == MotionEvent.ACTION_DOWN) onUserPanned()
false
} }
}, mapViewRef.value = this
update = { mv -> }
mv.overlays.clear() },
update = { mv ->
val now = System.currentTimeMillis()
// Own position: a centred "you are here" dot, not a pin. Own position is a fact // Intersections we can actually place: SPATEM carries signal state but no geometry
// about the viewer rather than one of the tracked objects, and when both used // (that is MAPEM's job), so the only position available is the sending RSU's own CAM.
// osmdroid's identical default pin the two were indistinguishable at a glance. val locatedSpats = spats.mapNotNull { spat ->
mv.overlays.add( remotes[spat.stationId]?.let { rsu -> spat to rsu }
Marker(mv).apply { }
position = ownGeoPoint // An RSU drawn as a traffic light must not also be drawn as a CAM pin underneath it:
setAnchor(Marker.ANCHOR_CENTER, Marker.ANCHOR_CENTER) // two markers on one point, the lower one unreachable.
icon = ContextCompat.getDrawable(context, R.drawable.ic_map_own) val spatStationIds = locatedSpats.map { (spat, _) -> spat.stationId }.toSet()
title = context.getString(R.string.v2x_map_own_label)
}
)
remotes.forEach { (stationId, cam) -> val live = mutableSetOf<String>()
val level = alertByStation[stationId]
val label = when (level) { // Own position: a centred "you are here" dot, not a pin. Own position is a fact about
AlertLevel.WARNING -> context.getString(R.string.v2x_map_remote_warning, stationId) // the viewer rather than one of the tracked objects, and when both used osmdroid's
AlertLevel.AWARENESS -> context.getString(R.string.v2x_map_remote_awareness, stationId) // identical default pin the two were indistinguishable at a glance.
AlertLevel.INFO -> context.getString(R.string.v2x_map_remote_info, stationId) markers.marker(mv, KEY_OWN, live).apply {
null -> context.getString(R.string.v2x_map_remote_plain, stationId) position = ownGeoPoint
} setAnchor(Marker.ANCHOR_CENTER, Marker.ANCHOR_CENTER)
// Teardrop pin anchored at its tip, tinted by severity. Now that these are icon = icons.own
// custom drawables, per-instance tinting is possible - severity no longer title = context.getString(R.string.v2x_map_own_label)
// depends on tapping the marker to read its label. mutate() is essential: }
// without it every marker shares one ConstantState and the last tint applied
// would recolour all of them. remotes.forEach { (stationId, cam) ->
val pin = ContextCompat.getDrawable(context, R.drawable.ic_map_remote_station) if (stationId in spatStationIds) return@forEach
?.mutate() val level = alertByStation[stationId]
?.apply { setTint(level.toMarkerColor()) } val label = when (level) {
mv.overlays.add( AlertLevel.WARNING -> context.getString(R.string.v2x_map_remote_warning, stationId)
Marker(mv).apply { AlertLevel.AWARENESS -> context.getString(R.string.v2x_map_remote_awareness, stationId)
position = GeoPoint(cam.latitude, cam.longitude) AlertLevel.INFO -> context.getString(R.string.v2x_map_remote_info, stationId)
setAnchor(Marker.ANCHOR_CENTER, Marker.ANCHOR_BOTTOM) null -> context.getString(R.string.v2x_map_remote_plain, stationId)
icon = pin }
title = label // Teardrop pin anchored at its tip, tinted by severity, so severity no longer
} // depends on tapping the marker to read its label.
markers.marker(mv, "$KEY_CAM$stationId", live).apply {
position = GeoPoint(cam.latitude, cam.longitude)
setAnchor(Marker.ANCHOR_CENTER, Marker.ANCHOR_BOTTOM)
icon = icons.remotePin(level)
title = label
}
}
// Hazards and signals are added after the vehicle pins, so they draw on top: a hazard
// hidden behind a CAM pin defeats the point of showing it.
denms.forEach { denm ->
markers.marker(mv, "$KEY_DENM${denm.dedupKey}", live).apply {
position = GeoPoint(denm.latitude, denm.longitude)
setAnchor(Marker.ANCHOR_CENTER, Marker.ANCHOR_BOTTOM)
icon = icons.denm
title = denm.causeCode?.let {
context.getString(
R.string.v2x_map_denm_labeled,
it,
denm.subCauseCode ?: 0,
denm.stationId,
)
} ?: context.getString(R.string.v2x_map_denm_plain, denm.stationId)
}
}
locatedSpats.forEach { (spat, rsu) ->
val phase = spat.leadingPhase(now)
markers.marker(mv, "$KEY_SPAT${spat.key}", live).apply {
position = GeoPoint(rsu.latitude, rsu.longitude)
setAnchor(Marker.ANCHOR_CENTER, Marker.ANCHOR_BOTTOM)
icon = icons.signal(phase)
title = context.getString(
R.string.v2x_spat_rx_title, spat.state.key, spat.stationId,
) )
snippet = spat.state.movements.joinToString(" · ") { movement ->
val seconds = movement.current?.secondsUntil(now)?.takeIf { it in 0.0..99.0 }
context.getString(R.string.v2x_spat_group, movement.signalGroup) +
(seconds?.let { " " + context.getString(R.string.v2x_spat_countdown, it) } ?: "")
}
} }
}
// DENM hazard pins, added last so they draw on top of vehicle markers - a hazard // Drop markers for stations, hazards and intersections that have expired, then rebuild
// hidden behind a CAM pin defeats the point of showing it. // the overlay list in draw order from the cached Markers. Reordering moves references;
denms.forEach { denm -> // nothing here allocates a Marker or decodes a Drawable.
mv.overlays.add( markers.keys.retainAll { key ->
Marker(mv).apply { (key in live).also { kept -> if (!kept) markers[key]?.closeInfoWindow() }
position = GeoPoint(denm.latitude, denm.longitude) }
setAnchor(Marker.ANCHOR_CENTER, Marker.ANCHOR_BOTTOM) mv.overlays.clear()
icon = ContextCompat.getDrawable(context, R.drawable.ic_denm_warning) markers.entries
title = denm.causeCode?.let { .sortedBy { (key, _) -> key.drawOrder() }
context.getString( .forEach { (_, marker) -> mv.overlays.add(marker) }
R.string.v2x_map_denm_labeled,
it,
denm.subCauseCode ?: 0,
denm.stationId,
)
} ?: context.getString(R.string.v2x_map_denm_plain, denm.stationId)
}
)
}
mv.controller.animateTo(ownGeoPoint) // setCenter, not animateTo: an animation restarted on every CAM never finishes, which
mv.invalidate() // is exactly the judder this used to show under live traffic. The one animated move is
}, // the rider re-enabling follow, where the travel is worth seeing.
// osmdroid's onDetach() permanently tears the MapView down: afterwards its if (followOwn) {
// MapViewRepository holds a null MapView, so constructing a Marker against it throws if (wasFollowing.value) mv.controller.setCenter(ownGeoPoint)
// NullPointerException from deep inside InfoWindow's constructor. else mv.controller.animateTo(ownGeoPoint)
// }
// This used to run in the DisposableEffect's onDispose, which is NOT safe: that effect wasFollowing.value = followOwn
// is keyed on the lifecycle owner and disposes independently of this AndroidView, so
// the update block above could still run against an already-detached MapView and mv.invalidate()
// rebuild its markers. It crashed the app on 2026-08-17 once DENMs started arriving, },
// because every incoming message recomposes this view and there are far more updates // osmdroid's onDetach() permanently tears the MapView down: afterwards its
// to land in that window than there used to be. // MapViewRepository holds a null MapView, so constructing a Marker against it throws
// // NullPointerException from deep inside InfoWindow's constructor.
// onRelease is the callback that actually means "this View is gone": Compose //
// guarantees no further update after it. // This used to run in the DisposableEffect's onDispose, which is NOT safe: that effect
onRelease = { it.onDetach() }, // is keyed on the lifecycle owner and disposes independently of this AndroidView, so
modifier = Modifier.fillMaxSize(), // the update block above could still run against an already-detached MapView and
) // rebuild its markers. It crashed the app on 2026-08-17 once DENMs started arriving,
// because every incoming message recomposes this view and there are far more updates
// to land in that window than there used to be.
//
// onRelease is the callback that actually means "this View is gone": Compose
// guarantees no further update after it.
onRelease = {
markers.clear()
it.onDetach()
},
modifier = modifier.fillMaxSize(),
)
}
// ── Marker cache ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
private const val KEY_OWN = "own"
private const val KEY_CAM = "cam:"
private const val KEY_DENM = "denm:"
private const val KEY_SPAT = "spat:"
/** Draw order: own dot at the bottom, then vehicles, with hazards and signals on top. */
private fun String.drawOrder(): Int = when {
this == KEY_OWN -> 0
startsWith(KEY_CAM) -> 1
startsWith(KEY_DENM) -> 2
else -> 3
}
/**
* The cached [Marker] for [key], created against [mv] on first use, recording the key in [live]
* so the caller can drop whatever it did not ask for this update.
*/
private fun MutableMap<String, Marker>.marker(
mv: MapView,
key: String,
live: MutableSet<String>,
): Marker {
live += key
return getOrPut(key) { Marker(mv) }
}
/**
* Marker artwork, loaded once per composition rather than per update.
*
* The remote pin is drawn white and tinted per severity here; [mutate] is what keeps the four
* tinted copies independent, since without it they would share one ConstantState and the last
* tint applied would recolour all of them.
*/
private class MapIcons(context: Context) {
val own: Drawable? = ContextCompat.getDrawable(context, R.drawable.ic_map_own)
val denm: Drawable? = ContextCompat.getDrawable(context, R.drawable.ic_denm_warning)
private val pins: Map<AlertLevel?, Drawable?> =
(listOf(null) + AlertLevel.entries).associateWith { level ->
ContextCompat.getDrawable(context, R.drawable.ic_map_remote_station)
?.mutate()
?.apply { setTint(level.toMarkerColor()) }
}
private val signals: Map<SignalLamp, Drawable?> = SignalLamp.entries.associateWith { lamp ->
ContextCompat.getDrawable(context, lamp.drawableRes)
}
fun remotePin(level: AlertLevel?): Drawable? = pins[level]
fun signal(lamp: SignalLamp): Drawable? = signals[lamp]
}
// ── Signal phase → lamp ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/** Which lamp of the traffic-light marker is lit. */
private enum class SignalLamp(val drawableRes: Int) {
RED(R.drawable.ic_map_spat_red),
AMBER(R.drawable.ic_map_spat_amber),
GREEN(R.drawable.ic_map_spat_green),
DARK(R.drawable.ic_map_spat_dark),
}
/**
* The lamp to light for this intersection.
*
* Without MAPEM there is no lane geometry, so there is no way to know which of an intersection's
* signal groups applies to the rider's own approach. This follows the rule the Dashboard's
* SignalCard already uses — the group changing soonest speaks for the intersection — so the same
* intersection reads the same way in both places rather than inventing a second convention.
*/
private fun SpatIntersection.leadingPhase(nowMs: Long): SignalLamp {
val leading = state.movements.minByOrNull { movement ->
movement.current?.secondsUntil(nowMs)?.takeIf { it >= 0.0 } ?: Double.MAX_VALUE
}
val phase = leading?.current?.phase
return when {
phase == null -> SignalLamp.DARK
phase.isGo -> SignalLamp.GREEN
phase.isStop -> SignalLamp.RED
phase.isTransition -> SignalLamp.AMBER
else -> SignalLamp.DARK // UNAVAILABLE / DARK / caution
} }
} }
@@ -228,5 +383,10 @@ private fun initOsmForV2xMap(context: Context) {
Configuration.getInstance().apply { Configuration.getInstance().apply {
load(context, context.getSharedPreferences("osmdroid", Context.MODE_PRIVATE)) load(context, context.getSharedPreferences("osmdroid", Context.MODE_PRIVATE))
userAgentValue = context.packageName userAgentValue = context.packageName
// Panning off the edge of the cache is what makes a raster map feel slow: the default
// 600 MB cap is plenty, but the default 2 download threads are not when a pan exposes a
// screenful of new tiles at once.
tileDownloadThreads = 6.toShort()
tileFileSystemThreads = 6.toShort()
} }
} }
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/ui/screens/V2xMapScreen.kt
+203
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,203 @@
package com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.ui.screens
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.Arrangement
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.Box
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.Row
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.Spacer
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.fillMaxSize
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.fillMaxWidth
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.padding
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.size
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.width
import androidx.compose.foundation.shape.RoundedCornerShape
import androidx.compose.material.icons.Icons
import androidx.compose.material.icons.automirrored.filled.ArrowBack
import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.MyLocation
import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.Place
import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.Traffic
import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.Warning
import androidx.compose.material3.FloatingActionButton
import androidx.compose.material3.Icon
import androidx.compose.material3.IconButton
import androidx.compose.material3.MaterialTheme
import androidx.compose.material3.Surface
import androidx.compose.material3.Text
import androidx.compose.runtime.Composable
import androidx.compose.runtime.collectAsState
import androidx.compose.runtime.getValue
import androidx.compose.runtime.mutableStateOf
import androidx.compose.runtime.remember
import androidx.compose.runtime.setValue
import androidx.compose.ui.Alignment
import androidx.compose.ui.Modifier
import androidx.compose.ui.graphics.Color
import androidx.compose.ui.graphics.vector.ImageVector
import androidx.compose.ui.res.stringResource
import androidx.compose.ui.unit.dp
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.R
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.viewmodel.MqttViewModel
/**
* Full-screen V2X live map — the map and nothing else, reached from the map button on the V2X
* Monitor screen.
*
* Identical on both hardware paths. Everything drawn here comes from
* [com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.cam.CamUseCaseRepository], which already merges the CiT One's MQTT
* feed and the ESP32-C5's serial feed into one set of flows, so this screen never has to know
* which OBU is connected.
*
* The chrome is deliberately minimal and floats over the map rather than boxing it in: a back
* button, a live count per message type, and a recentre button. The counts double as the map's
* legend — each one carries the same icon family as the marker it counts.
*/
@Composable
fun V2xMapScreen(
viewModel: MqttViewModel,
onBack: () -> Unit,
) {
val ownCamPosition by viewModel.ownCamPosition.collectAsState()
// Road users from the detection engine PLUS roadside units, which it deliberately does not
// track - an RSU is what carries the traffic lights below.
val stations by viewModel.stationsInRange.collectAsState()
val alerts by viewModel.useCaseAlerts.collectAsState()
val denms by viewModel.denmEvents.collectAsState()
val spats by viewModel.spatIntersections.collectAsState()
// Follow is on until the rider touches the map, and comes back when they ask for it. Without
// the hand-over, every incoming CAM would drag the viewport back to the ego position and the
// map could not be panned at all while traffic is flowing.
var followOwn by remember { mutableStateOf(true) }
// SPATEM carries no geometry of its own, so an intersection can only be placed if its RSU has
// also been heard over CAM. Saying so is better than silently dropping it: "the map shows two
// of the three lights I can see in the list" is otherwise an unexplained discrepancy.
val unlocatedSpats = spats.count { it.stationId !in stations.keys }
Box(modifier = Modifier.fillMaxSize()) {
V2xLiveMapView(
own = ownCamPosition,
remotes = stations,
alerts = alerts,
denms = denms,
spats = spats,
followOwn = followOwn,
onUserPanned = { followOwn = false },
modifier = Modifier.fillMaxSize(),
)
// ── Floating header: back + live counts, which double as the legend ──
Row(
modifier = Modifier
.align(Alignment.TopStart)
.fillMaxWidth()
.padding(8.dp),
verticalAlignment = Alignment.CenterVertically,
) {
MapChrome {
IconButton(onClick = onBack, modifier = Modifier.size(36.dp)) {
Icon(
Icons.AutoMirrored.Filled.ArrowBack,
contentDescription = stringResource(R.string.v2x_map_back),
)
}
}
Spacer(Modifier.width(8.dp))
MapChrome {
Row(
modifier = Modifier.padding(horizontal = 10.dp, vertical = 6.dp),
horizontalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(10.dp),
verticalAlignment = Alignment.CenterVertically,
) {
MapCount(
icon = Icons.Default.Place,
tint = CamPinBlue,
count = stations.size,
label = stringResource(R.string.v2x_map_legend_cam),
)
MapCount(
icon = Icons.Default.Warning,
tint = HazardAmber,
count = denms.size,
label = stringResource(R.string.v2x_map_legend_denm),
)
MapCount(
icon = Icons.Default.Traffic,
tint = SignalGreenDot,
count = spats.size,
label = stringResource(R.string.v2x_map_legend_spat),
)
}
}
}
if (unlocatedSpats > 0) {
MapChrome(
modifier = Modifier
.align(Alignment.BottomStart)
.padding(12.dp),
) {
Text(
text = stringResource(R.string.v2x_map_spat_unlocated, unlocatedSpats),
style = MaterialTheme.typography.labelSmall,
color = MaterialTheme.colorScheme.onSurfaceVariant,
modifier = Modifier.padding(horizontal = 10.dp, vertical = 6.dp),
)
}
}
// Recentre: lit while following, so the button also reports which mode the map is in.
FloatingActionButton(
onClick = { followOwn = true },
containerColor = if (followOwn) MaterialTheme.colorScheme.primary
else MaterialTheme.colorScheme.surfaceVariant,
modifier = Modifier
.align(Alignment.BottomEnd)
.padding(16.dp),
) {
Icon(
Icons.Default.MyLocation,
contentDescription = stringResource(R.string.v2x_map_follow),
tint = if (followOwn) MaterialTheme.colorScheme.onPrimary
else MaterialTheme.colorScheme.onSurfaceVariant,
)
}
}
}
/** A translucent pill for anything floating over the map, so chrome stays readable over tiles. */
@Composable
private fun MapChrome(
modifier: Modifier = Modifier,
content: @Composable () -> Unit,
) {
Surface(
shape = RoundedCornerShape(18.dp),
color = MaterialTheme.colorScheme.surface.copy(alpha = 0.88f),
tonalElevation = 3.dp,
shadowElevation = 2.dp,
modifier = modifier,
) { content() }
}
@Composable
private fun MapCount(icon: ImageVector, tint: Color, count: Int, label: String) {
Row(
horizontalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(3.dp),
verticalAlignment = Alignment.CenterVertically,
) {
Icon(icon, contentDescription = label, tint = tint, modifier = Modifier.size(16.dp))
Text(
text = count.toString(),
style = MaterialTheme.typography.labelMedium,
color = MaterialTheme.colorScheme.onSurface,
)
}
}
// Legend tints, matching the marker artwork rather than the theme: these name the drawables on
// the map, so they must not shift with light/dark mode the way theme colours do.
private val CamPinBlue = Color(0xFF78909C)
private val HazardAmber = Color(0xFFFFC107)
private val SignalGreenDot = Color(0xFF4CAF50)
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/viewmodel/MqttViewModel.kt
+44 -13
View File
@@ -13,8 +13,11 @@ import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.EspLinkStatus
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.ObuHardware import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.ObuHardware
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.TransportType import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.TransportType
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.UsbNetworkDetector import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.UsbNetworkDetector
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.UsbSerialState import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.Esp32LinkState
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.UsbSerialTransport import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.Esp32Link
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.Esp32Transport
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.OutgoingMessage
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.StationStatus
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.denm.DenmEvent import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.denm.DenmEvent
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.denm.DenmParser import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.denm.DenmParser
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.spat.SpatIntersection import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.spat.SpatIntersection
@@ -45,7 +48,7 @@ class MqttViewModel @Inject constructor(
private val usbDetector: UsbNetworkDetector, private val usbDetector: UsbNetworkDetector,
private val camUseCaseRepository: CamUseCaseRepository, private val camUseCaseRepository: CamUseCaseRepository,
private val obuHardwarePrefs: ObuHardwarePreferences, private val obuHardwarePrefs: ObuHardwarePreferences,
private val usbSerialTransport: UsbSerialTransport, private val esp32Link: Esp32Link,
private val camPinger: CamPinger, private val camPinger: CamPinger,
) : ViewModel() { ) : ViewModel() {
@@ -80,14 +83,42 @@ class MqttViewModel @Inject constructor(
/** Auto-detected OBU gateway IP on the USB interface. */ /** Auto-detected OBU gateway IP on the USB interface. */
val detectedObuIp: StateFlow<String?> = usbDetector.detectedGatewayIp val detectedObuIp: StateFlow<String?> = usbDetector.detectedGatewayIp
/** ESP32-C5 USB-serial link state (Phase 03) — see [UsbSerialTransport]. */ /** ESP32-C5 link state, over USB or BLE per [esp32Transport] — see [Esp32Link]. */
val usbSerialState: StateFlow<UsbSerialState> = usbSerialTransport.state val esp32LinkState: StateFlow<Esp32LinkState> = esp32Link.state
/** Latest firmware heartbeat + drop counters, null until the first STATUS frame arrives. */ /** Latest firmware heartbeat + drop counters, null until the first STATUS frame arrives. */
val espLinkStatus: StateFlow<EspLinkStatus?> = usbSerialTransport.linkStatus val espLinkStatus: StateFlow<EspLinkStatus?> = esp32Link.linkStatus
/** Non-zero means CAMs are being built and dropped — see [UsbSerialTransport.sendCamTx]. */ /** Non-zero means CAMs are being built and dropped — see [Esp32Link.send]. */
val camSendFailures: StateFlow<Int> = usbSerialTransport.consecutiveWriteFailures val camSendFailures: StateFlow<Int> = esp32Link.consecutiveWriteFailures
/** Signing and radio counters of the current obu-firmware; null with the previous firmware. */
val stationStatus: StateFlow<StationStatus?> = esp32Link.stationStatus
/** One line about the link session (pairing passkey, provisioning, refusals); null when quiet. */
val esp32Detail: StateFlow<String?> = esp32Link.detail
// ── ESP32-C5 settings ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
val esp32Transport: StateFlow<Esp32Transport> = esp32Link.transport
fun setEsp32Transport(transport: Esp32Transport) {
viewModelScope.launch { obuHardwarePrefs.setEsp32Transport(transport) }
}
val outgoingMessage: StateFlow<OutgoingMessage> = obuHardwarePrefs.outgoingMessageFlow
.stateIn(viewModelScope, SharingStarted.Eagerly, OutgoingMessage.CAM)
fun setOutgoingMessage(message: OutgoingMessage) {
viewModelScope.launch { obuHardwarePrefs.setOutgoingMessage(message) }
}
val signOutgoing: StateFlow<Boolean> = obuHardwarePrefs.signOutgoingFlow
.stateIn(viewModelScope, SharingStarted.Eagerly, true)
fun setSignOutgoing(sign: Boolean) {
viewModelScope.launch { obuHardwarePrefs.setSignOutgoing(sign) }
}
// ── ESP32-C5 CAM pinger (manual bench test, Phase 03) ───────────────────── // ── ESP32-C5 CAM pinger (manual bench test, Phase 03) ─────────────────────
// The ESP32-C5-path equivalent of the CiT One's manual DENM trigger below — a fixed- // The ESP32-C5-path equivalent of the CiT One's manual DENM trigger below — a fixed-
@@ -352,10 +383,10 @@ class MqttViewModel @Inject constructor(
fun connect() = repo.connect() fun connect() = repo.connect()
fun disconnect() = repo.disconnect() fun disconnect() = repo.disconnect()
/** Connect/disconnect the ESP32-C5 USB-serial link — separate from [connect]/[disconnect], /** Connect/disconnect the ESP32-C5 link (USB or BLE per [esp32Transport]) — separate from
* which drive the CiT One's MQTT-over-USB-C/Wi-Fi path. See [ConnectionSetupScreen]. */ * [connect]/[disconnect], which drive the CiT One's MQTT-over-USB-C/Wi-Fi path. */
fun connectUsbSerial() = usbSerialTransport.connect() fun connectEsp32() = esp32Link.connect()
fun disconnectUsbSerial() = usbSerialTransport.disconnect() fun disconnectEsp32() = esp32Link.disconnect()
fun selectTopic(topic: String?) { _selectedTopic.value = topic } fun selectTopic(topic: String?) { _selectedTopic.value = topic }
fun setAutoScroll(enabled: Boolean) { _autoScroll.value = enabled } fun setAutoScroll(enabled: Boolean) { _autoScroll.value = enabled }
@@ -389,7 +420,7 @@ class MqttViewModel @Inject constructor(
super.onCleared() super.onCleared()
repo.disconnect() repo.disconnect()
camPinger.stop() camPinger.stop()
// Deliberately NOT usbSerialTransport.disconnect(): the transport is an app-scoped // Deliberately NOT esp32Link.disconnect(): the link is an app-scoped
// @Singleton also held by the foreground TripRecordingService (via CamTransmitLoop). // @Singleton also held by the foreground TripRecordingService (via CamTransmitLoop).
// Closing it here would tear the port down when the Activity goes away — e.g. swiping // Closing it here would tear the port down when the Activity goes away — e.g. swiping
// the app from Recents mid-recording — leaving the still-running service beaconing into // the app from Recents mid-recording — leaving the still-running service beaconing into
app/src/main/res/drawable/ic_map_spat_amber.xml
+38
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
<!--
Live-map marker for a signalised intersection heard over SPATEM: a traffic light housing with
the lamp for the intersection's leading phase lit and the other two dimmed.
One drawable per lit lamp rather than one drawable tinted at runtime: setTint recolours every
path in a vector, so a single shared asset could not keep the unlit lamps dark while colouring
the lit one - the whole light would turn one flat colour and stop reading as a traffic light.
Anchored at the bottom in V2xLiveMapView, so the housing sits above the intersection rather
than covering it.
-->
<vector xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android"
android:width="30dp"
android:height="30dp"
android:viewportWidth="24"
android:viewportHeight="24">
<!-- White outline first, so the marker stays legible over dark map features. -->
<path
android:fillColor="#FFFFFFFF"
android:pathData="M4.4,0.8H19.6V23.2H4.4z" />
<!-- Housing. -->
<path
android:fillColor="#FF263238"
android:pathData="M5.8,2.0H18.2V22.0H5.8z" />
<!-- Lamps, top to bottom: red, amber, green. -->
<path
android:fillColor="#FF5A2220"
android:pathData="M12,6.6m-2.6,0a2.6,2.6 0 1,0 5.2,0a2.6,2.6 0 1,0 -5.2,0" />
<path
android:fillColor="#FFFFC107"
android:pathData="M12,12.0m-2.6,0a2.6,2.6 0 1,0 5.2,0a2.6,2.6 0 1,0 -5.2,0" />
<path
android:fillColor="#FF1E4D2B"
android:pathData="M12,17.4m-2.6,0a2.6,2.6 0 1,0 5.2,0a2.6,2.6 0 1,0 -5.2,0" />
</vector>
app/src/main/res/drawable/ic_map_spat_dark.xml
+38
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
<!--
Live-map marker for a signalised intersection heard over SPATEM: a traffic light housing with
the lamp for the intersection's leading phase lit and the other two dimmed.
One drawable per lit lamp rather than one drawable tinted at runtime: setTint recolours every
path in a vector, so a single shared asset could not keep the unlit lamps dark while colouring
the lit one - the whole light would turn one flat colour and stop reading as a traffic light.
Anchored at the bottom in V2xLiveMapView, so the housing sits above the intersection rather
than covering it.
-->
<vector xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android"
android:width="30dp"
android:height="30dp"
android:viewportWidth="24"
android:viewportHeight="24">
<!-- White outline first, so the marker stays legible over dark map features. -->
<path
android:fillColor="#FFFFFFFF"
android:pathData="M4.4,0.8H19.6V23.2H4.4z" />
<!-- Housing. -->
<path
android:fillColor="#FF263238"
android:pathData="M5.8,2.0H18.2V22.0H5.8z" />
<!-- Lamps, top to bottom: red, amber, green. -->
<path
android:fillColor="#FF5A2220"
android:pathData="M12,6.6m-2.6,0a2.6,2.6 0 1,0 5.2,0a2.6,2.6 0 1,0 -5.2,0" />
<path
android:fillColor="#FF4A2E1C"
android:pathData="M12,12.0m-2.6,0a2.6,2.6 0 1,0 5.2,0a2.6,2.6 0 1,0 -5.2,0" />
<path
android:fillColor="#FF1E4D2B"
android:pathData="M12,17.4m-2.6,0a2.6,2.6 0 1,0 5.2,0a2.6,2.6 0 1,0 -5.2,0" />
</vector>
app/src/main/res/drawable/ic_map_spat_green.xml
+38
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
<!--
Live-map marker for a signalised intersection heard over SPATEM: a traffic light housing with
the lamp for the intersection's leading phase lit and the other two dimmed.
One drawable per lit lamp rather than one drawable tinted at runtime: setTint recolours every
path in a vector, so a single shared asset could not keep the unlit lamps dark while colouring
the lit one - the whole light would turn one flat colour and stop reading as a traffic light.
Anchored at the bottom in V2xLiveMapView, so the housing sits above the intersection rather
than covering it.
-->
<vector xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android"
android:width="30dp"
android:height="30dp"
android:viewportWidth="24"
android:viewportHeight="24">
<!-- White outline first, so the marker stays legible over dark map features. -->
<path
android:fillColor="#FFFFFFFF"
android:pathData="M4.4,0.8H19.6V23.2H4.4z" />
<!-- Housing. -->
<path
android:fillColor="#FF263238"
android:pathData="M5.8,2.0H18.2V22.0H5.8z" />
<!-- Lamps, top to bottom: red, amber, green. -->
<path
android:fillColor="#FF5A2220"
android:pathData="M12,6.6m-2.6,0a2.6,2.6 0 1,0 5.2,0a2.6,2.6 0 1,0 -5.2,0" />
<path
android:fillColor="#FF4A2E1C"
android:pathData="M12,12.0m-2.6,0a2.6,2.6 0 1,0 5.2,0a2.6,2.6 0 1,0 -5.2,0" />
<path
android:fillColor="#FF4CAF50"
android:pathData="M12,17.4m-2.6,0a2.6,2.6 0 1,0 5.2,0a2.6,2.6 0 1,0 -5.2,0" />
</vector>
app/src/main/res/drawable/ic_map_spat_red.xml
+38
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
<!--
Live-map marker for a signalised intersection heard over SPATEM: a traffic light housing with
the lamp for the intersection's leading phase lit and the other two dimmed.
One drawable per lit lamp rather than one drawable tinted at runtime: setTint recolours every
path in a vector, so a single shared asset could not keep the unlit lamps dark while colouring
the lit one - the whole light would turn one flat colour and stop reading as a traffic light.
Anchored at the bottom in V2xLiveMapView, so the housing sits above the intersection rather
than covering it.
-->
<vector xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android"
android:width="30dp"
android:height="30dp"
android:viewportWidth="24"
android:viewportHeight="24">
<!-- White outline first, so the marker stays legible over dark map features. -->
<path
android:fillColor="#FFFFFFFF"
android:pathData="M4.4,0.8H19.6V23.2H4.4z" />
<!-- Housing. -->
<path
android:fillColor="#FF263238"
android:pathData="M5.8,2.0H18.2V22.0H5.8z" />
<!-- Lamps, top to bottom: red, amber, green. -->
<path
android:fillColor="#FFFF5252"
android:pathData="M12,6.6m-2.6,0a2.6,2.6 0 1,0 5.2,0a2.6,2.6 0 1,0 -5.2,0" />
<path
android:fillColor="#FF4A2E1C"
android:pathData="M12,12.0m-2.6,0a2.6,2.6 0 1,0 5.2,0a2.6,2.6 0 1,0 -5.2,0" />
<path
android:fillColor="#FF1E4D2B"
android:pathData="M12,17.4m-2.6,0a2.6,2.6 0 1,0 5.2,0a2.6,2.6 0 1,0 -5.2,0" />
</vector>
app/src/main/res/values-de/strings.xml
+22 -3
View File
@@ -142,12 +142,18 @@
<string name="gnss_no_fix">Noch kein GPS-Signal - gehen Sie ins Freie</string> <string name="gnss_no_fix">Noch kein GPS-Signal - gehen Sie ins Freie</string>
<string name="map_title">Standortkarte</string> <string name="map_title">Standortkarte</string>
<string name="map_location_label">Aktueller Standort</string> <string name="map_location_label">Aktueller Standort</string>
<string name="v2x_map_remote_count">%1$d erfasste externe Verkehrsteilnehmer</string>
<string name="v2x_map_own_label">Eigen (Ego)</string> <string name="v2x_map_own_label">Eigen (Ego)</string>
<string name="v2x_map_remote_plain">Extern #%1$d</string> <string name="v2x_map_remote_plain">Extern #%1$d</string>
<string name="v2x_map_remote_info">Extern #%1$d · Info</string> <string name="v2x_map_remote_info">Extern #%1$d · Info</string>
<string name="v2x_map_remote_awareness">Extern #%1$d · Aufmerksamkeit</string> <string name="v2x_map_remote_awareness">Extern #%1$d · Aufmerksamkeit</string>
<string name="v2x_map_remote_warning">Extern #%1$d · Warnung</string> <string name="v2x_map_remote_warning">Extern #%1$d · Warnung</string>
<string name="v2x_map_title">V2X-Live-Karte</string>
<string name="v2x_map_back">Zurück</string>
<string name="v2x_map_follow">Auf eigene Position zentrieren</string>
<string name="v2x_map_legend_cam">Verkehrsteilnehmer (CAM)</string>
<string name="v2x_map_legend_denm">Gefahren (DENM)</string>
<string name="v2x_map_legend_spat">Signale (SPATEM)</string>
<string name="v2x_map_spat_unlocated">%1$d Signal(e) nicht dargestellt - Senderposition unbekannt</string>
<!-- Settings --> <!-- Settings -->
<string name="settings_title">Einstellungen</string> <string name="settings_title">Einstellungen</string>
@@ -183,7 +189,7 @@
<string name="settings_obu_hardware">OBU-Hardware</string> <string name="settings_obu_hardware">OBU-Hardware</string>
<string name="settings_obu_hardware_cit_one">CiT One</string> <string name="settings_obu_hardware_cit_one">CiT One</string>
<string name="settings_obu_hardware_esp32">ESP32-C5</string> <string name="settings_obu_hardware_esp32">ESP32-C5</string>
<string name="settings_obu_hardware_esp32_note">Der ESP32-C5 arbeitet als „dummer" Transceiver: CAM wird auf dem Smartphone erstellt und kodiert, über USB-Seriell an den ESP32 gesendet und über ITS-G5 gesendet. Auf diesem Pfad gibt es keinen MQTT-Broker und keine DENM-Use-Case-Engine - siehe den CAM-Pinger im V2X-Monitor für ein manuelles Testwerkzeug.</string> <string name="settings_obu_hardware_esp32_note">Das Smartphone erstellt CAM oder VAM und übergibt sie per USB-C oder Bluetooth an den ESP32-C5; der ESP32 ergänzt GeoNetworking, signiert (optional) und sendet über ITS-G5. Auf diesem Pfad gibt es keinen MQTT-Broker und keine DENM-Use-Case-Engine - siehe den CAM-Pinger im V2X-Monitor für ein manuelles Testwerkzeug.</string>
<string name="settings_usb_transport">Aktiver Transport</string> <string name="settings_usb_transport">Aktiver Transport</string>
<string name="settings_transport_usbc">USB-C</string> <string name="settings_transport_usbc">USB-C</string>
<string name="settings_transport_wifi">WLAN</string> <string name="settings_transport_wifi">WLAN</string>
@@ -197,7 +203,6 @@
<string name="mqtt_no_topics">Noch keine Nachrichten</string> <string name="mqtt_no_topics">Noch keine Nachrichten</string>
<string name="mqtt_view_list">Liste</string> <string name="mqtt_view_list">Liste</string>
<string name="mqtt_view_topics">Topics</string> <string name="mqtt_view_topics">Topics</string>
<string name="mqtt_view_map">Karte</string>
<string name="mqtt_no_topics_hint">Mit der OBU verbinden und auf V2X-Verkehr warten</string> <string name="mqtt_no_topics_hint">Mit der OBU verbinden und auf V2X-Verkehr warten</string>
<string name="mqtt_no_messages">Noch keine Nachrichten zu diesem Thema</string> <string name="mqtt_no_messages">Noch keine Nachrichten zu diesem Thema</string>
@@ -313,4 +318,18 @@
<string name="v2x_spat_rx_title">Kreuzung %1$s · Station %2$d</string> <string name="v2x_spat_rx_title">Kreuzung %1$s · Station %2$d</string>
<string name="v2x_spat_group">SG%1$d</string> <string name="v2x_spat_group">SG%1$d</string>
<string name="v2x_spat_countdown">%1$.0f s</string> <string name="v2x_spat_countdown">%1$.0f s</string>
<string name="settings_esp32_link">ESP32-C5-Verbindung</string>
<string name="settings_esp32_link_ble">Bluetooth</string>
<string name="settings_esp32_link_ble_note">Beim ersten Verbinden wird das Koppeln mit micrOBU-XXXX angefragt: Passkey 123456 eingeben. Die Platine wirbt nur, solange ihr USB-C-Port nicht benutzt wird. BLE teilt sich das Funk-Frontend mit ITS-G5; der Einfluss auf den 5,9-GHz-Empfang ist noch nicht gemessen.</string>
<string name="settings_esp32_message">Senden während der Aufzeichnung</string>
<string name="settings_esp32_message_cam">CAM</string>
<string name="settings_esp32_message_vam">VAM</string>
<string name="settings_esp32_sign">Ausgehende Nachrichten signieren</string>
<string name="settings_esp32_sign_note">Signiert mit einer Demo-PKI, nicht der EU-Vertrauensliste: Empfänger, die dagegen prüfen, verwerfen diese Nachrichten. Aus sendet sie wie bisher unsigniert.</string>
<string name="conn_esp32_via_usb">über USB-C (nativer Port)</string>
<string name="conn_esp32_via_ble">über Bluetooth (Passkey 123456 beim ersten Koppeln)</string>
<string name="conn_esp32_cancel">Abbrechen</string>
<string name="conn_esp32_signing">Signieren %1$s · Tickets %2$d · signiert %3$d · abgelehnt %4$d · gesendet %5$d</string>
<string name="conn_esp32_signing_on">an</string>
<string name="conn_esp32_signing_off">aus</string>
</resources> </resources>
app/src/main/res/values/strings.xml
+23 -4
View File
@@ -143,12 +143,18 @@
<string name="gnss_no_fix">No GPS fix yet - move to an open area</string> <string name="gnss_no_fix">No GPS fix yet - move to an open area</string>
<string name="map_title">Location Map</string> <string name="map_title">Location Map</string>
<string name="map_location_label">Current Location</string> <string name="map_location_label">Current Location</string>
<string name="v2x_map_remote_count">%1$d tracked remote road user(s)</string>
<string name="v2x_map_own_label">Own (ego)</string> <string name="v2x_map_own_label">Own (ego)</string>
<string name="v2x_map_remote_plain">Remote #%1$d</string> <string name="v2x_map_remote_plain">Remote #%1$d</string>
<string name="v2x_map_remote_info">Remote #%1$d · Info</string> <string name="v2x_map_remote_info">Remote #%1$d · Info</string>
<string name="v2x_map_remote_awareness">Remote #%1$d · Awareness</string> <string name="v2x_map_remote_awareness">Remote #%1$d · Awareness</string>
<string name="v2x_map_remote_warning">Remote #%1$d · Warning</string> <string name="v2x_map_remote_warning">Remote #%1$d · Warning</string>
<string name="v2x_map_title">V2X Live Map</string>
<string name="v2x_map_back">Back</string>
<string name="v2x_map_follow">Centre on own position</string>
<string name="v2x_map_legend_cam">Road users (CAM)</string>
<string name="v2x_map_legend_denm">Hazards (DENM)</string>
<string name="v2x_map_legend_spat">Signals (SPATEM)</string>
<string name="v2x_map_spat_unlocated">%1$d signal(s) not shown - sender position unknown</string>
<!-- Settings --> <!-- Settings -->
<string name="settings_title">Settings</string> <string name="settings_title">Settings</string>
@@ -184,7 +190,7 @@
<string name="settings_obu_hardware">OBU Hardware</string> <string name="settings_obu_hardware">OBU Hardware</string>
<string name="settings_obu_hardware_cit_one">CiT One</string> <string name="settings_obu_hardware_cit_one">CiT One</string>
<string name="settings_obu_hardware_esp32">ESP32-C5</string> <string name="settings_obu_hardware_esp32">ESP32-C5</string>
<string name="settings_obu_hardware_esp32_note">ESP32-C5 acts as a "dumb" transceiver: CAM is built and encoded on the phone, sent to the ESP32 over USB serial, and broadcast over ITS-G5. No MQTT broker or DENM use-case engine on this path - see the V2X Monitor screen\'s CAM Pinger for a manual test tool.</string> <string name="settings_obu_hardware_esp32_note">The phone builds CAM or VAM and hands it to the ESP32-C5 over USB-C or Bluetooth; the ESP32 adds GeoNetworking, signs it (optional) and broadcasts it over ITS-G5. No MQTT broker or DENM use-case engine on this path - see the V2X Monitor screen\'s CAM Pinger for a manual test tool.</string>
<string name="settings_usb_transport">Active transport</string> <string name="settings_usb_transport">Active transport</string>
<string name="settings_transport_usbc">USB-C</string> <string name="settings_transport_usbc">USB-C</string>
<string name="settings_transport_wifi">Wi-Fi</string> <string name="settings_transport_wifi">Wi-Fi</string>
@@ -198,7 +204,6 @@
<string name="mqtt_no_topics">No messages yet</string> <string name="mqtt_no_topics">No messages yet</string>
<string name="mqtt_view_list">List</string> <string name="mqtt_view_list">List</string>
<string name="mqtt_view_topics">Topics</string> <string name="mqtt_view_topics">Topics</string>
<string name="mqtt_view_map">Map</string>
<string name="mqtt_no_topics_hint">Connect to the OBU and wait for V2X traffic</string> <string name="mqtt_no_topics_hint">Connect to the OBU and wait for V2X traffic</string>
<string name="mqtt_no_messages">No messages on this topic yet</string> <string name="mqtt_no_messages">No messages on this topic yet</string>
@@ -259,7 +264,7 @@
<string name="mqtt_cam_pinger_active">Pinging - 1 CAM/s over the serial link</string> <string name="mqtt_cam_pinger_active">Pinging - 1 CAM/s over the serial link</string>
<string name="mqtt_cam_pinger_sent_count">Sent: %1$d</string> <string name="mqtt_cam_pinger_sent_count">Sent: %1$d</string>
<string name="mqtt_cam_pinger_send_failures">Write failures: %1$d consecutive - CAMs are not reaching the ESP32</string> <string name="mqtt_cam_pinger_send_failures">Write failures: %1$d consecutive - CAMs are not reaching the ESP32</string>
<string name="mqtt_cam_pinger_fw_counters">ESP32: tx fail %1$d · oversize %2$d · crc err %3$d</string> <string name="mqtt_cam_pinger_fw_counters">ESP32: tx fail %1$d · oversize %2$d · crc err %3$d · rx queue drop %4$d</string>
<string name="mqtt_cam_pinger_loopback">Own TX heard back: %1$d frames · %2$d dBm</string> <string name="mqtt_cam_pinger_loopback">Own TX heard back: %1$d frames · %2$d dBm</string>
<string name="mqtt_cam_pinger_loopback_no_rssi">Own TX heard back: %1$d frames</string> <string name="mqtt_cam_pinger_loopback_no_rssi">Own TX heard back: %1$d frames</string>
<string name="mqtt_start_pinger">Start Pinger</string> <string name="mqtt_start_pinger">Start Pinger</string>
@@ -320,4 +325,18 @@
<!-- Phase A: Trip Review screen --> <!-- Phase A: Trip Review screen -->
<string name="trip_review_title">Trip Review</string> <string name="trip_review_title">Trip Review</string>
<string name="settings_esp32_link">ESP32-C5 link</string>
<string name="settings_esp32_link_ble">Bluetooth</string>
<string name="settings_esp32_link_ble_note">The first connection asks to pair with micrOBU-XXXX: enter passkey 123456. The board only advertises while nothing uses its USB-C port. BLE shares the radio front end with ITS-G5; its effect on 5.9 GHz reception has not been measured yet.</string>
<string name="settings_esp32_message">Transmit while recording</string>
<string name="settings_esp32_message_cam">CAM</string>
<string name="settings_esp32_message_vam">VAM</string>
<string name="settings_esp32_sign">Sign outgoing messages</string>
<string name="settings_esp32_sign_note">Signed with a demo PKI, not the EU trust list: receivers that verify against it will drop these messages. Off sends them unsigned, as before.</string>
<string name="conn_esp32_via_usb">via USB-C (native port)</string>
<string name="conn_esp32_via_ble">via Bluetooth (passkey 123456 on first pairing)</string>
<string name="conn_esp32_cancel">Cancel</string>
<string name="conn_esp32_signing">Signing %1$s · tickets %2$d · signed %3$d · refused %4$d · on air %5$d</string>
<string name="conn_esp32_signing_on">on</string>
<string name="conn_esp32_signing_off">off</string>
</resources> </resources>
app/src/test/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/CamTxPvSerialTest.kt
+15
View File
@@ -166,6 +166,21 @@ class CamTxPvSerialTest {
assertFalse(EspLinkStatus.parse("0000000000000002".hexToBytes())!!.supportsCamTxPv) assertFalse(EspLinkStatus.parse("0000000000000002".hexToBytes())!!.supportsCamTxPv)
} }
@Test
fun `firmware that predates the rx queue drop counter reports zero`() {
// 8-byte heartbeat (status + counters + capabilities, no rx queue drops tail).
val status = EspLinkStatus.parse("0000000000000001".hexToBytes())!!
assertEquals(0, status.rxQueueDrops)
}
@Test
fun `rx queue drops are read little-endian from the 10-byte payload`() {
// status=0, oversize=0, txFail=0, rxCrc=0, capabilities=0x01, rxQueueDrops=0x0102 (LE: 02 01)
val status = EspLinkStatus.parse("00000000000000010201".hexToBytes())!!
assertEquals(0x0102, status.rxQueueDrops)
assertTrue(status.supportsCamTxPv)
}
private val mac = "024d49435230".hexToBytes() private val mac = "024d49435230".hexToBytes()
private fun vectorAt(tstMs: Long) = GnPositionVector( private fun vectorAt(tstMs: Long) = GnPositionVector(
app/src/test/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/StationLinkTest.kt
+119
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
package com.hawhamburg.micr0bu
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.BtpDataRequest
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.LinkMessage
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.LinkOpcode
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.LinkResult
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.LinkSecurityProfile
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.PotiUpdate
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.StationConfigure
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.StationInfo
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.StationStatus
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.credentialsSegment
import org.junit.Assert.assertArrayEquals
import org.junit.Assert.assertEquals
import org.junit.Assert.assertNotNull
import org.junit.Assert.assertNull
import org.junit.Assert.assertTrue
import org.junit.Test
/**
* Pins the phone side of the station-link message layer.
*
* ## Where the expected bytes come from
* The colleague's Python implementation of the same protocol, microbu-esp32c5
* station-link/python/microbu_link/messages.py (`encode_message` over each body's `encode`),
* run with the same field values. That module is what their phone emulator drives the firmware
* with, so an agreement here is agreement with a second, independent implementation.
*/
class StationLinkTest {
private fun String.hexToBytes(): ByteArray = chunked(2).map { it.toInt(16).toByte() }.toByteArray()
private fun ByteArray.hex(): String = joinToString("") { "%02x".format(it) }
@Test
fun `STATION_CONFIGURE matches the Python encoder`() {
val body = StationConfigure(stationType = 2, mid = "021122334455".hexToBytes()).encode()
assertEquals(
"0100070002010002112233445500b40014020205",
LinkMessage(LinkOpcode.STATION_CONFIGURE, 7, body).encode().hex(),
)
}
@Test
fun `POTI_UPDATE matches the Python encoder`() {
val body = PotiUpdate(
timestampMs = 717_254_800_123L, latTenMicroDeg = 535_546_667, lonTenMicroDeg = 100_223_889,
semiMajorCm = 486, semiMinorCm = 486, speedCms = 543, headingDeciDeg = 1234, pai = true,
).encode()
assertEquals(
"02000800fbb2b7ffa60000002bcbeb1f914bf905e601e60100000e000000001f02d204",
LinkMessage(LinkOpcode.POTI_UPDATE, 8, body).encode().hex(),
)
}
@Test
fun `BTP_DATA_REQUEST for a signed CAM matches the Python encoder`() {
val body = BtpDataRequest(
destinationPort = 2001, itsAid = 36, securityProfile = LinkSecurityProfile.SECURED,
permissions = "010000".hexToBytes(), flSdu = "0102030405".hexToBytes(),
).encode()
assertEquals(
"0300090001d1070000010102ffff000000000024000000030100000005000102030405",
LinkMessage(LinkOpcode.BTP_DATA_REQUEST, 9, body).encode().hex(),
)
}
@Test
fun `CREDENTIALS_PROVISION segment matches the Python encoder`() {
val body = credentialsSegment(totalLength = 695, offset = 240, segment = ByteArray(3) { 0xAB.toByte() })
assertEquals("04000a00b702f00003ababab", LinkMessage(LinkOpcode.CREDENTIALS_PROVISION, 10, body).encode().hex())
}
@Test
fun `STATUS from the Python encoder decodes field by field`() {
val message = LinkMessage.decode(
("8400341240e20100010800021122334455b80b49387a4c12eb00010b0000000c0000000d0000000e000000" +
"0f000000100000001100000012000000130000001400000015000000160000001700000018000000" +
"190000001a0000001b0000001c000000fbb2b7ffa6000000").hexToBytes(),
)
assertNotNull(message)
assertEquals(LinkOpcode.STATUS, message!!.opcode)
assertEquals(0x1234, message.sequence)
val status = StationStatus.decode(message.body)!!
assertEquals(123_456L, status.uptimeMs)
assertTrue(status.configured)
assertArrayEquals("b80b49387a4c12eb".hexToBytes(), status.identifier)
assertEquals(1, status.tickets)
assertEquals(11L, status.signedMessages)
assertEquals(12L, status.refusedNoTicket)
assertEquals(13L, status.refusedChangePending)
assertEquals(14L, status.refusedPermission)
assertEquals(15L, status.signFailed)
assertEquals(16L, status.verified)
assertEquals(17L, status.rejected)
assertEquals(18L, status.requestsAccepted)
assertEquals(19L, status.requestsRefused)
assertEquals(21L, status.radioSubmitted)
assertEquals(22L, status.radioFailed)
assertEquals(23L, status.radioReceived)
assertEquals(24L, status.radioDropped)
assertEquals(26L, status.linkCrcErrors)
assertEquals(27L, status.linkMalformed)
assertEquals(28L, status.potiUpdates)
assertEquals(717_254_800_123L, status.itsTimeMs)
}
@Test
fun `a STATUS of the wrong length is refused, as the Python decoder does`() {
assertNull(StationStatus.decode(ByteArray(StationStatus.SIZE + 1)))
}
@Test
fun `RESULT of STATION_CONFIGURE carries the credential state`() {
val message = LinkMessage.decode("8000070000120800021122334455b80b49387a4c12eb0101".hexToBytes())!!
val result = LinkResult.decode(message.body)!!
assertTrue(result.accepted)
assertEquals(StationInfo(credentialsLoaded = true, tickets = 1), StationInfo.decode(result.detail))
}
}
app/src/test/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/VamGenerationRulesTest.kt
+60
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
package com.hawhamburg.micr0bu
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.vam.VamGenerationRules
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.vam.VamGenerationRules.Kinematics
import org.junit.Assert.assertFalse
import org.junit.Assert.assertTrue
import org.junit.Test
/** TS 103 300-3 clause 6.4 items 1 to 4, with the Table 16/17 values. */
class VamGenerationRulesTest {
private val here = Kinematics(53.5546667, 10.0223889, speedMps = 3.0, headingDeg = 90.0)
private fun sentAt(ms: Long, k: Kinematics = here) = VamGenerationRules().apply { onSent(ms, k, withLowFrequency = true) }
@Test
fun `the first VAM is always due`() {
assertTrue(VamGenerationRules().due(0, here))
}
@Test
fun `nothing is due within T_GenVamMin even after a big jump`() {
assertFalse(sentAt(1_000).due(1_050, here.copy(latitude = here.latitude + 0.001)))
}
@Test
fun `a stationary VRU gets one VAM every T_GenVamMax`() {
val rules = sentAt(1_000)
assertFalse(rules.due(5_900, here))
assertTrue(rules.due(6_001, here))
}
@Test
fun `position, speed and heading changes trigger past their thresholds only`() {
val rules = sentAt(1_000)
// ~3.3 m north: under 4 m. ~5.6 m: over.
assertFalse(rules.due(2_000, here.copy(latitude = here.latitude + 0.00003)))
assertTrue(rules.due(2_000, here.copy(latitude = here.latitude + 0.00005)))
assertFalse(rules.due(2_000, here.copy(speedMps = 3.4)))
assertTrue(rules.due(2_000, here.copy(speedMps = 3.6)))
assertFalse(rules.due(2_000, here.copy(headingDeg = 93.0)))
assertTrue(rules.due(2_000, here.copy(headingDeg = 95.0)))
}
@Test
fun `heading change is measured the short way round north`() {
val rules = sentAt(1_000, here.copy(headingDeg = 358.0))
assertFalse(rules.due(2_000, here.copy(headingDeg = 1.0))) // 3 degrees across north
assertTrue(rules.due(2_000, here.copy(headingDeg = 3.0))) // 5 degrees
}
@Test
fun `the low-frequency container goes with the first VAM, then every T_GenVamLFMin`() {
val rules = VamGenerationRules()
assertTrue(rules.includeLowFrequency(0))
rules.onSent(0, here, withLowFrequency = true)
assertFalse(rules.includeLowFrequency(1_999))
assertTrue(rules.includeLowFrequency(2_000))
}
}
app/src/test/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/VamUperCodecTest.kt
+59
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
package com.hawhamburg.micr0bu
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.asn1.VamContent
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.asn1.VamUperCodec
import org.junit.Assert.assertEquals
import org.junit.Test
/**
* Pins the VAM encoder against bytes this code did not produce.
*
* ## Where the expected bytes come from
* asn1tools 0.167, compiling the ETSI modules vanetza-idf ships (asn1/release2:
* TS102894-2v241-CDD.asn, TS103300-3v231/VAM-PDU-Descriptions.asn and its motorcyclist container),
* encoding the same values as a Python dict: the same toolchain the colleague's reference VBS
* (microbu-esp32c5/station-link/python/microbu_link/vbs.py) builds its VAMs with. Station
* 0x12345678, fix at Unix ms 1790170000123 (generationDeltaTime 45819), 53.5546667 N
* 10.0223889 E, 5.43 m/s, heading 123.4 deg, -1.26 m/s^2; every confidence and the altitude
* unavailable, as the encoder sends them.
*/
class VamUperCodecTest {
private fun ByteArray.hex(): String = joinToString("") { "%02x".format(it) }
private fun content(includeLowFrequency: Boolean, accuracyM: Float? = 3.0f) = VamContent(
stationId = 0x12345678,
timestamp = 1_790_170_000_123L,
latitude = 53.5546667,
longitude = 10.0223889,
accuracyM = accuracyM,
speedMps = 5.43,
headingDeg = 123.4,
accelerationMps2 = -1.26,
includeLowFrequency = includeLowFrequency,
)
@Test
fun `VAM with the low-frequency container matches asn1tools`() {
assertEquals(
"031012345678b2fb400aac85a15b8a18ec88f30f3708eddd0f8002697e087ff24f322220",
VamUperCodec.encode(content(includeLowFrequency = true)).hex(),
)
}
@Test
fun `VAM without the low-frequency container matches asn1tools`() {
assertEquals(
"031012345678b2fb000aac85a15b8a18ec88f30f3708eddd0f8002697e087ff24f30",
VamUperCodec.encode(content(includeLowFrequency = false)).hex(),
)
}
@Test
fun `unknown accuracy encodes the confidence ellipse as unavailable`() {
assertEquals(
"031012345678b2fb000aac85a15b8a18ec8fffffff08eddd0f8002697e087ff24f30",
VamUperCodec.encode(content(includeLowFrequency = false, accuracyM = null)).hex(),
)
}
}
docs/06-signed-its-vam-ble.md
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# 06 – Signed ITS messages, VAM and the BLE link (2026-09-23)
What changed when the ESP32-C5 OBU moved onto the colleague's vanetza-idf station, how the pieces
fit together, how it was verified, and what is still open. Hardware checks still to do are in
`TODO.md` ("Signed-TX firmware ...").
## Summary
- **Signing lives on the ESP32-C5.** The authorization ticket's private key is in the board's NVS;
vanetza-idf's security entity signs every secured message there (IEEE 1609.2 / ETSI TS 103 097,
ECDSA NIST P-256). The phone never holds a key and never signs.
- **The phone decides what to send and when.** It builds CAM or VAM (UPER) from its own GNSS/IMU,
hands each message to the board with the flag "signed" or "unsigned", and keeps the board's clock
and position current.
- **Two links, one protocol.** USB-C (native USB Serial/JTAG) or Bluetooth LE, chosen in Settings.
Both carry the colleague's station-link protocol v1 plus one MicrOBU extension for reception.
- **Reception is unchanged for the app.** Every ITS message heard on air reaches the phone, signed
or not, verifiable or not, exactly as with the previous firmware.
- **Demo PKI, not the EU trust list.** Signed messages carry a throwaway chain. Receivers that
verify against the EU trust list drop them; unsigned sending remains available.
## Who does what
| | Phone (app) | ESP32-C5 (obu-firmware) |
|---|---|---|
| CAM / VAM content and UPER encoding | yes | – |
| Send cadence (CAM 1 Hz baseline; VAM per TS 103 300-3 clause 6.4) | yes | – |
| Pseudonym (station ID + MAC, rotated together) | yes | uses the MAC it is configured with |
| Time and position (PoTi) | yes, per new GNSS fix | keeps an ITS clock from it |
| GeoNetworking + BTP headers | – | yes |
| Signing (TS 103 097), certificate handling | – | yes |
| Credentials | ships the demo bundle, provisions it once | stores it in NVS |
| 802.11p radio at 5 900 MHz | – | yes |
| Reception: unwrap GN/BTP, forward | decodes CAM / DENM / SPATEM | yes (all frames) |
## Firmware (obu-firmware)
obu-firmware is now a port of `microbu-esp32c5/firmware`, from the colleague's own repository
(not part of this one; nothing is pushed there). The C-ITS library it needs is copied into this
repository as `obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf` (their commit cf4b99f, unchanged), so
obu-firmware builds from a plain clone. It builds
with **ESP-IDF 6.0.2 only**: the raw-TX path uses private Wi-Fi driver structures that vanetza-idf
pins to that version. The previous C firmware (IDF 6.1) is backed up as a full flash image in
`firmware-backups/` (gitignored, restore command in its README.txt); its sources stay on disk,
unbuilt. Setup and flashing: `obu-firmware/FLASHING.md`. Design notes and every deviation from the
colleague's code (`MicrOBU:` in the sources): `obu-firmware/NOTES.md`.
Main changes against the colleague's firmware:
- **Raw receive path kept.** vanetza-idf decapsulates strictly and would drop unsigned frames (the
bench car) and anything not signed under the demo root (every RSU). Every captured frame also
goes through the previous firmware's `gn_unwrap.c` and reaches the phone as link opcode
`V2X_RX` (0x85), whose body is the old `SERIAL_MSG_V2X_RX` payload.
- **Unsigned sending kept.** The colleague's station refuses unsecured requests; here they go out
with the previous firmware's `geonet.c` header.
- **Console on UART0** (CH343, COM3 on the bench); the native USB port carries only link frames.
- **BLE pauses advertising while USB is in use** (BLE and ITS-G5 share one RF front end).
- **NVS 80 KB instead of 24 KB**, app at 0x20000. At 24 KB the BLE bond could not be stored and the
phone had to pair on every connection.
- Fixes found on the bench: radio queue drained before the first PoTi (no RX, ~177 queue drops
before); station loop waited 0 ticks at 100 Hz and starved the idle task; 2.4 KB RX buffer moved
off the Wi-Fi task stack; no silent truncation of BLE notifications; ATT MTU 517; serial writes
skipped when no USB host is present.
## Link protocol
Station-link v1 (colleague's repository, `station-link/README.md`): `[opcode][flags][sequence LE][body]`,
little-endian, at most 512 octets. Over USB each message is one `0xAA55` frame of type `0x10`
(the old framing and CRC). Over BLE each message is one GATT value on service
`0000C175-BA5E-4C17-8000-00805F9B34FB` (the README describes a different, Nordic-UART layout; the
firmware is what counts).
| Direction | Message | Used for |
|---|---|---|
| phone → board | `STATION_CONFIGURE` | pseudonym MAC, station type, channel 180, 20 dBm; starts the radio |
| phone → board | `CREDENTIALS_PROVISION` | the demo bundle, once, when the board reports no ticket |
| phone → board | `POTI_UPDATE` | position and ITS time, once per new GNSS fix |
| phone → board | `BTP_DATA_REQUEST` | one CAM (port 2001, psid 36) or VAM (port 2018, psid 638), signed or not |
| board → phone | `RESULT` | answer to a request |
| board → phone | `STATUS` | every second: counters, tickets, signed/refused counts |
| board → phone | `V2X_RX` (0x85, MicrOBU) | every ITS message heard on air |
The app side is `Esp32Link.kt` (session), `StationLink.kt` (codec, pinned by unit tests to bytes
from the colleague's Python implementation), `UsbSerialTransport.kt` and `BleLinkTransport.kt`.
A board still on the previous firmware is recognised by its old heartbeat and keeps working for
CAM over USB.
## Redundancy and recovery
| Situation | What notices | What happens |
|---|---|---|
| USB link dead (board hung, cable) | app watchdog: no frame for 3.5 s (the board's `STATUS` comes every second) | link marked ERROR on the card |
| USB unplugged | Android detach broadcast | port closed; Connect again after re-plugging |
| BLE link lost | BLE supervision timeout (4 s) | app reconnects by itself: 1 s after a drop, then backing off to 30 s if attempts fail |
| Board reset / power cycle | first `STATUS` says "not configured" | app reconfigures (and re-provisions if needed) without user action |
| App closed and reopened | new session | app configures the board again; BLE reconnects with the stored bond, no passkey (confirmed) |
| Phone clock or GNSS time jumping | app tracks the board's clock | PoTi never moves it backwards (except a real correction of ≥ 60 s), so the board does not restart its stack |
| Board firmware wedged | ESP task watchdog (30 s, logs on COM3) | the phone sees it as a dead link (above) |
## App changes
- Settings > Connection > ESP32-C5: **link** USB-C / Bluetooth, **transmit** CAM / VAM, **sign
outgoing messages** (on by default). The connection card, top bar and dashboard show the link in
use, the pairing passkey when needed, and signing counters.
- VAM encoder (`VamUperCodec.kt`, TS 103 300-3 V2.3.1, checked against asn1tools) and the VAM
generation rules (`VamGenerationRules.kt`).
- `GnssTimeSource` keeps the last measured phone-clock error while GNSS time drops out indoors. The
bench phone's clock was 14 minutes fast; falling back to it made every transmitted timestamp
jump by 14 minutes.
- Bluetooth permissions (Android 12+) requested at start-up.
## Credentials (demo PKI)
`app/src/main/assets/demo-chain.vcr`, generated 2026-09-23 with the colleague's `vidf_issue`: root
`6E7D0374FB021901` → AA `B3312F29844299E0` → AT `B80B49387A4C12EB` (two years; psid 36 SSP `010000`,
psid 638 SSP `01`). It is throwaway and not EU-registered; its private key ships with the app on
purpose. The colleague's own demo chain only grants psid 638 and cannot sign CAMs.
## Verification
- **Unit tests** (103): VAM bytes against asn1tools, station-link messages against the colleague's
Python encoder, VAM generation rules.
- **Signatures on air**: `obu-firmware/test/verify_signed_pcap.py` checks a pcap with asn1tools
and OpenSSL, sharing no code with the firmware. Pinger capture of 2026-09-23: 12/12 signed CAMs,
psid 36, signer the demo AT, all signatures valid, chain valid.
- **Third-party stack**: the CiT One receives the signed CAMs (~1 Hz on `v2x/rx/cam`), so its
stack unwraps our envelope. Its MQTT interface exposes no security information, and it forwards
unsigned and unknown-root messages alike, so it cannot tell whether it verified the signature.
- **V2X2MAP (COM10)**: now the colleague's v2x2map 0.3.0 bridge from source with a new
`verify.py` and `--trust demo-chain.vcr`; it shows "signature verified", "SIGNATURE INVALID" or
"not verified" per packet. Signed CAMs and signed VAMs verified live; a one-bit change in a
signed CAM comes out invalid. Launcher: `micrOBU_workspace/v2x-obu-esp32c5/start-v2x2map-signed.bat`.
## Open
- BLE/ITS-G5 coexistence is not measured: does an active BLE connection cost 5.9 GHz reception?
- `time_regression` standing still indoors for several minutes, and board reset recovery over BLE,
after the last fixes.
- The signature's generationTime follows the app's UTC-based `ItsTime`; the colleague's VBS adds
the 5 leap seconds (TAI). Which is right is the open question in `ItsTime.kt`.
- Real EU PKI enrolment/authorisation (TS 102 941) instead of the demo chain.
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obu-cam-transmistter/NOTES.md
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# OBU transmit firmware - Phase 2 (in progress: HLN-SV DENM beacon) # OBU transmit firmware - Phase 2 (in progress: HLN-SV DENM beacon)
Started. See `docs/04-transmit-setup.md` in the project root for build/flash Build and flash steps are under "Build and flash" below. (`docs/04-transmit-setup.md`,
steps and how to validate this against your own sniffer. referenced here and in the sources, is not in the repo.)
## Toolchain: use a dedicated terminal (ESP-IDF 5.5.4) ## Toolchain: use a dedicated terminal (ESP-IDF 5.5.4)
@@ -29,6 +29,123 @@ referenced an older source path under `micrOBU_workspace/v2x-obu-esp32c5/`,
which makes `idf.py fullclean` refuse to run). If that error reappears, delete which makes `idf.py fullclean` refuse to run). If that error reappears, delete
`build/` manually rather than fighting it. `build/` manually rather than fighting it.
## Build and flash
The firmware needs no button, phone or serial connection to start. On every power-up or reset,
`app_main` sets up the radio and starts `tx_task`, which starts driving the simulated route and
sending CAMs on 5900 MHz. A board flashed with this image starts beaconing on its own as soon as it
gets power.
In a fresh PowerShell window:
```powershell
$env:IDF_PYTHON_ENV_PATH = $null; $env:IDF_PATH = $null
. C:\Espressif\frameworks\esp-idf-v5.5.4\export.ps1
cd C:\Users\Ashin\AndroidStudioProjects\MicrOBU\obu-cam-transmistter
```
1. **Check what the board is running before you flash it.** Both this project and `obu-firmware`
name their image `obu_firmware.bin`, so the file name tells you nothing. Read the app
descriptor instead (replace `COMx` with the board's port):
```powershell
python -m esptool --chip esp32c5 -p COMx read_flash 0x10000 0x100 $env:TEMP\desc.bin
$b = [IO.File]::ReadAllBytes("$env:TEMP\desc.bin")
function S($o,$n){ [Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString($b,$o,$n).Trim([char]0) }
"time=" + (S 0x70 16) + " date=" + (S 0x80 16) + " idf=" + (S 0x90 32)
```
`idf=v6.1...` means the board runs the production OBU (`obu-firmware`). Don't flash this beacon
over it. `idf=v5.5.4` means this transmitter, or another bench image.
2. **Build:**
```powershell
idf.py build
```
A rebuild after small changes takes about 1-2 minutes. The output is
`build\obu_firmware.bin`.
3. **Flash** (the board must be on its UART bridge port or its native USB port):
```powershell
idf.py -p COMx flash
```
The flash is good when esptool prints `Hash of data verified.`, then resets the board.
4. **Check that it's transmitting:**
```powershell
idf.py -p COMx monitor
```
(Exit with `Ctrl+]`.) About 1.4 s after reset you should see:
```
W obu-tx: OCB @ 5900 MHz - CAM beacon armed, driving a 103-point street loop
I obu-tx: CAM sent (119 bytes) @ 5900 MHz genDeltaT=1087 pos=53.5531770,10.0220980 50.0 km/h heading 77.0 pt1
```
After that, a `CAM sent` line appears about 3 times a second, with the position, speed and
heading changing. These lines only mean each frame was
handed to the radio. To confirm the frames actually went out, capture them with a second
ESP32-C5 running the receiver firmware.
Don't open the console of the production OBU (COM3) while the phone is attached. Opening the port
resets that board and drops the phone's USB link. The beacon boards have no phone attached, so
this doesn't apply to them.
## Simulated drive
The beacon pretends to be a car driving a loop through St. Georg / Berliner Tor in Hamburg, on
the real streets. The route comes from six waypoints, which you set in `tools/make_route.py`.
**Changing the route:** edit `WAYPOINTS` in `tools/make_route.py`, then run
```powershell
py -3.11 tools/make_route.py
```
The script asks the OSRM demo server (router.project-osrm.org) for a legal driving route through the
waypoints in order and back to the first, then writes three files:
- `main/route_points.h`: the street geometry, thinned to points no more than 1.5 m off the line
(currently 103 points).
- `tools/route_osrm.json`: OSRM's raw answer. `--offline` rebuilds the header from it without the
network.
- `tools/route_map.html`: the route on an OpenStreetMap map. Open it in a browser and check it
before building.
Then build and flash as above. Route data (c) OpenStreetMap contributors, ODbL; routing by OSRM.
**Things to know about the routing:**
- OSRM follows one-way streets and turn bans, so the loop can be longer than the waypoints suggest.
The current one is 5.2 km, with two turn-round detours: a loop via Borgfelder Straße and
Anckelmannsplatz between wp2 and wp3, and one round Nagelsweg, Norderstraße and Repsoldstraße
between wp5 and wp6. To avoid a detour, move the waypoint on either side of it.
- Each waypoint is sent with the direction towards the next one. Without it, points on divided
roads (Beim Strohhause, for example) snap to the carriageway going the other way, and the loop
grows to 8.4 km of U-turns.
**How the car drives** (`main/route.c`):
- **Speed:** it cruises at 50 km/h (`CRUISE_MPS` in `main/main.c`). Each bend gets a speed limit
from its radius, keeping sideways acceleration at 2 m/s², so a 90° junction turn is taken at
about 15 km/h and a gentle curve barely slows the car. It never drops below 10 km/h
(`MIN_CORNER_MPS`). It brakes at 2 m/s² and accelerates at 1.5 m/s², planning braking across as
many points as a bend needs. A lap takes about 7.7 min, averaging 40 km/h.
- **Heading:** the compass bearing of the current straight piece. It changes gradually through
curves but jumps at sharp junction turns.
- **When CAMs are sent:** following ETSI EN 302 637-2, the state is checked every 100 ms. A CAM goes
out when the heading changed by more than 4°, the position by more than 4 m, or the speed by more
than 0.5 m/s since the last one, and at least once a second. That's about 3 CAMs a second at
50 km/h.
- **What's filled in:** position, speed and heading go into both the CAM and the GeoNetworking
source position vector. `genDeltaT` is milliseconds since boot.
- **Testing:** `route.c` only uses standard headers, so you can compile it on the PC with MSYS2 gcc
and simulate a lap.
## CAM encoding ## CAM encoding
`main/cam.c` IS compiled here (unlike `obu-firmware`'s copy, which is a `main/cam.c` IS compiled here (unlike `obu-firmware`'s copy, which is a
@@ -44,10 +161,12 @@ hazard-light GPIO is grounded. No location/alacarte containers.
- `main/main.c` - entry point, the `phy_11p_set`/`phy_change_channel(5900,...)` - `main/main.c` - entry point, the `phy_11p_set`/`phy_change_channel(5900,...)`
register hack, GPIO polling, TX loop register hack, GPIO polling, TX loop
- `main/denm.c` / `.h` - ASN.1 UPER encoding of a minimal DENM - `main/denm.c` / `.h` - ASN.1 UPER encoding of a minimal DENM
- `main/route.c` / `.h` - simulated drive round the route loop
- `main/route_points.h` - the route, generated by `tools/make_route.py`
- `main/geonet.c` / `.h` - GeoNetworking Basic/Common/SHB headers + BTP-B - `main/geonet.c` / `.h` - GeoNetworking Basic/Common/SHB headers + BTP-B
- `main/dot11p.c` / `.h` - 802.11 OCB (QoS Data, broadcast) frame + LLC/SNAP - `main/dot11p.c` / `.h` - 802.11 OCB (QoS Data, broadcast) frame + LLC/SNAP
Known gaps, tracked as TODOs in the source: no real GNSS (lat/long hardcoded Known gaps, tracked as TODOs in the source: no real GNSS (the CAM position comes
0), no real time source (detectionTime/referenceTime hardcoded 0, decodes as from the simulated drive above), no real time source (detectionTime/referenceTime hardcoded 0, decodes as
2004-01-01), fixed (non-rotating) pseudonym MAC, SHB instead of GeoBroadcast 2004-01-01), fixed (non-rotating) pseudonym MAC, SHB instead of GeoBroadcast
(no multi-hop forwarding), unsecured (no IEEE 1609.2 signing). (no multi-hop forwarding), unsecured (no IEEE 1609.2 signing).
obu-cam-transmistter/main/CMakeLists.txt
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# wifi_patches.c is intentionally NOT in this list anymore - superseded by # wifi_patches.c is intentionally NOT in this list anymore - superseded by
# tx_custom.c (see that file for why). Left on disk, unused, for history. # tx_custom.c (see that file for why). Left on disk, unused, for history.
idf_component_register( idf_component_register(
SRCS "main.c" "denm.c" "cam.c" "geonet.c" "dot11p.c" "tx_custom.c" SRCS "main.c" "denm.c" "cam.c" "geonet.c" "dot11p.c" "tx_custom.c" "route.c"
INCLUDE_DIRS "." INCLUDE_DIRS "."
REQUIRES esp_event esp_netif nvs_flash driver esp_phy REQUIRES esp_event esp_timer esp_netif nvs_flash driver esp_phy
PRIV_REQUIRES esp_wifi PRIV_REQUIRES esp_wifi
) )
obu-cam-transmistter/main/geonet.c
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@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
int geonet_wrap_shb(const uint8_t *its_payload, int its_len, int geonet_wrap_shb(const uint8_t *its_payload, int its_len,
const uint8_t mac[6], uint8_t station_type, const uint8_t mac[6], uint8_t station_type,
int32_t latitude_tenmicrodeg, int32_t longitude_tenmicrodeg, int32_t latitude_tenmicrodeg, int32_t longitude_tenmicrodeg,
uint16_t speed_cm_s, uint16_t heading_ddeg,
uint16_t btp_dest_port, uint16_t btp_dest_port,
uint8_t *out, size_t out_len) uint8_t *out, size_t out_len)
{ {
@@ -68,12 +69,12 @@ int geonet_wrap_shb(const uint8_t *its_payload, int its_len,
uint32_t lon_u = (uint32_t)longitude_tenmicrodeg; uint32_t lon_u = (uint32_t)longitude_tenmicrodeg;
*p++ = (uint8_t)(lon_u >> 24); *p++ = (uint8_t)(lon_u >> 16); *p++ = (uint8_t)(lon_u >> 24); *p++ = (uint8_t)(lon_u >> 16);
*p++ = (uint8_t)(lon_u >> 8); *p++ = (uint8_t)(lon_u); *p++ = (uint8_t)(lon_u >> 8); *p++ = (uint8_t)(lon_u);
// PAI(1 bit) + Speed(15 bits), packed into 2 bytes: 0 = PAI false, // PAI(1 bit) + Speed(15 bits, signed, 0.01 m/s), packed into 2 bytes. PAI stays 0: the
// speed 0 - which is actually correct semantics for a STATIONARY // position has no accuracy estimate behind it.
// vehicle beacon, not just a placeholder. uint16_t spd = speed_cm_s > 0x7FFF ? 0x7FFF : speed_cm_s;
*p++ = 0x00; *p++ = 0x00; *p++ = (uint8_t)(spd >> 8); *p++ = (uint8_t)(spd & 0xFF);
// Heading (16 bits, 0.1 degree units): 0 = due north / unavailable // Heading (16 bits, 0.1 degree units, clockwise from north)
*p++ = 0x00; *p++ = 0x00; *p++ = (uint8_t)(heading_ddeg >> 8); *p++ = (uint8_t)(heading_ddeg & 0xFF);
// Reserved (4 bytes) - clause 9.8.4: the SHB extended header is the 24-byte Source Position // Reserved (4 bytes) - clause 9.8.4: the SHB extended header is the 24-byte Source Position
// Vector FOLLOWED BY a 4-byte reserved field (media-dependent data), 28 bytes in total. These // Vector FOLLOWED BY a 4-byte reserved field (media-dependent data), 28 bytes in total. These
// four bytes were missing, which is why a standards-compliant receiver read our CAM payload's // four bytes were missing, which is why a standards-compliant receiver read our CAM payload's
obu-cam-transmistter/main/geonet.h
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@@ -31,6 +31,10 @@
// working (same extended header shape as CAM). Fine for a single-vehicle // working (same extended header shape as CAM). Fine for a single-vehicle
// beacon; revisit if you need real multi-hop forwarding later. // beacon; revisit if you need real multi-hop forwarding later.
// //
// `speed_cm_s` (0.01 m/s) and `heading_ddeg` (0.1 deg) also go into the Source Long Position
// Vector; pass the same values as the CAM's high-frequency container. Speed is a 15-bit field, so
// values above 32767 are clamped.
//
// `btp_dest_port` is the BTP-B destination port for the service being carried // `btp_dest_port` is the BTP-B destination port for the service being carried
// (ETSI TS 103 248): 2001 = CAM, 2002 = DENM, 2003 = MAPEM, 2004 = SPATEM, ... // (ETSI TS 103 248): 2001 = CAM, 2002 = DENM, 2003 = MAPEM, 2004 = SPATEM, ...
// //
@@ -38,6 +42,7 @@
int geonet_wrap_shb(const uint8_t *its_payload, int its_len, int geonet_wrap_shb(const uint8_t *its_payload, int its_len,
const uint8_t mac[6], uint8_t station_type, const uint8_t mac[6], uint8_t station_type,
int32_t latitude_tenmicrodeg, int32_t longitude_tenmicrodeg, int32_t latitude_tenmicrodeg, int32_t longitude_tenmicrodeg,
uint16_t speed_cm_s, uint16_t heading_ddeg,
uint16_t btp_dest_port, uint16_t btp_dest_port,
uint8_t *out, size_t out_len); uint8_t *out, size_t out_len);
obu-cam-transmistter/main/main.c
+82 -30
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@@ -1,7 +1,11 @@
#include <stdio.h> #include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h> #include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <math.h>
#include "freertos/FreeRTOS.h" #include "freertos/FreeRTOS.h"
#include "freertos/task.h" #include "freertos/task.h"
#include "esp_timer.h"
#include "driver/gpio.h" #include "driver/gpio.h"
#include "esp_wifi.h" #include "esp_wifi.h"
#include "esp_event.h" #include "esp_event.h"
@@ -14,13 +18,17 @@
#include "geonet.h" #include "geonet.h"
#include "dot11p.h" #include "dot11p.h"
#include "tx_custom.h" #include "tx_custom.h"
#include "route.h"
#include "route_points.h"
static const char *TAG = "obu-tx"; static const char *TAG = "obu-tx";
// CAM beacon: transmit a Cooperative Awareness Message every TX_INTERVAL_MS, // CAM beacon for a simulated car driving round a block in Hamburg (see route.c). The CAM
// unconditionally (no hazard-light gating - CAM is a continuous beacon, unlike // generation rules follow ETSI EN 302 637-2 clause 6.1.3: every CHECK_INTERVAL_MS the car's state
// the event-triggered DENM). Matches the working Rust reference // is compared with the last CAM sent, and a new CAM goes out when the heading changed by more than
// (esp32-c_its-companion, feat/tx-cam), which beacons CAM on 5900 MHz. // 4 degrees, the position by more than 4 m, the speed by more than 0.5 m/s, or 1 s has passed.
// There is no hazard-light gating - CAM is a continuous beacon, unlike the event-triggered DENM.
// Transmits on 5900 MHz like the working Rust reference (esp32-c_its-companion, feat/tx-cam).
// ISOLATION TEST for whether tx_custom.c is the blocker. // ISOLATION TEST for whether tx_custom.c is the blocker.
// 1 = transmit via the STANDARD, well-tested esp_wifi_80211_tx() using a // 1 = transmit via the STANDARD, well-tested esp_wifi_80211_tx() using a
@@ -55,15 +63,19 @@ static const char *TAG = "obu-tx";
#define VEHICLE_LENGTH_DM 40 // VehicleLengthValue, 10cm steps (4.0 m) #define VEHICLE_LENGTH_DM 40 // VehicleLengthValue, 10cm steps (4.0 m)
#define VEHICLE_WIDTH_DM 18 // VehicleWidth, 10cm steps (1.8 m) #define VEHICLE_WIDTH_DM 18 // VehicleWidth, 10cm steps (1.8 m)
#define BTP_PORT_CAM 2001 // BTP-B destination port for CAM (ETSI TS 103 248) #define BTP_PORT_CAM 2001 // BTP-B destination port for CAM (ETSI TS 103 248)
#define TX_INTERVAL_MS 1000 // CAM beacon period (1 Hz; ITS allows 1-10 Hz) #define CHECK_INTERVAL_MS 100 // T_CheckCamGen: how often the generation rules are evaluated
#define CAM_MAX_INTERVAL_MS 1000 // T_GenCamMax: a CAM goes out at least this often
#define CAM_HEADING_DDEG 40 // > 4 degrees heading change triggers a CAM
#define CAM_POSITION_M 4.0 // > 4 m position change triggers a CAM
#define CAM_SPEED_CM_S 50 // > 0.5 m/s speed change triggers a CAM
// Bench location, hardcoded since there's no GNSS module wired in yet and // ---- Simulated drive ----
// the unit is genuinely stationary here: 53°33'16.8"N 10°01'20.6"E, in // route_points (main/route_points.h) is the street geometry of a driving loop through six waypoints
// 1/10-microdegree units (decimal_degrees * 10,000,000). Replace with real // in St. Georg, generated by tools/make_route.py from OpenStreetMap via OSRM. To change the route,
// GNSS output once you have a fix source; until then this beats 0/0 // edit WAYPOINTS in that script and rerun it. No GNSS is wired in; replace with real fixes once
// ("Null Island"), which is an obvious placeholder-tell on any map. // there is one.
#define BENCH_LATITUDE_TENMICRODEG 535546667 #define CRUISE_MPS (50.0 / 3.6) // 50 km/h, the urban limit
#define BENCH_LONGITUDE_TENMICRODEG 100223889 #define MIN_CORNER_MPS (10.0 / 3.6) // slowest the car goes, for hairpins and U-turns
// Single source of truth for the pseudonym/link-layer address: used both as // Single source of truth for the pseudonym/link-layer address: used both as
// the 802.11 source MAC (Addr2) and as GN_ADDR's MID field, since the GN // the 802.11 source MAC (Addr2) and as GN_ADDR's MID field, since the GN
@@ -78,33 +90,28 @@ static const uint8_t pseudonym_mac[6] = {0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01};
extern void phy_11p_set(int enable, int unused); extern void phy_11p_set(int enable, int unused);
extern void phy_change_channel(int freq_mhz, int bw_mode, int sec_chan_offset, int unused); extern void phy_change_channel(int freq_mhz, int bw_mode, int sec_chan_offset, int unused);
static void send_cam(void) static void send_cam(const route_state_t *car, uint16_t gen_delta)
{ {
// GenerationDeltaTime is TimestampIts mod 65536 (ms). No RTC/GNSS time here,
// so use a free-running ms counter that advances one beacon-interval per
// send. It wraps at 65536, which is exactly the field's defined behaviour.
static uint16_t gen_delta = 0;
uint8_t frame[300]; uint8_t frame[300];
cam_fields_t fields = { cam_fields_t fields = {
.station_id = STATION_ID, .station_id = STATION_ID,
.station_type = STATION_TYPE, .station_type = STATION_TYPE,
.generation_delta_time = gen_delta, .generation_delta_time = gen_delta,
.latitude_tenmicrodeg = BENCH_LATITUDE_TENMICRODEG, .latitude_tenmicrodeg = car->latitude_tenmicrodeg,
.longitude_tenmicrodeg = BENCH_LONGITUDE_TENMICRODEG, .longitude_tenmicrodeg = car->longitude_tenmicrodeg,
.speed_cm_s = 0, // stationary .speed_cm_s = car->speed_cm_s,
.heading_ddeg = 3601, // HeadingValue unavailable (no heading source) .heading_ddeg = car->heading_ddeg,
.vehicle_length_dm = VEHICLE_LENGTH_DM, .vehicle_length_dm = VEHICLE_LENGTH_DM,
.vehicle_width_dm = VEHICLE_WIDTH_DM, .vehicle_width_dm = VEHICLE_WIDTH_DM,
}; };
gen_delta += TX_INTERVAL_MS;
uint8_t cam_payload[96]; uint8_t cam_payload[96];
int cam_len = cam_encode(&fields, cam_payload, sizeof(cam_payload)); int cam_len = cam_encode(&fields, cam_payload, sizeof(cam_payload));
uint8_t gn_payload[160]; uint8_t gn_payload[160];
int gn_len = geonet_wrap_shb(cam_payload, cam_len, pseudonym_mac, STATION_TYPE, int gn_len = geonet_wrap_shb(cam_payload, cam_len, pseudonym_mac, STATION_TYPE,
BENCH_LATITUDE_TENMICRODEG, BENCH_LONGITUDE_TENMICRODEG, car->latitude_tenmicrodeg, car->longitude_tenmicrodeg,
car->speed_cm_s, car->heading_ddeg,
BTP_PORT_CAM, gn_payload, sizeof(gn_payload)); BTP_PORT_CAM, gn_payload, sizeof(gn_payload));
// qos=false for the standard-TX path (esp_wifi_80211_tx accepts only non-QoS // qos=false for the standard-TX path (esp_wifi_80211_tx accepts only non-QoS
@@ -127,7 +134,10 @@ static void send_cam(void)
if (err != ESP_OK) { if (err != ESP_OK) {
ESP_LOGW(TAG, "esp_wifi_80211_tx (standard) failed: %d", err); ESP_LOGW(TAG, "esp_wifi_80211_tx (standard) failed: %d", err);
} else { } else {
ESP_LOGI(TAG, "CAM sent via STANDARD tx (%d bytes) @ %d MHz genDeltaT=%u", frame_len, TX_FREQ_MHZ, gen_delta); ESP_LOGI(TAG, "CAM sent (%d bytes) @ %d MHz genDeltaT=%u pos=%.7f,%.7f %.1f km/h heading %.1f pt%d",
frame_len, TX_FREQ_MHZ, gen_delta,
car->latitude_tenmicrodeg / 1e7, car->longitude_tenmicrodeg / 1e7,
car->speed_cm_s * 0.036, car->heading_ddeg / 10.0, car->segment + 1);
} }
#else #else
// tx_custom path: submits to the driver's internal HMAC TX path, // tx_custom path: submits to the driver's internal HMAC TX path,
@@ -151,12 +161,49 @@ static void send_cam(void)
} }
} }
static bool cam_due(const route_state_t *car, const route_state_t *last, int64_t since_last_ms)
{
if (since_last_ms >= CAM_MAX_INTERVAL_MS) {
return true;
}
int dh = abs((int)car->heading_ddeg - (int)last->heading_ddeg);
if (dh > 1800) {
dh = 3600 - dh;
}
if (dh > CAM_HEADING_DDEG) {
return true;
}
if (abs((int)car->speed_cm_s - (int)last->speed_cm_s) > CAM_SPEED_CM_S) {
return true;
}
// Flat-earth distance is plenty for a 4 m threshold.
double north_m = (car->latitude_tenmicrodeg - last->latitude_tenmicrodeg) * 0.0111194930;
double east_m = (car->longitude_tenmicrodeg - last->longitude_tenmicrodeg) * 0.0111194930
* cos(car->latitude_tenmicrodeg / 1e7 * M_PI / 180.0);
return north_m * north_m + east_m * east_m > CAM_POSITION_M * CAM_POSITION_M;
}
static void tx_task(void *arg) static void tx_task(void *arg)
{ {
route_state_t car;
route_state_t last_sent;
int64_t last_sent_ms = 0;
bool sent_any = false;
TickType_t wake = xTaskGetTickCount();
route_step(0.0, &car);
while (1) { while (1) {
// CAM is a continuous beacon - send every interval, unconditionally. int64_t now_ms = esp_timer_get_time() / 1000;
send_cam(); if (!sent_any || cam_due(&car, &last_sent, now_ms - last_sent_ms)) {
vTaskDelay(pdMS_TO_TICKS(TX_INTERVAL_MS)); // GenerationDeltaTime is TimestampIts mod 65536 (ms). No real clock here, so use
// milliseconds since boot, which advances at the right rate.
send_cam(&car, (uint16_t)now_ms);
last_sent = car;
last_sent_ms = now_ms;
sent_any = true;
}
vTaskDelayUntil(&wake, pdMS_TO_TICKS(CHECK_INTERVAL_MS));
route_step(CHECK_INTERVAL_MS / 1000.0, &car);
} }
} }
@@ -255,8 +302,13 @@ void app_main(void)
phy_change_channel(TX_FREQ_MHZ, 1, 0, 0); phy_change_channel(TX_FREQ_MHZ, 1, 0, 0);
ESP_LOGI(TAG, "phy_change_channel returned"); ESP_LOGI(TAG, "phy_change_channel returned");
ESP_LOGW(TAG, "OCB @ %d MHz - CAM beacon armed, transmitting every %d ms", if (route_init(route_points, sizeof(route_points) / sizeof(route_points[0]),
TX_FREQ_MHZ, TX_INTERVAL_MS); CRUISE_MPS, MIN_CORNER_MPS) != 0) {
ESP_LOGE(TAG, "route_init failed - check route_points");
return;
}
ESP_LOGW(TAG, "OCB @ %d MHz - CAM beacon armed, driving a %d-point street loop",
TX_FREQ_MHZ, (int)(sizeof(route_points) / sizeof(route_points[0])));
xTaskCreate(tx_task, "tx_task", 4096, NULL, 5, NULL); xTaskCreate(tx_task, "tx_task", 4096, NULL, 5, NULL);
} }
obu-cam-transmistter/main/route.c
+125
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@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
#include "route.h"
#include <math.h>
#define DEG_TO_RAD (M_PI / 180.0)
#define METRES_PER_DEG 111194.93 // mean Earth radius 6371 km; a block is small enough for a flat projection
#define ACCEL_MPS2 1.5 // pulling away from a corner
#define DECEL_MPS2 2.0 // braking ahead of a corner
#define LATERAL_MPS2 2.0 // sideways acceleration a normal driver takes a bend at
#define STRAIGHT_DEG 3.0 // kinks gentler than this are digitising noise, not bends
#define BEND_SPAN_M 15.0 // longest segment counted towards a bend's radius (see route_init)
static const route_point_t *s_pts;
static int s_n;
static double s_len[ROUTE_MAX_POINTS]; // segment i runs from point i to point (i+1) % n
static double s_bearing_deg[ROUTE_MAX_POINTS];
static double s_corner_mps[ROUTE_MAX_POINTS]; // speed limit at point i, where segment i starts
static double s_cruise_mps;
static int s_seg;
static double s_pos_m; // distance along the current segment
static double segment_speed(int seg, double pos_m)
{
double v = s_cruise_mps;
double pull_away = sqrt(s_corner_mps[seg] * s_corner_mps[seg] + 2.0 * ACCEL_MPS2 * pos_m);
int next = (seg + 1) % s_n;
double braking = sqrt(s_corner_mps[next] * s_corner_mps[next]
+ 2.0 * DECEL_MPS2 * (s_len[seg] - pos_m));
if (pull_away < v) v = pull_away;
if (braking < v) v = braking;
return v;
}
int route_init(const route_point_t *points, int n, double cruise_mps, double min_corner_mps)
{
if (n < 2 || n > ROUTE_MAX_POINTS) {
return -1;
}
s_pts = points;
s_n = n;
s_cruise_mps = cruise_mps;
for (int i = 0; i < n; i++) {
const route_point_t *a = &points[i];
const route_point_t *b = &points[(i + 1) % n];
double mid_lat = (a->latitude_tenmicrodeg + (double)b->latitude_tenmicrodeg) / 2e7;
double north_m = (b->latitude_tenmicrodeg - a->latitude_tenmicrodeg) / 1e7 * METRES_PER_DEG;
double east_m = (b->longitude_tenmicrodeg - a->longitude_tenmicrodeg) / 1e7 * METRES_PER_DEG
* cos(mid_lat * DEG_TO_RAD);
s_len[i] = sqrt(north_m * north_m + east_m * east_m);
if (s_len[i] < 0.01) {
return -1;
}
double bearing = atan2(east_m, north_m) / DEG_TO_RAD;
s_bearing_deg[i] = bearing < 0 ? bearing + 360.0 : bearing;
}
// Speed limit at each point from how tight the bend there is. A polyline bend of angle theta
// between segments of length L approximates an arc of radius L / theta, and a car takes a
// radius R at sqrt(a_lat * R). L is capped at BEND_SPAN_M: at a junction the two streets can be
// hundreds of metres long, but the car still turns within the width of the crossing.
for (int i = 0; i < n; i++) {
double turn = fabs(s_bearing_deg[i] - s_bearing_deg[(i + n - 1) % n]);
if (turn > 180.0) {
turn = 360.0 - turn;
}
double v = cruise_mps;
if (turn > STRAIGHT_DEG) {
double span = s_len[(i + n - 1) % n] < s_len[i] ? s_len[(i + n - 1) % n] : s_len[i];
if (span > BEND_SPAN_M) {
span = BEND_SPAN_M;
}
v = sqrt(LATERAL_MPS2 * span / (turn * DEG_TO_RAD));
}
if (v > cruise_mps) v = cruise_mps;
if (v < min_corner_mps) v = min_corner_mps;
s_corner_mps[i] = v;
}
// A point's limit also has to respect the bends after it (the car must be able to brake for
// them within the segments in between) and before it (it can only have sped up so much since).
// segment_speed only looks at the two ends of a segment, so settle this here. Limits only ever
// go down, so repeating the two passes until nothing changes terminates.
for (int changed = 1; changed;) {
changed = 0;
for (int k = 0; k < 2 * n; k++) {
int i = (2 * n - 1 - k) % n; // backwards: braking
int next = (i + 1) % n;
double v = sqrt(s_corner_mps[next] * s_corner_mps[next] + 2.0 * DECEL_MPS2 * s_len[i]);
if (v < s_corner_mps[i] - 1e-9) { s_corner_mps[i] = v; changed = 1; }
}
for (int k = 0; k < 2 * n; k++) {
int i = k % n; // forwards: accelerating
int next = (i + 1) % n;
double v = sqrt(s_corner_mps[i] * s_corner_mps[i] + 2.0 * ACCEL_MPS2 * s_len[i]);
if (v < s_corner_mps[next] - 1e-9) { s_corner_mps[next] = v; changed = 1; }
}
}
s_seg = 0;
s_pos_m = 0.0;
return 0;
}
void route_step(double dt_s, route_state_t *out)
{
// Advance with the speed at the start of the step; at 100 ms steps the error is well under a metre.
double d = segment_speed(s_seg, s_pos_m) * dt_s;
while (s_pos_m + d >= s_len[s_seg]) {
d -= s_len[s_seg] - s_pos_m;
s_seg = (s_seg + 1) % s_n;
s_pos_m = 0.0;
}
s_pos_m += d;
const route_point_t *a = &s_pts[s_seg];
const route_point_t *b = &s_pts[(s_seg + 1) % s_n];
double f = s_pos_m / s_len[s_seg];
out->latitude_tenmicrodeg = (int32_t)lround(a->latitude_tenmicrodeg
+ f * (b->latitude_tenmicrodeg - a->latitude_tenmicrodeg));
out->longitude_tenmicrodeg = (int32_t)lround(a->longitude_tenmicrodeg
+ f * (b->longitude_tenmicrodeg - a->longitude_tenmicrodeg));
out->speed_cm_s = (uint16_t)lround(segment_speed(s_seg, s_pos_m) * 100.0);
out->heading_ddeg = (uint16_t)(lround(s_bearing_deg[s_seg] * 10.0) % 3600);
out->segment = s_seg;
}
obu-cam-transmistter/main/route.h
+40
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@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
#ifndef ROUTE_H
#define ROUTE_H
#include <stdint.h>
// Simulated drive around a closed loop of waypoints, so the beacon looks like a
// car going round the block instead of a parked one.
//
// The car follows straight lines between the points and goes from the last one
// back to the first, forever. For street-following, the points are the street
// geometry from tools/make_route.py (main/route_points.h). Speed is a function
// of where the car is on a segment: it cruises, brakes ahead of each bend down to
// the speed that bend allows, and accelerates away after it. Heading is the
// bearing of the current segment.
//
// Uses only standard headers, so it also compiles on the host for testing.
typedef struct {
int32_t latitude_tenmicrodeg; // 1/10 microdegree, same units as the CAM
int32_t longitude_tenmicrodeg;
} route_point_t;
typedef struct {
int32_t latitude_tenmicrodeg;
int32_t longitude_tenmicrodeg;
uint16_t speed_cm_s; // SpeedValue units (0.01 m/s)
uint16_t heading_ddeg; // HeadingValue units (0.1 deg, 0..3599, 0 = north, clockwise)
int segment; // index of the route point the car last passed
} route_state_t;
#define ROUTE_MAX_POINTS 512 // keep in step with MAX_POINTS in tools/make_route.py
// `points` must stay valid for as long as the route is used. Returns 0, or -1
// if n is out of range (2..ROUTE_MAX_POINTS) or a segment has zero length.
// min_corner_mps is the slowest the car ever goes (hairpins, U-turns).
int route_init(const route_point_t *points, int n, double cruise_mps, double min_corner_mps);
// Moves the car on by dt_s seconds and writes its new position into `out`.
void route_step(double dt_s, route_state_t *out);
#endif
obu-cam-transmistter/main/route_points.h
+116
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@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
// GENERATED by tools/make_route.py - do not edit by hand; change WAYPOINTS there and rerun.
// Route data (c) OpenStreetMap contributors, ODbL. Routing by OSRM.
//
// Driving loop through 6 waypoints: 5179 m (legs 147 m, 1837 m, 381 m, 819 m, 1234 m, 761 m), 103 points after
// simplifying to 1.5 m. Streets: Beim Strohhause, Berlinertordamm, Berliner Tor, Bei der Hauptfeuerwache, Westphalensweg, Berliner Tor, Berlinertordamm, Borgfelder Straße, Anckelmannstraße, Anckelmannsplatz, Bürgerweide, Wallstraße, Lübeckertordamm, Steindamm, Kreuzweg, Adenauerallee, Nagelsweg, Norderstraße, Repsoldstraße, Kurt-Schumacher-Allee, Kreuzweg, Adenauerallee, Kurt-Schumacher-Allee, Beim Strohhause.
#ifndef ROUTE_POINTS_H
#define ROUTE_POINTS_H
#include "route.h"
static const route_point_t route_points[] = {
{ 535531770, 100220980 },
{ 535534470, 100240600 },
{ 535535790, 100244160 },
{ 535536400, 100244520 },
{ 535537130, 100244160 },
{ 535538480, 100242840 },
{ 535538720, 100242140 },
{ 535540390, 100240200 },
{ 535548880, 100233930 },
{ 535549470, 100235130 },
{ 535554140, 100253280 },
{ 535553570, 100254580 },
{ 535546070, 100251700 },
{ 535543130, 100250020 },
{ 535542570, 100249130 },
{ 535542760, 100247800 },
{ 535539980, 100244600 },
{ 535538720, 100242140 },
{ 535538140, 100241960 },
{ 535535720, 100243380 },
{ 535535300, 100244470 },
{ 535535090, 100246580 },
{ 535536830, 100264460 },
{ 535537600, 100270920 },
{ 535538520, 100275220 },
{ 535541110, 100290830 },
{ 535540170, 100291550 },
{ 535539890, 100294430 },
{ 535539580, 100295330 },
{ 535532290, 100299300 },
{ 535527980, 100302450 },
{ 535525130, 100291880 },
{ 535524220, 100289760 },
{ 535522900, 100287820 },
{ 535522890, 100285300 },
{ 535522610, 100282810 },
{ 535520620, 100276050 },
{ 535519820, 100271130 },
{ 535519670, 100269030 },
{ 535520220, 100267120 },
{ 535520930, 100262840 },
{ 535521850, 100260020 },
{ 535522840, 100258210 },
{ 535527790, 100257880 },
{ 535538650, 100261370 },
{ 535551660, 100266470 },
{ 535555790, 100268750 },
{ 535559620, 100271540 },
{ 535561120, 100272050 },
{ 535562430, 100271250 },
{ 535563830, 100269390 },
{ 535569610, 100260190 },
{ 535579530, 100242810 },
{ 535584090, 100237660 },
{ 535585850, 100234670 },
{ 535584970, 100230060 },
{ 535584000, 100227260 },
{ 535580730, 100222030 },
{ 535579100, 100218590 },
{ 535574500, 100208430 },
{ 535570560, 100199010 },
{ 535568130, 100194820 },
{ 535564910, 100187620 },
{ 535563990, 100184630 },
{ 535562540, 100181160 },
{ 535559780, 100176310 },
{ 535542180, 100136840 },
{ 535539720, 100133430 },
{ 535537350, 100132010 },
{ 535534760, 100131390 },
{ 535523840, 100132690 },
{ 535524980, 100155090 },
{ 535524890, 100156360 },
{ 535524440, 100157650 },
{ 535523030, 100158530 },
{ 535517610, 100158580 },
{ 535504440, 100168810 },
{ 535501360, 100156400 },
{ 535499250, 100144880 },
{ 535498470, 100133880 },
{ 535498630, 100126150 },
{ 535499110, 100121980 },
{ 535504260, 100117230 },
{ 535505720, 100115500 },
{ 535507630, 100112310 },
{ 535508400, 100111560 },
{ 535510000, 100110940 },
{ 535511390, 100119560 },
{ 535512440, 100122280 },
{ 535514510, 100132770 },
{ 535515020, 100134120 },
{ 535516630, 100135630 },
{ 535518260, 100136100 },
{ 535523950, 100134870 },
{ 535524980, 100155090 },
{ 535524890, 100156360 },
{ 535524440, 100157650 },
{ 535523470, 100158460 },
{ 535518560, 100158480 },
{ 535519070, 100162430 },
{ 535522260, 100178080 },
{ 535527880, 100197650 },
{ 535530060, 100209020 },
};
#endif
obu-cam-transmistter/tools/make_route.py
+170
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@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
"""Turn the beacon's waypoints into a street-following route for main/route_points.h.
Asks the OSRM demo server (router.project-osrm.org, OpenStreetMap data) for a driving route that
visits WAYPOINTS in order and returns to the first, thins the street geometry out, and writes:
main/route_points.h the C array the firmware drives (commit this)
tools/route_osrm.json the raw OSRM answer, so the header can be regenerated offline (--offline)
tools/route_map.html the route over an OpenStreetMap map, to check it before flashing
Each waypoint also gets a bearing (the direction towards the next waypoint), so OSRM snaps it onto
the carriageway going that way. Without it, points on divided roads land on the wrong side and
every leg grows a U-turn detour.
Usage (Python 3.8+, standard library only):
py tools/make_route.py fetch from OSRM, then write all three files
py -3 tools/make_route.py --offline rebuild from the saved route_osrm.json
Route data (c) OpenStreetMap contributors, ODbL. Routing by OSRM.
"""
import argparse
import json
import math
import pathlib
import urllib.request
# (latitude, longitude) in decimal degrees, in driving order. The route closes back to the first.
WAYPOINTS = [
(53.553309, 10.022043),
(53.553611, 10.024146),
(53.556164, 10.027121),
(53.558310, 10.023362),
(53.554062, 10.013515),
(53.551540, 10.013398),
]
BEARING_TOLERANCE_DEG = 60 # how far the road's direction may differ from the waypoint bearing
SIMPLIFY_M = 1.5 # drop points that move the line by less than this
MAX_POINTS = 512 # must match ROUTE_MAX_POINTS in main/route.h
HERE = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent
PROJECT = HERE.parent
OSRM_JSON = HERE / "route_osrm.json"
HEADER = PROJECT / "main" / "route_points.h"
MAP_HTML = HERE / "route_map.html"
METRES_PER_DEG = 111194.93
def to_xy(lat, lon, lat0):
return (lon * METRES_PER_DEG * math.cos(math.radians(lat0)), lat * METRES_PER_DEG)
def bearing(a, b):
north = b[0] - a[0]
east = (b[1] - a[1]) * math.cos(math.radians(a[0]))
return math.degrees(math.atan2(east, north)) % 360
def fetch():
n = len(WAYPOINTS)
pts = WAYPOINTS + [WAYPOINTS[0]]
bearings = [round(bearing(WAYPOINTS[i], WAYPOINTS[(i + 1) % n])) for i in range(n)]
bearings.append(bearings[0])
url = ("https://router.project-osrm.org/route/v1/driving/"
+ ";".join(f"{lon},{lat}" for lat, lon in pts)
+ "?overview=full&geometries=geojson&steps=true&bearings="
+ ";".join(f"{b},{BEARING_TOLERANCE_DEG}" for b in bearings))
req = urllib.request.Request(url, headers={"User-Agent": "MicrOBU-route-tool"})
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=30) as resp:
data = json.load(resp)
if data.get("code") != "Ok":
raise SystemExit(f"OSRM error: {data.get('code')} {data.get('message')}")
OSRM_JSON.write_text(json.dumps(data, indent=1), encoding="utf-8")
return data
def simplify(xy, tol):
"""Douglas-Peucker, iterative. Keeps the first and last point."""
keep = [False] * len(xy)
keep[0] = keep[-1] = True
stack = [(0, len(xy) - 1)]
while stack:
a, b = stack.pop()
(ax, ay), (bx, by) = xy[a], xy[b]
dx, dy = bx - ax, by - ay
seg2 = dx * dx + dy * dy
worst, worst_d = -1, tol
for i in range(a + 1, b):
px, py = xy[i]
if seg2 == 0:
d = math.hypot(px - ax, py - ay)
else:
t = max(0.0, min(1.0, ((px - ax) * dx + (py - ay) * dy) / seg2))
d = math.hypot(px - ax - t * dx, py - ay - t * dy)
if d > worst_d:
worst, worst_d = i, d
if worst >= 0:
keep[worst] = True
stack += [(a, worst), (worst, b)]
return [i for i, k in enumerate(keep) if k]
def main():
ap = argparse.ArgumentParser()
ap.add_argument("--offline", action="store_true", help="use the saved route_osrm.json")
args = ap.parse_args()
data = json.loads(OSRM_JSON.read_text(encoding="utf-8")) if args.offline else fetch()
route = data["routes"][0]
# GeoJSON is [lon, lat]; round to the CAM's 1/10-microdegree grid and drop repeats.
raw = []
for lon, lat in route["geometry"]["coordinates"]:
p = (round(lat * 1e7), round(lon * 1e7))
if not raw or p != raw[-1]:
raw.append(p)
if raw[0] == raw[-1]:
raw.pop()
closed = raw + [raw[0]]
lat0 = closed[0][0] / 1e7
xy = [to_xy(p[0] / 1e7, p[1] / 1e7, lat0) for p in closed]
pts = [closed[i] for i in simplify(xy, SIMPLIFY_M)][:-1]
if len(pts) > MAX_POINTS:
raise SystemExit(f"{len(pts)} points is more than MAX_POINTS={MAX_POINTS}; raise SIMPLIFY_M")
streets = []
for leg in route["legs"]:
for step in leg["steps"]:
if step["name"] and (not streets or streets[-1] != step["name"]):
streets.append(step["name"])
legs = ", ".join(f"{round(l['distance'])} m" for l in route["legs"])
lines = [
"// GENERATED by tools/make_route.py - do not edit by hand; change WAYPOINTS there and rerun.",
"// Route data (c) OpenStreetMap contributors, ODbL. Routing by OSRM.",
"//",
f"// Driving loop through {len(WAYPOINTS)} waypoints: {round(route['distance'])} m "
f"(legs {legs}), {len(pts)} points after",
f"// simplifying to {SIMPLIFY_M} m. Streets: {', '.join(streets)}.",
"#ifndef ROUTE_POINTS_H",
"#define ROUTE_POINTS_H",
'#include "route.h"',
"",
"static const route_point_t route_points[] = {",
]
lines += [f" {{ {lat}, {lon} }}," for lat, lon in pts]
lines += ["};", "", "#endif", ""]
HEADER.write_text("\n".join(lines), encoding="utf-8", newline="\n")
MAP_HTML.write_text(f"""<!doctype html><meta charset="utf-8"><title>Beacon route</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" href="https://unpkg.com/leaflet@1.9.4/dist/leaflet.css">
<script src="https://unpkg.com/leaflet@1.9.4/dist/leaflet.js"></script>
<style>html,body,#m{{height:100%;margin:0}}</style><div id="m"></div><script>
const pts={json.dumps([[p[0] / 1e7, p[1] / 1e7] for p in pts])};
const wps={json.dumps(WAYPOINTS)};
const m=L.map('m');
L.tileLayer('https://tile.openstreetmap.org/{{z}}/{{x}}/{{y}}.png',{{maxZoom:19,
attribution:'&copy; OpenStreetMap contributors'}}).addTo(m);
const line=L.polyline(pts.concat([pts[0]]),{{color:'#d33',weight:4}}).addTo(m);
wps.forEach((w,i)=>L.marker(w,{{title:'wp'+(i+1)}}).bindTooltip('wp'+(i+1),{{permanent:true}}).addTo(m));
L.circleMarker(pts[0],{{radius:7,color:'#060'}}).bindTooltip('start').addTo(m);
m.fitBounds(line.getBounds(),{{padding:[20,20]}});
</script>
""", encoding="utf-8")
print(f"{round(route['distance'])} m, legs {legs}")
print(f"{len(route['geometry']['coordinates'])} OSRM points -> {len(pts)} after simplifying")
print(f"wrote {HEADER.relative_to(PROJECT)}, {OSRM_JSON.relative_to(PROJECT)}, "
f"{MAP_HTML.relative_to(PROJECT)}")
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
obu-cam-transmistter/tools/route_map.html
+14
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@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
<!doctype html><meta charset="utf-8"><title>Beacon route</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" href="https://unpkg.com/leaflet@1.9.4/dist/leaflet.css">
<script src="https://unpkg.com/leaflet@1.9.4/dist/leaflet.js"></script>
<style>html,body,#m{height:100%;margin:0}</style><div id="m"></div><script>
const pts=[[53.553177, 10.022098], [53.553447, 10.02406], [53.553579, 10.024416], [53.55364, 10.024452], [53.553713, 10.024416], [53.553848, 10.024284], [53.553872, 10.024214], [53.554039, 10.02402], [53.554888, 10.023393], [53.554947, 10.023513], [53.555414, 10.025328], [53.555357, 10.025458], [53.554607, 10.02517], [53.554313, 10.025002], [53.554257, 10.024913], [53.554276, 10.02478], [53.553998, 10.02446], [53.553872, 10.024214], [53.553814, 10.024196], [53.553572, 10.024338], [53.55353, 10.024447], [53.553509, 10.024658], [53.553683, 10.026446], [53.55376, 10.027092], [53.553852, 10.027522], [53.554111, 10.029083], [53.554017, 10.029155], [53.553989, 10.029443], [53.553958, 10.029533], [53.553229, 10.02993], [53.552798, 10.030245], [53.552513, 10.029188], [53.552422, 10.028976], [53.55229, 10.028782], [53.552289, 10.02853], [53.552261, 10.028281], [53.552062, 10.027605], [53.551982, 10.027113], [53.551967, 10.026903], [53.552022, 10.026712], [53.552093, 10.026284], [53.552185, 10.026002], [53.552284, 10.025821], [53.552779, 10.025788], [53.553865, 10.026137], [53.555166, 10.026647], [53.555579, 10.026875], [53.555962, 10.027154], [53.556112, 10.027205], [53.556243, 10.027125], [53.556383, 10.026939], [53.556961, 10.026019], [53.557953, 10.024281], [53.558409, 10.023766], [53.558585, 10.023467], [53.558497, 10.023006], [53.5584, 10.022726], [53.558073, 10.022203], [53.55791, 10.021859], [53.55745, 10.020843], [53.557056, 10.019901], [53.556813, 10.019482], [53.556491, 10.018762], [53.556399, 10.018463], [53.556254, 10.018116], [53.555978, 10.017631], [53.554218, 10.013684], [53.553972, 10.013343], [53.553735, 10.013201], [53.553476, 10.013139], [53.552384, 10.013269], [53.552498, 10.015509], [53.552489, 10.015636], [53.552444, 10.015765], [53.552303, 10.015853], [53.551761, 10.015858], [53.550444, 10.016881], [53.550136, 10.01564], [53.549925, 10.014488], [53.549847, 10.013388], [53.549863, 10.012615], [53.549911, 10.012198], [53.550426, 10.011723], [53.550572, 10.01155], [53.550763, 10.011231], [53.55084, 10.011156], [53.551, 10.011094], [53.551139, 10.011956], [53.551244, 10.012228], [53.551451, 10.013277], [53.551502, 10.013412], [53.551663, 10.013563], [53.551826, 10.01361], [53.552395, 10.013487], [53.552498, 10.015509], [53.552489, 10.015636], [53.552444, 10.015765], [53.552347, 10.015846], [53.551856, 10.015848], [53.551907, 10.016243], [53.552226, 10.017808], [53.552788, 10.019765], [53.553006, 10.020902]];
const wps=[[53.553309, 10.022043], [53.553611, 10.024146], [53.556164, 10.027121], [53.55831, 10.023362], [53.554062, 10.013515], [53.55154, 10.013398]];
const m=L.map('m');
L.tileLayer('https://tile.openstreetmap.org/{z}/{x}/{y}.png',{maxZoom:19,
attribution:'&copy; OpenStreetMap contributors'}).addTo(m);
const line=L.polyline(pts.concat([pts[0]]),{color:'#d33',weight:4}).addTo(m);
wps.forEach((w,i)=>L.marker(w,{title:'wp'+(i+1)}).bindTooltip('wp'+(i+1),{permanent:true}).addTo(m));
L.circleMarker(pts[0],{radius:7,color:'#060'}).bindTooltip('start').addTo(m);
m.fitBounds(line.getBounds(),{padding:[20,20]});
</script>
obu-cam-transmistter/tools/route_osrm.json
+5893
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obu-firmware/CMakeLists.txt
+62 -7
View File
@@ -1,9 +1,64 @@
cmake_minimum_required(VERSION 3.16) cmake_minimum_required(VERSION 3.22)
# obu-firmware: the ESP32-C5 half of the MicrOBU station, on the vanetza-idf C-ITS stack.
#
# Since 2026-09-23 this is a port of the colleague's standalone VRU station
# (microbu-esp32c5/firmware, in their own repository, not part of this one). From it:
# BTP/GeoNetworking and the TS 103 097 security entity (vanetza-idf), the station-link message
# layer over native USB Serial/JTAG and BLE GATT, the NVS credential store, and the C5 radio adapter.
# Added here for this project: the raw receive path of the previous firmware (gn_unwrap.c, forwarded
# as link opcode V2X_RX) so unsigned and non-demo-signed traffic still reaches the phone, the
# unsigned transmit path of the previous firmware (geonet.c), and BLE pausing while USB is in use.
# See NOTES.md.
#
# ESP-IDF 6.0.2 exactly: the C5 radio's private Wi-Fi driver ABI (otm_tx_custom.c) is pinned to it
# by vanetza-idf's radio_c5.cmake and has only been validated there. The previous C firmware was
# built with IDF 6.1; see FLASHING.md for the export script of each.
#
# vanetza-idf lives in external/vanetza-idf, copied from the colleague's repository (their
# external/vanetza-idf at commit cf4b99f, unchanged; see its PROVENANCE.md). Override with
# -DVANETZA_IDF_DIR=... to build against another checkout.
if(NOT VANETZA_IDF_DIR)
set(VANETZA_IDF_DIR "${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/external/vanetza-idf")
endif()
if(NOT EXISTS "${VANETZA_IDF_DIR}/idf_component.yml")
message(FATAL_ERROR "vanetza-idf not found at ${VANETZA_IDF_DIR}: obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf "
"is part of this repository; check it is complete, or pass "
"-DVANETZA_IDF_DIR=<path to a vanetza-idf checkout>")
endif()
# Provenance guard for main/otm_tx_custom.c, copied unchanged from microbu-esp32c5/firmware/CMakeLists.txt:
# this checked-in copy is what microbu::C5Radio::request() links against for every transmission.
# Fail configure if either the pinned upstream or this file drifts from the reviewed revision.
set(_otm_upstream "${VANETZA_IDF_DIR}/ports/esp_idf/third_party/otm/main/tx_custom.c")
if(EXISTS "${_otm_upstream}")
file(READ "${_otm_upstream}" _otm_upstream_text)
string(REPLACE "\r\n" "\n" _otm_upstream_text "${_otm_upstream_text}")
string(SHA256 _otm_upstream_hash "${_otm_upstream_text}")
if(NOT _otm_upstream_hash STREQUAL "cb1dccfef96912ca59275e8a9102f41f56925b94a19d4a4629082aaeb779be1b")
message(FATAL_ERROR "OpenTrafficMap upstream tx_custom.c differs from the reviewed source revision (674e3412) -- review before updating main/otm_tx_custom.c and this hash")
endif()
endif()
set(_otm_checked_in "${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/main/otm_tx_custom.c")
file(READ "${_otm_checked_in}" _otm_checked_in_text)
string(REPLACE "\r\n" "\n" _otm_checked_in_text "${_otm_checked_in_text}")
string(SHA256 _otm_checked_in_hash "${_otm_checked_in_text}")
if(NOT _otm_checked_in_hash STREQUAL "114693af99ce3866cfc767066d484e45822eaf15335d94a03626b60ac5777277")
message(FATAL_ERROR "main/otm_tx_custom.c differs from the reviewed copy -- review the change, then update this hash")
endif()
list(APPEND EXTRA_COMPONENT_DIRS "${VANETZA_IDF_DIR}")
set(SDKCONFIG_DEFAULTS "${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/sdkconfig.defaults")
set(COMPONENTS main)
include($ENV{IDF_PATH}/tools/cmake/project.cmake) include($ENV{IDF_PATH}/tools/cmake/project.cmake)
# No longer need -Wl,-zmuldefs here - that was only for main/wifi_patches.c's
# symbol-override attempt (which didn't work anyway; see docs/04-transmit-setup.md),
# and that file is no longer part of the build. Superseded by main/tx_custom.c,
# which bypasses the gate at a different layer instead of trying to override it.
project(obu_firmware) project(obu_firmware)
add_compile_options(-Wno-error -Wno-cpp -Wno-error=implicit-function-declaration)
idf_component_get_property(vanetza_lib vanetza-idf COMPONENT_LIB)
if(vanetza_lib)
target_compile_options(${vanetza_lib} PRIVATE -Wno-error=implicit-function-declaration -Wno-error=cpp)
endif()
# GCC 15's stricter -Warray-bounds false-positives on NimBLE's fixed-size bond-store arrays
# (upstream Apache Mynewt code); demote to a warning so the component still builds.
idf_component_get_property(bt_lib bt COMPONENT_LIB)
if(bt_lib)
target_compile_options(${bt_lib} PRIVATE -Wno-error=array-bounds)
endif()
obu-firmware/FLASHING.md
+101 -27
View File
@@ -2,35 +2,93 @@
## Two toolchains - use a dedicated terminal for each ## Two toolchains - use a dedicated terminal for each
This project builds against the receiver-firmware's pinned ESP-IDF **6.1**. Since 2026-09-23 this project builds against ESP-IDF **6.0.2** exactly
The separate `obu-cam-transmistter` project builds against the global ESP-IDF (`C:\Espressif\frameworks\esp-idf-v6.0.2`): it is the vanetza-idf port (see
**5.5.4**. Exporting both in one PowerShell window fails: the second export NOTES.md), and vanetza-idf's `radio_c5.cmake` refuses any other version because
the raw TX path pokes private Wi-Fi driver structures only validated there. The
previous C firmware used the receiver firmware's IDF **6.1**; the separate
`obu-cam-transmistter` project builds against the global ESP-IDF **5.5.4**.
Exporting two of them in one PowerShell window fails: the second export
inherits the first's `IDF_PYTHON_ENV_PATH` and reports every Python dependency inherits the first's `IDF_PYTHON_ENV_PATH` and reports every Python dependency
as unmet. Don't run `install.bat` to "fix" that - open a fresh terminal, or as unmet. Don't run `install.bat` to "fix" that - open a fresh terminal, or
clear the state with `$env:IDF_PYTHON_ENV_PATH = $null; $env:IDF_PATH = $null`. clear the state with `$env:IDF_PYTHON_ENV_PATH = $null; $env:IDF_PATH = $null`.
## Every new PowerShell session The build is self-contained: the C-ITS library comes from
`obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf`, a copy of `external/vanetza-idf` from the
colleague's microbu-esp32c5 repository (their commit cf4b99f, unchanged). Pass
`-DVANETZA_IDF_DIR=<path>` to `idf.py` to build against another checkout. The
first build downloads `espressif/esp-boost` into `managed_components/`.
Activate the toolchain (obu-firmware has no esp-idf of its own — reuse the Nothing is fetched from or pushed to the colleague's repository (HAW GitLab,
receiver firmware's already-installed checkout): urban-mobility-lab/microbu/microbu-esp32c5). To take a newer vanetza-idf from
it, copy their `external/vanetza-idf` over this folder, rebuild and test, and
commit it here. The rest of their tree (their own VAM firmware, PKI tooling,
station-link Python tools, the V2X2MAP bridge) is not part of this repository.
## Every new PowerShell session
```powershell ```powershell
Set-ExecutionPolicy -Scope Process -ExecutionPolicy Bypass Set-ExecutionPolicy -Scope Process -ExecutionPolicy Bypass
C:\Users\Ashin\Documents\micrOBU_workspace\its-g5-receiver-firmware\esp-idf\export.ps1 $env:IDF_TOOLS_PATH = "C:\Espressif"
idf.py --version C:\Espressif\frameworks\esp-idf-v6.0.2\export.ps1
idf.py --version # v6.0.2
``` ```
## Build & flash ## Build & flash
Flash over the board's **UART-bridge port** (CH343; COM3 for the production OBU
on the bench), not the native port the phone uses.
```powershell ```powershell
cd C:\Users\Ashin\AndroidStudioProjects\MicrOBU\obu-firmware cd C:\Users\Ashin\AndroidStudioProjects\MicrOBU\obu-firmware
idf.py set-target esp32c5 # only needed once per clean build folder idf.py set-target esp32c5 # only needed once per clean build folder
idf.py build idf.py build
idf.py -p COM5 -b 921600 flash monitor idf.py -p COM3 -b 921600 flash monitor
``` ```
Swap `COM5` for whatever port the ESP32-C5 enumerates as (Device Manager → Swap `COM3` for whatever port the ESP32-C5's bridge enumerates as (Device Manager →
Ports). `monitor` opens the serial console after flashing — `Ctrl+]` to exit. Ports). `monitor` opens the serial console after flashing — `Ctrl+]` to exit.
Use `flash` (bootloader + partition table + app), not `app-flash`, whenever the
partition table may differ from what the board has.
### First flash onto a board with the previous firmware
The partition table changed with the port (NVS 24 KB → 80 KB, app 0x10000 →
0x20000), and the old NVS is full of Wi-Fi settings the previous firmware left
behind. Erase the whole new NVS range once, then do a full flash:
```powershell
python -m esptool --chip esp32c5 -p COM3 -b 921600 erase-region 0x9000 0x15000
idf.py -p COM3 -b 921600 flash
```
Without the erase, the board cannot store the BLE bond and the phone has to pair
on every connection (2026-09-23). After it:
- the boot log shows `0 bonded phone(s) in NVS`, `BLE advertising started as
'micrOBU-XXXX'` and `station task ready`; the radio stays off until the app
connects;
- on the first Connect the app provisions the demo credentials once (the card
says "Provisioning the demo credentials"); they stay in NVS from then on;
- a phone that was paired with the board before must forget `micrOBU-XXXX` in
Android's Bluetooth settings and pair again (passkey 123456).
Erasing NVS later (e.g. after a partition change) has the same effects.
## Going back to the previous firmware
The previous, unsigned C firmware (frame types 0x01-0x05, CAM over USB only)
can come back two ways. The app detects it and falls back to its protocol.
- **Image:** `firmware-backups/` in the repository root (gitignored, on the lab
laptop only) holds a full-flash image of the COM3 board as it was before the
port, with the esptool command in its README.txt. It restores the old
partition table and NVS too.
- **Source:** commit `7285fa1` is the last one before the port. Check it out in
a separate worktree and build it with the receiver firmware's IDF 6.1
(`its-g5-receiver-firmware\esp-idf\export.ps1`). Erase the NVS range as above
first, then `flash` (full, since the partition table differs); erasing after
flashing would wipe the start of the old app, which sits at 0x10000.
## If the build fails ## If the build fails
@@ -50,9 +108,9 @@ Ports). `monitor` opens the serial console after flashing — `Ctrl+]` to exit.
The board has two USB-C ports — use the right one: The board has two USB-C ports — use the right one:
- **Native USB-C port** (labeled for JTAG/native USB, up to 12 Mbps) — this - **Native USB-C port** (labeled for JTAG/native USB, up to 12 Mbps) — this
is where the phone plugs in via USB-OTG. The CAM serial link is where the phone plugs in via USB-OTG. The station link
(`serial_link.c`) runs over the ESP32-C5's native USB Serial/JTAG (`serial_link.cpp`: station-link messages as frame type 0x10 in the 0xAA55
peripheral on this port, enumerating as a CDC-ACM device under Espressif's framing) runs over the ESP32-C5's native USB Serial/JTAG peripheral on this port, enumerating as a CDC-ACM device under Espressif's
VID/PID (0x303A/0x1001). VID/PID (0x303A/0x1001).
- **UART-bridge port** (labeled for flashing) — this is what you use for - **UART-bridge port** (labeled for flashing) — this is what you use for
`idf.py flash monitor` from your PC. Leave the phone unplugged from this `idf.py flash monitor` from your PC. Leave the phone unplugged from this
@@ -69,10 +127,10 @@ at all — that isolates a bad/charge-only OTG cable from an app-side issue.
Work down this list — each step isolates the layer below it. Work down this list — each step isolates the layer below it.
1. **Flash and install together.** `SERIAL_LINK_MAX_PAYLOAD` is 512 on both sides. 1. **Flash and install together.** The app detects the firmware generation by
A phone at 512 talking to firmware still at 160 (or vice versa) silently its heartbeat and speaks either protocol, but only an app from 2026-09-23 on
rejects every large frame at the `length exceeds max, resync` branch. Never knows the station-link protocol; messages are at most 512 octets on both
update one side alone. sides.
2. **Does Android see the device at all?** Plug the phone into the **native** 2. **Does Android see the device at all?** Plug the phone into the **native**
USB-C port, hit Connect, and read logcat for `UsbSerialTransport`. It logs USB-C port, hit Connect, and read logcat for `UsbSerialTransport`. It logs
every attached device *and* each device's interfaces. Empty list = cable / every attached device *and* each device's interfaces. Empty list = cable /
@@ -81,10 +139,12 @@ Work down this list — each step isolates the layer below it.
composite device — expect CDC control (class 2) + CDC data (class 10) + composite device — expect CDC control (class 2) + CDC data (class 10) +
vendor-specific JTAG (class 255) in that dump. Compare against the `ports=` vendor-specific JTAG (class 255) in that dump. Compare against the `ports=`
count on the `matched device` line. count on the `matched device` line.
4. **Is the link alive?** The firmware sends a STATUS heartbeat at 1 Hz 4. **Is the link alive?** The firmware sends a STATUS at 1 Hz regardless of
regardless of radio traffic, and the app marks the link ERROR after ~3.5 s of radio traffic, and the app marks the link ERROR after ~3.5 s of silence.
silence. Connected-and-staying-connected means device→host actually works. Connected-and-staying-connected means device→host actually works. The board
5. **If it connects but no CAM_RX ever arrives** — suspect DTR. The app now starts its radio only after the app's STATION_CONFIGURE, so nothing is
received before Connect.
5. **If it connects but no V2X_RX ever arrives** — suspect DTR. The app now
asserts DTR/RTS on open (`openDevice()` in `UsbSerialTransport.kt`), because asserts DTR/RTS on open (`openDevice()` in `UsbSerialTransport.kt`), because
`CdcAcmSerialDriver` doesn't do it by default and the ESP32's USB Serial/JTAG `CdcAcmSerialDriver` doesn't do it by default and the ESP32's USB Serial/JTAG
endpoint may gate TX on the host opening the CDC line. **This is still endpoint may gate TX on the host opening the CDC line. **This is still
@@ -93,14 +153,28 @@ Work down this list — each step isolates the layer below it.
next to the VID/PID note, so nobody has to guess again. next to the VID/PID note, so nobody has to guess again.
6. **Watch the counters, not just "Sent: N".** The CAM Pinger card shows 6. **Watch the counters, not just "Sent: N".** The CAM Pinger card shows
consecutive write failures (phone side) and the firmware's tx-failure / consecutive write failures (phone side) and the firmware's tx-failure /
oversize-drop / CRC-error totals from the heartbeat. A rising `tx fail` means RX-queue-drop / CRC-error totals from the heartbeat; the connection card
CAMs reach the ESP32 but `esp_wifi_80211_tx` rejects them — a radio problem, shows tickets, signed and refused counts. A rising `tx fail` means messages
not a link problem. reach the ESP32 but the radio refuses them — a radio problem, not a link
problem. A rising `refused` with signing on usually means no ticket (NVS
erased: reconnect so the app provisions again).
## Connecting over Bluetooth instead
Settings > Connection > ESP32-C5 > link: Bluetooth, then Connect. The board
advertises as `micrOBU-XXXX` (last two bytes of its BT MAC; `micrOBU-4AFA` on
COM3), but only while nothing uses its native USB port. Android asks to pair
the first time: passkey **123456** (fixed in `simple_ble.cpp`). The bond is kept
on both sides; the board keeps one bond, so pairing a second phone or a PC
replaces the first. Log lines on the console start with `cits_ble:`.
## Notes ## Notes
- No `git submodule update` needed here — obu-firmware has no pinned - No `git submodule update` needed here — obu-firmware has no pinned
submodule of its own, unlike its-g5-receiver-firmware. submodule of its own, unlike its-g5-receiver-firmware.
- Don't use the global "ESP-IDF 5.5 PowerShell" shortcut — always export from - Don't use the global "ESP-IDF 5.5 PowerShell" shortcut or the receiver
the receiver-firmware's pinned checkout, since this firmware's undocumented firmware's 6.1 checkout — export from `esp-idf-v6.0.2`, the version the
PHY/driver internals were verified against that specific build. vanetza-idf radio's undocumented driver internals were verified against.
- The console (ESP_LOG, boot messages, panics) stays on the UART-bridge port.
Opening it resets the board; do that only while nothing else depends on the
session.
obu-firmware/NOTES.md
+55 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,58 @@
# OBU transmit firmware - Phase 2 (in progress: HLN-SV DENM beacon) # obu-firmware
## Since 2026-09-23: signed ITS on vanetza-idf
This firmware is a port of the colleague's standalone ESP32-C5 VRU station
(`microbu-esp32c5/firmware`, in their own repository; only its `external/vanetza-idf` is copied
here, to `obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf`).
From it: the vanetza-idf C-ITS stack (BTP, GeoNetworking, the TS 103 097 security entity with
credentials in NVS), the station-link protocol v1 (`link_protocol.*`, `link_service.*`) over the
native USB port (`serial_link.*`, frame type 0x10 in the same 0xAA55 framing as before) and over BLE
GATT (`simple_ble.*`), and the radio adapter (`c5_radio.*`, `otm_tx_custom.c`). Build with ESP-IDF
**6.0.2**; see FLASHING.md.
The phone builds CAM or VAM, configures the station, provisions credentials, sends PoTi and hands
each message over as a BTP-DATA.request; the firmware adds GN/BTP, signs with the authorization
ticket, and transmits. The phone side is `Esp32Link.kt` in the app.
Changed or added for this project (search for `MicrOBU:` in the sources):
- **Reception stays as it was.** vanetza-idf decapsulates with `itsGnSnDecapResultHandling =
STRICT`, so it drops unsigned traffic (the bench sim car) and everything signed under a root other
than the provisioned demo root (every RSU). Every captured frame therefore also goes through the
previous firmware's `gn_unwrap.c` and reaches the phone as link opcode `V2X_RX` (0x85), whose body
is exactly the old `SERIAL_MSG_V2X_RX` payload (`Station::forward_raw`). The app's receive side is
unchanged.
- **Unsigned transmission is still possible.** The colleague's station refuses unsecured requests.
Here a request with GN security profile 1 goes out with the previous firmware's `geonet.c` header
and the position of the last PoTi (`Station::unsecured_request`); the app's "Sign outgoing
messages" setting decides per message.
- **Console on UART0.** ESP_LOG stays on the CH343 bridge port (COM3 on the bench); the native port
carries only link frames. The colleague's single-port board routes the log into LOG frames there
(`CONFIG_MICROBU_LOG_OVER_LINK`, off here).
- **BLE pauses while USB is in use** (`CONFIG_MICROBU_BLE_USB_IDLE_MS`, 3 s): BLE and ITS-G5 share
the C5's one RF front end. Whether a live BLE connection disturbs 5.9 GHz is still unmeasured
(TODO.md).
- A serial write no longer stalls the station task when no USB host is present (BLE-only use).
- A notification longer than the ATT MTU is dropped instead of silently truncated.
- The Wi-Fi RX callback's 2.4 KB capture buffer is static rather than on the driver task's stack
(the previous firmware's commit 04b0076 fixed the same risk).
- Manual country policy and the TX-power read-back from the previous firmware's radio bring-up.
- The activity LED (GPIO27 on the colleague's XIAO board) is off unless configured.
Credentials: the app ships `assets/demo-chain.vcr`, a throwaway chain generated 2026-09-23 with the
colleague's `vidf_issue` (root `6E7D0374FB021901`, AA `B3312F29844299E0`, AT `B80B49387A4C12EB`
valid two years, permissions psid 36 SSP `010000` and psid 638 SSP `01`). The colleague's own demo
chain only grants psid 638 and so cannot sign CAMs. Not EU-registered: receivers that verify against
the EU trust list drop what it signs.
Time: the signature's generationTime comes from the PoTi timestamp, which follows the app's
`ItsTime` convention (UTC-based, no leap seconds). The colleague's VBS adds the 5 leap seconds.
Which one is right is the open question documented in `ItsTime.kt`.
## Earlier notes (Phase 2, superseded)
### OBU transmit firmware - Phase 2 (in progress: HLN-SV DENM beacon)
Started. See `docs/04-transmit-setup.md` in the project root for build/flash Started. See `docs/04-transmit-setup.md` in the project root for build/flash
steps and how to validate this against your own sniffer. steps and how to validate this against your own sniffer.
obu-firmware/dependencies.lock
+21
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@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
dependencies:
espressif/esp-boost:
component_hash: 45cfa63ade2ad7c489203ab2ddf3f33be50ec9cab752b6eb17a79f06aee8f8f0
dependencies:
- name: idf
require: private
version: '>=5.3'
source:
registry_url: https://components.espressif.com/
type: service
version: 0.4.1
idf:
source:
type: idf
version: 6.0.2
direct_dependencies:
- espressif/esp-boost
- idf
manifest_hash: 3fca1283d556ade5b08c63857e23cb3b08582f1d1c24bb7c1d5e374f438415d7
target: esp32c5
version: 3.0.0
obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf/.gitignore
+14
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
build
.cache/
build-*/
build-*.log
sdkconfig
sdkconfig.old
sdkconfig.*.old
managed_components/
dependencies.lock
__pycache__/
conanfile.pyc
doxygen/html/
www/
build.asn1/
obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf/CMakeLists.txt
Vendored
+158
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@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
if(ESP_PLATFORM)
include("${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/ports/esp_idf/CMakeLists.txt")
return()
endif()
cmake_minimum_required(VERSION 3.14)
cmake_policy(VERSION 3.14...3.31)
project(Vanetza VERSION 26.02)
set(VANETZA_SOVERSION 0)
list(APPEND CMAKE_MODULE_PATH ${PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR}/cmake)
# Look up threading library (usually pthread)
set(CMAKE_THREAD_PREFER_PTHREAD TRUE)
set(THREADS_PREFER_PTHREAD_FLAG TRUE)
find_package(Threads MODULE)
# Build configuration options
option(BUILD_SHARED_LIBS "Build shared libraries" OFF)
option(BUILD_TESTS "Build unit tests" OFF)
if(BUILD_TESTS)
enable_testing()
add_subdirectory(gtest)
endif()
set(CMAKE_RUNTIME_OUTPUT_DIRECTORY ${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/bin)
set(CMAKE_LIBRARY_OUTPUT_DIRECTORY ${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/lib)
set(CMAKE_ARCHIVE_OUTPUT_DIRECTORY ${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/lib/static)
include(GNUInstallDirs)
include(UseVanetza)
# Enable usage of targets' folder property (good for Visual Studio)
set_property(GLOBAL PROPERTY USE_FOLDERS ON)
# Find project dependencies
find_package(Boost 1.70 REQUIRED COMPONENTS date_time OPTIONAL_COMPONENTS program_options CONFIG)
vanetza_optional_dependency(GeographicLib 1.37 VANETZA_WITH_GEOGRAPHICLIB "Use GeographicLib for precise geodesy")
vanetza_optional_dependency(CapnProto 0.8 VANETZA_WITH_RPC "Enable RPC support")
vanetza_optional_dependency(CryptoPP 5.6.1 VANETZA_WITH_CRYPTOPP "Enable Crypto++ support")
vanetza_optional_dependency(OpenSSL 1.1.1 VANETZA_WITH_OPENSSL "Enable OpenSSL extensions")
option(VANETZA_WITH_PQC "Enable the experimental hybrid-PQC certificate profile" OFF)
if(VANETZA_WITH_PQC)
find_package(liboqs 0.14 CONFIG REQUIRED)
endif()
option(VANETZA_EMBED_COUNTRY_DATA "Embed country boundary data into geodesy library" OFF)
add_subdirectory(vanetza/access)
add_subdirectory(vanetza/asn1)
add_subdirectory(vanetza/btp)
add_subdirectory(vanetza/common)
add_subdirectory(vanetza/dcc)
add_subdirectory(vanetza/facilities)
add_subdirectory(vanetza/geodesy)
add_subdirectory(vanetza/geonet)
add_subdirectory(vanetza/gnss)
add_subdirectory(vanetza/net)
add_subdirectory(vanetza/rpc)
add_subdirectory(vanetza/security)
add_subdirectory(vanetza/units)
option(BUILD_SOCKTAP "Build socktap application" OFF)
if(BUILD_SOCKTAP)
add_subdirectory(tools/socktap)
endif()
option(BUILD_CERTIFY "Build certify application" OFF)
if(BUILD_CERTIFY)
add_subdirectory(tools/certify)
if(VANETZA_WITH_PQC)
add_subdirectory(tools/certify-pqc)
endif()
endif()
option(BUILD_BENCHMARK "Build benchmark application" OFF)
if(BUILD_BENCHMARK)
add_subdirectory(tools/benchmark)
endif()
option(BUILD_FUZZ "Build fuzz harness" OFF)
if(BUILD_FUZZ)
add_subdirectory(tools/fuzz-harness)
endif()
option(BUILD_PKI "Build PKI tools" OFF)
if(BUILD_PKI AND VANETZA_WITH_PQC)
message(FATAL_ERROR
"BUILD_PKI cannot be combined with VANETZA_WITH_PQC: the unchanged PKI "
"client uses Vanetza's standard Security ASN.1 profile. Build the PKI "
"client separately with VANETZA_WITH_PQC=OFF.")
endif()
if(BUILD_PKI)
add_subdirectory(tools/pki)
endif()
# interface library for convenience
get_property(_components GLOBAL PROPERTY VANETZA_COMPONENTS)
add_library(vanetza INTERFACE)
add_library(Vanetza::vanetza ALIAS vanetza)
foreach(_component IN LISTS _components)
target_link_libraries(vanetza INTERFACE ${_component})
endforeach()
# installation rules
include(CMakePackageConfigHelpers)
set(CMAKECONFIG_INSTALL_DIR "${CMAKE_INSTALL_LIBDIR}/cmake/Vanetza")
set(CMAKECONFIG_BUILD_DIR "${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/cmake-config")
write_basic_package_version_file(${CMAKECONFIG_BUILD_DIR}/VanetzaConfigVersion.cmake
COMPATIBILITY ExactVersion)
configure_package_config_file(cmake/VanetzaConfig.cmake.in
${CMAKECONFIG_BUILD_DIR}/VanetzaConfig.cmake
INSTALL_DESTINATION ${CMAKECONFIG_INSTALL_DIR}
PATH_VARS CMAKE_INSTALL_INCLUDEDIR)
install(TARGETS vanetza EXPORT ${PROJECT_NAME})
install(FILES
${CMAKECONFIG_BUILD_DIR}/VanetzaConfig.cmake
${CMAKECONFIG_BUILD_DIR}/VanetzaConfigVersion.cmake
DESTINATION ${CMAKECONFIG_INSTALL_DIR})
install(DIRECTORY ${PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR}/cmake/
DESTINATION ${CMAKECONFIG_INSTALL_DIR}
FILES_MATCHING
PATTERN "Find*.cmake")
install(EXPORT ${PROJECT_NAME} NAMESPACE Vanetza:: FILE VanetzaTargets.cmake DESTINATION ${CMAKECONFIG_INSTALL_DIR})
# install all C++ headers except those found for tests
file(GLOB_RECURSE _vanetza_headers
RELATIVE ${PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR}
CONFIGURE_DEPENDS
vanetza/*.hpp)
list(FILTER _vanetza_headers EXCLUDE REGEX "/tests/")
if(NOT VANETZA_WITH_PQC)
list(FILTER _vanetza_headers EXCLUDE REGEX "vanetza/security/pqc/")
endif()
foreach(_header IN LISTS _vanetza_headers)
get_filename_component(_dir ${_header} DIRECTORY)
install(FILES ${_header}
DESTINATION ${CMAKE_INSTALL_INCLUDEDIR}/${_dir})
endforeach()
# export build tree (allows import by outside projects)
option(VANETZA_EXPORT_PACKAGE "Export Vanetza build directory to CMake package registry" OFF)
if(VANETZA_EXPORT_PACKAGE)
export(EXPORT ${PROJECT_NAME} NAMESPACE Vanetza:: FILE VanetzaExports.cmake)
file(COPY ${CMAKECONFIG_BUILD_DIR}/VanetzaConfigVersion.cmake
DESTINATION ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR})
configure_file(cmake/VanetzaExportsConfig.cmake.in
${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/VanetzaConfig.cmake @ONLY)
export(PACKAGE ${PROJECT_NAME})
endif()
# mark build directory as cache dir, see https://bford.info/cachedir
file(WRITE ${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/CACHEDIR.TAG
"Signature: 8a477f597d28d172789f06886806bc55")
obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf/Doxyfile
Vendored
+2983
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File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf/Kconfig
Vendored
+1
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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
rsource "ports/esp_idf/Kconfig"
obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf/LICENSE.md
Vendored
+853
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,853 @@
This file contains copies of the GNU Lesser General Public License as well
as the GNU General Public License, both in their third version.
# GNU Lesser General Public License (LGPL) v3
```
GNU LESSER GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE
Version 3, 29 June 2007
Copyright (C) 2007 Free Software Foundation, Inc. <http://fsf.org/>
Everyone is permitted to copy and distribute verbatim copies
of this license document, but changing it is not allowed.
This version of the GNU Lesser General Public License incorporates
the terms and conditions of version 3 of the GNU General Public
License, supplemented by the additional permissions listed below.
0. Additional Definitions.
As used herein, "this License" refers to version 3 of the GNU Lesser
General Public License, and the "GNU GPL" refers to version 3 of the GNU
General Public License.
"The Library" refers to a covered work governed by this License,
other than an Application or a Combined Work as defined below.
An "Application" is any work that makes use of an interface provided
by the Library, but which is not otherwise based on the Library.
Defining a subclass of a class defined by the Library is deemed a mode
of using an interface provided by the Library.
A "Combined Work" is a work produced by combining or linking an
Application with the Library. The particular version of the Library
with which the Combined Work was made is also called the "Linked
Version".
The "Minimal Corresponding Source" for a Combined Work means the
Corresponding Source for the Combined Work, excluding any source code
for portions of the Combined Work that, considered in isolation, are
based on the Application, and not on the Linked Version.
The "Corresponding Application Code" for a Combined Work means the
object code and/or source code for the Application, including any data
and utility programs needed for reproducing the Combined Work from the
Application, but excluding the System Libraries of the Combined Work.
1. Exception to Section 3 of the GNU GPL.
You may convey a covered work under sections 3 and 4 of this License
without being bound by section 3 of the GNU GPL.
2. Conveying Modified Versions.
If you modify a copy of the Library, and, in your modifications, a
facility refers to a function or data to be supplied by an Application
that uses the facility (other than as an argument passed when the
facility is invoked), then you may convey a copy of the modified
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a) under this License, provided that you make a good faith effort to
ensure that, in the event an Application does not supply the
function or data, the facility still operates, and performs
whatever part of its purpose remains meaningful, or
b) under the GNU GPL, with none of the additional permissions of
this License applicable to that copy.
3. Object Code Incorporating Material from Library Header Files.
The object code form of an Application may incorporate material from
a header file that is part of the Library. You may convey such object
code under terms of your choice, provided that, if the incorporated
material is not limited to numerical parameters, data structure
layouts and accessors, or small macros, inline functions and templates
(ten or fewer lines in length), you do both of the following:
a) Give prominent notice with each copy of the object code that the
Library is used in it and that the Library and its use are
covered by this License.
b) Accompany the object code with a copy of the GNU GPL and this license
document.
4. Combined Works.
You may convey a Combined Work under terms of your choice that,
taken together, effectively do not restrict modification of the
portions of the Library contained in the Combined Work and reverse
engineering for debugging such modifications, if you also do each of
the following:
a) Give prominent notice with each copy of the Combined Work that
the Library is used in it and that the Library and its use are
covered by this License.
b) Accompany the Combined Work with a copy of the GNU GPL and this license
document.
c) For a Combined Work that displays copyright notices during
execution, include the copyright notice for the Library among
these notices, as well as a reference directing the user to the
copies of the GNU GPL and this license document.
d) Do one of the following:
0) Convey the Minimal Corresponding Source under the terms of this
License, and the Corresponding Application Code in a form
suitable for, and under terms that permit, the user to
recombine or relink the Application with a modified version of
the Linked Version to produce a modified Combined Work, in the
manner specified by section 6 of the GNU GPL for conveying
Corresponding Source.
1) Use a suitable shared library mechanism for linking with the
Library. A suitable mechanism is one that (a) uses at run time
a copy of the Library already present on the user's computer
system, and (b) will operate properly with a modified version
of the Library that is interface-compatible with the Linked
Version.
e) Provide Installation Information, but only if you would otherwise
be required to provide such information under section 6 of the
GNU GPL, and only to the extent that such information is
necessary to install and execute a modified version of the
Combined Work produced by recombining or relinking the
Application with a modified version of the Linked Version. (If
you use option 4d0, the Installation Information must accompany
the Minimal Corresponding Source and Corresponding Application
Code. If you use option 4d1, you must provide the Installation
Information in the manner specified by section 6 of the GNU GPL
for conveying Corresponding Source.)
5. Combined Libraries.
You may place library facilities that are a work based on the
Library side by side in a single library together with other library
facilities that are not Applications and are not covered by this
License, and convey such a combined library under terms of your
choice, if you do both of the following:
a) Accompany the combined library with a copy of the same work based
on the Library, uncombined with any other library facilities,
conveyed under the terms of this License.
b) Give prominent notice with the combined library that part of it
is a work based on the Library, and explaining where to find the
accompanying uncombined form of the same work.
6. Revised Versions of the GNU Lesser General Public License.
The Free Software Foundation may publish revised and/or new versions
of the GNU Lesser General Public License from time to time. Such new
versions will be similar in spirit to the present version, but may
differ in detail to address new problems or concerns.
Each version is given a distinguishing version number. If the
Library as you received it specifies that a certain numbered version
of the GNU Lesser General Public License "or any later version"
applies to it, you have the option of following the terms and
conditions either of that published version or of any later version
published by the Free Software Foundation. If the Library as you
received it does not specify a version number of the GNU Lesser
General Public License, you may choose any version of the GNU Lesser
General Public License ever published by the Free Software Foundation.
If the Library as you received it specifies that a proxy can decide
whether future versions of the GNU Lesser General Public License shall
apply, that proxy's public statement of acceptance of any version is
permanent authorization for you to choose that version for the
Library.
```
# GNU General Public License (GPL) v3
```
GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE
Version 3, 29 June 2007
Copyright (C) 2007 Free Software Foundation, Inc. <http://fsf.org/>
Everyone is permitted to copy and distribute verbatim copies
of this license document, but changing it is not allowed.
Preamble
The GNU General Public License is a free, copyleft license for
software and other kinds of works.
The licenses for most software and other practical works are designed
to take away your freedom to share and change the works. By contrast,
the GNU General Public License is intended to guarantee your freedom to
share and change all versions of a program--to make sure it remains free
software for all its users. We, the Free Software Foundation, use the
GNU General Public License for most of our software; it applies also to
any other work released this way by its authors. You can apply it to
your programs, too.
When we speak of free software, we are referring to freedom, not
price. Our General Public Licenses are designed to make sure that you
have the freedom to distribute copies of free software (and charge for
them if you wish), that you receive source code or can get it if you
want it, that you can change the software or use pieces of it in new
free programs, and that you know you can do these things.
To protect your rights, we need to prevent others from denying you
these rights or asking you to surrender the rights. Therefore, you have
certain responsibilities if you distribute copies of the software, or if
you modify it: responsibilities to respect the freedom of others.
For example, if you distribute copies of such a program, whether
gratis or for a fee, you must pass on to the recipients the same
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or can get the source code. And you must show them these terms so they
know their rights.
Developers that use the GNU GPL protect your rights with two steps:
(1) assert copyright on the software, and (2) offer you this License
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For the developers' and authors' protection, the GPL clearly explains
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Some devices are designed to deny users access to install or run
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The precise terms and conditions for copying, distribution and
modification follow.
TERMS AND CONDITIONS
0. Definitions.
"This License" refers to version 3 of the GNU General Public License.
"Copyright" also means copyright-like laws that apply to other kinds of
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1. Source Code.
The "source code" for a work means the preferred form of the work
for making modifications to it. "Object code" means any non-source
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END OF TERMS AND CONDITIONS
How to Apply These Terms to Your New Programs
If you develop a new program, and you want it to be of the greatest
possible use to the public, the best way to achieve this is to make it
free software which everyone can redistribute and change under these terms.
To do so, attach the following notices to the program. It is safest
to attach them to the start of each source file to most effectively
state the exclusion of warranty; and each file should have at least
the "copyright" line and a pointer to where the full notice is found.
<one line to give the program's name and a brief idea of what it does.>
Copyright (C) <year> <name of author>
This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
Also add information on how to contact you by electronic and paper mail.
If the program does terminal interaction, make it output a short
notice like this when it starts in an interactive mode:
<program> Copyright (C) <year> <name of author>
This program comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY; for details type `show w'.
This is free software, and you are welcome to redistribute it
under certain conditions; type `show c' for details.
The hypothetical commands `show w' and `show c' should show the appropriate
parts of the General Public License. Of course, your program's commands
might be different; for a GUI interface, you would use an "about box".
You should also get your employer (if you work as a programmer) or school,
if any, to sign a "copyright disclaimer" for the program, if necessary.
For more information on this, and how to apply and follow the GNU GPL, see
<http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
The GNU General Public License does not permit incorporating your program
into proprietary programs. If your program is a subroutine library, you
may consider it more useful to permit linking proprietary applications with
the library. If this is what you want to do, use the GNU Lesser General
Public License instead of this License. But first, please read
<http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/why-not-lgpl.html>.
```
obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf/PROVENANCE.md
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# Vanetza Upstream Provenance
This directory (`external/vanetza-idf`) contains the Vanetza protocol stack and its ESP-IDF integration for the micrOBU ESP32-C5 ITS-S station.
## Upstream Software Basis
- **Project**: Vanetza (ETSI C-ITS protocol stack implementation in C++17)
- **Upstream Repository**: `https://github.com/riebl/vanetza.git`
- **Pinned Upstream Revision**: `a7cacc1879f3e2124dfb8ef2d83886b1e82d3b36`
- **Author / Upstream Maintainer**: Raphael Riebl et al.
- **Citekey**: `rieblRieblVanetza2026`
- **License**: BSD-3-Clause (retained in `LICENSE.md`)
## Integrated Components & Third-Party Dependencies
1. **Boost C++ Libraries (v1.87.0)**:
- Located in `ports/esp_idf/third_party/` (`circular_buffer`, `geometry`, `heap`, `iostreams`, `multiprecision`, `rational`).
- License: Boost Software License 1.0 (`BSL-1.0`).
2. **OpenTrafficMap (OTM) Transmitter**:
- Upstream: `https://codeberg.org/opentrafficmap/its-g5-receiver-firmware_txenabled.git`
- Reviewed Revision: `674e34128279235ba34c9f8d778f43cf1d075397`
- Core file: `ports/esp_idf/third_party/otm/main/tx_custom.c` (guarded by SHA-256 in `firmware/CMakeLists.txt`).
3. **ESP-IDF Port (`ports/esp_idf`)**:
- Implements hardware-accelerated crypto (mbedTLS ECC/ECDSA/SHA), NVS credential persistence, ESP32-C5 802.11p PHY bindings (`radio_c5.cmake`), and localhost PKI verification tooling (`ports/esp_idf/tools/local_pki.py`, `pki_client.py`).
obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf/README.md
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# vanetza-idf
Modular C++17 Vanetza library for ESP-IDF. Choose an access, network/transport,
or facilities-codec profile; supply your own platform and radio adapters.
The portable core targets the ESP32 family. The integrated C5 radio backend
is experimental and requires separate hardware validation.
**Start with the [ESP-IDF integration guide](docs/idf/README.md).** It covers
installation, Kconfig, ownership/event-loop rules, examples, and standalone
host/device tests. [Standards traceability](docs/idf/standards.md) links the public
interfaces to precise ETSI editions and clauses.
The [interface assessment](docs/idf/interface-assessment.md) identifies remaining
contract and capability gaps. [Test campaigns](docs/idf/test-campaigns.md) explains
how the separately installed ETSI framework and two-C5 radio tests connect.
**This is an experimental port, not a completed ETSI-conformant stack.**
See [implementation and conformance gaps](docs/idf/conformance.md) and
[validation results](docs/idf/validation.md). CAM/DENM/VAM codecs and endpoints
are distinct from complete Basic Services.
## Components and configurable boundaries
The arrangement follows the facilities, networking/transport and access layers
of the ETSI ITS station architecture, with management and security as shared
cross-layer services. It is an implementation map, inspired by
[TS 102 723-11, clauses 4–5](https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_ts/102700_102799/10272311/01.01.01_60/ts_10272311v010101p.pdf)
and [EN 303 797, Annex B](https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_en/303700_303799/303797/02.01.01_60/en_303797v020101p.pdf).
It does not imply that every service in those figures is implemented.
```mermaid
flowchart TB
subgraph station["vanetza-idf"]
direction TB
subgraph entry["Application / test entry points"]
direction LR
application["Application or upper tester"]
f_entry["Facilities PDU entry"]
b_entry["BTP-DATA entry"]
a_entry["AL_DATA entry"]
application --> f_entry
application --> b_entry
application --> a_entry
end
subgraph dataplane["Protocol data plane"]
direction LR
subgraph facilities["Facilities"]
direction TB
codecs["CAM R2 / DENM R2 / VAM R2\nASN.1 codecs"]
basic_services["CA / DEN / VRU Basic Services\npending"]
end
subgraph nt["Networking & Transport"]
direction TB
btp["BTP-A / BTP-B"]
gn["GeoNetworking\nSHB / GBC"]
btp --> gn
end
subgraph access_layer["Access boundary"]
direction TB
access["AL_DATA\nparameter validation"]
end
codecs --> btp
gn --> access
end
subgraph shared["Shared / cross-layer services"]
direction LR
position["Position + clock"]
management["Management\nMIB + configuration"]
security["Security entity\nTS 103 097 signing + ticket pool\nverification pending"]
saps["SAP bindings\nSN / SF / MN / MF / MI"]
end
f_entry --> codecs
b_entry --> btp
a_entry --> access
position -.-> gn
management -.-> gn
security -.-> gn
saps -.-> security
saps -.-> gn
end
subgraph integration["Platform / external integration"]
direction LR
etsi["External ETSI TTCN-3\nframework + SUT adapter"]
hil["Optional HIL framing\nbounded VID1 envelope"]
adapter["External access adapter\nsoftware lower tester / radio"]
radio["ESP32-C5 radio backend\nexperimental; DCC + HW validation pending"]
hil -.-> etsi
adapter -.-> radio
end
etsi -.-> application
etsi -.-> adapter
access <-->|"owned GNPDU + metadata"| adapter
```
The main transmit path is deliberately kept horizontal: Facilities → BTP →
GeoNetworking → Access. Management, position/time and security are shown as
shared services because they support protocol processing rather than form another
encapsulation stage. Reception travels back up the selected layers. The access
profile omits the network and facilities layers; the network profile adds
BTP/GeoNetworking; the facilities profile also enables the individually
selectable codecs. Complete CA, DEN and VRU Basic Services are still pending.
The optional HIL envelope carries adapter payloads; it is not an ETSI protocol.
## External TTCN-3 and HIL
Install the TTCN-3 runtime and the [official ETSI ITS framework](https://forge.etsi.org/rep/ITS/TS.ITS)
separately. The library does not install or bundle them. The test application
connects that framework's suite-specific SUT adapter to these points:
| Point | API/boundary | Intended use |
|---|---|---|
| Upper tester | Named NF-SAP binding, `Stack::request`, position/time/security injection | Stimulate implemented behavior and collect actual results; full service operations remain pending |
| Software lower tester | `Access::request` and `Stack::indicate` | Inject/observe GN traffic while the protocol implementation runs on the ESP32 |
| Physical lower tester | Independent ITS-G5 capture/injection radio | Validate transmitted frames, access behavior and RF properties |
Enable `CONFIG_VANETZA_IDF_HIL` for optional bounded framing. USB/UART/BLE/IP
transports and suite-specific command decoding remain in the test application
and host SUT adapter. Preserve the ETSI codec payload and map it to the actual
service under test; never synthesize a successful acknowledgement.
The [hook-up guide](docs/idf/README.md#connect-a-separately-installed-etsi-ttcn-3-framework)
explains payload boundaries, metadata, real-time versus injected-time tests,
PICS/PIXIT, Release 2 ATS adaptation, and evidence retention. A mirrored SUT
packet is software evidence; radio conformance requires independent observation.
## Foundation and acknowledgements
vanetza-idf is an independent ESP-IDF adaptation built on
[Vanetza](https://github.com/riebl/vanetza). It is not maintained by, affiliated
with, or endorsed by the Vanetza team. Upstream authorship and license notices
remain with the original source files. See the
[upstream documentation](https://www.vanetza.org/) for the original library.
Thank you to [OpenTrafficMap](https://codeberg.org/opentrafficmap) for the
foundational work that established how to transmit ITS-G5 using the ESP32-C5
radio, shared in their
[receiver firmware with TX enabled](https://codeberg.org/opentrafficmap/its-g5-receiver-firmware_txenabled).
The C5 backend builds on that work. Its private SDK dependencies and validation
status are documented separately from the portable protocol core.
Vanetza is licensed under LGPLv3; see [LICENSE.md](LICENSE.md).
Third-party components retain their respective notices and licensing terms.
obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf/asn1/COPYRIGHT.md
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These ASN.1 files are taken from their respective standardisation documents and are **not** licensed the same way as Vanetza itself.
Please refer to the referenced standardisation documents for details about the applicable Intellectual Property Rights (IPR).
To the best of my knowledge, ETSI does not object to bundling ASN.1 files of their published documents along with software.
Some editorial changes may have been applied, e.g. removal of trailing whitespace etc.
Code generated from the files located here can be found in the *vanetza/asn1/its* directory.
# Standardisation documents
- *EN302637-2v141-CAM.asn* from ETSI EN 302 637-2 v1.4.1 (2019-04)
- *EN302637-3v131-DENM.asn* from ETSI EN 302 637-3 v1.3.1 (2019-04)
- *TS102894-2v131-CDD.asn* from ETSI TS 102 894-2 v1.3.1 (2018-08)
- *TS102941v131-\*.asn* from ETSI TS 102 941 v1.3.1 (2019-02)
- *TS103097v131.asn* from ETSI TS 103 097 v1.3.1 (2017-10)
- *TS103097v211-\*.asn* from ETSI TS 103 097 v2.1.1 (2021-10)
- *TR103562v211.asn* from ETSI TR 103 562 v2.1.1 (2019-12)
- *IEEE1609dot2.asn* and *IEEE1609dot2BaseTypes.asn* from IEEE 1609.2 as printed in ETSI TS 103 097 v1.3.1
# ETSI WebSVN
You may find these ITS ASN.1 modules also in ETSI's public SVN repository: http://oldforge.etsi.org/websvn/listing.php?repname=ITS.ITS_ASN1
While above source is still online (in March 2020), ETSI seems to have moved to https://forge.etsi.org/rep/ITS/ITS_ASN1 by now.
This newer source also contains a license file explicitly. A copy is included below for reference.
> Copyright 2019 ETSI
>
> Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
> modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
> 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
> this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
> 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
> this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
> and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
> 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of its contributors
> may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without
> specific prior written permission.
>
> THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND
> ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
> WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
> IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
> INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING,
> BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
> DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
> LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE
> OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
> OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf/asn1/EN302637-2v141-CAM.asn
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CAM-PDU-Descriptions {
itu-t (0) identified-organization (4) etsi (0) itsDomain (5) wg1 (1) en (302637) cam (2) version (2)
}
DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
ItsPduHeader, CauseCode, ReferencePosition, AccelerationControl, Curvature, CurvatureCalculationMode, Heading, LanePosition, EmergencyPriority, EmbarkationStatus, Speed, DriveDirection, LongitudinalAcceleration, LateralAcceleration, VerticalAcceleration, StationType, ExteriorLights, DangerousGoodsBasic, SpecialTransportType, LightBarSirenInUse, VehicleRole, VehicleLength, VehicleWidth, PathHistory, RoadworksSubCauseCode, ClosedLanes, TrafficRule, SpeedLimit, SteeringWheelAngle, PerformanceClass, YawRate, ProtectedCommunicationZone, PtActivation, Latitude, Longitude, ProtectedCommunicationZonesRSU, CenDsrcTollingZone FROM ITS-Container {
itu-t (0) identified-organization (4) etsi (0) itsDomain (5) wg1 (1) ts (102894) cdd (2) version (2)
};
-- The root data frame for cooperative awareness messages
CAM ::= SEQUENCE {
header ItsPduHeader,
cam CoopAwareness
}
CoopAwareness ::= SEQUENCE {
generationDeltaTime GenerationDeltaTime,
camParameters CamParameters
}
CamParameters ::= SEQUENCE {
basicContainer BasicContainer,
highFrequencyContainer HighFrequencyContainer,
lowFrequencyContainer LowFrequencyContainer OPTIONAL,
specialVehicleContainer SpecialVehicleContainer OPTIONAL,
...
}
HighFrequencyContainer ::= CHOICE {
basicVehicleContainerHighFrequency BasicVehicleContainerHighFrequency,
rsuContainerHighFrequency RSUContainerHighFrequency,
...
}
LowFrequencyContainer ::= CHOICE {
basicVehicleContainerLowFrequency BasicVehicleContainerLowFrequency,
...
}
SpecialVehicleContainer ::= CHOICE {
publicTransportContainer PublicTransportContainer,
specialTransportContainer SpecialTransportContainer,
dangerousGoodsContainer DangerousGoodsContainer,
roadWorksContainerBasic RoadWorksContainerBasic,
rescueContainer RescueContainer,
emergencyContainer EmergencyContainer,
safetyCarContainer SafetyCarContainer,
...
}
BasicContainer ::= SEQUENCE {
stationType StationType,
referencePosition ReferencePosition,
...
}
BasicVehicleContainerHighFrequency ::= SEQUENCE {
heading Heading,
speed Speed,
driveDirection DriveDirection,
vehicleLength VehicleLength,
vehicleWidth VehicleWidth,
longitudinalAcceleration LongitudinalAcceleration,
curvature Curvature,
curvatureCalculationMode CurvatureCalculationMode,
yawRate YawRate,
accelerationControl AccelerationControl OPTIONAL,
lanePosition LanePosition OPTIONAL,
steeringWheelAngle SteeringWheelAngle OPTIONAL,
lateralAcceleration LateralAcceleration OPTIONAL,
verticalAcceleration VerticalAcceleration OPTIONAL,
performanceClass PerformanceClass OPTIONAL,
cenDsrcTollingZone CenDsrcTollingZone OPTIONAL
}
BasicVehicleContainerLowFrequency ::= SEQUENCE {
vehicleRole VehicleRole,
exteriorLights ExteriorLights,
pathHistory PathHistory
}
PublicTransportContainer ::= SEQUENCE {
embarkationStatus EmbarkationStatus,
ptActivation PtActivation OPTIONAL
}
SpecialTransportContainer ::= SEQUENCE {
specialTransportType SpecialTransportType,
lightBarSirenInUse LightBarSirenInUse
}
DangerousGoodsContainer ::= SEQUENCE {
dangerousGoodsBasic DangerousGoodsBasic
}
RoadWorksContainerBasic ::= SEQUENCE {
roadworksSubCauseCode RoadworksSubCauseCode OPTIONAL,
lightBarSirenInUse LightBarSirenInUse,
closedLanes ClosedLanes OPTIONAL
}
RescueContainer ::= SEQUENCE {
lightBarSirenInUse LightBarSirenInUse
}
EmergencyContainer ::= SEQUENCE {
lightBarSirenInUse LightBarSirenInUse,
incidentIndication CauseCode OPTIONAL,
emergencyPriority EmergencyPriority OPTIONAL
}
SafetyCarContainer ::= SEQUENCE {
lightBarSirenInUse LightBarSirenInUse,
incidentIndication CauseCode OPTIONAL,
trafficRule TrafficRule OPTIONAL,
speedLimit SpeedLimit OPTIONAL
}
RSUContainerHighFrequency ::= SEQUENCE {
protectedCommunicationZonesRSU ProtectedCommunicationZonesRSU OPTIONAL,
...
}
GenerationDeltaTime ::= INTEGER { oneMilliSec(1) } (0..65535)
END
obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf/asn1/EN302637-3v131-DENM.asn
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DENM-PDU-Descriptions {
itu-t (0) identified-organization (4) etsi (0) itsDomain (5) wg1 (1) en (302637) denm (1) version (2)
}
DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
ItsPduHeader, CauseCode, Speed, InformationQuality, ReferencePosition, ClosedLanes, DangerousGoodsExtended, Heading, LanePosition, LightBarSirenInUse, RoadType, HeightLonCarr, PosLonCarr, PosCentMass, PositioningSolutionType, RequestResponseIndication, StationType, SpeedLimit, StationarySince, TimestampIts, WheelBaseVehicle, TurningRadius, PosFrontAx, PositionOfOccupants, Temperature, VehicleMass, VehicleIdentification, EnergyStorageType, ActionID, ItineraryPath, NumberOfOccupants, PositionOfPillars, RelevanceTrafficDirection, RestrictedTypes, Traces, TransmissionInterval, ValidityDuration, RelevanceDistance, EventHistory, TrafficRule, DeltaReferencePosition FROM ITS-Container {
itu-t (0) identified-organization (4) etsi (0) itsDomain (5) wg1 (1) ts (102894) cdd (2) version (2)
};
DENM ::= SEQUENCE {
header ItsPduHeader,
denm DecentralizedEnvironmentalNotificationMessage
}
DecentralizedEnvironmentalNotificationMessage ::= SEQUENCE {
management ManagementContainer,
situation SituationContainer OPTIONAL,
location LocationContainer OPTIONAL,
alacarte AlacarteContainer OPTIONAL
}
ManagementContainer ::= SEQUENCE {
actionID ActionID,
detectionTime TimestampIts,
referenceTime TimestampIts,
termination Termination OPTIONAL,
eventPosition ReferencePosition,
relevanceDistance RelevanceDistance OPTIONAL,
relevanceTrafficDirection RelevanceTrafficDirection OPTIONAL,
validityDuration ValidityDuration DEFAULT defaultValidity,
transmissionInterval TransmissionInterval OPTIONAL,
stationType StationType,
...
}
SituationContainer ::= SEQUENCE {
informationQuality InformationQuality,
eventType CauseCode,
linkedCause CauseCode OPTIONAL,
eventHistory EventHistory OPTIONAL,
...
}
LocationContainer ::= SEQUENCE {
eventSpeed Speed OPTIONAL,
eventPositionHeading Heading OPTIONAL,
traces Traces,
roadType RoadType OPTIONAL,
...
}
ImpactReductionContainer ::= SEQUENCE {
heightLonCarrLeft HeightLonCarr,
heightLonCarrRight HeightLonCarr,
posLonCarrLeft PosLonCarr,
posLonCarrRight PosLonCarr,
positionOfPillars PositionOfPillars,
posCentMass PosCentMass,
wheelBaseVehicle WheelBaseVehicle,
turningRadius TurningRadius,
posFrontAx PosFrontAx,
positionOfOccupants PositionOfOccupants,
vehicleMass VehicleMass,
requestResponseIndication RequestResponseIndication
}
RoadWorksContainerExtended ::= SEQUENCE {
lightBarSirenInUse LightBarSirenInUse OPTIONAL,
closedLanes ClosedLanes OPTIONAL,
restriction RestrictedTypes OPTIONAL,
speedLimit SpeedLimit OPTIONAL,
incidentIndication CauseCode OPTIONAL,
recommendedPath ItineraryPath OPTIONAL,
startingPointSpeedLimit DeltaReferencePosition OPTIONAL,
trafficFlowRule TrafficRule OPTIONAL,
referenceDenms ReferenceDenms OPTIONAL
}
StationaryVehicleContainer ::= SEQUENCE {
stationarySince StationarySince OPTIONAL,
stationaryCause CauseCode OPTIONAL,
carryingDangerousGoods DangerousGoodsExtended OPTIONAL,
numberOfOccupants NumberOfOccupants OPTIONAL,
vehicleIdentification VehicleIdentification OPTIONAL,
energyStorageType EnergyStorageType OPTIONAL
}
AlacarteContainer ::= SEQUENCE {
lanePosition LanePosition OPTIONAL,
impactReduction ImpactReductionContainer OPTIONAL,
externalTemperature Temperature OPTIONAL,
roadWorks RoadWorksContainerExtended OPTIONAL,
positioningSolution PositioningSolutionType OPTIONAL,
stationaryVehicle StationaryVehicleContainer OPTIONAL,
...
}
defaultValidity INTEGER ::= 600
Termination ::= ENUMERATED {isCancellation(0), isNegation (1)}
ReferenceDenms ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..8, ...)) OF ActionID
END
obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf/asn1/IEEE1609dot2.asn
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IEEE1609dot2 {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) base (1) schema (1) major-version-2(2)
}
--******************************************************************************
--
-- IEEE P1609.2 Data Types
--
--******************************************************************************
DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::= BEGIN
EXPORTS ALL;
IMPORTS
CrlSeries,
EccP256CurvePoint,
EciesP256EncryptedKey,
EncryptionKey,
GeographicRegion,
GroupLinkageValue,
HashAlgorithm,
HashedId3,
HashedId8,
Hostname,
IValue,
LinkageValue,
Opaque,
Psid,
PsidSsp,
PsidSspRange,
PublicEncryptionKey,
PublicVerificationKey,
SequenceOfHashedId3,
SequenceOfPsidSsp,
SequenceOfPsidSspRange,
ServiceSpecificPermissions,
Signature,
SubjectAssurance,
SymmetricEncryptionKey,
ThreeDLocation,
Time64,
Uint3,
Uint8,
Uint16,
Uint32,
ValidityPeriod
FROM IEEE1609dot2BaseTypes {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) base(1) base-types(2) major-version-2 (2)
};
--
--*********************************************************************
--
-- Structures for describing secured data
--
--*********************************************************************
-- Necessary to get certain tools to generate sample PDUs
-- TestIeee1609Dot2Data ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data
-- TestCertificate ::= Certificate
-- this structure belongs later in the file but putting it here avoids
-- compiler errors with certain tools
SignedDataPayload ::= SEQUENCE {
data Ieee1609Dot2Data OPTIONAL,
extDataHash HashedData OPTIONAL,
...
}
(WITH COMPONENTS {..., data PRESENT} |
WITH COMPONENTS {..., extDataHash PRESENT})
Ieee1609Dot2Data ::= SEQUENCE {
protocolVersion Uint8(3),
content Ieee1609Dot2Content
}
Ieee1609Dot2Content ::= CHOICE {
unsecuredData Opaque,
signedData SignedData,
encryptedData EncryptedData,
signedCertificateRequest Opaque,
...
}
SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
hashId HashAlgorithm,
tbsData ToBeSignedData,
signer SignerIdentifier,
signature Signature
}
SignerIdentifier ::= CHOICE {
digest HashedId8,
certificate SequenceOfCertificate,
self NULL,
...
}
ToBeSignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
payload SignedDataPayload,
headerInfo HeaderInfo
}
HashedData::= CHOICE {
sha256HashedData OCTET STRING (SIZE(32)),
...
}
HeaderInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
psid Psid,
generationTime Time64 OPTIONAL,
expiryTime Time64 OPTIONAL,
generationLocation ThreeDLocation OPTIONAL,
p2pcdLearningRequest HashedId3 OPTIONAL,
missingCrlIdentifier MissingCrlIdentifier OPTIONAL,
encryptionKey EncryptionKey OPTIONAL,
...,
inlineP2pcdRequest SequenceOfHashedId3 OPTIONAL,
requestedCertificate Certificate OPTIONAL
}
MissingCrlIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
cracaId HashedId3,
crlSeries CrlSeries,
...
}
Countersignature ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
content (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
signedData (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
tbsData (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
payload (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
data ABSENT,
extDataHash PRESENT
}),
headerInfo(WITH COMPONENTS {...,
generationTime PRESENT,
expiryTime ABSENT,
generationLocation ABSENT,
p2pcdLearningRequest ABSENT,
missingCrlIdentifier ABSENT,
encryptionKey ABSENT
})
})
})
})
})
--**********************************************************************
--
-- Structures for describing encrypted data
--
--**********************************************************************
EncryptedData ::= SEQUENCE {
recipients SequenceOfRecipientInfo,
ciphertext SymmetricCiphertext
}
RecipientInfo ::= CHOICE {
pskRecipInfo PreSharedKeyRecipientInfo,
symmRecipInfo SymmRecipientInfo,
certRecipInfo PKRecipientInfo,
signedDataRecipInfo PKRecipientInfo,
rekRecipInfo PKRecipientInfo
}
SequenceOfRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE OF RecipientInfo
PreSharedKeyRecipientInfo ::= HashedId8
SymmRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
recipientId HashedId8,
encKey SymmetricCiphertext
}
PKRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
recipientId HashedId8,
encKey EncryptedDataEncryptionKey
}
EncryptedDataEncryptionKey ::= CHOICE {
eciesNistP256 EciesP256EncryptedKey,
eciesBrainpoolP256r1 EciesP256EncryptedKey,
...
}
SymmetricCiphertext ::= CHOICE {
aes128ccm AesCcmCiphertext,
...
}
AesCcmCiphertext ::= SEQUENCE {
nonce OCTET STRING (SIZE (12)),
ccmCiphertext Opaque -- 16 bytes longer than plaintext
}
--**********************************************************************
--
-- Certificates and other security management data structures
--
--**********************************************************************
-- Certificates are implicit (type = implicit, toBeSigned includes
-- reconstruction value, signature absent) or explicit (type = explicit,
-- toBeSigned includes verification key, signature present).
Certificate ::= CertificateBase (ImplicitCertificate | ExplicitCertificate)
SequenceOfCertificate ::= SEQUENCE OF Certificate
CertificateBase ::= SEQUENCE {
version Uint8(3),
type CertificateType,
issuer IssuerIdentifier,
toBeSigned ToBeSignedCertificate,
signature Signature OPTIONAL
}
CertificateType ::= ENUMERATED {
explicit,
implicit,
...
}
ImplicitCertificate ::= CertificateBase (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
type(implicit),
toBeSigned (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
verifyKeyIndicator(WITH COMPONENTS {reconstructionValue})
}),
signature ABSENT
})
ExplicitCertificate ::= CertificateBase (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
type(explicit),
toBeSigned(WITH COMPONENTS {...,
verifyKeyIndicator(WITH COMPONENTS {verificationKey})
}),
signature PRESENT
})
IssuerIdentifier ::= CHOICE {
sha256AndDigest HashedId8,
self HashAlgorithm,
...,
sha384AndDigest HashedId8
}
ToBeSignedCertificate ::= SEQUENCE {
id CertificateId,
cracaId HashedId3,
crlSeries CrlSeries,
validityPeriod ValidityPeriod,
region GeographicRegion OPTIONAL,
assuranceLevel SubjectAssurance OPTIONAL,
appPermissions SequenceOfPsidSsp OPTIONAL,
certIssuePermissions SequenceOfPsidGroupPermissions OPTIONAL,
certRequestPermissions SequenceOfPsidGroupPermissions OPTIONAL,
canRequestRollover NULL OPTIONAL,
encryptionKey PublicEncryptionKey OPTIONAL,
verifyKeyIndicator VerificationKeyIndicator,
...
}
(WITH COMPONENTS { ..., appPermissions PRESENT} |
WITH COMPONENTS { ..., certIssuePermissions PRESENT} |
WITH COMPONENTS { ..., certRequestPermissions PRESENT})
CertificateId ::= CHOICE {
linkageData LinkageData,
name Hostname,
binaryId OCTET STRING(SIZE(1..64)),
none NULL,
...
}
LinkageData ::= SEQUENCE {
iCert IValue,
linkage-value LinkageValue,
group-linkage-value GroupLinkageValue OPTIONAL
}
EndEntityType ::= BIT STRING { app (0), enrol (1) } (SIZE (8)) (ALL EXCEPT {})
PsidGroupPermissions ::= SEQUENCE {
subjectPermissions SubjectPermissions,
minChainLength INTEGER DEFAULT 1,
chainLengthRange INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
eeType EndEntityType DEFAULT {app} -- vanetza-idf: IEEE Std 1609.2-2022 6.4.28 (was '00'H)
}
SequenceOfPsidGroupPermissions ::= SEQUENCE OF PsidGroupPermissions
SubjectPermissions ::= CHOICE {
explicit SequenceOfPsidSspRange,
all NULL,
...
}
VerificationKeyIndicator ::= CHOICE {
verificationKey PublicVerificationKey,
reconstructionValue EccP256CurvePoint,
...
}
END
obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf/asn1/IEEE1609dot2BaseTypes.asn
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IEEE1609dot2BaseTypes {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) base(1) base-types(2) major-version-2(2)
}
--
--********************************************************************
-- IEEE P1609.2 Base Data Types
--
--********************************************************************
DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::= BEGIN
EXPORTS ALL;
-- ------------------------------------------------------------------
--
-- Integers
--
-- ------------------------------------------------------------------
Uint3 ::= INTEGER (0..7) -- (hex) 07
Uint8 ::= INTEGER (0..255) -- (hex) ff
Uint16 ::= INTEGER (0..65535) -- (hex) ff ff
Uint32 ::= INTEGER (0..4294967295) -- (hex) ff ff ff ff
Uint64 ::= INTEGER (0..18446744073709551615) -- (hex) ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
SequenceOfUint8 ::= SEQUENCE OF Uint8
SequenceOfUint16 ::= SEQUENCE OF Uint16
-- ------------------------------------------------------------------
--
-- OCTET STRING types
--
-- ------------------------------------------------------------------
Opaque ::= OCTET STRING
HashedId10 ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(10))
HashedId8 ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(8))
HashedId3 ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(3))
SequenceOfHashedId3 ::= SEQUENCE OF HashedId3
-- ------------------------------------------------------------------
--
-- Time
--
-- ------------------------------------------------------------------
Time32 ::= Uint32
Time64 ::= Uint64
ValidityPeriod ::= SEQUENCE {
start Time32,
duration Duration
}
Duration ::= CHOICE {
microseconds Uint16,
milliseconds Uint16,
seconds Uint16,
minutes Uint16,
hours Uint16,
sixtyHours Uint16,
years Uint16
}
-- ------------------------------------------------------------------
--
-- Location
--
-- ------------------------------------------------------------------
GeographicRegion ::= CHOICE {
circularRegion CircularRegion,
rectangularRegion SequenceOfRectangularRegion,
polygonalRegion PolygonalRegion,
identifiedRegion SequenceOfIdentifiedRegion,
...
}
CircularRegion ::= SEQUENCE {
center TwoDLocation,
radius Uint16
}
RectangularRegion ::= SEQUENCE {
northWest TwoDLocation,
southEast TwoDLocation
}
SequenceOfRectangularRegion ::= SEQUENCE OF RectangularRegion
PolygonalRegion ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(3..MAX) OF TwoDLocation
TwoDLocation ::= SEQUENCE {
latitude Latitude,
longitude Longitude
}
IdentifiedRegion ::= CHOICE {
countryOnly CountryOnly,
countryAndRegions CountryAndRegions,
countryAndSubregions CountryAndSubregions,
...
}
SequenceOfIdentifiedRegion ::= SEQUENCE OF IdentifiedRegion
CountryOnly ::= Uint16
CountryAndRegions ::= SEQUENCE {
countryOnly CountryOnly,
regions SequenceOfUint8
}
CountryAndSubregions ::= SEQUENCE {
country CountryOnly,
regionAndSubregions SequenceOfRegionAndSubregions
}
RegionAndSubregions ::= SEQUENCE {
region Uint8,
subregions SequenceOfUint16
}
SequenceOfRegionAndSubregions ::= SEQUENCE OF RegionAndSubregions
ThreeDLocation ::= SEQUENCE {
latitude Latitude,
longitude Longitude,
elevation Elevation
}
Latitude ::= NinetyDegreeInt
Longitude ::= OneEightyDegreeInt
Elevation ::= ElevInt
NinetyDegreeInt ::= INTEGER {
min (-900000000),
max (900000000),
unknown (900000001)
} (-900000000..900000001)
KnownLatitude ::= NinetyDegreeInt (min..max) -- Minus 90deg to +90deg in microdegree intervals
UnknownLatitude ::= NinetyDegreeInt (unknown)
OneEightyDegreeInt ::= INTEGER {
min (-1799999999),
max (1800000000),
unknown (1800000001)
} (-1799999999..1800000001)
KnownLongitude ::= OneEightyDegreeInt (min..max)
UnknownLongitude ::= OneEightyDegreeInt (unknown)
ElevInt ::= Uint16 -- Range is from -4096 to 61439 in units of one-tenth of a meter
-- ------------------------------------------------------------------
--
-- Crypto
--
-- ------------------------------------------------------------------
Signature ::= CHOICE {
ecdsaNistP256Signature EcdsaP256Signature,
ecdsaBrainpoolP256r1Signature EcdsaP256Signature,
...,
ecdsaBrainpoolP384r1Signature EcdsaP384Signature
}
EcdsaP256Signature ::= SEQUENCE {
rSig EccP256CurvePoint,
sSig OCTET STRING (SIZE (32))
}
EcdsaP384Signature ::= SEQUENCE {
rSig EccP384CurvePoint,
sSig OCTET STRING (SIZE (48))
}
EccP256CurvePoint ::= CHOICE {
x-only OCTET STRING (SIZE (32)),
fill NULL, -- consistency with 1363 / X9.62
compressed-y-0 OCTET STRING (SIZE (32)),
compressed-y-1 OCTET STRING (SIZE (32)),
uncompressedP256 SEQUENCE {
x OCTET STRING (SIZE (32)),
y OCTET STRING (SIZE (32))
}
}
EccP384CurvePoint ::= CHOICE {
x-only OCTET STRING (SIZE (48)),
fill NULL, -- consistency w 1363 / X9.62
compressed-y-0 OCTET STRING (SIZE (48)),
compressed-y-1 OCTET STRING (SIZE (48)),
uncompressedP384 SEQUENCE {
x OCTET STRING (SIZE (48)),
y OCTET STRING (SIZE (48))
}
}
SymmAlgorithm ::= ENUMERATED {
aes128Ccm,
...
}
HashAlgorithm ::= ENUMERATED {
sha256,
...,
sha384
}
EciesP256EncryptedKey ::= SEQUENCE {
v EccP256CurvePoint,
c OCTET STRING (SIZE (16)),
t OCTET STRING (SIZE (16))
}
EncryptionKey ::= CHOICE {
public PublicEncryptionKey,
symmetric SymmetricEncryptionKey
}
PublicEncryptionKey ::= SEQUENCE {
supportedSymmAlg SymmAlgorithm,
publicKey BasePublicEncryptionKey
}
BasePublicEncryptionKey ::= CHOICE {
eciesNistP256 EccP256CurvePoint,
eciesBrainpoolP256r1 EccP256CurvePoint,
...
}
PublicVerificationKey ::= CHOICE {
ecdsaNistP256 EccP256CurvePoint,
ecdsaBrainpoolP256r1 EccP256CurvePoint,
...,
ecdsaBrainpoolP384r1 EccP384CurvePoint
}
SymmetricEncryptionKey ::= CHOICE {
aes128Ccm OCTET STRING(SIZE(16)),
...
}
-- ------------------------------------------------------------------
--
-- PSID / ITS-AID
--
-- ------------------------------------------------------------------
PsidSsp ::= SEQUENCE {
psid Psid,
ssp ServiceSpecificPermissions OPTIONAL
}
SequenceOfPsidSsp ::= SEQUENCE OF PsidSsp
Psid ::= INTEGER (0..MAX)
SequenceOfPsid ::= SEQUENCE OF Psid
ServiceSpecificPermissions ::= CHOICE {
opaque OCTET STRING (SIZE(0..MAX)),
...,
bitmapSsp BitmapSsp
}
BitmapSsp ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(0..31))
PsidSspRange ::= SEQUENCE {
psid Psid,
sspRange SspRange OPTIONAL
}
SequenceOfPsidSspRange ::= SEQUENCE OF PsidSspRange
SspRange ::= CHOICE {
opaque SequenceOfOctetString,
all NULL,
... ,
bitmapSspRange BitmapSspRange
}
BitmapSspRange ::= SEQUENCE {
sspValue OCTET STRING (SIZE(1..32)),
sspBitmask OCTET STRING (SIZE(1..32))
}
SequenceOfOctetString ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE (0..MAX)) OF OCTET STRING (SIZE(0..MAX))
-- ------------------------------------------------------------------
--
-- Goes in certs
--
-- ------------------------------------------------------------------
SubjectAssurance ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(1))
CrlSeries ::= Uint16
-- ------------------------------------------------------------------
--
-- Pseudonym Linkage
--
-- ------------------------------------------------------------------
IValue ::= Uint16
Hostname ::= UTF8String (SIZE(0..255))
LinkageValue ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(9))
GroupLinkageValue ::= SEQUENCE {
jValue OCTET STRING (SIZE(4)),
value OCTET STRING (SIZE(9))
}
LaId ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(2))
LinkageSeed ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(16))
END
obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf/asn1/TR103562v211-CPM.asn
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+372
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@@ -0,0 +1,372 @@
CPM-PDU-Descriptions {
itu-t (0) identified-organization (4) etsi (0) itsDomain (5) wg1 (1) tr (103562) cpm (1) version (1)
}
DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS ItsPduHeader, Heading, ReferencePosition, Speed, DriveDirection, LongitudinalAcceleration, LateralAcceleration, VerticalAcceleration, StationType, VehicleLength, VehicleWidth, YawRate, SpeedConfidence
FROM ITS-Container { itu-t (0) identified-organization (4) etsi (0) itsDomain (5) wg1 (1) ts (102894) cdd (2) version (2) }
IntersectionReferenceID, LaneID, NodeOffsetPointXY, Offset-B10, Offset-B11, Offset-B12, Offset-B13, Offset-B14, Offset-B16, RoadSegmentReferenceID, VehicleHeight
FROM DSRC { iso (1) standard (0) signalizedIntersection (19091) profilec(2) dsrc (2) version2 (2) }
GenerationDeltaTime FROM CAM-PDU-Descriptions { itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg1(1) en(302637) cam(2) version(2)} ;
-- The root data frame for collective perception message
CPM ::= SEQUENCE {
header ItsPduHeader,
cpm CollectivePerceptionMessage
}
CollectivePerceptionMessage ::= SEQUENCE {
generationDeltaTime GenerationDeltaTime,
cpmParameters CpmParameters
}
CpmParameters ::= SEQUENCE {
managementContainer CpmManagementContainer,
stationDataContainer StationDataContainer OPTIONAL,
sensorInformationContainer SensorInformationContainer OPTIONAL,
perceivedObjectContainer PerceivedObjectContainer OPTIONAL,
freeSpaceAddendumContainer FreeSpaceAddendumContainer OPTIONAL,
numberOfPerceivedObjects NumberOfPerceivedObjects,
...
}
CpmManagementContainer ::= SEQUENCE {
stationType StationType,
perceivedObjectContainerSegmentInfo PerceivedObjectContainerSegmentInfo OPTIONAL,
referencePosition ReferencePosition,
...
}
StationDataContainer ::= CHOICE {
originatingVehicleContainer OriginatingVehicleContainer,
originatingRSUContainer OriginatingRSUContainer,
...
}
OriginatingVehicleContainer ::= SEQUENCE {
heading Heading,
speed Speed,
vehicleOrientationAngle WGS84Angle OPTIONAL,
driveDirection DriveDirection DEFAULT forward,
longitudinalAcceleration LongitudinalAcceleration OPTIONAL,
lateralAcceleration LateralAcceleration OPTIONAL,
verticalAcceleration VerticalAcceleration OPTIONAL,
yawRate YawRate OPTIONAL,
pitchAngle CartesianAngle OPTIONAL,
rollAngle CartesianAngle OPTIONAL,
vehicleLength VehicleLength OPTIONAL,
vehicleWidth VehicleWidth OPTIONAL,
vehicleHeight VehicleHeight OPTIONAL,
trailerDataContainer TrailerDataContainer OPTIONAL,
...
}
OriginatingRSUContainer ::= CHOICE {
intersectionReferenceId IntersectionReferenceID,
roadSegmentReferenceId RoadSegmentReferenceID,
...
}
SensorInformationContainer ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..128, ...) OF SensorInformation
SensorInformation ::= SEQUENCE {
sensorID Identifier,
type SensorType,
detectionArea DetectionArea,
freeSpaceConfidence FreeSpaceConfidence OPTIONAL,
...
}
PerceivedObjectContainer ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..128, ...) OF PerceivedObject
PerceivedObject ::= SEQUENCE {
objectID Identifier,
sensorIDList SensorIdList OPTIONAL,
timeOfMeasurement TimeOfMeasurement,
objectAge ObjectAge OPTIONAL,
objectConfidence ObjectConfidence DEFAULT 0,
xDistance ObjectDistanceWithConfidence,
yDistance ObjectDistanceWithConfidence,
zDistance ObjectDistanceWithConfidence OPTIONAL,
xSpeed SpeedExtended,
ySpeed SpeedExtended,
zSpeed SpeedExtended OPTIONAL,
xAcceleration LongitudinalAcceleration OPTIONAL,
yAcceleration LateralAcceleration OPTIONAL,
zAcceleration VerticalAcceleration OPTIONAL,
yawAngle CartesianAngle OPTIONAL,
planarObjectDimension1 ObjectDimension OPTIONAL,
planarObjectDimension2 ObjectDimension OPTIONAL,
verticalObjectDimension ObjectDimension OPTIONAL,
objectRefPoint ObjectRefPoint DEFAULT 0,
dynamicStatus DynamicStatus OPTIONAL,
classification ObjectClassDescription OPTIONAL,
matchedPosition MatchedPosition OPTIONAL,
...
}
DetectionArea ::= CHOICE {
vehicleSensor VehicleSensor,
stationarySensorRadial AreaRadial,
stationarySensorPolygon AreaPolygon,
stationarySensorCircular AreaCircular,
stationarySensorEllipse AreaEllipse,
stationarySensorRectangle AreaRectangle,
...
}
VehicleSensor ::= SEQUENCE {
refPointId RefPointId DEFAULT 0,
xSensorOffset XSensorOffset,
ySensorOffset YSensorOffset,
zSensorOffset ZSensorOffset OPTIONAL,
vehicleSensorPropertyList VehicleSensorPropertyList,
...
}
VehicleSensorPropertyList ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..10) OF VehicleSensorProperties
VehicleSensorProperties ::= SEQUENCE {
range Range,
horizontalOpeningAngleStart CartesianAngleValue,
horizontalOpeningAngleEnd CartesianAngleValue,
verticalOpeningAngleStart CartesianAngleValue OPTIONAL,
verticalOpeningAngleEnd CartesianAngleValue OPTIONAL,
...
}
AreaCircular ::= SEQUENCE {
nodeCenterPoint OffsetPoint OPTIONAL,
radius Radius
}
AreaEllipse ::= SEQUENCE {
nodeCenterPoint OffsetPoint OPTIONAL,
semiMinorRangeLength SemiRangeLength,
semiMajorRangeLength SemiRangeLength,
semiMajorRangeOrientation WGS84AngleValue,
semiHeight SemiRangeLength OPTIONAL
}
AreaRectangle ::= SEQUENCE {
nodeCenterPoint OffsetPoint OPTIONAL,
semiMajorRangeLength SemiRangeLength,
semiMinorRangeLength SemiRangeLength,
semiMajorRangeOrientation WGS84AngleValue,
semiHeight SemiRangeLength OPTIONAL
}
AreaPolygon ::= SEQUENCE {
polyPointList PolyPointList
}
PolyPointList ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(3..16, ...)) OF OffsetPoint
AreaRadial ::= SEQUENCE {
range Range,
stationaryHorizontalOpeningAngleStart WGS84AngleValue,
stationaryHorizontalOpeningAngleEnd WGS84AngleValue,
verticalOpeningAngleStart CartesianAngleValue OPTIONAL,
verticalOpeningAngleEnd CartesianAngleValue OPTIONAL,
sensorPositionOffset OffsetPoint OPTIONAL,
sensorHeight SensorHeight OPTIONAL,
...
}
FreeSpaceAddendumContainer ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..128, ...) OF FreeSpaceAddendum
FreeSpaceAddendum ::= SEQUENCE {
freeSpaceConfidence FreeSpaceConfidence,
freeSpaceArea FreeSpaceArea,
sensorIDList SensorIdList OPTIONAL,
shadowingApplies ShadowingApplies DEFAULT TRUE,
...
}
FreeSpaceArea ::= CHOICE {
freeSpacePolygon AreaPolygon,
freeSpaceCircular AreaCircular,
freeSpaceEllipse AreaEllipse,
freeSpaceRectangle AreaRectangle,
...
}
ObjectDistanceWithConfidence ::= SEQUENCE {
value DistanceValue,
confidence DistanceConfidence
}
ObjectDimension ::= SEQUENCE {
value ObjectDimensionValue,
confidence ObjectDimensionConfidence
}
CartesianAngle ::= SEQUENCE {
value CartesianAngleValue,
confidence AngleConfidence
}
WGS84Angle ::= SEQUENCE {
value WGS84AngleValue,
confidence AngleConfidence
}
SpeedExtended ::= SEQUENCE {
value SpeedValueExtended,
confidence SpeedConfidence
}
SensorIdList ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..128, ...) OF Identifier
TrailerDataContainer ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..2) OF TrailerData
TrailerData ::= SEQUENCE {
refPointId RefPointId,
hitchPointOffset HitchPointOffset,
frontOverhang FrontOverhang,
rearOverhang RearOverhang,
trailerWidth VehicleWidth OPTIONAL,
hitchAngle CartesianAngle OPTIONAL,
...
}
LongitudinalLanePosition ::= SEQUENCE {
longitudinalLanePositionValue LongitudinalLanePositionValue,
longitudinalLanePositionConfidence LongitudinalLanePositionConfidence
}
MatchedPosition ::= SEQUENCE {
laneID LaneID OPTIONAL,
longitudinalLanePosition LongitudinalLanePosition OPTIONAL,
...
}
PerceivedObjectContainerSegmentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
totalMsgSegments SegmentCount,
thisSegmentNum SegmentCount
}
ObjectClassDescription ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..8)) OF ObjectClass
ObjectClass ::= SEQUENCE {
confidence ClassConfidence,
class CHOICE {
vehicle VehicleSubclass,
person PersonSubclass,
animal AnimalSubclass,
other OtherSubclass
}
}
VehicleSubclass ::= SEQUENCE {
type VehicleSubclassType DEFAULT 0,
confidence ClassConfidence DEFAULT 0
}
PersonSubclass ::= SEQUENCE {
type PersonSubclassType DEFAULT 0,
confidence ClassConfidence DEFAULT 0
}
AnimalSubclass ::= SEQUENCE {
type AnimalSubclassType DEFAULT 0,
confidence ClassConfidence DEFAULT 0
}
OtherSubclass ::= SEQUENCE {
type OtherSublassType DEFAULT 0,
confidence ClassConfidence DEFAULT 0
}
OffsetPoint ::= SEQUENCE {
nodeOffsetPointxy NodeOffsetPointXY (WITH COMPONENTS {..., node-LatLon ABSENT, regional ABSENT}),
nodeOffsetPointZ NodeOffsetPointZ OPTIONAL
}
NodeOffsetPointZ ::= CHOICE {
node-Z1 Offset-B10, -- node is within 5.11m of last node
node-Z2 Offset-B11, -- node is within 10.23m of last node
node-Z3 Offset-B12, -- node is within 20.47m of last node
node-Z4 Offset-B13, -- node is within 40.96m of last node
node-Z5 Offset-B14, -- node is within 81.91m of last node
node-Z6 Offset-B16 -- node is within 327.67m of last node
}
AnimalSubclassType ::= INTEGER {unknown(0)} (0..255)
ClassConfidence ::= INTEGER {unknown(0), onePercent(1), oneHundredPercent(100), unavailable(101)} (0..101)
WGS84AngleValue ::= INTEGER {wgs84North(0), wgs84East(900), wgs84South(1800), wgs84West(2700), unavailable(3601)} (0..3601)
CartesianAngleValue ::= INTEGER {zeroPointOneDegree(1), oneDegree(10), unavailable(3601)} (0..3601)
AngleConfidence ::= INTEGER {zeroPointOneDegree (1), oneDegree (10), outOfRange(126), unavailable(127)} (1..127)
SemiRangeLength ::= INTEGER {zeroPointOneMeter(1), oneMeter(10)} (0..10000)
DistanceValue ::= INTEGER {zeroPointZeroOneMeter(1), oneMeter(100)} (-132768..132767)
DistanceConfidence ::= INTEGER {zeroPointZeroOneMeter(1), oneMeter(100), outOfRange(101), unavailable(102)} (0..102)
DynamicStatus ::= INTEGER {dynamic(0), hasBeenDynamic(1), static(2)} (0..2)
HitchPointOffset ::= INTEGER {zeroPointOneMeter(1), oneMeter(10)} (0..100)
FrontOverhang ::= INTEGER {zeroPointOneMeter(1), oneMeter(10)} (0..50)
FreeSpaceConfidence ::= INTEGER {unknown(0), onePercent(1), oneHundredPercent(100), unavailable(101)} (0..101)
LongitudinalLanePositionValue ::= INTEGER {zeroPointOneMeter(1)} (0..32767)
LongitudinalLanePositionConfidence ::= INTEGER {zeroPointZeroOneMeter(1), oneMeter(100), outOfRange(101), unavailable(102)} (0..102)
ObjectAge ::= INTEGER {oneMiliSec(1)} (0..1500)
ObjectConfidence ::= INTEGER {unknown(0), onePercent(1), oneHundredPercent(100), unavailable(101)} (0..101)
ObjectDimensionValue ::= INTEGER {zeroPointOneMeter(1), oneMeter(10)} (0..1023)
ObjectDimensionConfidence ::= INTEGER {zeroPointZeroOneMeter(1), oneMeter(100), outOfRange(101), unavailable(102)} (0..102)
ObjectRefPoint ::= INTEGER {mid(0), bottomLeft(1), midLeft(2), topLeft(3), bottomMid(4), topMid(5), bottomRight(6), midRight(7), topRight(8)} (0..8)
OtherSublassType ::= INTEGER {unknown(0), roadSideUnit(1)} (0..255)
PersonSubclassType ::= INTEGER {unknown(0), pedestrian(1), personInWheelchair(2), cyclist(3), personWithStroller(4), personOnSkates(5), personGroup(6)} (0..255)
Radius ::= INTEGER {zeroPointOneMeter(1), oneMeter(10)} (0..10000)
Range ::= INTEGER {zeroPointOneMeter(1), oneMeter(10)} (0..10000)
RearOverhang ::= INTEGER {zeroPointOneMeter(1), oneMeter(10)} (0..150)
RefPointId ::= INTEGER (0..255)
SensorHeight ::= INTEGER {zeroPointZeroOneMeter(1)} (-5000..5000)
ShadowingApplies ::= BOOLEAN
Identifier ::= INTEGER (0..255)
NumberOfPerceivedObjects ::= INTEGER (0..255)
SensorType ::= INTEGER {undefined(0), radar(1), lidar(2), monovideo(3), stereovision(4), nightvision(5), ultrasonic(6), pmd(7), fusion(8), inductionloop(9), sphericalCamera(10), itssaggregation(11)} (0..15)
SegmentCount ::= INTEGER(1..127)
SpeedValueExtended ::= INTEGER {standstill(0), oneCentimeterPerSec(1),unavailable(16383)} (-16383..16383)
TimeOfMeasurement ::= INTEGER {oneMilliSecond(1)} (-1500..1500)
VehicleSubclassType ::= INTEGER {unknown(0), moped(1), motorcycle(2), passengerCar(3), bus(4), lightTruck(5), heavyTruck(6), trailer(7), specialVehicles(8), tram(9), emergencyVehicle(10), agricultural(11)} (0..255)
XSensorOffset ::= INTEGER {negativeZeroPointZeroOneMeter(-1), negativeOneMeter(-100)} (-5000..0)
YSensorOffset ::= INTEGER {zeroPointZeroOneMeter(1), oneMeter(100)} (-1000..1000)
ZSensorOffset ::= INTEGER {zeroPointZeroOneMeter(1), oneMeter(100)} (0..1000)
END
obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf/asn1/TS102894-2v131-CDD.asn
Vendored
+505
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@@ -0,0 +1,505 @@
ITS-Container {
itu-t (0) identified-organization (4) etsi (0) itsDomain (5) wg1 (1) ts (102894) cdd (2) version (2)
}
DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::=
BEGIN
ItsPduHeader ::= SEQUENCE {
protocolVersion INTEGER (0..255),
messageID INTEGER{ denm(1), cam(2), poi(3), spatem(4), mapem(5), ivim(6), ev-rsr(7), tistpgtransaction(8), srem(9), ssem(10), evcsn(11), saem(12), rtcmem(13) } (0..255), -- Mantis #7209, #7005
stationID StationID
}
StationID ::= INTEGER(0..4294967295)
ReferencePosition ::= SEQUENCE {
latitude Latitude,
longitude Longitude,
positionConfidenceEllipse PosConfidenceEllipse ,
altitude Altitude
}
DeltaReferencePosition ::= SEQUENCE {
deltaLatitude DeltaLatitude,
deltaLongitude DeltaLongitude,
deltaAltitude DeltaAltitude
}
Longitude ::= INTEGER {oneMicrodegreeEast (10), oneMicrodegreeWest (-10), unavailable(1800000001)} (-1800000000..1800000001)
Latitude ::= INTEGER {oneMicrodegreeNorth (10), oneMicrodegreeSouth (-10), unavailable(900000001)} (-900000000..900000001)
Altitude ::= SEQUENCE {
altitudeValue AltitudeValue,
altitudeConfidence AltitudeConfidence
}
AltitudeValue ::= INTEGER {referenceEllipsoidSurface(0), oneCentimeter(1), unavailable(800001)} (-100000..800001)
AltitudeConfidence ::= ENUMERATED {
alt-000-01 (0),
alt-000-02 (1),
alt-000-05 (2),
alt-000-10 (3),
alt-000-20 (4),
alt-000-50 (5),
alt-001-00 (6),
alt-002-00 (7),
alt-005-00 (8),
alt-010-00 (9),
alt-020-00 (10),
alt-050-00 (11),
alt-100-00 (12),
alt-200-00 (13),
outOfRange (14),
unavailable (15)
}
DeltaLongitude ::= INTEGER {oneMicrodegreeEast (10), oneMicrodegreeWest (-10), unavailable(131072)} (-131071..131072)
DeltaLatitude ::= INTEGER {oneMicrodegreeNorth (10), oneMicrodegreeSouth (-10) , unavailable(131072)} (-131071..131072)
DeltaAltitude ::= INTEGER {oneCentimeterUp (1), oneCentimeterDown (-1), unavailable(12800)} (-12700..12800)
PosConfidenceEllipse ::= SEQUENCE {
semiMajorConfidence SemiAxisLength,
semiMinorConfidence SemiAxisLength,
semiMajorOrientation HeadingValue
}
PathPoint ::= SEQUENCE {
pathPosition DeltaReferencePosition,
pathDeltaTime PathDeltaTime OPTIONAL
}
PathDeltaTime ::= INTEGER {tenMilliSecondsInPast(1)} (1..65535, ...)
PtActivation ::= SEQUENCE {
ptActivationType PtActivationType,
ptActivationData PtActivationData
}
PtActivationType ::= INTEGER {undefinedCodingType(0), r09-16CodingType(1), vdv-50149CodingType(2)} (0..255)
PtActivationData ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(1..20))
AccelerationControl ::= BIT STRING {
brakePedalEngaged (0),
gasPedalEngaged (1),
emergencyBrakeEngaged (2),
collisionWarningEngaged (3),
accEngaged (4),
cruiseControlEngaged (5),
speedLimiterEngaged (6)
} (SIZE(7))
SemiAxisLength ::= INTEGER{oneCentimeter(1), outOfRange(4094), unavailable(4095)} (0..4095)
CauseCode ::= SEQUENCE {
causeCode CauseCodeType,
subCauseCode SubCauseCodeType,
...
}
CauseCodeType ::= INTEGER {
reserved (0),
trafficCondition (1),
accident (2),
roadworks (3),
impassability (5),
adverseWeatherCondition-Adhesion (6),
aquaplannning (7),
hazardousLocation-SurfaceCondition (9),
hazardousLocation-ObstacleOnTheRoad (10),
hazardousLocation-AnimalOnTheRoad (11),
humanPresenceOnTheRoad (12),
wrongWayDriving (14),
rescueAndRecoveryWorkInProgress (15),
adverseWeatherCondition-ExtremeWeatherCondition (17),
adverseWeatherCondition-Visibility (18),
adverseWeatherCondition-Precipitation (19),
slowVehicle (26),
dangerousEndOfQueue (27),
vehicleBreakdown (91),
postCrash (92),
humanProblem (93),
stationaryVehicle (94),
emergencyVehicleApproaching (95),
hazardousLocation-DangerousCurve (96),
collisionRisk (97),
signalViolation (98),
dangerousSituation (99)
} (0..255)
SubCauseCodeType ::= INTEGER (0..255)
TrafficConditionSubCauseCode ::= INTEGER {unavailable(0), increasedVolumeOfTraffic(1), trafficJamSlowlyIncreasing(2), trafficJamIncreasing(3), trafficJamStronglyIncreasing(4), trafficStationary(5), trafficJamSlightlyDecreasing(6), trafficJamDecreasing(7), trafficJamStronglyDecreasing(8)} (0..255)
AccidentSubCauseCode ::= INTEGER {unavailable(0), multiVehicleAccident(1), heavyAccident(2), accidentInvolvingLorry(3), accidentInvolvingBus(4), accidentInvolvingHazardousMaterials(5), accidentOnOppositeLane(6), unsecuredAccident(7), assistanceRequested(8)} (0..255)
RoadworksSubCauseCode ::= INTEGER {unavailable(0), majorRoadworks(1), roadMarkingWork(2), slowMovingRoadMaintenance(3), shortTermStationaryRoadworks(4), streetCleaning(5), winterService(6)} (0..255)
HumanPresenceOnTheRoadSubCauseCode ::= INTEGER {unavailable(0), childrenOnRoadway(1), cyclistOnRoadway(2), motorcyclistOnRoadway(3)} (0..255)
WrongWayDrivingSubCauseCode ::= INTEGER {unavailable(0), wrongLane(1), wrongDirection(2)} (0..255)
AdverseWeatherCondition-ExtremeWeatherConditionSubCauseCode ::= INTEGER {unavailable(0), strongWinds(1), damagingHail(2), hurricane(3), thunderstorm(4), tornado(5), blizzard(6)} (0..255)
AdverseWeatherCondition-AdhesionSubCauseCode ::= INTEGER {unavailable(0), heavyFrostOnRoad(1), fuelOnRoad(2), mudOnRoad(3), snowOnRoad(4), iceOnRoad(5), blackIceOnRoad(6), oilOnRoad(7), looseChippings(8), instantBlackIce(9), roadsSalted(10)} (0..255)
AdverseWeatherCondition-VisibilitySubCauseCode ::= INTEGER {unavailable(0), fog(1), smoke(2), heavySnowfall(3), heavyRain(4), heavyHail(5), lowSunGlare(6), sandstorms(7), swarmsOfInsects(8)} (0..255)
AdverseWeatherCondition-PrecipitationSubCauseCode ::= INTEGER {unavailable(0), heavyRain(1), heavySnowfall(2), softHail(3)} (0..255)
SlowVehicleSubCauseCode ::= INTEGER {unavailable(0), maintenanceVehicle(1), vehiclesSlowingToLookAtAccident(2), abnormalLoad(3), abnormalWideLoad(4), convoy(5), snowplough(6), deicing(7), saltingVehicles(8)} (0..255)
StationaryVehicleSubCauseCode ::= INTEGER {unavailable(0), humanProblem(1), vehicleBreakdown(2), postCrash(3), publicTransportStop(4), carryingDangerousGoods(5)} (0..255)
HumanProblemSubCauseCode ::= INTEGER {unavailable(0), glycemiaProblem(1), heartProblem(2)} (0..255)
EmergencyVehicleApproachingSubCauseCode ::= INTEGER {unavailable(0), emergencyVehicleApproaching(1), prioritizedVehicleApproaching(2)} (0..255)
HazardousLocation-DangerousCurveSubCauseCode ::= INTEGER {unavailable(0), dangerousLeftTurnCurve(1), dangerousRightTurnCurve(2), multipleCurvesStartingWithUnknownTurningDirection(3), multipleCurvesStartingWithLeftTurn(4), multipleCurvesStartingWithRightTurn(5)} (0..255)
HazardousLocation-SurfaceConditionSubCauseCode ::= INTEGER {unavailable(0), rockfalls(1), earthquakeDamage(2), sewerCollapse(3), subsidence(4), snowDrifts(5), stormDamage(6), burstPipe(7), volcanoEruption(8), fallingIce(9)} (0..255)
HazardousLocation-ObstacleOnTheRoadSubCauseCode ::= INTEGER {unavailable(0), shedLoad(1), partsOfVehicles(2), partsOfTyres(3), bigObjects(4), fallenTrees(5), hubCaps(6), waitingVehicles(7)} (0..255)
HazardousLocation-AnimalOnTheRoadSubCauseCode ::= INTEGER {unavailable(0), wildAnimals(1), herdOfAnimals(2), smallAnimals(3), largeAnimals(4)} (0..255)
CollisionRiskSubCauseCode ::= INTEGER {unavailable(0), longitudinalCollisionRisk(1), crossingCollisionRisk(2), lateralCollisionRisk(3), vulnerableRoadUser(4)} (0..255)
SignalViolationSubCauseCode ::= INTEGER {unavailable(0), stopSignViolation(1), trafficLightViolation(2), turningRegulationViolation(3)} (0..255)
RescueAndRecoveryWorkInProgressSubCauseCode ::= INTEGER {unavailable(0), emergencyVehicles(1), rescueHelicopterLanding(2), policeActivityOngoing(3), medicalEmergencyOngoing(4), childAbductionInProgress(5)} (0..255)
DangerousEndOfQueueSubCauseCode ::= INTEGER {unavailable(0), suddenEndOfQueue(1), queueOverHill(2), queueAroundBend(3), queueInTunnel(4)} (0..255)
DangerousSituationSubCauseCode ::= INTEGER {unavailable(0), emergencyElectronicBrakeEngaged(1), preCrashSystemEngaged(2), espEngaged(3), absEngaged(4), aebEngaged(5), brakeWarningEngaged(6), collisionRiskWarningEngaged(7)} (0..255)
VehicleBreakdownSubCauseCode ::= INTEGER {unavailable(0), lackOfFuel (1), lackOfBatteryPower (2), engineProblem(3), transmissionProblem(4), engineCoolingProblem(5), brakingSystemProblem(6), steeringProblem(7), tyrePuncture(8), tyrePressureProblem(9)} (0..255)
PostCrashSubCauseCode ::= INTEGER {unavailable(0), accidentWithoutECallTriggered (1), accidentWithECallManuallyTriggered (2), accidentWithECallAutomaticallyTriggered (3), accidentWithECallTriggeredWithoutAccessToCellularNetwork(4)} (0..255)
Curvature ::= SEQUENCE {
curvatureValue CurvatureValue,
curvatureConfidence CurvatureConfidence
}
CurvatureValue ::= INTEGER {straight(0), unavailable(1023)} (-1023..1023)
CurvatureConfidence ::= ENUMERATED {
onePerMeter-0-00002 (0),
onePerMeter-0-0001 (1),
onePerMeter-0-0005 (2),
onePerMeter-0-002 (3),
onePerMeter-0-01 (4),
onePerMeter-0-1 (5),
outOfRange (6),
unavailable (7)
}
CurvatureCalculationMode ::= ENUMERATED {yawRateUsed(0), yawRateNotUsed(1), unavailable(2), ...}
Heading ::= SEQUENCE {
headingValue HeadingValue,
headingConfidence HeadingConfidence
}
HeadingValue ::= INTEGER {wgs84North(0), wgs84East(900), wgs84South(1800), wgs84West(2700), unavailable(3601)} (0..3601)
HeadingConfidence ::= INTEGER {equalOrWithinZeroPointOneDegree (1), equalOrWithinOneDegree (10), outOfRange(126), unavailable(127)} (1..127)
LanePosition ::= INTEGER {offTheRoad(-1), innerHardShoulder(0), innermostDrivingLane(1), secondLaneFromInside(2), outerHardShoulder(14)} (-1..14)
ClosedLanes ::= SEQUENCE {
innerhardShoulderStatus HardShoulderStatus OPTIONAL,
outerhardShoulderStatus HardShoulderStatus OPTIONAL,
drivingLaneStatus DrivingLaneStatus OPTIONAL,
...
}
HardShoulderStatus ::= ENUMERATED {availableForStopping(0), closed(1), availableForDriving(2)}
DrivingLaneStatus ::= BIT STRING (SIZE (1..13))
PerformanceClass ::= INTEGER {unavailable(0), performanceClassA(1), performanceClassB(2)} (0..7)
SpeedValue ::= INTEGER {standstill(0), oneCentimeterPerSec(1), unavailable(16383)} (0..16383)
SpeedConfidence ::= INTEGER {equalOrWithinOneCentimeterPerSec(1), equalOrWithinOneMeterPerSec(100), outOfRange(126), unavailable(127)} (1..127)
VehicleMass ::= INTEGER {hundredKg(1), unavailable(1024)} (1..1024)
Speed ::= SEQUENCE {
speedValue SpeedValue,
speedConfidence SpeedConfidence
}
DriveDirection ::= ENUMERATED {forward (0), backward (1), unavailable (2)}
EmbarkationStatus ::= BOOLEAN
LongitudinalAcceleration ::= SEQUENCE {
longitudinalAccelerationValue LongitudinalAccelerationValue,
longitudinalAccelerationConfidence AccelerationConfidence
}
LongitudinalAccelerationValue ::= INTEGER {pointOneMeterPerSecSquaredForward(1), pointOneMeterPerSecSquaredBackward(-1), unavailable(161)} (-160 .. 161)
AccelerationConfidence ::= INTEGER {pointOneMeterPerSecSquared(1), outOfRange(101), unavailable(102)} (0 .. 102)
LateralAcceleration ::= SEQUENCE {
lateralAccelerationValue LateralAccelerationValue,
lateralAccelerationConfidence AccelerationConfidence
}
LateralAccelerationValue ::= INTEGER {pointOneMeterPerSecSquaredToRight(-1), pointOneMeterPerSecSquaredToLeft(1), unavailable(161)} (-160 .. 161)
VerticalAcceleration ::= SEQUENCE {
verticalAccelerationValue VerticalAccelerationValue,
verticalAccelerationConfidence AccelerationConfidence
}
VerticalAccelerationValue ::= INTEGER {pointOneMeterPerSecSquaredUp(1), pointOneMeterPerSecSquaredDown(-1), unavailable(161)} (-160 .. 161)
StationType ::= INTEGER {unknown(0), pedestrian(1), cyclist(2), moped(3), motorcycle(4), passengerCar(5), bus(6), lightTruck(7), heavyTruck(8), trailer(9), specialVehicles(10), tram(11), roadSideUnit(15)} (0..255)
ExteriorLights ::= BIT STRING {
lowBeamHeadlightsOn (0),
highBeamHeadlightsOn (1),
leftTurnSignalOn (2),
rightTurnSignalOn (3),
daytimeRunningLightsOn (4),
reverseLightOn (5),
fogLightOn (6),
parkingLightsOn (7)
} (SIZE(8))
DangerousGoodsBasic::= ENUMERATED {
explosives1(0),
explosives2(1),
explosives3(2),
explosives4(3),
explosives5(4),
explosives6(5),
flammableGases(6),
nonFlammableGases(7),
toxicGases(8),
flammableLiquids(9),
flammableSolids(10),
substancesLiableToSpontaneousCombustion(11),
substancesEmittingFlammableGasesUponContactWithWater(12),
oxidizingSubstances(13),
organicPeroxides(14),
toxicSubstances(15),
infectiousSubstances(16),
radioactiveMaterial(17),
corrosiveSubstances(18),
miscellaneousDangerousSubstances(19)
}
DangerousGoodsExtended ::= SEQUENCE {
dangerousGoodsType DangerousGoodsBasic,
unNumber INTEGER (0..9999),
elevatedTemperature BOOLEAN,
tunnelsRestricted BOOLEAN,
limitedQuantity BOOLEAN,
emergencyActionCode IA5String (SIZE (1..24)) OPTIONAL,
phoneNumber PhoneNumber OPTIONAL,
companyName UTF8String (SIZE (1..24)) OPTIONAL,
...
}
SpecialTransportType ::= BIT STRING {heavyLoad(0), excessWidth(1), excessLength(2), excessHeight(3)} (SIZE(4))
LightBarSirenInUse ::= BIT STRING {
lightBarActivated (0),
sirenActivated (1)
} (SIZE(2))
HeightLonCarr ::= INTEGER {oneCentimeter(1), unavailable(100)} (1..100)
PosLonCarr ::= INTEGER {oneCentimeter(1), unavailable(127)} (1..127)
PosPillar ::= INTEGER {tenCentimeters(1), unavailable(30)} (1..30)
PosCentMass ::= INTEGER {tenCentimeters(1), unavailable(63)} (1..63)
RequestResponseIndication ::= ENUMERATED {request(0), response(1)}
SpeedLimit ::= INTEGER {oneKmPerHour(1)} (1..255)
StationarySince ::= ENUMERATED {lessThan1Minute(0), lessThan2Minutes(1), lessThan15Minutes(2), equalOrGreater15Minutes(3)}
Temperature ::= INTEGER {equalOrSmallerThanMinus60Deg (-60), oneDegreeCelsius(1), equalOrGreaterThan67Deg(67)} (-60..67)
TrafficRule ::= ENUMERATED {noPassing(0), noPassingForTrucks(1), passToRight(2), passToLeft(3), ...}
WheelBaseVehicle ::= INTEGER {tenCentimeters(1), unavailable(127)} (1..127)
TurningRadius ::= INTEGER {point4Meters(1), unavailable(255)} (1..255)
PosFrontAx ::= INTEGER {tenCentimeters(1), unavailable(20)} (1..20)
PositionOfOccupants ::= BIT STRING {
row1LeftOccupied (0),
row1RightOccupied (1),
row1MidOccupied (2),
row1NotDetectable (3),
row1NotPresent (4),
row2LeftOccupied (5),
row2RightOccupied (6),
row2MidOccupied (7),
row2NotDetectable (8),
row2NotPresent (9),
row3LeftOccupied (10),
row3RightOccupied (11),
row3MidOccupied (12),
row3NotDetectable (13),
row3NotPresent (14),
row4LeftOccupied (15),
row4RightOccupied (16),
row4MidOccupied (17),
row4NotDetectable (18),
row4NotPresent (19)} (SIZE(20))
PositioningSolutionType ::= ENUMERATED {noPositioningSolution(0), sGNSS(1), dGNSS(2), sGNSSplusDR(3), dGNSSplusDR(4), dR(5), ...}
VehicleIdentification ::= SEQUENCE {
wMInumber WMInumber OPTIONAL,
vDS VDS OPTIONAL,
...
}
WMInumber ::= IA5String (SIZE(1..3))
VDS ::= IA5String (SIZE(6))
EnergyStorageType ::= BIT STRING {hydrogenStorage(0), electricEnergyStorage(1), liquidPropaneGas(2), compressedNaturalGas(3), diesel(4), gasoline(5), ammonia(6)} (SIZE(7))
VehicleLength ::= SEQUENCE {
vehicleLengthValue VehicleLengthValue,
vehicleLengthConfidenceIndication VehicleLengthConfidenceIndication
}
VehicleLengthValue ::= INTEGER {tenCentimeters(1), outOfRange(1022), unavailable(1023)} (1..1023)
VehicleLengthConfidenceIndication ::= ENUMERATED {noTrailerPresent(0), trailerPresentWithKnownLength(1), trailerPresentWithUnknownLength(2), trailerPresenceIsUnknown(3), unavailable(4)}
VehicleWidth ::= INTEGER {tenCentimeters(1), outOfRange(61), unavailable(62)} (1..62)
PathHistory::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(0..40)) OF PathPoint
EmergencyPriority ::= BIT STRING {requestForRightOfWay(0), requestForFreeCrossingAtATrafficLight(1)} (SIZE(2))
InformationQuality ::= INTEGER {unavailable(0), lowest(1), highest(7)} (0..7)
RoadType ::= ENUMERATED {
urban-NoStructuralSeparationToOppositeLanes(0),
urban-WithStructuralSeparationToOppositeLanes(1),
nonUrban-NoStructuralSeparationToOppositeLanes(2),
nonUrban-WithStructuralSeparationToOppositeLanes(3)}
SteeringWheelAngle ::= SEQUENCE {
steeringWheelAngleValue SteeringWheelAngleValue,
steeringWheelAngleConfidence SteeringWheelAngleConfidence
}
SteeringWheelAngleValue ::= INTEGER {straight(0), onePointFiveDegreesToRight(-1), onePointFiveDegreesToLeft(1), unavailable(512)} (-511..512)
SteeringWheelAngleConfidence ::= INTEGER {equalOrWithinOnePointFiveDegree (1), outOfRange(126), unavailable(127)} (1..127)
TimestampIts ::= INTEGER {utcStartOf2004(0), oneMillisecAfterUTCStartOf2004(1)} (0..4398046511103)
VehicleRole ::= ENUMERATED {default(0), publicTransport(1), specialTransport(2), dangerousGoods(3), roadWork(4), rescue(5), emergency(6), safetyCar(7), agriculture(8),commercial(9),military(10),roadOperator(11),taxi(12), reserved1(13), reserved2(14), reserved3(15)}
YawRate::= SEQUENCE {
yawRateValue YawRateValue,
yawRateConfidence YawRateConfidence
}
YawRateValue ::= INTEGER {straight(0), degSec-000-01ToRight(-1), degSec-000-01ToLeft(1), unavailable(32767)} (-32766..32767)
YawRateConfidence ::= ENUMERATED {
degSec-000-01 (0),
degSec-000-05 (1),
degSec-000-10 (2),
degSec-001-00 (3),
degSec-005-00 (4),
degSec-010-00 (5),
degSec-100-00 (6),
outOfRange (7),
unavailable (8)
}
ProtectedZoneType::= ENUMERATED { permanentCenDsrcTolling (0), ..., temporaryCenDsrcTolling (1) }
RelevanceDistance ::= ENUMERATED {lessThan50m(0), lessThan100m(1), lessThan200m(2), lessThan500m(3), lessThan1000m(4), lessThan5km(5), lessThan10km(6), over10km(7)}
RelevanceTrafficDirection ::= ENUMERATED {allTrafficDirections(0), upstreamTraffic(1), downstreamTraffic(2), oppositeTraffic(3)}
TransmissionInterval ::= INTEGER {oneMilliSecond(1), tenSeconds(10000)} (1..10000)
ValidityDuration ::= INTEGER {timeOfDetection(0), oneSecondAfterDetection(1)} (0..86400)
ActionID ::= SEQUENCE {
originatingStationID StationID,
sequenceNumber SequenceNumber
}
ItineraryPath ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..40) OF ReferencePosition
ProtectedCommunicationZone ::= SEQUENCE {
protectedZoneType ProtectedZoneType,
expiryTime TimestampIts OPTIONAL,
protectedZoneLatitude Latitude,
protectedZoneLongitude Longitude,
protectedZoneRadius ProtectedZoneRadius OPTIONAL,
protectedZoneID ProtectedZoneID OPTIONAL,
...
}
Traces ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..7) OF PathHistory
NumberOfOccupants ::= INTEGER {oneOccupant (1), unavailable(127)} (0..127)
SequenceNumber ::= INTEGER (0..65535)
PositionOfPillars ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..3, ...)) OF PosPillar
RestrictedTypes ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..3, ...)) OF StationType
EventHistory::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..23)) OF EventPoint
EventPoint ::= SEQUENCE {
eventPosition DeltaReferencePosition,
eventDeltaTime PathDeltaTime OPTIONAL,
informationQuality InformationQuality
}
ProtectedCommunicationZonesRSU ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..16)) OF ProtectedCommunicationZone
CenDsrcTollingZone ::= SEQUENCE {
protectedZoneLatitude Latitude,
protectedZoneLongitude Longitude,
cenDsrcTollingZoneID CenDsrcTollingZoneID OPTIONAL,
...
}
ProtectedZoneRadius ::= INTEGER {oneMeter(1)} (1..255, ...)
ProtectedZoneID ::= INTEGER (0..134217727)
CenDsrcTollingZoneID ::= ProtectedZoneID
DigitalMap ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..256)) OF ReferencePosition
OpeningDaysHours ::= UTF8String
PhoneNumber ::= NumericString (SIZE(1..16))
END
obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf/asn1/TS102941v131-BaseTypes.asn
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EtsiTs102941BaseTypes
{ itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(102941) baseTypes(3) version2(2) }
DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
HashedId8, Time32, PublicEncryptionKey, PublicVerificationKey, Signature
FROM
IEEE1609dot2BaseTypes {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) base(1) base-types(2) major-version-2(2)}
CertificateId, SubjectAssurance, SequenceOfPsidSsp, SequenceOfPsidGroupPermissions,
ValidityPeriod, GeographicRegion
FROM
IEEE1609dot2 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) base (1) schema (1) major-version-2(2)}
EtsiTs103097Data, EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted, EtsiTs103097Data-Signed, EtsiTs103097Data-SignedExternalPayload
FROM
EtsiTs103097Module {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(103097) securedMessageV1(0)}
;
CertificateFormat::= INTEGER {
ts103097v131 (1)
}(1..255)
CertificateSubjectAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
id CertificateId OPTIONAL,
validityPeriod ValidityPeriod OPTIONAL,
region GeographicRegion OPTIONAL,
assuranceLevel SubjectAssurance OPTIONAL,
appPermissions SequenceOfPsidSsp OPTIONAL,
certIssuePermissions SequenceOfPsidGroupPermissions OPTIONAL,
...
}(WITH COMPONENTS { ..., appPermissions PRESENT} | WITH COMPONENTS { ..., certIssuePermissions PRESENT})
EcSignature::= CHOICE {
encryptedEcSignature EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted{EtsiTs103097Data-SignedExternalPayload},
ecSignature EtsiTs103097Data-SignedExternalPayload
}
PublicKeys ::= SEQUENCE {
verificationKey PublicVerificationKey,
encryptionKey PublicEncryptionKey OPTIONAL
}
Version ::= INTEGER {v1(1)}
EtsiTs103097Data-Unsecured {ToBeSentDataContent} ::= EtsiTs103097Data
(WITH COMPONENTS {...,
content (WITH COMPONENTS {
unsecuredData (CONTAINING ToBeSentDataContent)
})
})
EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted-Unicast {ToBeEncryptedDataContent} ::= EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted { EtsiTs103097Data-Unsecured{ToBeEncryptedDataContent}}
(WITH COMPONENTS {...,
content (WITH COMPONENTS {
encryptedData (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
recipients (SIZE(1))
})
})
})
EtsiTs103097Data-SignedAndEncrypted-Unicast {ToBesignedAndEncryptedDataContent} ::= EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted {EtsiTs103097Data-Signed {ToBesignedAndEncryptedDataContent}}
(WITH COMPONENTS {...,
content (WITH COMPONENTS {
encryptedData (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
recipients (SIZE(1))
})
})
})
END
obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf/asn1/TS102941v131-MessagesCa.asn
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/*************************************************************************************
This file contains the EtsiTs102941Messages module containing all possible PKI messages.
It should be used when all PKI messages needs to be implemented (for example, for CA development)
**************************************************************************************/
EtsiTs102941MessagesCa
{ itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(102941) messagesCa(0) version2(2) }
DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
EtsiTs103097Data-Signed,
--EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted,
EtsiTs103097Data-SignedExternalPayload
--EtsiTs103097Data-SignedAndEncrypted
FROM EtsiTs103097Module { itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(103097) securedMessageV1(0) }
Version, EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted-Unicast, EtsiTs103097Data-SignedAndEncrypted-Unicast
FROM EtsiTs102941BaseTypes { itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(102941) baseTypes(3) version2(2) }
InnerEcRequestSignedForPop, InnerEcResponse
FROM EtsiTs102941TypesEnrolment { itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(102941) enrolment(4) version2(2) }
InnerAtRequest, InnerAtResponse
FROM EtsiTs102941TypesAuthorization { itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(102941) authorization(5) version2(2) }
ToBeSignedCrl, ToBeSignedTlmCtl, ToBeSignedRcaCtl
FROM EtsiTs102941TrustLists { itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(102941) trustLists(6) version2(2) }
AuthorizationValidationRequest, AuthorizationValidationResponse
FROM EtsiTs102941TypesAuthorizationValidation { itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(102941) authValidation(7) version2(2) }
CaCertificateRequest
FROM EtsiTs102941TypesCaManagement { itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(102941) caManagement(8) version2(2) }
;
/************
-- Messages
************/
EnrolmentRequestMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-SignedAndEncrypted-Unicast {EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{enrolmentRequest PRESENT})})}
EnrolmentResponseMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-SignedAndEncrypted-Unicast {EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{enrolmentResponse PRESENT})})}
AuthorizationRequestMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted-Unicast {EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{authorizationRequest PRESENT})})}
AuthorizationRequestMessageWithPop ::= EtsiTs103097Data-SignedAndEncrypted-Unicast {EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{authorizationRequest PRESENT})})}
AuthorizationResponseMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-SignedAndEncrypted-Unicast {EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{authorizationResponse PRESENT})})}
CertificateRevocationListMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-Signed{EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{certificateRevocationList PRESENT})})}
TlmCertificateTrustListMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-Signed{EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{certificateTrustListTlm PRESENT})})}
RcaCertificateTrustListMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-Signed{EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{certificateTrustListRca PRESENT})})}
AuthorizationValidationRequestMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-SignedAndEncrypted-Unicast {EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{authorizationValidationRequest PRESENT})})}
AuthorizationValidationResponseMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-SignedAndEncrypted-Unicast {EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{authorizationValidationResponse PRESENT})})}
CaCertificateRequestMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-Signed {EtsiTs102941Data(WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{caCertificateRequest PRESENT})})}
CaCertificateRekeyingMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-Signed {EtsiTs103097Data-Signed {EtsiTs102941Data(WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{caCertificateRequest PRESENT})})}}
/************
-- EtsiTs102941Data
************/
EtsiTs102941Data::= SEQUENCE {
version Version (v1),
content EtsiTs102941DataContent
}
EtsiTs102941DataContent ::= CHOICE {
enrolmentRequest InnerEcRequestSignedForPop,
enrolmentResponse InnerEcResponse,
authorizationRequest InnerAtRequest,
authorizationResponse InnerAtResponse,
certificateRevocationList ToBeSignedCrl,
certificateTrustListTlm ToBeSignedTlmCtl,
certificateTrustListRca ToBeSignedRcaCtl,
authorizationValidationRequest AuthorizationValidationRequest,
authorizationValidationResponse AuthorizationValidationResponse,
caCertificateRequest CaCertificateRequest,
...
}
END
obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf/asn1/TS102941v131-TrustLists.asn
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EtsiTs102941TrustLists
{ itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(102941) trustLists(6) version2(2) }
DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
EtsiTs103097Certificate, EtsiTs103097Data-SignedAndEncrypted, EtsiTs103097Data-Signed
FROM EtsiTs103097Module {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(103097) securedMessageV1(0)}
HashedId8, Time32, Version --, CertificateAuthorityConstraints
FROM EtsiTs102941BaseTypes {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(102941) baseTypes(3) version2(2)}
;
/************
-- CRL
************/
ToBeSignedCrl ::= SEQUENCE {
version Version,
thisUpdate Time32,
nextUpdate Time32,
entries SEQUENCE OF CrlEntry,
...
}
CrlEntry ::= HashedId8
/************
-- TLM CTL
************/
ToBeSignedTlmCtl ::= CtlFormat (FullCtl | DeltaCtl) (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
ctlCommands ( WITH COMPONENT(
( WITH COMPONENTS {...,
add ( WITH COMPONENTS {...,
ea ABSENT,
aa ABSENT
})
})
))
})
/************
-- RCA CTL
************/
ToBeSignedRcaCtl ::= CtlFormat (FullCtl | DeltaCtl) ( WITH COMPONENTS {...,
ctlCommands ( WITH COMPONENT(
( WITH COMPONENTS {...,
add ( WITH COMPONENTS {...,
rca ABSENT,
tlm ABSENT
})
})
))
})
/************
-- CTL
************/
FullCtl::= CtlFormat ( WITH COMPONENTS {...,
isFullCtl ( TRUE ),
ctlCommands ( WITH COMPONENT(
( WITH COMPONENTS {...,
delete ABSENT
})
))
})
DeltaCtl::= CtlFormat (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
isFullCtl(FALSE)
})
CtlFormat ::= SEQUENCE {
version Version,
nextUpdate Time32,
isFullCtl BOOLEAN,
ctlSequence INTEGER (0..255),
ctlCommands SEQUENCE OF CtlCommand,
...
}
CtlCommand ::= CHOICE {
add CtlEntry,
delete CtlDelete,
...
}
CtlEntry ::= CHOICE {
rca RootCaEntry,
ea EaEntry,
aa AaEntry,
dc DcEntry,
tlm TlmEntry,
...
}
CtlDelete ::= CHOICE {
cert HashedId8,
dc DcDelete,
...
}
TlmEntry::= SEQUENCE {
selfSignedTLMCertificate EtsiTs103097Certificate,
linkTLMCertificate EtsiTs103097Certificate OPTIONAL,
accessPoint Url
}
RootCaEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
selfsignedRootCa EtsiTs103097Certificate,
linkRootCaCertificate EtsiTs103097Certificate OPTIONAL
}
EaEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
eaCertificate EtsiTs103097Certificate,
aaAccessPoint Url,
itsAccessPoint Url OPTIONAL
}
AaEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
aaCertificate EtsiTs103097Certificate,
accessPoint Url
}
DcEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
url Url,
cert SEQUENCE OF HashedId8
}
DcDelete ::= Url
Url::= IA5String
END
obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf/asn1/TS102941v131-TypesAuthorization.asn
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EtsiTs102941TypesAuthorization
{ itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(102941) authorization(5) version2(2) }
DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
EtsiTs103097Certificate, EtsiTs103097Data-Signed
FROM EtsiTs103097Module { itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(103097) securedMessageV1(0)}
CertificateFormat, CertificateSubjectAttributes, EcSignature, HashedId8, PublicKeys, Version
FROM EtsiTs102941BaseTypes { itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(102941) baseTypes(3) version2(2) }
;
/************
-- AuthorizationRequest/Response
************/
AuthorizationResponseCode ::= ENUMERATED {
ok(0),
-- ITS->AA
its-aa-cantparse, -- valid for any structure
its-aa-badcontenttype, -- not encrypted, not signed, not authorizationrequest
its-aa-imnottherecipient, -- the "recipients" of the outermost encrypted data doesn't include me
its-aa-unknownencryptionalgorithm, -- either kexalg or contentencryptionalgorithm
its-aa-decryptionfailed, -- works for ECIES-HMAC and AES-CCM
its-aa-keysdontmatch, -- HMAC keyTag verification fails
its-aa-incompleterequest, -- some elements are missing
its-aa-invalidencryptionkey, -- the responseEncryptionKey is bad
its-aa-outofsyncrequest, -- signingTime is outside acceptable limits
its-aa-unknownea, -- the EA identified by eaId is unknown to me
its-aa-invalidea, -- the EA certificate is revoked
its-aa-deniedpermissions, -- I, the AA, deny the requested permissions
-- AA->EA
aa-ea-cantreachea, -- the EA is unreachable (network error?)
-- EA->AA
ea-aa-cantparse, -- valid for any structure
ea-aa-badcontenttype, -- not encrypted, not signed, not authorizationrequest
ea-aa-imnottherecipient, -- the "recipients" of the outermost encrypted data doesn't include me
ea-aa-unknownencryptionalgorithm, -- either kexalg or contentencryptionalgorithm
ea-aa-decryptionfailed, -- works for ECIES-HMAC and AES-CCM
-- TODO: to be continued...
invalidaa, -- the AA certificate presented is invalid/revoked/whatever
invalidaasignature, -- the AA certificate presented can't validate the request signature
wrongea, -- the encrypted signature doesn't designate me as the EA
unknownits, -- can't retrieve the EC/ITS in my DB
invalidsignature, -- signature verification of the request by the EC fails
invalidencryptionkey, -- signature is good, but the key is bad
deniedpermissions, -- permissions not granted
deniedtoomanycerts, -- parallel limit
... }
InnerAtRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
publicKeys PublicKeys,
hmacKey OCTET STRING (SIZE(32)),
sharedAtRequest SharedAtRequest,
ecSignature EcSignature,
...
}
SharedAtRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
eaId HashedId8,
keyTag OCTET STRING (SIZE(16)),
certificateFormat CertificateFormat,
requestedSubjectAttributes CertificateSubjectAttributes (WITH COMPONENTS{..., certIssuePermissions ABSENT}),
...
}
InnerAtResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
requestHash OCTET STRING (SIZE(16)),
responseCode AuthorizationResponseCode,
certificate EtsiTs103097Certificate OPTIONAL,
...
}
(WITH COMPONENTS { responseCode (ok), certificate PRESENT }
| WITH COMPONENTS { responseCode (ALL EXCEPT ok), certificate ABSENT }
)
END
obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf/asn1/TS102941v131-TypesAuthorizationValidation.asn
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EtsiTs102941TypesAuthorizationValidation
{ itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(102941) authValidation(7) version2(2) }
DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
EtsiTs103097Certificate
FROM EtsiTs103097Module { itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(103097) securedMessageV1(0) }
CertificateFormat, CertificateSubjectAttributes,EcSignature, HashedId8, PublicKeys, Version
FROM EtsiTs102941BaseTypes { itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(102941) baseTypes(3) version2(2) }
SharedAtRequest
FROM EtsiTs102941TypesAuthorization { itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(102941) authorization(5) version2(2) }
;
/************
-- AuthorizationValidationRequest/Response
************/
AuthorizationValidationResponseCode ::= ENUMERATED {
ok(0),
cantparse, -- valid for any structure
badcontenttype, -- not encrypted, not signed, not permissionsverificationrequest
imnottherecipient, -- the "recipients" of the outermost encrypted data doesn't include me
unknownencryptionalgorithm, -- either kexalg or contentencryptionalgorithm
decryptionfailed, -- works for ECIES-HMAC and AES-CCM
invalidaa, -- the AA certificate presented is invalid/revoked/whatever
invalidaasignature, -- the AA certificate presented can't validate the request signature
wrongea, -- the encrypted signature doesn't designate me as the EA
unknownits, -- can't retrieve the EC/ITS in my DB
invalidsignature, -- signature verification of the request by the EC fails
invalidencryptionkey, -- signature is good, but the responseEncryptionKey is bad
deniedpermissions, -- requested permissions not granted
deniedtoomanycerts, -- parallel limit
deniedrequest, -- any other reason?
...
}
AuthorizationValidationRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
sharedAtRequest SharedAtRequest,
ecSignature EcSignature,
...
}
AuthorizationValidationResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
requestHash OCTET STRING (SIZE(16)),
responseCode AuthorizationValidationResponseCode,
confirmedSubjectAttributes CertificateSubjectAttributes (WITH COMPONENTS{..., certIssuePermissions ABSENT}) OPTIONAL,
...
}
(WITH COMPONENTS { responseCode (ok), confirmedSubjectAttributes PRESENT }
| WITH COMPONENTS { responseCode (ALL EXCEPT ok), confirmedSubjectAttributes ABSENT }
)
END
obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf/asn1/TS102941v131-TypesCaManagement.asn
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EtsiTs102941TypesCaManagement
{ itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(102941) caManagement(8) version2(2) }
DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
EtsiTs103097Certificate, EtsiTs103097Data-Signed
FROM EtsiTs103097Module {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(103097) securedMessageV1(0) }
PublicKeys, CertificateSubjectAttributes
FROM EtsiTs102941BaseTypes { itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(102941) baseTypes(3) version2(2) }
;
/************
-- CA certificate request
************/
CaCertificateRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
publicKeys PublicKeys,
requestedSubjectAttributes CertificateSubjectAttributes,
...
}
END
obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf/asn1/TS102941v131-TypesEnrolment.asn
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EtsiTs102941TypesEnrolment
{ itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(102941) enrolment(4) version2(2) }
DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
EtsiTs103097Certificate, EtsiTs103097Data-Signed
FROM EtsiTs103097Module { itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(103097) securedMessageV1(0) }
CertificateFormat, CertificateSubjectAttributes, EcSignature, HashedId8, PublicKeys, Version
FROM EtsiTs102941BaseTypes { itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(102941) baseTypes(3) version2(2) }
;
/************
-- EnrolmentRequest/Response
************/
EnrolmentResponseCode ::= ENUMERATED {
ok(0),
cantparse, -- valid for any structure
badcontenttype, -- not encrypted, not signed, not enrolmentrequest
imnottherecipient, -- the "recipients" doesn't include me
unknownencryptionalgorithm, -- either kexalg or contentencryptionalgorithm
decryptionfailed, -- works for ECIES-HMAC and AES-CCM
unknownits, -- can't retrieve the ITS from the itsId
invalidsignature, -- signature verification of the request fails
invalidencryptionkey, -- signature is good, but the responseEncryptionKey is bad
baditsstatus, -- revoked, not yet active
incompleterequest, -- some elements are missing
deniedpermissions, -- requested permissions are not granted
invalidkeys, -- either the verification_key of the encryption_key is bad
deniedrequest, -- any other reason?
...
}
InnerEcRequestSignedForPop::= EtsiTs103097Data-Signed{InnerEcRequest}
InnerEcRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
itsId OCTET STRING,
certificateFormat CertificateFormat,
publicKeys PublicKeys,
requestedSubjectAttributes CertificateSubjectAttributes (WITH COMPONENTS{..., certIssuePermissions ABSENT}),
...
}
InnerEcResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
requestHash OCTET STRING (SIZE(16)),
responseCode EnrolmentResponseCode,
certificate EtsiTs103097Certificate OPTIONAL,
...
}
(WITH COMPONENTS { responseCode (ok), certificate PRESENT }
| WITH COMPONENTS { responseCode (ALL EXCEPT ok), certificate ABSENT }
)
END
obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf/asn1/TS103097v131.asn
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EtsiTs103097Module {
itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(103097) v1(0)
}
DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::= BEGIN
IMPORTS
Ieee1609Dot2Data, ExplicitCertificate
FROM IEEE1609dot2 {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) base (1) schema (1) major-version-2(2)
};
EtsiTs103097Certificate ::= ExplicitCertificate (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
toBeSigned (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
id (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
linkageData ABSENT,
binaryId ABSENT
}),
certRequestPermissions ABSENT,
canRequestRollover ABSENT
})
})
SingleEtsiTs103097Certificate ::= SEQUENCE {
only EtsiTs103097Certificate
}
EtsiTs103097Data ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
content (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
signedData (WITH COMPONENTS {..., -- constraints on signed data headers
tbsData (WITH COMPONENTS {
headerInfo (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
generationTime PRESENT,
p2pcdLearningRequest ABSENT,
missingCrlIdentifier ABSENT
})
}),
signer (WITH COMPONENTS {..., -- constraints on the certificate
certificate (SIZE(1))
})
}),
encryptedData (WITH COMPONENTS {..., -- constraints on encrypted data headers
recipients (WITH COMPONENT (
(WITH COMPONENTS {...,
pskRecipInfo ABSENT,
symmRecipInfo ABSENT,
rekRecipInfo ABSENT
})
))
}),
signedCertificateRequest ABSENT
})
})
EtsiTs103097Data-Signed {ToBeSignedDataContent} ::= EtsiTs103097Data (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
content (WITH COMPONENTS {
signedData (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
tbsData (WITH COMPONENTS {
payload (WITH COMPONENTS {
data (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
content (WITH COMPONENTS {
unsecuredData (CONTAINING ToBeSignedDataContent)
})
}) PRESENT
})
})
})
})
})
EtsiTs103097Data-SignedExternalPayload ::= EtsiTs103097Data (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
content (WITH COMPONENTS {
signedData (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
tbsData (WITH COMPONENTS {
payload (WITH COMPONENTS {
extDataHash (WITH COMPONENTS {
sha256HashedData PRESENT
}) PRESENT
})
})
})
})
})
EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted {ToBeEncryptedDataContent} ::= EtsiTs103097Data (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
content (WITH COMPONENTS {
encryptedData (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
ciphertext (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
aes128ccm (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
ccmCiphertext (CONSTRAINED BY { -- ccm encryption of -- ToBeEncryptedDataContent})
})
})
})
})
})
EtsiTs103097Data-SignedAndEncrypted {ToBesignedAndEncryptedDataContent} ::= EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted {EtsiTs103097Data-Signed {ToBesignedAndEncryptedDataContent}}
END
obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf/asn1/TS103301v211-IVIM.asn
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-- @brief Specification of the In vehicle information Message ETSI TS 103 301
-- Latest version available at @url https://forge.etsi.org/rep/ITS/asn1/is_ts103301.git
IVIM-PDU-Descriptions {
itu-t (0) identified-organization (4) etsi (0) itsDomain (5) wg1 (1) ts103301 (103301) ivim (2) version2 (2)
}
DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
-- @brief Include ISO 19321
-- Include references from @url https://standards.iso.org/iso/ts/19321/ed-2/en/ISO19321IVIv2.asn
IviStructure
FROM IVI { iso (1) standard (0) ivi (19321) version2 (2) }
-- @brief Include ETSI TS 102 894-2
-- Include references from @url https://forge.etsi.org/rep/ITS/ITS_ASN1/blob/master/CDD_TS102894-2/ITS-Container.asn
ItsPduHeader
FROM ITS-Container { itu-t (0) identified-organization (4) etsi (0) itsDomain (5) wg1 (1) ts (102894) cdd (2) version (2)};
-- In vehicle information Message Message
-- @brief In vehicle information Message Root
-- This DF includes DEs for the IVIM protocolVersion, the IVI message type identifier _messageID_,
-- the station identifier _stationID_ of the originating ITS-S and the IVI data from ISO TS 19321.
IVIM ::= SEQUENCE {
-- @details header
-- The DE _protocolVersion_ is used to select the appropriate protocol decoder at the receiving ITS-S.
-- It shall be set to 2.
-- The DE _messageID_ shall be ivim(6).
header ItsPduHeader,
-- @details ivi
-- The DE _ivi_ contains the IVI data as defined in ISO TS 19321.
ivi IviStructure
}
END
obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf/asn1/TS103301v211-MAPEM.asn
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-- @brief Specification of the Map (lane topology) extended Message ETSI TS 103 301
-- Latest version available at @url https://forge.etsi.org/rep/ITS/asn1/is_ts103301.git
MAPEM-PDU-Descriptions {
itu-t (0) identified-organization (4) etsi (0) itsDomain (5) wg1 (1) ts103301 (103301) mapem (1) version2 (2)
}
DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
-- @brief Include ISO TS 19091
-- Include references from @url https://standards.iso.org/iso/ts/19091/ed-2/en/ISO-TS-19091-addgrp-C-2018.asn
MapData FROM DSRC { iso (1) standard (0) signalizedIntersection (19091) profilec(2) dsrc (2) version2 (2) }
-- @brief Include ETSI TS 102 894-2
-- Include references from @url https://forge.etsi.org/rep/ITS/ITS_ASN1/blob/master/CDD_TS102894-2/ITS-Container.asn
ItsPduHeader
FROM ITS-Container { itu-t (0) identified-organization (4) etsi (0) itsDomain (5) wg1 (1) ts (102894) cdd (2) version (2)};
-- Map (lane topology) extended Message
-- @brief Map (lane topology) extended Message Root
-- This DF includes DEs for the MAPEM: protocolVersion, the MAPEM message type identifier _messageID_,
-- the station identifier _stationID_ of the originating ITS-S and the Map data from ISO TS 19091.
MAPEM ::= SEQUENCE {
-- @details header
-- The DE _protocolVersion_ is used to select the appropriate protocol decoder at the receiving ITS-S.
-- It shall be set to 2.
-- The DE _messageID_ shall be mapem(5).
header ItsPduHeader,
-- @details map
-- The DE _map_ contains the MAP data as defined in ISO TS 19091.
map MapData
}
END
obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf/asn1/TS103301v211-RTCMEM.asn
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-- @brief Specification of the RTCM corrections extended Message ETSI TS 103 301
-- Latest version available at @url https://forge.etsi.org/rep/ITS/asn1/is_ts103301.git
RTCMEM-PDU-Descriptions {
itu-t (0) identified-organization (4) etsi (0) itsDomain (5) wg1 (1) ts103301 (103301) rtcmem (5) version1 (1)
}
DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
-- @brief Include ISO 19091
-- Include references from @url https://standards.iso.org/iso/ts/19091/ed-2/en/ISO-TS-19091-addgrp-C-2018.asn
RTCMcorrections
FROM DSRC { iso (1) standard (0) signalizedIntersection (19091) profilec(2) dsrc (2) version2 (2) }
-- @brief Include ETSI TS 102 894-2
-- Include references from @url https://forge.etsi.org/rep/ITS/ITS_ASN1/blob/master/CDD_TS102894-2/ITS-Container.asn
ItsPduHeader
FROM ITS-Container { itu-t (0) identified-organization (4) etsi (0) itsDomain (5) wg1 (1) ts (102894) cdd (2) version (2)};
-- RTCM corrections extended extended Message
-- @brief RTCM corrections extended extended Message Root
-- This DF includes DEs for the RTCMEM: protocolVersion, the RTCMEM message type identifier _messageID_,
-- the station identifier _stationID_ of the originating ITS-S and the RTCM corrections as os ISO TS 19091.
RTCMEM ::= SEQUENCE {
-- @details header
-- The DE _protocolVersion_ is used to select the appropriate protocol decoder at the receiving ITS-S.
-- It shall be set to 1.
-- The DE _messageID_ shall be rtcmem(13).
header ItsPduHeader,
-- @details rtcmc
-- The DE _rtcmc_ contains the RTCM corrections data as defined in ISO TS 19091.
rtcmc RTCMcorrections
}
END
obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf/asn1/TS103301v211-SPATEM.asn
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-- @brief Specification of the Signal phase and timing extended Message ETSI TS 103 301
-- Latest version available at @url https://forge.etsi.org/rep/ITS/asn1/is_ts103301.git
SPATEM-PDU-Descriptions {
itu-t (0) identified-organization (4) etsi (0) itsDomain (5) wg1 (1) ts103301 (103301) spatem (0) version2 (2)
}
DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
-- @brief Include ISO TS 19091
-- Include references from @url https://standards.iso.org/iso/ts/19091/ed-2/en/ISO-TS-19091-addgrp-C-2018.asn
SPAT
FROM DSRC { iso (1) standard (0) signalizedIntersection (19091) profilec(2) dsrc (2) version2 (2) }
-- @brief Include ETSI TS 102 894-2
-- Include references from @url https://forge.etsi.org/rep/ITS/ITS_ASN1/blob/master/CDD_TS102894-2/ITS-Container.asn
ItsPduHeader
FROM ITS-Container { itu-t (0) identified-organization (4) etsi (0) itsDomain (5) wg1 (1) ts (102894) cdd (2) version (2) };
-- Signal phase and timing extended Message
-- @brief Signal phase and timing extended Message Root
-- This DF includes DEs for the SPATEM: protocolVersion, the SPATEM message type identifier _messageID_,
-- the station identifier _stationID_ of the originating ITS-S and the SPaT data from ISO TS 19091.
SPATEM ::= SEQUENCE {
-- @details header
-- The DE _protocolVersion_ is used to select the appropriate protocol decoder at the receiving ITS-S.
-- It shall be set to 2.
-- The DE _messageID_ shall be spatem(4).
header ItsPduHeader,
-- @details spat
-- The DE _spat_ contains the SPaT data as defined in ISO TS 19091.
spat SPAT
}
END
obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf/asn1/TS103301v211-SREM.asn
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-- @brief Specification of the Signal request extended Message ETSI TS 103 301
-- Latest version available at @url https://forge.etsi.org/rep/ITS/asn1/is_ts103301.git
SREM-PDU-Descriptions {
itu-t (0) identified-organization (4) etsi (0) itsDomain (5) wg1 (1) ts103301 (103301) srem (3) version2 (2)
}
DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
-- @brief Include ISO 19091
-- Include references from @url https://standards.iso.org/iso/ts/19091/ed-2/en/ISO-TS-19091-addgrp-C-2018.asn
SignalRequestMessage
FROM DSRC { iso (1) standard (0) signalizedIntersection (19091) profilec(2) dsrc (2) version2 (2) }
-- @brief Include ETSI TS 102 894-2
-- Include references from @url https://forge.etsi.org/rep/ITS/ITS_ASN1/blob/master/CDD_TS102894-2/ITS-Container.asn
ItsPduHeader
FROM ITS-Container { itu-t (0) identified-organization (4) etsi (0) itsDomain (5) wg1 (1) ts (102894) cdd (2) version (2)};
-- Signal request extended Message Message
-- @brief Signal request extended Message Root
-- This DF includes DEs for the SREM: protocolVersion, the SREM message type identifier _messageID_,
-- the station identifier _stationID_ of the originating ITS-S and the signal request data ISO TS 19091.
SREM ::= SEQUENCE {
-- @details header
-- The DE _protocolVersion_ is used to select the appropriate protocol decoder at the receiving ITS-S.
-- It shall be set to 2.
-- The DE _messageID_ shall be srem(9).
header ItsPduHeader,
-- @details srm
-- The DE _srm_ contains the Signal request data as defined in ISO TS 19091.
srm SignalRequestMessage
}
END
obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf/asn1/TS103301v211-SSEM.asn
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-- @brief Specification of the Signal status extended Message ETSI TS 103 301
-- Latest version available at @url https://forge.etsi.org/rep/ITS/asn1/is_ts103301.git
SSEM-PDU-Descriptions {
itu-t (0) identified-organization (4) etsi (0) itsDomain (5) wg1 (1) ts103301 (103301) ssem (4) version2 (2)
}
DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
-- @brief Include ISO 19091
-- Include references from @url https://standards.iso.org/iso/ts/19091/ed-2/en/ISO-TS-19091-addgrp-C-2018.asn
SignalStatusMessage
FROM DSRC { iso (1) standard (0) signalizedIntersection (19091) profilec(2) dsrc (2) version2 (2) }
-- @brief Include ETSI TS 102 894-2
-- Include references from @url https://forge.etsi.org/rep/ITS/ITS_ASN1/blob/master/CDD_TS102894-2/ITS-Container.asn
ItsPduHeader
FROM ITS-Container { itu-t (0) identified-organization (4) etsi (0) itsDomain (5) wg1 (1) ts (102894) cdd (2) version (2)};
-- Signal status extended Message
-- @brief Signal status extended Message Root
-- This DF includes DEs for the SSEM: protocolVersion, the SSEM message type identifier _messageID_ and
-- the station identifier _stationID_ of the originating ITS-S and the signal status data ISO TS 19091.
SSEM ::= SEQUENCE {
-- @details header
-- The DE _protocolVersion_ is used to select the appropriate protocol decoder at the receiving ITS-S.
-- It shall be set to 2.
-- The DE _messageID_ shall be ssem(10).
header ItsPduHeader,
-- @details ssm
-- The DE _ssm_ contains the Signal status data as defined in ISO TS 19091.
ssm SignalStatusMessage
}
END
obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf/asn1/release2/README.md
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# ETSI ITS ASN.1
The ASN.1 files in this directory are a slightly patched subset of the files published by ETSI for ITS Release 2.
You can find the original files on [ETSI Forge](https://forge.etsi.org/rep/ITS/asn1). Our changes are documented below.
These files are distributed under a permissive license:
> Copyright 2019 ETSI
>
> Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
> modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
> 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
> this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
> 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
> this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
> and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
> 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of its contributors
> may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without
> specific prior written permission.
>
> THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND
> ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
> WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
> IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
> INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING,
> BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
> DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
> LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE
> OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
> OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
# Changes
## CDD
Removed obsolete `ActionID` and `StationID` data elements. The generated file names clash with those of `ActionId` and `StationId` on case-insensitive filesystems.
## CPM
Updated CDD imports.
## VAM
Updated CDD imports.
obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf/asn1/release2/TS102894-2v241-CDD.asn
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obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf/asn1/release2/TS102941v221/BaseTypes.asn
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EtsiTs102941BaseTypes
{ itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(102941) baseTypes(3) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1)}
DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
HashedId8, Time32, PublicEncryptionKey, PublicVerificationKey, Signature
FROM
Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111)
standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609)
dot2(2) base(1) base-types(2) major-version-2(2) minor-version-3(3)}
WITH SUCCESSORS
CertificateId, SubjectAssurance, SequenceOfPsidSsp, SequenceOfPsidGroupPermissions,
ValidityPeriod, GeographicRegion, HashedData
FROM
Ieee1609Dot2 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111)
standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609)
dot2(2) base (1) schema (1) major-version-2(2) minor-version-4(4)}
WITH SUCCESSORS
EtsiTs103097Data, EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted, EtsiTs103097Data-Signed,
EtsiTs103097Data-SignedExternalPayload,
EtsiTs103097Data-Unsecured, EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted-Unicast, EtsiTs103097Data-SignedAndEncrypted-Unicast
FROM
EtsiTs103097Module {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) secHeaders(103097) core(1) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1)}
WITH SUCCESSORS
;
CertificateFormat::= INTEGER {
ts103097v131 (1)
}(1..255)
CertificateSubjectAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
id CertificateId OPTIONAL,
validityPeriod ValidityPeriod OPTIONAL,
region GeographicRegion OPTIONAL,
assuranceLevel SubjectAssurance OPTIONAL,
appPermissions SequenceOfPsidSsp OPTIONAL,
certIssuePermissions SequenceOfPsidGroupPermissions OPTIONAL,
...
}(WITH COMPONENTS { ..., appPermissions PRESENT} |
WITH COMPONENTS { ..., certIssuePermissions PRESENT})
EcSignature::= CHOICE {
encryptedEcSignature EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted{EtsiTs103097Data-SignedExternalPayload},
ecSignature EtsiTs103097Data-SignedExternalPayload
}
PublicKeys ::= SEQUENCE {
verificationKey PublicVerificationKey,
encryptionKey PublicEncryptionKey OPTIONAL
}
Version ::= INTEGER {v1(1)}
END
obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf/asn1/release2/TS102941v221/MessagesCa.asn
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/*************************************************************************************
This file contains the EtsiTs102941Messages module containing all possible PKI messages.
It should be used when all PKI messages needs to be implemented (for example, for CA development)
**************************************************************************************/
EtsiTs102941MessagesCa
{ itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(102941) messagesCa(0) major-version-3(3) minor-version-3(3)}
DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
EtsiTs103097Data-Signed,
EtsiTs103097Data-SignedExternalPayload,
EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted-Unicast,
EtsiTs103097Data-SignedAndEncrypted-Unicast
FROM EtsiTs103097Module
{itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) secHeaders(103097) core(1) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1)}
WITH SUCCESSORS
Version
FROM EtsiTs102941BaseTypes
{ itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(102941) baseTypes(3) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1) }
WITH SUCCESSORS
InnerEcRequestSignedForPop, InnerEcResponse
FROM EtsiTs102941TypesEnrolment
{ itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(102941) enrolment(4) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1) }
WITH SUCCESSORS
EtsiTs102941ButterflyAuthorizationRequest-X509Signed, InnerAtRequest, InnerAtResponse
FROM EtsiTs102941TypesAuthorization
{ itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(102941) authorization(5) major-version-3(3) minor-version-2(2) }
WITH SUCCESSORS
ToBeSignedCrl, ToBeSignedTlmCtl, ToBeSignedRcaCtl
FROM EtsiTs102941TrustLists
{ itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(102941) trustLists(6) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1) }
WITH SUCCESSORS
AuthorizationValidationRequest, AuthorizationValidationResponse
FROM EtsiTs102941TypesAuthorizationValidation
{ itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(102941) authValidation(7) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1) }
WITH SUCCESSORS
CaCertificateRequest
FROM EtsiTs102941TypesCaManagement
{ itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(102941) caManagement(8) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1) }
WITH SUCCESSORS
ToBeSignedLinkCertificate, ToBeSignedLinkCertificateTlm, ToBeSignedLinkCertificateRca
FROM EtsiTs102941TypesLinkCertificate
{ itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(102941) linkCertificate(9) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1) }
WITH SUCCESSORS
EeRaCertRequest, RaEeCertInfo, EeRaDownloadRequest
FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EeRaInterface
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) ee-ra(11) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1)}
WITH SUCCESSORS
RaAcaCertRequest, AcaRaCertResponse
FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaRaInterface
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) aca-ra(4) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1)}
WITH SUCCESSORS
;
/************
-- Messages
************/
EnrolmentRequestMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-SignedAndEncrypted-Unicast {EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{enrolmentRequest PRESENT})})}
EnrolmentResponseMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-SignedAndEncrypted-Unicast {EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{enrolmentResponse PRESENT})})}
AuthorizationRequestMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted-Unicast {EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{authorizationRequest PRESENT})})}
AuthorizationRequestMessageWithPop ::= EtsiTs103097Data-SignedAndEncrypted-Unicast {EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{authorizationRequest PRESENT})})}
AuthorizationResponseMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-SignedAndEncrypted-Unicast {EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{authorizationResponse PRESENT})})}
CertificateRevocationListMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-Signed{EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{certificateRevocationList PRESENT})})}
TlmCertificateTrustListMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-Signed{EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{certificateTrustListTlm PRESENT})})}
RcaCertificateTrustListMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-Signed{EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{certificateTrustListRca PRESENT})})}
AuthorizationValidationRequestMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-SignedAndEncrypted-Unicast {EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{authorizationValidationRequest PRESENT})})}
AuthorizationValidationResponseMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-SignedAndEncrypted-Unicast {EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{authorizationValidationResponse PRESENT})})}
CaCertificateRequestMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-Signed {EtsiTs102941Data(WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{caCertificateRequest PRESENT})})}
CaCertificateRekeyingMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-Signed {EtsiTs103097Data-Signed {EtsiTs102941Data(WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{caCertificateRequest PRESENT})})}}
TlmLinkCertificateMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-Signed {EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{linkCertificateTlm PRESENT})})}
RcaSingleSignedLinkCertificateMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-Signed {EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{singleSignedLinkCertificateRca PRESENT})})}
RcaDoubleSignedLinkCertificateMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-Signed {EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{doubleSignedlinkCertificateRca PRESENT})})}
ButterflyAuthorizationRequestMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-SignedAndEncrypted-Unicast {EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{butterflyAuthorizationRequest PRESENT})})}
X509SignedButterflyAuthorizationRequestMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted-Unicast {EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{x509SignedbutterflyAuthorizationRequest PRESENT})})}
ButterflyAuthorizationResponseMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-Signed {EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{butterflyAuthorizationResponse PRESENT})})}
ButterflyAtDownloadRequestMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-SignedAndEncrypted-Unicast {EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{butterflyAtDownloadRequest PRESENT})})}
ButterflyCertRequestMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-SignedAndEncrypted-Unicast {EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{butterflyCertificateRequest PRESENT})})}
ButterflyCertResponseMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-SignedAndEncrypted-Unicast {EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{butterflyCertificateResponse PRESENT})})}
/************
-- EtsiTs102941Data
************/
EtsiTs102941Data::= SEQUENCE {
version Version (v1),
content EtsiTs102941DataContent
}
EtsiTs102941DataContent ::= CHOICE {
enrolmentRequest InnerEcRequestSignedForPop,
enrolmentResponse InnerEcResponse,
authorizationRequest InnerAtRequest,
authorizationResponse InnerAtResponse,
certificateRevocationList ToBeSignedCrl,
certificateTrustListTlm ToBeSignedTlmCtl,
certificateTrustListRca ToBeSignedRcaCtl,
authorizationValidationRequest AuthorizationValidationRequest,
authorizationValidationResponse AuthorizationValidationResponse,
caCertificateRequest CaCertificateRequest,
...,
linkCertificateTlm ToBeSignedLinkCertificateTlm,
singleSignedLinkCertificateRca ToBeSignedLinkCertificateRca,
doubleSignedlinkCertificateRca RcaSingleSignedLinkCertificateMessage,
/* Extension for butterfly key provisioning */
[[butterflyAuthorizationRequest EeRaCertRequest,
x509SignedbutterflyAuthorizationRequest EtsiTs102941ButterflyAuthorizationRequest-X509Signed,
butterflyAuthorizationResponse RaEeCertInfo,
butterflyCertificateRequest RaAcaCertRequest,
butterflyCertificateResponse AcaRaCertResponse,
butterflyAtDownloadRequest EeRaDownloadRequest]]
}
END
obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf/asn1/release2/TS102941v221/MessagesItss-OptionalPrivacy.asn
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/*************************************************************************************
This file contains the EtsiTs102941MessagesItss-OptionalPrivacy module providing the
same subset of messages as the EtsiTs102941MessagesItss module.
It should never be used together with the EtsiTs102941MessagesCA and EtsiTs102941MessagesItss
This module allows the usage of unencrypted EC signature for AA requests.
**************************************************************************************/
EtsiTs102941MessagesItss-OptionalPrivacy
{ itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(102941) messagesItssOp(2) major-version-3(3) minor-version-3(3)}
DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
EtsiTs103097Data-Signed,
EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted-Unicast,
EtsiTs103097Data-SignedAndEncrypted-Unicast
FROM EtsiTs103097Module
{ itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) secHeaders(103097) core(1) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1) }
WITH SUCCESSORS
Version
FROM EtsiTs102941BaseTypes
{ itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(102941) baseTypes(3) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1) }
WITH SUCCESSORS
InnerEcRequestSignedForPop, InnerEcResponse
FROM EtsiTs102941TypesEnrolment
{ itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(102941) enrolment(4) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1) }
WITH SUCCESSORS
EtsiTs102941ButterflyAuthorizationRequest-X509Signed, InnerAtRequest, InnerAtResponse
FROM EtsiTs102941TypesAuthorization
{ itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(102941) authorization(5) major-version-3(3) minor-version-2(2) }
WITH SUCCESSORS
ToBeSignedCrl, ToBeSignedTlmCtl, ToBeSignedRcaCtl
FROM EtsiTs102941TrustLists
{ itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(102941) trustLists(6) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1) }
WITH SUCCESSORS
ToBeSignedLinkCertificate, ToBeSignedLinkCertificateTlm
FROM EtsiTs102941TypesLinkCertificate
{ itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(102941) linkCertificate(9) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1)}
WITH SUCCESSORS
EeRaCertRequest, RaEeCertInfo, EeRaDownloadRequest
FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EeRaInterface
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) ee-ra(11) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1)}
WITH SUCCESSORS
;
/************
-- Messages
************/
EnrolmentRequestMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-SignedAndEncrypted-Unicast {EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{enrolmentRequest PRESENT})})}
EnrolmentResponseMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-SignedAndEncrypted-Unicast {EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{enrolmentResponse PRESENT})})}
AuthorizationRequestMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted-Unicast {EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{authorizationRequest PRESENT})})}
AuthorizationRequestMessageWithPop ::= EtsiTs103097Data-SignedAndEncrypted-Unicast {EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{authorizationRequest PRESENT})})}
AuthorizationResponseMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-SignedAndEncrypted-Unicast {EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{authorizationResponse PRESENT})})}
CertificateRevocationListMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-Signed{EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{certificateRevocationList PRESENT})})}
TlmCertificateTrustListMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-Signed{EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{certificateTrustListTlm PRESENT})})}
RcaCertificateTrustListMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-Signed{EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{certificateTrustListRca PRESENT})})}
TlmLinkCertificateMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-Signed {EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{linkCertificateTlm PRESENT})})}
ButterflyAuthorizationRequestMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-SignedAndEncrypted-Unicast {EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{butterflyAuthorizationRequest PRESENT})})}
X509SignedButterflyAuthorizationRequestMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted-Unicast {EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{x509SignedbutterflyAuthorizationRequest PRESENT})})}
ButterflyAuthorizationResponseMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-Signed {EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{butterflyAuthorizationResponse PRESENT})})}
ButterflyAtDownloadRequestMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-SignedAndEncrypted-Unicast {EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{butterflyAtDownloadRequest PRESENT})})}
/************
-- EtsiTs102941Data
************/
EtsiTs102941Data::= SEQUENCE {
version Version (v1),
content EtsiTs102941DataContent
}
EtsiTs102941DataContent ::= CHOICE {
enrolmentRequest InnerEcRequestSignedForPop,
enrolmentResponse InnerEcResponse,
authorizationRequest InnerAtRequest,
authorizationResponse InnerAtResponse,
certificateRevocationList ToBeSignedCrl,
certificateTrustListTlm ToBeSignedTlmCtl,
certificateTrustListRca ToBeSignedRcaCtl,
authorizationValidationRequest NULL,
authorizationValidationResponse NULL,
caCertificateRequest NULL,
...,
linkCertificateTlm ToBeSignedLinkCertificateTlm,
singleSignedLinkCertificateRca NULL,
doubleSignedlinkCertificateRca NULL,
/* Extension for butterfly key provisioning */
[[butterflyAuthorizationRequest EeRaCertRequest,
x509SignedbutterflyAuthorizationRequest EtsiTs102941ButterflyAuthorizationRequest-X509Signed,
butterflyAuthorizationResponse RaEeCertInfo,
butterflyCertificateRequest NULL,
butterflyCertificateResponse NULL,
butterflyAtDownloadRequest EeRaDownloadRequest]]
}
END
obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf/asn1/release2/TS102941v221/MessagesItss.asn
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/*************************************************************************************
This file contains the EtsiTs102941MessagesItss module providing the ITS-S subset
of messages defined in the module EtsiTs102941MessagesCA
It should never be imported together with the module EtsiTs102941MessagesCA.
Use the EtsiTs102941MessagesCA if all possible PKI message types are needed.
This module blocks the usage of unencrypted EC signature for AA requests.
**************************************************************************************/
EtsiTs102941MessagesItss
{ itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(102941) messagesItss(1) major-version-3(3) minor-version-3(3)}
DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
EtsiTs103097Data-Signed,
EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted-Unicast,
EtsiTs103097Data-SignedAndEncrypted-Unicast
FROM EtsiTs103097Module
{ itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) secHeaders(103097) core(1) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1) }
WITH SUCCESSORS
Version
FROM EtsiTs102941BaseTypes
{ itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(102941) baseTypes(3) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1) }
WITH SUCCESSORS
InnerEcRequestSignedForPop, InnerEcResponse
FROM EtsiTs102941TypesEnrolment
{ itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(102941) enrolment(4) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1) }
WITH SUCCESSORS
EtsiTs102941ButterflyAuthorizationRequest-X509Signed, InnerAtRequest, InnerAtResponse
FROM EtsiTs102941TypesAuthorization
{ itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(102941) authorization(5) major-version-3(3) minor-version-2(2) }
WITH SUCCESSORS
ToBeSignedCrl, ToBeSignedTlmCtl, ToBeSignedRcaCtl
FROM EtsiTs102941TrustLists
{ itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(102941) trustLists(6) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1) }
WITH SUCCESSORS
ToBeSignedLinkCertificate, ToBeSignedLinkCertificateTlm
FROM EtsiTs102941TypesLinkCertificate
{ itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(102941) linkCertificate(9) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1) }
WITH SUCCESSORS
EeRaCertRequest, RaEeCertInfo, EeRaDownloadRequest
FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EeRaInterface
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) ee-ra(11) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1)}
WITH SUCCESSORS
;
/************
-- Messages
************/
EnrolmentRequestMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-SignedAndEncrypted-Unicast {EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{enrolmentRequest PRESENT})})}
EnrolmentResponseMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-SignedAndEncrypted-Unicast {EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{enrolmentResponse PRESENT})})}
AuthorizationRequestMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted-Unicast {EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{authorizationRequest PRESENT})})}
AuthorizationRequestMessageWithPop ::= EtsiTs103097Data-SignedAndEncrypted-Unicast {EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{authorizationRequest PRESENT})})}
AuthorizationResponseMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-SignedAndEncrypted-Unicast {EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{authorizationResponse PRESENT})})}
CertificateRevocationListMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-Signed{EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{certificateRevocationList PRESENT})})}
TlmCertificateTrustListMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-Signed{EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{certificateTrustListTlm PRESENT})})}
RcaCertificateTrustListMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-Signed{EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{certificateTrustListRca PRESENT})})}
TlmLinkCertificateMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-Signed {EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{linkCertificateTlm PRESENT})})}
ButterflyAuthorizationRequestMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-SignedAndEncrypted-Unicast {EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{butterflyAuthorizationRequest PRESENT})})}
X509SignedButterflyAuthorizationRequestMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted-Unicast {EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{x509SignedbutterflyAuthorizationRequest PRESENT})})}
ButterflyAuthorizationResponseMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-Signed {EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{butterflyAuthorizationResponse PRESENT})})}
ButterflyAtDownloadRequestMessage ::= EtsiTs103097Data-SignedAndEncrypted-Unicast {EtsiTs102941Data (WITH COMPONENTS{..., content (WITH COMPONENTS{butterflyAtDownloadRequest PRESENT})})}
/************
-- EtsiTs102941Data
************/
EtsiTs102941Data::= SEQUENCE {
version Version (v1),
content EtsiTs102941DataContent
}
EtsiTs102941DataContent ::= CHOICE {
enrolmentRequest InnerEcRequestSignedForPop,
enrolmentResponse InnerEcResponse,
authorizationRequest InnerAtRequest,
authorizationResponse InnerAtResponse,
certificateRevocationList ToBeSignedCrl,
certificateTrustListTlm ToBeSignedTlmCtl,
certificateTrustListRca ToBeSignedRcaCtl,
authorizationValidationRequest NULL,
authorizationValidationResponse NULL,
caCertificateRequest NULL,
...,
linkCertificateTlm ToBeSignedLinkCertificateTlm,
singleSignedLinkCertificateRca NULL,
doubleSignedlinkCertificateRca NULL,
/* Extension for butterfly key provisioning */
[[butterflyAuthorizationRequest EeRaCertRequest,
x509SignedbutterflyAuthorizationRequest EtsiTs102941ButterflyAuthorizationRequest-X509Signed,
butterflyAuthorizationResponse RaEeCertInfo,
butterflyCertificateRequest NULL,
butterflyCertificateResponse NULL,
butterflyAtDownloadRequest EeRaDownloadRequest]]
} (WITH COMPONENTS{...,
authorizationRequest (WITH COMPONENTS{...,
ecSignature (WITH COMPONENTS{...,
encryptedEcSignature PRESENT
})
})
})
END
obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf/asn1/release2/TS102941v221/README.md
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The TS 102941 v2.2.1 PKI ASN1 files are copied from its [ETSI repository](https://forge.etsi.org/rep/ITS/asn1/pki_ts102941/-/tree/v2.2.1).
See [ETSI License](https://forge.etsi.org/rep/ITS/asn1/pki_ts102941/-/blob/v2.2.1/LICENSE) for copyright details.
obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf/asn1/release2/TS102941v221/TrustLists.asn
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EtsiTs102941TrustLists
{ itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(102941) trustLists(6) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1)}
DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
EtsiTs103097Certificate, EtsiTs103097Data-SignedAndEncrypted, EtsiTs103097Data-Signed
FROM
EtsiTs103097Module
{ itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) secHeaders(103097) core(1) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1) }
WITH SUCCESSORS
HashedId8, Time32, Version --, CertificateAuthorityConstraints
FROM EtsiTs102941BaseTypes
{itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(102941) baseTypes(3) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1) }
WITH SUCCESSORS
;
/************
-- CRL
************/
ToBeSignedCrl ::= SEQUENCE {
version Version,
thisUpdate Time32,
nextUpdate Time32,
entries SEQUENCE OF CrlEntry,
...
}
CrlEntry ::= HashedId8
/************
-- TLM CTL
************/
ToBeSignedTlmCtl ::= CtlFormat (FullCtl | DeltaCtl) (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
ctlCommands ( WITH COMPONENT(
( WITH COMPONENTS {...,
add ( WITH COMPONENTS {...,
ea ABSENT,
aa ABSENT
})
})
))
})
/************
-- RCA CTL
************/
ToBeSignedRcaCtl ::= CtlFormat (FullCtl | DeltaCtl) ( WITH COMPONENTS {...,
ctlCommands ( WITH COMPONENT(
( WITH COMPONENTS {...,
add ( WITH COMPONENTS {...,
rca ABSENT,
tlm ABSENT
})
})
))
})
/************
-- CTL
************/
FullCtl::= CtlFormat ( WITH COMPONENTS {...,
isFullCtl ( TRUE ),
ctlCommands ( WITH COMPONENT(
( WITH COMPONENTS {...,
delete ABSENT
})
))
})
DeltaCtl::= CtlFormat (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
isFullCtl(FALSE)
})
CtlFormat ::= SEQUENCE {
version Version,
nextUpdate Time32,
isFullCtl BOOLEAN,
ctlSequence INTEGER (0..255),
ctlCommands SEQUENCE OF CtlCommand,
...
}
CtlCommand ::= CHOICE {
add CtlEntry,
delete CtlDelete,
...
}
CtlEntry ::= CHOICE {
rca RootCaEntry,
ea EaEntry,
aa AaEntry,
dc DcEntry,
tlm TlmEntry,
...
}
CtlDelete ::= CHOICE {
cert HashedId8,
dc DcDelete,
...
}
TlmEntry::= SEQUENCE {
selfSignedTLMCertificate EtsiTs103097Certificate,
successorTo EtsiTs103097Certificate OPTIONAL,
accessPoint Url
}
RootCaEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
selfsignedRootCa EtsiTs103097Certificate,
successorTo EtsiTs103097Certificate OPTIONAL
}
EaEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
eaCertificate EtsiTs103097Certificate,
aaAccessPoint Url,
itsAccessPoint Url OPTIONAL
}
AaEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
aaCertificate EtsiTs103097Certificate,
accessPoint Url
}
DcEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
url Url,
cert SEQUENCE OF HashedId8
}
DcDelete ::= Url
Url::= IA5String
END
obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf/asn1/release2/TS102941v221/TypesAuthorization.asn
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EtsiTs102941TypesAuthorization
{ itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(102941) authorization(5) major-version-3(3) minor-version-3(3)}
DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
EtsiTs103097Certificate,
EtsiTs103097Data-Signed
FROM EtsiTs103097Module
{ itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) secHeaders(103097) core(1) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1) }
WITH SUCCESSORS
CertificateFormat, CertificateSubjectAttributes, EcSignature, HashedId8, PublicKeys, Version
FROM EtsiTs102941BaseTypes
{ itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(102941) baseTypes(3) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1) }
WITH SUCCESSORS
EeRaInterfacePdu
FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EeRaInterface
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) ee-ra(11) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1)}
WITH SUCCESSORS
Ieee1609Dot2Data-SignedX509AuthenticatedCertRequest, ScmsPdu-Scoped, SignerSingleX509Cert
FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) protocol(17) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1)}
WITH SUCCESSORS
;
/************
-- AuthorizationRequest/Response
************/
AuthorizationResponseCode ::= ENUMERATED {
ok(0),
-- ITS->AA
its-aa-cantparse, -- valid for any structure
its-aa-badcontenttype, -- not encrypted, not signed, not authorizationrequest
its-aa-imnottherecipient, -- the "recipients" of the outermost encrypted data doesn't include me
its-aa-unknownencryptionalgorithm, -- either kexalg or contentencryptionalgorithm
its-aa-decryptionfailed, -- works for ECIES-HMAC and AES-CCM
its-aa-keysdontmatch, -- HMAC keyTag verification fails
its-aa-incompleterequest, -- some elements are missing
its-aa-invalidencryptionkey, -- the responseEncryptionKey is bad
its-aa-outofsyncrequest, -- signingTime is outside acceptable limits
its-aa-unknownea, -- the EA identified by eaId is unknown to me
its-aa-invalidea, -- the EA certificate is revoked
its-aa-deniedpermissions, -- I, the AA, deny the requested permissions
-- AA->EA
aa-ea-cantreachea, -- the EA is unreachable (network error?)
-- EA->AA
ea-aa-cantparse, -- valid for any structure
ea-aa-badcontenttype, -- not encrypted, not signed, not authorizationrequest
ea-aa-imnottherecipient, -- the "recipients" of the outermost encrypted data doesn't include me
ea-aa-unknownencryptionalgorithm, -- either kexalg or contentencryptionalgorithm
ea-aa-decryptionfailed, -- works for ECIES-HMAC and AES-CCM
-- TODO: to be continued...
invalidaa, -- the AA certificate presented is invalid/revoked/whatever
invalidaasignature, -- the AA certificate presented can't validate the request signature
wrongea, -- the encrypted signature doesn't designate me as the EA
unknownits, -- can't retrieve the EC/ITS in my DB
invalidsignature, -- signature verification of the request by the EC fails
invalidencryptionkey, -- signature is good, but the key is bad
deniedpermissions, -- permissions not granted
deniedtoomanycerts, -- parallel limit
... }
InnerAtRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
publicKeys PublicKeys,
hmacKey OCTET STRING (SIZE(32)),
sharedAtRequest SharedAtRequest,
ecSignature EcSignature,
...
}
SharedAtRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
eaId HashedId8,
keyTag OCTET STRING (SIZE(16)),
certificateFormat CertificateFormat,
requestedSubjectAttributes CertificateSubjectAttributes (WITH COMPONENTS{..., certIssuePermissions ABSENT}),
...
}
InnerAtResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
requestHash OCTET STRING (SIZE(16)),
responseCode AuthorizationResponseCode,
certificate EtsiTs103097Certificate OPTIONAL,
...
}
(WITH COMPONENTS { responseCode (ok), certificate PRESENT }
| WITH COMPONENTS { responseCode (ALL EXCEPT ok), certificate ABSENT }
)
EtsiTs102941ButterflyAuthorizationRequest-X509Signed ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-SignedX509AuthenticatedCertRequest {
ScmsPdu-Scoped {
EeRaInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS {
eeRaCertRequest})
},
SignerSingleX509Cert
}
END
obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf/asn1/release2/TS102941v221/TypesAuthorizationValidation.asn
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EtsiTs102941TypesAuthorizationValidation
{ itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(102941) authValidation(7) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1)}
DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
EtsiTs103097Certificate
FROM EtsiTs103097Module
{ itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) secHeaders(103097) core(1) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1) }
WITH SUCCESSORS
CertificateFormat, CertificateSubjectAttributes,EcSignature, HashedId8, PublicKeys, Version
FROM EtsiTs102941BaseTypes
{ itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(102941) baseTypes(3) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1) }
WITH SUCCESSORS
SharedAtRequest
FROM EtsiTs102941TypesAuthorization
{ itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(102941) authorization(5) major-version-3(3) minor-version-2(2) }
WITH SUCCESSORS
;
/************
-- AuthorizationValidationRequest/Response
************/
AuthorizationValidationResponseCode ::= ENUMERATED {
ok(0),
cantparse, -- valid for any structure
badcontenttype, -- not encrypted, not signed, not permissionsverificationrequest
imnottherecipient, -- the "recipients" of the outermost encrypted data doesn't include me
unknownencryptionalgorithm, -- either kexalg or contentencryptionalgorithm
decryptionfailed, -- works for ECIES-HMAC and AES-CCM
invalidaa, -- the AA certificate presented is invalid/revoked/whatever
invalidaasignature, -- the AA certificate presented can't validate the request signature
wrongea, -- the encrypted signature doesn't designate me as the EA
unknownits, -- can't retrieve the EC/ITS in my DB
invalidsignature, -- signature verification of the request by the EC fails
invalidencryptionkey, -- signature is good, but the responseEncryptionKey is bad
deniedpermissions, -- requested permissions not granted
deniedtoomanycerts, -- parallel limit
deniedrequest, -- any other reason?
... }
AuthorizationValidationRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
sharedAtRequest SharedAtRequest,
ecSignature EcSignature,
...
}
AuthorizationValidationResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
requestHash OCTET STRING (SIZE(16)),
responseCode AuthorizationValidationResponseCode,
confirmedSubjectAttributes CertificateSubjectAttributes (WITH COMPONENTS{..., certIssuePermissions ABSENT}) OPTIONAL,
...
}
(WITH COMPONENTS { responseCode (ok), confirmedSubjectAttributes PRESENT }
| WITH COMPONENTS { responseCode (ALL EXCEPT ok), confirmedSubjectAttributes ABSENT }
)
END
obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf/asn1/release2/TS102941v221/TypesCaManagement.asn
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EtsiTs102941TypesCaManagement
{ itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(102941) caManagement(8) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1)}
DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
EtsiTs103097Certificate, EtsiTs103097Data-Signed
FROM
EtsiTs103097Module
{ itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) secHeaders(103097) core(1) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1) }
WITH SUCCESSORS
PublicKeys, CertificateSubjectAttributes
FROM EtsiTs102941BaseTypes
{ itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(102941) baseTypes(3) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1) }
WITH SUCCESSORS
;
/************
-- CA certificate request
************/
CaCertificateRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
publicKeys PublicKeys,
requestedSubjectAttributes CertificateSubjectAttributes,
...
}
END
obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf/asn1/release2/TS102941v221/TypesEnrolment.asn
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EtsiTs102941TypesEnrolment
{ itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(102941) enrolment(4) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1) }
DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
EtsiTs103097Certificate,
EtsiTs103097Data-Signed
FROM EtsiTs103097Module
{ itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) secHeaders(103097) core(1) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1) }
WITH SUCCESSORS
CertificateFormat, CertificateSubjectAttributes, EcSignature, HashedId8, PublicKeys, Version
FROM EtsiTs102941BaseTypes
{ itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(102941) baseTypes(3) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1) }
WITH SUCCESSORS
;
/************
-- EnrolmentRequest/Response
************/
EnrolmentResponseCode ::= ENUMERATED {
ok(0),
cantparse, -- valid for any structure
badcontenttype, -- not encrypted, not signed, not enrolmentrequest
imnottherecipient, -- the "recipients" doesn't include me
unknownencryptionalgorithm, -- either kexalg or contentencryptionalgorithm
decryptionfailed, -- works for ECIES-HMAC and AES-CCM
unknownits, -- can't retrieve the ITS from the itsId
invalidsignature, -- signature verification of the request fails
invalidencryptionkey, -- signature is good, but the responseEncryptionKey is bad
baditsstatus, -- revoked, not yet active
incompleterequest, -- some elements are missing
deniedpermissions, -- requested permissions are not granted
invalidkeys, -- either the verification_key of the encryption_key is bad
deniedrequest, -- any other reason?
... }
InnerEcRequestSignedForPop::= EtsiTs103097Data-Signed{InnerEcRequest}
InnerEcRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
itsId OCTET STRING,
certificateFormat CertificateFormat,
publicKeys PublicKeys,
requestedSubjectAttributes CertificateSubjectAttributes (WITH COMPONENTS{..., certIssuePermissions ABSENT}),
...
}
InnerEcResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
requestHash OCTET STRING (SIZE(16)),
responseCode EnrolmentResponseCode,
certificate EtsiTs103097Certificate OPTIONAL,
...
}
(WITH COMPONENTS { responseCode (ok), certificate PRESENT }
| WITH COMPONENTS { responseCode (ALL EXCEPT ok), certificate ABSENT }
)
END
obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf/asn1/release2/TS102941v221/TypesLinkCertificate.asn
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EtsiTs102941TypesLinkCertificate
{ itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(102941) linkCertificate(9) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1) }
DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
Time32, HashedData
FROM EtsiTs102941BaseTypes
{itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) ts(102941) baseTypes(3) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1)}
WITH SUCCESSORS
;
/************
-- Link certificate messages
************/
ToBeSignedLinkCertificate ::= SEQUENCE {
expiryTime Time32,
certificateHash HashedData,
...
}
ToBeSignedLinkCertificateTlm ::= ToBeSignedLinkCertificate
ToBeSignedLinkCertificateRca ::= ToBeSignedLinkCertificate
END
obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf/asn1/release2/TS103097v211-Extension.asn
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EtsiTs103097ExtensionModule
{itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) secHeaders(103097) extension(2) major-version-1(1) minor-version-1(1)}
DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::= BEGIN
IMPORTS
HashedId8,
Time32
FROM Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111)
standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609)
dot2(2) base(1) base-types(2) major-version-2 (2) minor-version-3 (3)}
WITH SUCCESSORS
;
ExtensionModuleVersion::= INTEGER(1)
Extension {EXT-TYPE : ExtensionTypes} ::= SEQUENCE {
id EXT-TYPE.&extId({ExtensionTypes}),
content EXT-TYPE.&ExtContent({ExtensionTypes}{@.id})
}
EXT-TYPE ::= CLASS {
&extId ExtId,
&ExtContent
} WITH SYNTAX {&ExtContent IDENTIFIED BY &extId}
ExtId ::= INTEGER(0..255)
EtsiOriginatingHeaderInfoExtension ::= Extension{{EtsiTs103097HeaderInfoExtensions}}
EtsiTs103097HeaderInfoExtensionId ::= ExtId
etsiTs102941CrlRequestId EtsiTs103097HeaderInfoExtensionId ::= 1 --'01'H
etsiTs102941DeltaCtlRequestId EtsiTs103097HeaderInfoExtensionId ::= 2 --'02'H
EtsiTs103097HeaderInfoExtensions EXT-TYPE ::= {
{ EtsiTs102941CrlRequest IDENTIFIED BY etsiTs102941CrlRequestId } |
{ EtsiTs102941DeltaCtlRequest IDENTIFIED BY etsiTs102941DeltaCtlRequestId },
...
}
EtsiTs102941CrlRequest::= SEQUENCE {
issuerId HashedId8,
lastKnownUpdate Time32 OPTIONAL
}
EtsiTs102941CtlRequest::= SEQUENCE {
issuerId HashedId8,
lastKnownCtlSequence INTEGER (0..255) OPTIONAL
}
EtsiTs102941DeltaCtlRequest::= EtsiTs102941CtlRequest
END
obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf/asn1/release2/TS103097v211.asn
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EtsiTs103097Module
{itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) secHeaders(103097) core(1) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1)}
DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::= BEGIN
IMPORTS
Ieee1609Dot2Data, Certificate
FROM Ieee1609Dot2 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111)
standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609)
dot2(2) base(1) schema(1) major-version-2(2) minor-version-4(4)}
WITH SUCCESSORS
ExtensionModuleVersion
FROM EtsiTs103097ExtensionModule {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4)
etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) secHeaders(103097) extension(2) major-version-1(1) minor-version-1(1)}
;
EtsiTs103097Certificate::= Certificate (WITH COMPONENTS{...,
toBeSigned (WITH COMPONENTS{...,
id (WITH COMPONENTS{...,
linkageData ABSENT,
binaryId ABSENT
}),
certRequestPermissions ABSENT,
canRequestRollover ABSENT
})
})
EtsiTs103097Data::=Ieee1609Dot2Data (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
content (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
signedData (WITH COMPONENTS {..., -- constraints on signed data headers
tbsData (WITH COMPONENTS {
headerInfo (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
generationTime PRESENT,
p2pcdLearningRequest ABSENT,
missingCrlIdentifier ABSENT
})
}),
signer (WITH COMPONENTS {..., --constraints on the certificate
certificate ((WITH COMPONENT (EtsiTs103097Certificate))^(SIZE(1)))
})
}),
encryptedData (WITH COMPONENTS {..., -- constraints on encrypted data headers
recipients (WITH COMPONENT (
(WITH COMPONENTS {...,
pskRecipInfo ABSENT,
symmRecipInfo ABSENT,
rekRecipInfo ABSENT
})
))
}),
signedCertificateRequest ABSENT
})
})
EtsiTs103097Data-Unsecured {ToBeSentDataContent} ::= EtsiTs103097Data (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
content (WITH COMPONENTS {
unsecuredData (CONTAINING ToBeSentDataContent)
})
})
EtsiTs103097Data-Signed {ToBeSignedDataContent} ::= EtsiTs103097Data (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
content (WITH COMPONENTS {
signedData (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
tbsData (WITH COMPONENTS {
payload (WITH COMPONENTS {
data (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
content (WITH COMPONENTS {
unsecuredData (CONTAINING ToBeSignedDataContent)
})
}) PRESENT
})
})
})
})
})
EtsiTs103097Data-SignedExternalPayload ::= EtsiTs103097Data (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
content (WITH COMPONENTS {
signedData (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
tbsData (WITH COMPONENTS {
payload (WITH COMPONENTS {
extDataHash (WITH COMPONENTS {
sha256HashedData PRESENT
}) PRESENT
})
})
})
})
})
EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted {ToBeEncryptedDataContent} ::= EtsiTs103097Data (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
content (WITH COMPONENTS {
encryptedData (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
ciphertext (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
aes128ccm (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
ccmCiphertext (CONSTRAINED BY {-- ccm encryption of -- ToBeEncryptedDataContent})
})
})
})
})
})
EtsiTs103097Data-SignedAndEncrypted {ToBesignedAndEncryptedDataContent} ::= EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted {EtsiTs103097Data-Signed {ToBesignedAndEncryptedDataContent}}
EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted-Unicast {ToBeEncryptedDataContent} ::= EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted { EtsiTs103097Data-Unsecured{ToBeEncryptedDataContent}} (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
content (WITH COMPONENTS {
encryptedData (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
recipients (SIZE(1))
})
})
})
EtsiTs103097Data-SignedAndEncrypted-Unicast {ToBesignedAndEncryptedDataContent} ::= EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted {EtsiTs103097Data-Signed {ToBesignedAndEncryptedDataContent}} (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
content (WITH COMPONENTS {
encryptedData (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
recipients (SIZE(1))
})
})
})
END
obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf/asn1/release2/TS103300-3v231/VAM-PDU-Descriptions.asn
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-- Draft V0.0.4_2.2.1 - VAM TS 103 300-1 ASN.1 module
-- Based on the official version available at @url https://forge.etsi.org/rep/ITS/asn1/vam-ts103300_3/-/tree/v2.1.1
-- Modified to import from the CDD module V2.1.1
VAM-PDU-Descriptions {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5)
wg1(1) 103300 vam(1) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1)}
DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
AccelerationChangeIndication, BasicContainer, CartesianAngle, ClusterBreakupInfo,
ClusterJoinInfo, ClusterLeaveInfo, Curvature, CurvatureCalculationMode,
DeltaTimeQuarterSecond, GenerationDeltaTime, HeadingChangeIndication, ItsPduHeader, LanePosition,
LateralAcceleration, LongitudinalAcceleration, PathHistory, PathPredicted,
SequenceOfSafeDistanceIndication, SequenceOfTrajectoryInterceptionIndication,
SequenceOfTrajectoryInterceptionIndication, Speed, StabilityChangeIndication, StationId,
TrajectoryInterceptionIndication, VerticalAcceleration, VruClusterInformation, VruDeviceUsage,
VruEnvironment, VruExteriorLights, GeneralizedLanePosition, VruProfileAndSubprofile, VruMovementControl,
VruSizeClass, YawRate, Wgs84Angle
FROM ETSI-ITS-CDD {itu-t (0) identified-organization (4) etsi (0) itsDomain (5) wg1 (1) 102894 cdd (2) major-version-3 (4) minor-version-3 (3) }
WITH SUCCESSORS
;
VAM ::= SEQUENCE {
header ItsPduHeaderVam,
vam VruAwareness
}
/**
* @details ItsPduHeaderVam
* The ITS PDU header for the VAM.
*
* This DF includes DEs for the VAM _protocolVersion_, the VAM message type identifier _messageID_
* and the station identifier _stationID_ of the originating ITS-S.
*
* @category: Communication information
* @revision: V2.2.1
*/
ItsPduHeaderVam ::= ItsPduHeader(WITH COMPONENTS {..., protocolVersion(3), messageId(vam)})
/**
* @details VruAwareness
* VAM payload.
*
* It includes the time stamp of the VAM and the VAM different containers
*
* @category: Communication information
* @revision: V2.2.1
*/
VruAwareness ::= SEQUENCE {
generationDeltaTime GenerationDeltaTime,
vamParameters VamParameters
}
/**
* @details VamParameters
* The VAM payload includes the @ref BasicContainer and @ref VruHighFrequencyContainer.
* The VAM payload may also include additional containers: @ref VruLowFrequencyContainer,
* @ref VruClusterInformationContainer, @ref VruClusterOperationContainer and @ref VruMotionPredictionContainer.
* The selection of the additional containers depends on the dissemination criteria,
* e.g. _vruCluster_ or _MotionDynamicPrediction_ availability.
*
* @category: Communication information
* @revision: V2.2.1
**/
VamParameters ::= SEQUENCE {
basicContainer BasicContainer,
vruHighFrequencyContainer VruHighFrequencyContainer,
vruLowFrequencyContainer VruLowFrequencyContainer OPTIONAL,
vruClusterInformationContainer VruClusterInformationContainer OPTIONAL,
vruClusterOperationContainer VruClusterOperationContainer OPTIONAL,
vruMotionPredictionContainer VruMotionPredictionContainer OPTIONAL,
...
}
/**
* @details VruHighFrequencyContainer
* The VRU HF container of the VAM contains potentially fast-changing status information of the VRU ITS-S.
* It includes the following components (setting indications are specified in clause 7.3.3 of TS 103 300-3):
*
* @field heading: heading and heading confidence of the originating VRU with regards to the true north.
* @field speed: speed in moving direction and speed confidence of the originating VRU.
* @field longitudinalAcceleration: longitudinal acceleration of the originating VRU.
* @field curvature: related to the actual trajectory of the originating VRU vehicle.
_(recommended for VRU Profile 2)_
* @field curvatureCalculationMode: indicates whether vehicle yaw-rate is used in the calculation of
* the curvature of the VRU vehicle ITS-S that originates the VAM. _(recommended for VRU Profile 2)_
* @field yawRate: yaw rate of originating VRU vehicle. _(recommended for VRU Profile 2)_
* @field lateralAcceleration: originating VRU lateral acceleration in the street plane.
* This field shall be present if the data is available at the originating ITS-S. _(recommended for VRU Profile 2)_
* @field verticalAcceleration: vertical acceleration of the originating VRU.
* This field shall be present if the data is available at the originating ITS-S.
* @field vruLanePosition: lane position of the referencePosition of a VRU, which is either a VRU-specific non-traffic lane
* or a standard traffic lane. This field shall be present if the data is available at the originating ITS-S.
* @field environment: provides contextual awareness of the VRU among other road users.
* This field shall be present only if the data is available at the originating ITS-S.
* @field movementControl: indicates the mechanism used by the VRU to control the longitudinal movement of the VRU vehicle.
* This field shall be present only if the data is available at the originating ITS-S. _(recommended for VRU Profile 2)_
* @field orientation : complements the dimensions of the VRU vehicle by defining the angle of the VRU vehicle longitudinal
* axis with regards to the WGS84 north. _(recommended for VRU Profile 2)_
* @field rollAngle: provides the angle and angle accuracy between the ground plane and the current orientation of a vehicle's
* y-axis with respect to the ground plane about the x-axis according to the ISO 8855.
* This field shall be present only if the data is available at the originating ITS-S. _(recommended for VRU Profile 2)_
* @field deviceUsage: provides indications from the personal device about the potential
* activity of the VRU. This field shall be present only if the data is available at the originating ITS-S.
* _(recommended for VRU Profile 1)_
*
* @category: VRU information
* @revision: V2.2.1
*/
VruHighFrequencyContainer ::= SEQUENCE {
heading Wgs84Angle,
speed Speed,
longitudinalAcceleration LongitudinalAcceleration,
curvature Curvature OPTIONAL,
curvatureCalculationMode CurvatureCalculationMode OPTIONAL,
yawRate YawRate OPTIONAL,
lateralAcceleration LateralAcceleration OPTIONAL,
verticalAcceleration VerticalAcceleration OPTIONAL,
vruLanePosition GeneralizedLanePosition OPTIONAL,
environment VruEnvironment OPTIONAL,
movementControl VruMovementControl OPTIONAL,
orientation Wgs84Angle OPTIONAL,
rollAngle CartesianAngle OPTIONAL,
deviceUsage VruDeviceUsage OPTIONAL,
...
}
/**
* @details VruLowFrequencyContainer
* The VRU LF container of the VAM contains potentially slow-changing information of the VRU ITS-S.
* It is mandatory with higher periodicity as specified in clause 6.2 or when VRU cluster operation container is present.
* It includes the following components (setting indications are specified in clause 7.3.4 of TS 103 300-3):
*
* @field profileAndSubprofile: profile of the ITS-S that originates the VAM, including sub-profile information.
* @field sizeClass: information about the size of the VRU.
* @field exteriorLights: status of the most important exterior lights switches of the VRU ITS-S that originates the VAM.
* _(conditional mandatory as specified in clause 7.3.4 of TS 103 300-3)_
*
* @category: VRU information
* @revision: V2.2.1
*/
VruLowFrequencyContainer ::= SEQUENCE {
profileAndSubprofile VruProfileAndSubprofile,
sizeClass VruSizeClass OPTIONAL,
exteriorLights VruExteriorLights OPTIONAL,
...
}
/**
* @details VruClusterInformationContainer
* The VRU Cluster Information container of the VAM provides the information/parameters relevant to the VRU cluster.
* It is mandatory if the VAM is transmitted by VRU cluster leader.
* It includes the following components (setting indications are specified in clause 7.3.5 of TS 103 300-3):
*
* @field vruClusterInformation: set of parammeters releated to the VRU cluster.
* When transmitted by a VRU ITS-S, the clusterId and clusterBoundingBoxShape fields inside this DF shall be present.
* The clusterBoundingBoxShape is positioned with respect to the position sent in the BasicContainer.
*
* @category: VRU information
* @revision: V2.2.1
*/
VruClusterInformationContainer::= SEQUENCE{
vruClusterInformation VruClusterInformation (WITH COMPONENTS{..., clusterId, clusterBoundingBoxShape PRESENT}),
...
}
/**
* @details VruClusterOperationContainer
* The VRU Cluster Operation container of the VAM provides information relevant to change of cluster state and composition.
* It is mandatory if the VAM is transmitted by a VRU joining, leaving or breaking up a cluster.
* It includes the following components (setting indications are specified in clause 7.3.5 of TS 103 300-3).
* At least one of the fields below shall be present if the container is present in the VAM:
*
* @field clusterJoinInfo: indicates the intent of an individual VAM transmitter to join a cluster.
* @field clusterLeaveInfo : indicates that an individual VAM transmitter has recently left the VRU cluster.
* @field clusterBreakupInfo: indicates the intent of a cluster VAM transmitter to stop sending cluster VAMs.
* @field clusterIdChangeTimeInfo: indicates the intent of a cluster VAM transmitter to change cluster ID.
*
* @category: VRU information
* @revision: V2.2.1
*/
VruClusterOperationContainer ::= SEQUENCE {
clusterJoinInfo ClusterJoinInfo OPTIONAL,
clusterLeaveInfo ClusterLeaveInfo OPTIONAL,
clusterBreakupInfo ClusterBreakupInfo OPTIONAL,
clusterIdChangeTimeInfo DeltaTimeQuarterSecond OPTIONAL,
...
}
/**
* @details VruMotionPredictionContainer
* The VRU Motion Prediction container of the VAM carries the past and future motion state information of the VRU.
* It includes the following components (setting indications are specified in clause 7.3.6 of TS 103 300-3).
* At least one of the fields below shall be present if the container is present in the VAM:
*
* @field pathHistory: represents the VRU's recent movement over some past time and/or distance.
* It consists of a list of path points.
* @field pathPrediction: provides the set of predicted locations of the ITS-S, confidence values
* and the corresponding future time instants.
* @field safeDistance: provides indication of safe distance between an ego-VRU and up to 8 other ITS-S
* or entity on the road to indicate whether the ego-VRU is at a safe distance (that is less likely to
* physically collide) from another ITS-S or entity on the road.
* @field trajectoryInterceptionIndication: provides the indication for possible trajectory interception
* with up to 8 VRUs or other objects on the road..
* @field accelerationChangeIndication: provides an acceleration change indication of the VRU.
* When present this DF indicates an anticipated change in the VRU speed for period of actionDeltaTime.
* @field headingChangeIndication: provides additional data elements associated to heading change indicators
* such as a change of travel direction (left or right).
* The direction change action is performed for a period of actionDeltaTime.
* @field stabilityChangeIndication: provides an estimation of the VRU stability.
*
* @category: GeoReference information, VRU information
* @revision: V2.2.1
*/
VruMotionPredictionContainer ::= SEQUENCE {
pathHistory PathHistory OPTIONAL,
pathPrediction PathPredicted OPTIONAL,
safeDistance SequenceOfSafeDistanceIndication OPTIONAL,
trajectoryInterceptionIndication SequenceOfTrajectoryInterceptionIndication OPTIONAL,
accelerationChangeIndication AccelerationChangeIndication OPTIONAL,
headingChangeIndication HeadingChangeIndication OPTIONAL,
stabilityChangeIndication StabilityChangeIndication OPTIONAL,
...
}
END

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