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Author SHA1 Message Date
Ashin Walpola 73d4477f1e Move the capture tooling into the repo 
live_capture.py and dump_pcap.py were untracked files inside the third-party
its-g5-receiver-firmware checkout, so the tools every on-air measurement depends
on were versioned nowhere and would vanish with a fresh clone of that project.
They are ours rather than that project's, so they now live in capture/, with the
setup notes rewritten as its README: which port the sniffer speaks on and why,
how to capture, how to check a capture, and how to flash the sniffer board.

live_capture.py carries the fix made on 2026-09-14. The sniffer's console
converts LF to CRLF on its way out, and that applies to every 0x0a byte of the
binary pcap stream, not only to log text, so every inserted CR shifts the rest
of the stream. A 787 KB capture parsed cleanly for only 82 of about 2000
records, and DENMs turned up on nonsense BTP ports because their payloads carry
0x0a often. undo_crlf() reverses it on the raw stream before any framing, which
is exact; afterwards a capture parsed to EOF and DENMs read as port 2002.
Captures taken before that date are truncated at their first corrupted record,
so anything measured from them is worth re-checking.

capture/recordings/ is gitignored, since captures are data rather than source.
The host tests now read both that directory and the older one in the receiver
checkout, so no capture has to be moved while it is being written.

dump_pcap.py reads the same console and still needs the same treatment; that is
recorded in TODO.md.
 2026-09-14 13:38:38 +02:00
Ashin Walpola 277c6b20f4 Record the on-air verification and how to run the bench beacon 
Both firmware fixes are now confirmed over the air, with the sniffer board
capturing and asn1tools judging the result.

GN lifetime: our station transmits 0x05 (1 s), the value both bench stations
use, where the August captures show 0x83 (3200 s) for the same frames. 397 CAMs
from station 999999 decode and re-encode byte-identically, so the whole
transmit chain is right on the wire, not only in the host tests.

yawRateConfidence: the bench beacon, flashed to a spare board, sends CAMs that
decode and re-encode byte-identically as well (72 of 72 from station
0x0BADC0DE). NOTES.md now says how to flash that beacon and how to check what
it sends, including that it shares the phone pinger's MAC and the two are told
apart by station ID.

The new firmware also runs on the OBU with the phone attached: CAM, DENM and
SPATEM from the bench stations all keep decoding in the app now that messages
are cut to the length their header declares.

Signed reception stays open. The CiT One transmits unsigned and nothing else
here signs, so it needs real roadside traffic, the CiT One switched to signed
mode, or a replay firmware on a spare board.

Two bench facts worth not rediscovering are recorded too: opening COM3's
console resets the OBU and drops the phone's USB link, and every capture taken
before today is truncated at its first corrupted record, because the receiver's
console inserts a CR before every 0x0a byte of the binary pcap stream.
live_capture.py now undoes that, a change that lives in the receiver repo and
is not part of this commit.
 2026-09-14 13:33:47 +02:00
Ashin Walpola 0f06cdb339 Merge branch 'main' of gitlab.rzbt.haw-hamburg.de:urban-mobility-lab/microbu/microbuapp 
# Please enter a commit message to explain why this merge is necessary,
# especially if it merges an updated upstream into a topic branch.
#
# Lines starting with '#' will be ignored, and an empty message aborts
# the commit.
 2026-09-14 12:56:30 +02:00
Ashin Walpola 75d6d3b85c Receive signed ITS messages and forward each at its declared length 
Signed packets. A GeoNetworking Basic Header NextHeader of 2 means a
TS 103 097 (IEEE 1609.2) envelope follows, with the Common Header
inside it. gn_unwrap_its rejected all of these, and most real traffic is
signed: the 2026-08-17 capture holds 157 signed frames from 15 source
MACs against 2 unsecured stations. It now opens a COER-encoded
signedData, or a bare unsecuredData, and parses the inner packet as
before. The inner packet comes first inside tbsData, so the certificate
and signature are never parsed, and the signature is not verified - the
firmware has no trust store. Such messages reach the phone with the new
V2X_RX flags bit1, signed but not verified. The app reads only bit0 and
is unaffected until it learns the flag. Encrypted payloads, nested
signing and the legacy v1.2.1 envelope are still rejected. All 157
recorded signed frames have the layout this reads, in all three COER
length forms, and asn1tools decodes every envelope to the same inner
packet.

Payload bounds. Every frame recorded through the ESP32-C5's promiscuous
RX, about 15 000 of them, ends in 8 bytes that are not part of the
802.11 frame and not a valid FCS. obu-firmware reads frames through the
same API and took the rest of the frame as the message, so it forwarded
those 8 bytes to the phone after every message. UPER decoders stop where
the message ends, so nothing visibly broke, but the bytes cost serial
bandwidth and 8 bytes of the DENM's headroom, and they stayed attached
wherever raw payloads were stored or passed on. The payload is now
exactly what the Common Header's payload-length field declares, which is
also what separates a signed message from its signature.

A frame longer than main.c's 800-byte capture buffer is now reported as
truncated instead of being forwarded cut off, and counted as an oversize
drop through the new serial_link_note_oversize_drop, as it was when the
cut-off frame failed serial_link's size check.

Host tests in obu-firmware/test/host build the firmware sources
unmodified with MSYS2 gcc; `make` runs all three.
- test_chain: frames from the firmware's TX code checked byte by byte
  against EN 302 636-4-1 and parsed back, including hand-built signed
  frames, the payload-length rule, the RX trailer, and every truncation
  length against a no-access guard page. 1731 checks, 0 failures.
- test_replay and check_replay.py: all 15 145 recorded frames through
  gn_unwrap_its, cut to 800 bytes as on the board, and re-derived
  independently in Python with the envelope decoded by asn1tools. They
  agree on every record; 15 131 accepted, 157 of them signed. 11 043 of
  the 11 106 distinct messages re-encode byte-identically. The other 63
  fail the same way with the old 8 bytes put back, so the boundary is
  not the cause: 5 are our own CAMs from before the 2026-08-20
  yawRateConfidence fix, and the rest, from other stations, are a
  follow-up in TODO.md.
- fuzz_gn_unwrap: random edits of every recorded frame, each run against
  the guard page. 50 000 000 iterations, no crash.

obu-firmware/test/pcap_gn_tally.py tallies GeoNetworking header fields
per station over captures; it is how the other stations' lifetimes were
measured. TODO.md collects what is still open, including the on-air
check for this change: it builds on IDF 6.1 but has not been flashed.
 2026-09-11 20:19:40 +02:00
Ashin Walpola 1baae2c5f6 Encode yawRateConfidence in 4 bits in the firmware CAM encoders 
YawRateConfidence has nine enumerands, degSec-000-01(0) to
unavailable(8) (cdd_1_3_1_1.asn), so UPER needs 4 bits and
"unavailable" is 8. Both firmware copies of cam.c wrote 3 bits with
value 7, which is also the wrong symbol (outOfRange), and every field
after it shifted by one bit. The app's CamUperCodec fixed the same line
on 2026-08-20; these two copies were missed.

obu-cam-transmistter compiles its cam.c, so a board running that bench
beacon sent CAMs no standards-compliant station could decode.
obu-firmware's copy is reference only - it is not in SRCS, since the
phone encodes the CAM - and is kept in step because the app's encoder
was ported from it. The production OBU runs obu-firmware and was never
affected.

Every other field width was compared against CamUperCodec.kt and
matches. Checked with asn1tools against asn1/cam_1_4_1.asn and
cdd_1_3_1_1.asn: the CAM both fixed copies emit decodes with every
expected value and re-encodes byte-identically, while the version before
this change fails on yawRateConfidence. obu-cam-transmistter builds on
IDF 5.5.4.
 2026-09-11 20:19:40 +02:00
Ashin Walpola 8871708a98 Send the GeoNetworking lifetime as 1 s, not 3200 s 
geonet_wrap_shb wrote lifetime 0x83, commented as about 60 s. The field
holds the multiplier in its upper six bits and the base in the lower two
(50 ms, 1 s, 10 s, 100 s), so 0x83 is 32 x 100 s = 3200 s. That is over
the 600 s itsGnMaxPacketLifetime a sender may use at all; vanetza
refuses to send such a packet. The byte arrived with the Phase 03 commit
as a placeholder and was never checked against the encoding.

For a single-hop CAM this is non-compliance rather than a functional
fault: nothing stores or forwards an SHB packet, so no receiver acts on
the value, and no dropped CAM was ever traced to it.

0x05 (1 x 1 s) is what every other station in
its-g5-receiver-firmware/recordings sends its CAMs with; the recorded
GeoBroadcast DENMs use 0x79 (30 s). Changed in obu-cam-transmistter's
copy as well. Both firmwares build (IDF 6.1 and 5.5.4), and the
disassembled geonet_wrap_shb of each stores 0x05. Not yet seen on air:
the production OBU still runs the 2026-09-10 build, and the on-air
check is listed in TODO.md.
 2026-09-11 20:19:39 +02:00
Ashin Walpola d7043bb04d Ignore the vanetza checkout and Python bytecode caches 
vanetza is a clone of the open-source ETSI C-ITS stack, kept beside the
project as a reference in the same way as C-ITS-Parser. It is read, not
built, and it carries its own .git, so a plain `git add .` would have
picked it up as an embedded repository.

__pycache__/ appears when obu-firmware/test/host/check_replay.py is
imported rather than run.
 2026-09-11 20:19:39 +02:00
niklasdathe@web e908f7fae1 Move architecture files into docs 2026-09-10 15:17:28 +02:00
Niklas Dathe 8f397eea20 Add drawio architecture diagram 2026-09-10 15:12:53 +02:00
Niklas Dathe cc395771ea First draft of architecture that was decided on at the Workshop (09.09.2026) 2026-09-10 14:55:45 +02:00
Ashin Walpola 83153a0971 Send each CAM with its position vector, a rotating pseudonym and GNSS time 
The app side of the firmware's CAM_TX_PV message. Until now the phone
handed the ESP32 bare CAM bytes, so the GeoNetworking header around them
could only carry the firmware's bench placeholders.

GnPositionVector.fromCam builds the Source Position Vector from the same
Cam the UPER is encoded from, so the two layers cannot disagree about
where the rider is. Position is rounded exactly as CamUperCodec rounds
it, heading wraps into 0..3599, and non-finite values become 0. PAI is
set when Android's horizontal accuracy is at most 24.7 m, the 40 m
itsGnPaiInterval/2 threshold converted from a 95% to a 68% confidence
radius. UsbSerialTransport.sendCamTx sends 0x05 once the heartbeat
advertises the capability and 0x01 otherwise, so this build still
transmits against older firmware, and logs which path it is on.

Pseudonyms. The station ID used to be created once per install and never
changed, under a MAC that never changed either, so every CAM this phone
ever sent was linkable to every other. PseudonymManager now owns the
station ID and the MAC as one identity and replaces both together every
10 minutes, or immediately if the clock goes backwards. Both are
persisted in a single edit, so a crash cannot leave them mismatched.
MACs are locally administered unicast and can never equal the bench
ping's. CamTransmitLoop takes the current pseudonym per CAM, and the two
most recently retired IDs still count as ours, so a frame sent just
before a rotation is not taken for a stranger.

GNSS time. On 2026-09-10 the bench phone's clock was 24 minutes fast:
with no SIM and no internet time it had no automatic time source, and
every CAM went out stamped in the future. GnssTimeSource moves transmit
timestamps onto SystemClock.currentGnssTimeClock() and falls back to the
wall clock without a fix, logging which one is in use and the measured
error. ItsTime is now the single rule for both the CAM's
generationDeltaTime and the GN TST. Receive paths stay on the wall clock
so everything they stamp remains comparable.

The bench pinger keeps its fixed station 999999 and a fixed MAC, so a
ping stays recognisable in a capture. 999999 now counts as ours only
while this phone's pinger runs and for 5 s after it stops. The previous
rule treated it as ours unconditionally, which hid another phone's pings
on the same bench.

Leap seconds are an open question, recorded in ItsTime: TimestampIts may
be TAI-based, which would put it 5 s higher. 85 tests, 0 failures.
 2026-09-10 14:47:30 +02:00
Ashin Walpola 3eeccfb268 Send CAMs under the phone's position vector, not bench placeholders 
Every field of the GeoNetworking Source Position Vector this firmware sent
was a compile-time constant: the bench coordinates, speed 0, heading 0,
TST 0, station type passengerCar and one fixed MAC. The CAM inside
described a moving cyclist while the GN header around it described a car
parked at the bench.

SERIAL_MSG_CAM_TX_PV (0x05) puts a 24-byte prefix ahead of the CAM UPER:
MAC, station type, PAI, TST, latitude, longitude, speed and heading, all
values the phone already has when it builds the CAM and none of which
this chip can know. geonet_wrap_shb now takes them as a gn_lpv_t, and
tx_radio_task hands the same MAC to dot11p_build_frame, so the 802.11
source address and the GN_ADDR MID stay one address across a pseudonym
change. Speed is clamped rather than masked, since an overflowing 15-bit
value flips its sign bit and reads as travelling backwards.

This reverses the Phase 03 decision that the firmware owns the
pseudonym. A pseudonym only protects anyone if the MAC, the GN_ADDR and
the CAM's stationID change together, and the phone owns the stationID.

The heartbeat gains a capability byte (payload[7], bit0 = CAM_TX_PV),
appended so an app reading the first 7 bytes is unaffected. The app sends
0x05 only once it sees that bit, so app and firmware can be updated in
either order. CAM_TX (0x01) is still handled and falls back to the bench
values, with the station type corrected to cyclist to match the CAM.

Verified on air from the COM10 test board, decoded independently by the
CiT One's gnHeader: 24 of 24 CAM_TX_PV frames matched the sent position
vector field by field, and so did the CAM station ID. The legacy path
delivered 23 of 24 frames with no field mismatches. Flashed on the COM3
OBU and its boot log is clean.

Also corrects the SERIAL_LINK_MAX_PAYLOAD comment, which still named the
400-byte receive capture buffer as the ceiling on the RX path. That
buffer is 800 bytes now, so the serial link is the ceiling, and larger
payloads are dropped and counted there.
 2026-09-10 14:47:30 +02:00
Ashin Walpola 5ec3619cbe Stop retaining detected manoeuvres; the CAM rate bump is their only consumer 
The detector runs to raise the CAM transmit rate through a manoeuvre. Nothing
else read its output once the UI was removed, so keeping the rows was storing
data with no reader on the chance it would one day be analysed.

Drops the detected_events table in schema v5, deletes DetectedEventEntity and
the DAO and repository methods behind it, removes the insertEvent call from the
recording service, and removes the per-event rows and their five columns
(event_type, confidence, peak_accel, peak_gyro, duration_ms) from the trip CSV
along with the events parameter threaded through buildTripCsv and shareTripCsv.
A detected manoeuvre now lives for the length of one onDetectedEvent call.

MIGRATION_1_2 still creates the table: a v1 install upgrades 1-2-3-4-5 and so
creates it before v5 drops it. Removing it from the earlier migration would
break that path for anyone who has not upgraded yet.

trips.eventCount is kept. Dropping a SQLite column means recreating the table
and copying every recorded ride across, which is real risk for one unused
integer; the service still writes an accurate count and the CSV header still
reports it. It is the only thing left about detected manoeuvres.

This closes off the route to the false-positive measurement that 11.3 flags as
missing, so 11.3 now says that outright rather than pointing at an export that
no longer carries the data. Docs 11.3/11.4, the user guide, the README and the
traceability matrix updated to match. 55 tests, 0 failures.
 2026-09-08 16:29:02 +02:00
Ashin Walpola 1ad123a6f8 Make the event detector a CAM rate input, not a ride-stats readout 
The detector's only live consumer is the CAM transmit-rate policy: every
emitted event calls CamTransmitLoop.onDetectedEvent, raising the beacon
rate from 1 Hz to the elevated rate for five seconds so nearby stations
get denser updates through a manoeuvre. Counting one's own braking events
is not a goal of this project, so the display is gone and the detector
stays: the live per-type counters and their notification text, the event
pins and detail sheet on the trip review map, and the event chip on the
history card. Events are still persisted and exported to CSV, which is
the only route to the tuning measurement section 11.3 says is missing.

Fix two defects found while documenting the detector.

TripRecordingService overrode nine of DetectionConfig's twelve parameters
in its constructor, so the tests validated the Phase A defaults while the
phone ran something materially less sensitive. The tuned values are now
the defaults and the override is deleted; the numbers moved location, not
value, so detector sensitivity is unchanged. EventDetectorTest now sets
only windowSize and the sustained-frame counts and inherits every signal
threshold, which cannot drift again. That was not a free change and makes
the same point from the other side: at the real thresholds the old stimuli
triggered nothing. Accel alternating 3.5/0.5 gives a std dev of 1.5 and
never clears 1.8, and the moderate-braking case used a 0.8 m/s drop that
never clears 1.0. Those stimuli are re-derived against the real values.

brakingHighConfidenceRate was documented as a rate but has always been
compared against the peak cumulative drop from the onset speed, which
grows with episode length, so HIGH was assigned more readily than the name
implied. Renamed to brakingHighConfidencePeakDrop rather than changing the
comparison: "lost more than 1.5 m/s in one episode" is coherent, whereas a
rate off a 1 Hz speed signal sampled at 50 Hz spikes on a near-zero
divisor early in an episode. Output is unchanged, so the existing
confidence assertions stay evidence instead of being re-baselined.

Docs 11.3/11.4 updated in place, including the correction of a claim that
detected events do not reach the V2X side; the rate-bump path already
existed when that was written. 55 tests, 0 failures.
 2026-09-08 16:20:14 +02:00
Ashin Walpola 83ccf335bb Document the event detector's specification and trigger conditions 
Section 11 described how the detector works and the test-design finding from
2026-08-25, but carried no threshold values, no trigger conditions and no
emission semantics. That was inconsistent with section 10.4, which tabulates
all nineteen UseCaseDetectionConfig parameters for the V2X side. Adds 11.3 and
11.4 to close the gap.

11.3 tabulates all twelve DetectionConfig parameters in three columns, because
three different configurations exist and they do not agree. DetectionConfig's
KDoc says its defaults match the Phase A specification; TripRecordingService
overrides nine of the twelve when it constructs the detector, every one of them
in the direction of lower sensitivity. The shipping detector is not the
specified detector, and that was recorded nowhere outside a constructor.

11.4 gives the input rates, the qualifying condition for each of the three
event types, when each emits, and how confidence is assigned. It also explains
why braking compares against a reference speed latched at onset rather than a
per-frame delta: GNSS updates at 1 Hz against a 50 Hz detector, so a per-frame
delta is non-zero on one frame in fifty and could never coincide with a
25-frame sustain requirement. That is the same sampling lag that made four
tests unsatisfiable, seen from the implementation side.

Two discrepancies found while writing this are recorded rather than fixed,
since fixing either changes behaviour and belongs in its own change:

- EventDetectorTest states it keeps production thresholds for all signal
  values. The values it keeps are the DetectionConfig defaults, not the ones
  TripRecordingService runs. All 18 tests validate a configuration that never
  executes on a phone. The logic under test is shared, so they remain valid
  logic tests; they are not evidence about the shipped system.
- brakingHighConfidenceRate is documented as a rate in m/s per GNSS update but
  is compared against the peak cumulative drop from the onset reference, which
  is not a rate and grows with episode length. HIGH confidence is therefore
  assigned more readily than the name implies.

Also notes the emission asymmetry: turning and stopping emit once per episode,
braking re-arms and re-fires roughly every half second at the shipping values.

Edited in place through the existing package rather than regenerated, so Word's
own parts and the manual edits from 312f094 survive. All sixteen package parts
verified present afterwards, section order unchanged, all nine image
placeholders intact.
 2026-09-07 16:42:58 +02:00
Ashin Walpola 034ef22336 Decode raw v2x/rx on the CiT One path, and stop tracking our own CAM pings 
The Use Case app's v2x-uca/output/json topics are a rate-limited and
lossy view: traffic the OBU's radio actually heard, the ESP32's CAM
pinger among it, never reached the app. The raw v2x/rx topics carry
everything, as RecvV2XMessage protobuf with the ITS-G5 PDU in one bytes
field (CI-CiT MQTT API section 2.4).

RecvV2xMessage is a minimal protobuf wire-format reader for the three
fields needed: btpHeader type and destination port, the GeoNetworking
destination-area radius, and the payload. Hand-written for the same
reason the ASN.1 codecs are, rather than adding protoc and the protobuf
Gradle plugin and vendoring a third-party .proto into this repository.
Field numbers are pinned by a byte fixture written out by hand from the
encoding rules, not generated by our own encoder.

Raw payloads now travel as bytes rather than String. The previous UTF-8
round trip replaced every byte that is not valid UTF-8, leaving a
payload that still looked plausible in a log and decoded to nothing.

CAM, DENM and SPATEM from both transports now meet in shared handlers,
so everything downstream is transport-agnostic. SPATEM works on the CiT
One path for the first time, and DENM gains its relevance radius there.
Where both sources describe the same event the decoded one wins: remote
CAMs from the processed topic are suppressed while the raw topic is
live, and DENMs dedup on ETSI's actionID with the decoded list last.
The processed topics stay subscribed as a fallback for an OBU whose
configuration does not publish the raw ones.

Two defects found while testing this:

CamPinger transmits under a fixed bench station id, deliberately
distinct from the persisted one, but the self-heard filter only knew
the persisted id. Every ping therefore came back through the ESP32's
promiscuous receive as a remote road user sitting exactly on top of the
ego position, moving at the ego's own speed and heading, and was handed
to the detection engine as a collision partner for itself. The rule now
lives in OwnStationIds, covers both ids, and has tests, so a third
transmit path cannot reintroduce the same gap quietly.

Self-heard frames are now counted and reported on the pinger card
instead of being discarded. That round trip is the only direct evidence
the serial link, the ESP32's transmit path and its receive path all
work, which is what the bench pinger exists to demonstrate.

Also: the stationType warning banner no longer shows in ESP32-C5 mode.
It reads a value from the CiT One's obu_gnss topic, which that hardware
never publishes, so it stayed on screen reporting on an OBU that was no
longer in use.
 2026-09-02 15:25:31 +02:00
Ashin Walpola ebe1c9edfd Dashboard: surface the nearest hazard and the next signal change 
Two cards below the status cards, each shown only when there is
something to show and each opening the V2X screen when tapped.

Hazard: cause name, distance, and a count of the others behind it,
ranked closest first. A hazard whose distance cannot be resolved,
because there is no fix yet, sorts last rather than being dropped.

Traffic light: the intersection changing soonest, its leading phase
with a countdown, and every signal group as a colour-coded chip. The
countdown runs on its own 500 ms clock rather than on SPATEM arrivals,
so it cannot freeze mid-count and keep claiming a light is about to
change after the RSU stops transmitting.

Signals are ranked by time-to-change rather than by distance because
SPATEM carries no position at all. Placing an intersection needs MAPEM
geometry, which nothing on air is currently sending.

Also fixes bottom-nav taps. One rule now applies to every tab: a tap
lands on that tab's own screen, popping back to it when it is still on
the stack so the gesture behaves exactly like Back or a back swipe.
saveState/restoreState are gone, since on this flat graph a restored
back stack brought back the sub-screen the rider was on instead of the
tab root, which is the opposite of what the tap asked for. Tabs also
now stay lit on the screens that belong to them.
 2026-09-02 15:25:05 +02:00
Ashin Walpola 312f094909 Save the Word-edited copies of both documents 
Both files were opened and edited in Word and are re-saved here as the
authoritative versions. They supersede the generated originals from 16998bf.

The files grew by roughly 9 to 11 KB, which is Word repackaging them: its own
settings part, embedded font references and per-run revision identifiers, none
of which the generator wrote. The technical document also lost two empty
paragraphs, which is Word trimming trailing empties.

Extracted text is byte-for-byte unchanged in the user guide and identical in
word count in the technical document, and both still carry their full section
structure and all twenty image placeholders. Neither file contains an embedded
image yet, so the placeholders are all still waiting on artwork.

Word is now the source of truth for these two files. There is no longer a
script that can regenerate them without discarding whatever was changed here,
so edit them in Word rather than rebuilding.
 2026-09-01 15:10:09 +02:00
Ashin Walpola b6a687982d Update the README for the ESP32-C5 path and the two documents 
The README still described the project as it was before Phase 03. Several
claims had become actively wrong rather than merely dated, and the last one
is the kind a reviewer would catch:

- "no ASN.1 encoding in the app" - the app hand-encodes and decodes CAM,
  DENM and SPATEM bit by bit on the ESP32-C5 path. domain/asn1/ is now the
  highest-risk code in the project, and the README denied it existed.
- The phase table listed Phase 03 as Bluetooth BLE. Phase 03 is the
  ESP32-C5; Bluetooth is not implemented and the requirements leave it open.
- "communicates with the OBU exclusively via the consider it MQTT API v6"
  is true of one of the two hardware paths.
- The feature list claimed MAP and CPM display. There is no MAPEM decoder
  and nothing in the tree supports CPM, so both claims are dropped rather
  than carried forward.
- DENM transmission was listed as a headline feature with no indication that
  it is a manual antenna and range test tool, CiT One only, and deliberately
  never triggered by a detected event or a use case alert. That decoupling is
  the project's central architectural rule and the README implied the
  opposite.
- The architecture tree predated domain/asn1, domain/usecase, domain/cam,
  data/cam, the serial transport, obu-firmware/ and asn1/.

Added: the project goal, the two hardware paths and the point where they
converge, a verification section, a documentation index, and a status
section.

The convergence point is worth stating in the README rather than only in the
technical document, because it is what makes the second OBU a drop-in rather
than a fork: both paths normalise into the domain Cam type at
CamUseCaseRepository, and everything above it is shared and
transport-agnostic.

The status section says plainly that requirement 11.6 is not met, that
messages are not signed, and that the detection thresholds are untuned
estimates. Someone arriving at this repository should learn that from the
front page rather than from page forty of a Word document.
 2026-09-01 15:07:57 +02:00
Ashin Walpola 3da60d3a99 Ignore Office lock files 
Word creates ~$<name>.docx beside a document while it is open and removes it on
close. docs/~$crOBU-User-Guide.docx was showing as untracked while the user guide
was being edited, which is exactly the kind of transient file a git add -A sweeps
in by accident.
 2026-08-26 17:13:50 +02:00
Ashin Walpola 081347f31b Tapping the active bottom-nav tab returns to that tab's root screen 
Tapping Settings while on Settings > Connection appeared to do nothing. The tab
navigated to its own route, but restoreState = true then restored that tab's
saved back stack, putting the sub-screen straight back on top. The only way out
was the back button or a back swipe.

When the tap targets the tab already in use and the current destination is deeper
inside it, pop back to the tab's own screen instead of navigating. Only entries
above the tab root are removed, so Back and back-swipe behave exactly as before -
both routes out of a sub-screen now work.

The tab also stayed unhighlighted while any sub-screen was open, because selected
compared the current route for equality with the tab's route. Ownership is now
derived from the existing route naming convention, so settings/connection belongs
to Settings and trip_review/{tripId} belongs to Trips. A new settings/* screen is
picked up automatically; a sub-screen named outside its tab's prefix would need a
line in ownsRoute.
 2026-08-26 17:12:46 +02:00
Ashin Walpola 16998bf478 Add the user guide and technical documentation as Word documents 
Two documents, wiki-style so they import cleanly: short titled sections,
tables over prose where the content is comparative, and cross-references
between sections rather than a narrative that has to be read start to end.

MicrOBU-User-Guide.docx is for riders. Features, setup for both hardware
paths, what each screen shows, what the five alerts mean in plain language,
troubleshooting. No ASN.1, no BTP ports, no bit widths anywhere in it. The
alert descriptions and the link states are taken from values/strings.xml so
the guide and the interface use the same words.

MicrOBU-Technical-Documentation.docx is for supervisors and stakeholders.
Architecture, the message path end to end, the serial protocol, the codecs
and how they are verified, the full requirements matrix, the bench results,
and the decisions. Section 15 is fourteen decisions written as chosen /
alternative / reasoning / cost accepted, because the alternative is the part
a supervisor asks about and it was previously recorded only in commit
messages.

Nothing is re-derived. Every measurement is cited from
05-obu-bench-test-2026-08-25.md, 04-transmit-setup.md, asn1/README.md or
the commit history. Where a claim has no evidence it is marked as unverified
rather than asserted:

- 11.6 Phase A success criteria is stated as not met, in its own subsection.
  The bench proves reception; it cannot prove the use case with two moving
  stations because nothing on the bench moves. This is the central claim of
  the project and it needs a real ride.
- The tx_custom.c bypass is described as the least defensible component in
  the system and load bearing, with the reverse-engineered struct layouts
  and the skipped sanity checking spelled out.
- The 5900 MHz transmit story is marked a mitigation for a hypothesis, not a
  diagnosis, and the isolation test that would settle it is named as not run.
- The detection thresholds are presented as untuned engineering estimates in
  both documents, since presenting them as validated is the easiest and most
  damaging overstatement available here.

Twenty image placeholders, none of them filled. Each is a shaded block
carrying a caption and a "Must show" line. For the three screenshots that
exist the line names the bench session and section they came from; for the
four diagrams that do not exist yet it is a full drawing spec, so the two
hardware paths, the message path, the frame layout and the verification loop
can be drawn from the document without re-reading the source.

references.bib collects the standards as BibTeX for a later publication:
EN 302 637-2/3, TS 103 301, SAE J2735, TS 102 894-2, EN 302 636-4-1 and
-5-1, TS 103 248, TS 103 097, IEEE 802.11 OCB, plus the C2C-CC white paper
and the vendored parser provenance.

Also tracks two documents the new ones cite that had never been committed:
docs/01-requirements-traceability.md and 04-transmit-setup.md. Section 18.3
lists them as repository sources, which would have been a dangling reference
otherwise.

Not included, deliberately: the two consider it PDFs cited in section 18.2.
They are third-party vendor documentation and redistributing them is a
licensing decision, not a documentation one.

Still missing: the German user guide. values-de/strings.xml already fixes the
terminology for it.
 2026-08-26 16:03:11 +02:00
Ashin Walpola cc35994e68 Fix four EventDetectorTest cases that never passed 
These have been red since the initial commit. All four failed for the same
reason, and in every case the test was wrong rather than the detector.

EventDetector requires two conditions to hold on the SAME frame, and one of them
is a rolling-window statistic that takes time to respond. The tests ignored that
lag, so they described situations the detector cannot see - and could not have
seen at any point in its history.

Braking (3 tests). Each filled the accel window with a CONSTANT value, then
stepped the GPS speed down. The speed drop is therefore true on exactly one
frame, and on that frame the accel std dev is still ~0.75 against a 1.2
threshold, because the window is full of the constant. By the time the window
recovers (frame 4), prevSpeedMps has caught up and the drop is 0. The two
conditions never coincide and no BRAKING is possible. Constant accelerometer
output right up to the instant of a brake is not physical either: the IMU is
sampled continuously while GPS speed lags, so the shaking precedes the reported
drop. The tests now establish that variability during the cruise phase.

Stopping. The second episode ran for stoppingFrames + 5. But stopping requires
the accel std dev to be BELOW a threshold, and the window still held the five
moving samples from the acceleration burst between episodes. Those take 8 frames
to drain far enough for the std dev to fall under 0.15, leaving 17 of the 21
frames the event needs. The first episode is unaffected because the window starts
empty. The episode is now long enough to cover the settling time.

Verified by simulating the detector's exact arithmetic against both the old and
new inputs before touching the file: the old profiles produce no events, the new
ones produce BRAKING/HIGH, BRAKING/HIGH, BRAKING/MEDIUM and two STOPPING.

No production code changed - the detector behaves consistently and defensibly.
Assertions are unchanged; only the stimulus is now something a bicycle could
actually produce. Suite is 41 tests, 0 failures.
 2026-08-25 15:21:34 +02:00
Ashin Walpola 04b0076b8b Move the RX capture buffer off the WiFi driver's callback stack 
rx_item_t is ~800 bytes at RX_FRAME_MAX_LEN, and wifi_promisc_rx_cb declared one
as a local. That callback runs on the WiFi driver's own task, already several
frames deep in the driver's call chain, on a stack of roughly 3.5 KB
(CONFIG_ESP_WIFI_TASK_STACK_SIZE, left at its default). Putting a fifth of that
stack into a single local is a stack-overflow risk that only appears under real
traffic - in front of an RSU rather than on the bench - and would present as a
random panic rather than anything pointing at its cause.

Both instances are now static: one in the callback, one in rx_forward_task. Safe
because each is touched by exactly one task, so there is no re-entrancy to guard
against; the same reasoning serial_link.c already uses for its static send
buffers. xQueueSend copies the struct out before returning, so reusing the
callback's buffer on the next frame is fine.

Firmware-only, no protocol change, so it does not require a matching app install.

Re-verified against live traffic after flashing: 1094 frames over 125 s with zero
decode failures, USB errors, detaches, crashes or mutex timeouts. SPATEM capture
rose from 3.20/s to 3.98/s against a theoretical maximum of 4.00/s, which is the
direction relieving stack pressure would produce, though RF geometry moves
between runs and this is not proof.

Report updated with T9, the accepted 512-byte ceiling, and the decision to drop
Phase B: the intersection use case is CAM-driven and needs none of it.
 2026-08-25 15:13:23 +02:00
Ashin Walpola d0701ccea4 Show roadside units in the station list; log ESP32 drop counters 
Bench test on 2026-08-25 against live RSU and CiT One traffic found that 611 RSU
CAMs decoded correctly and none of them were ever displayed. Excluding RSUs from
UseCaseDetectionEngine - correct, since a permanently stationary station at a
fixed point trips the stopped-vehicle use case for as long as it is in range -
also removed them from the map and station list, because remotePositions is the
engine's own map.

RSUs are now tracked in a separate rsuStations flow and merged with the engine's
road users for display only. Expiry is clock-driven for the same reason as
hazards and signals: an RSU going out of range simply stops transmitting, and no
further emission would arrive to recompute the list. Cleared on link-down
alongside engine.reset(), so a stale RSU cannot outlive an unplug.

The kinematics line is suppressed for them. An RSU's CAM uses
rsuContainerHighFrequency, which carries no kinematics at all, so the zeroes in
the model are placeholders - printing "0.0 km/h - heading 0" would assert a
stationary vehicle pointing due north.

Also logs the ESP32's STATUS heartbeat counters whenever one changes. They
previously reached only the CAM Pinger card, so a bench run captured through
logcat had no record of whether the firmware dropped anything. Logged on change
rather than per beat: the interesting event is a drop appearing, and a
once-per-second line would bury it.

Test report in 05-obu-bench-test-2026-08-25.md.
 2026-08-25 14:37:46 +02:00
Ashin Walpola b2b57fa39e Vendor the ASN.1 modules the codecs are verified against; untrack IDE churn 
asn1/
Three tests assert exact bytes - CamEncodeGoldenTest, DenmAirReceiveTest and
SpatemUperCodecTest - and their expected values came from asn1tools compiled
against ETSI modules that existed only as an untracked working copy on one
machine. A golden-byte fixture nobody else can regenerate is a fixture nobody
can safely touch, so the modules are now in the repo.

Only the seven .asn files those tests need are copied, 576 KB of a 4.2 MB
checkout; the upstream Rust parser is not used by this project at all. Verified
sufficient in isolation: copied into an empty directory, all three specs compile
and reproduce the committed golden CAM bytes byte-identically.

Source is consider it GmbH's C-ITS-Parser (github.com/consider-it/C-ITS-Parser)
at f457426, MIT licensed - LICENSE is retained alongside as that requires. The
schemas themselves are ETSI's standard definitions; upstream's contribution is
assembling them into a compilable set. asn1/README.md records the provenance,
which module pairs with which message, and the rule that matters: never
regenerate a golden fixture from this project's own encoder, because sharing a
mistake between encoder and decoder is exactly the failure these files exist to
catch.

Doc references in the codecs and tests now point at asn1/ instead of the
untracked checkout, and C-ITS-Parser/ is gitignored so the working copy beside
the project is never picked up.

Untracked local state
- .idea/deploymentTargetSelector.xml rewrites itself on every deploy, so it has
  been showing as modified in essentially every commit. Along with
  deviceManager.xml, appInsightsSettings.xml and studiobot.xml it is per-machine
  state, not project configuration.
- obu-firmware/sdkconfig.old is ESP-IDF build output - it is the previous
  sdkconfig, rewritten on every build. sdkconfig.defaults remains tracked, since
  that is the configuration actually chosen.

All five stay on disk; only the tracking is removed. Also ignores
.claude/settings.local.json, which is per-machine, while leaving the skills
beside it committable as project knowledge.
 2026-08-21 14:28:57 +02:00
Ashin Walpola eb6150260b Fix NPE crash on the V2X map when messages arrive during teardown 
osmdroid's MapView.onDetach() permanently tears the view down: afterwards its
MapViewRepository holds a null MapView, so constructing a Marker against it
throws NullPointerException from inside InfoWindow's constructor.

It was being called from a DisposableEffect keyed on the lifecycle owner, which
disposes independently of the AndroidView that owns the map. The update block
could therefore still run against an already-detached MapView and rebuild its
markers:

  java.lang.NullPointerException: Attempt to invoke virtual method
    'MapViewRepository MapView.getRepository()' on a null object reference
      at org.osmdroid.views.overlay.Marker.<init>(Marker.java:116)
      at V2xLiveMapViewKt...(V2xLiveMapView.kt:119)

The crash is dated 2026-08-17 18:19, ten minutes after DENM reception went live
on the device. The defect was always there, but every incoming message
recomposes this view, so going from occasional updates to one per second made
the window easy to land in - and SPATEM at ~2 Hz makes it easier still.

Moves the teardown to AndroidView's onRelease, which is the callback that means
"this View is gone" and after which Compose guarantees no further update.
 2026-08-20 16:31:41 +02:00
Ashin Walpola a5ad3dcc5d SPATEM receive, RSU CAM decode, and two ASN.1 encoding fixes 
SPATEM over the air
- gn_unwrap.c accepts BTP-B port 2004 alongside 2001/2002. The serial protocol
  already carries the port in its V2X_RX prefix, so nothing else changed there.
  Note the crossover that makes this easy to get wrong: SPATEM is port 2004 but
  messageID 4, while MAPEM is port 2003 and messageID 5.
- SpatemUperCodec decodes SPAT down to per-signal-group phase and timing. The
  bit layout was validated by replaying 79,042 real SPATEMs - the whole
  2026-03-18 drive across 7+ RSUs plus the bench trigger - against asn1tools
  using the ETSI modules. All 79,042 matched on every field, none hit an
  unsupported branch. Two traps are pinned by tests: TimeChangeDetails is the
  one SEQUENCE here that is NOT extensible (5 optional bits, no extension bit),
  and maneuverAssistList cannot be skipped when present - it is variable-length,
  so it has to be walked to find where the next movement starts.
- The V2X list shows one row per intersection with each signal group coloured by
  phase and a countdown where the RSU supplies timing. TimeMark wraps hourly, so
  the countdown corrects for it; without that it reads hugely negative once an
  hour, precisely when someone is watching it.
- Entries expire after 15 s, much shorter than DENM's window: a traffic light
  that stopped updating is not "still green".

  Size caveat, deliberately deferred: SERIAL_LINK_MAX_PAYLOAD is still 512, so a
  SPATEM over ~498 bytes is counted as an oversize drop. The bench RSU sends 58
  bytes and is unaffected, but real road RSUs measured 555 median / 1243 max, so
  roughly 70% would not arrive. Raising the cap also requires enlarging
  RX_FRAME_MAX_LEN and moving rx_item_t off the WiFi driver's callback stack,
  where it would otherwise overflow.

RSU CAM decode
- HighFrequencyContainer is a CHOICE, and a roadside unit picks
  rsuContainerHighFrequency, which carries no kinematics at all. The decoder
  bailed on that branch, so every RSU CAM was dropped - including the bench RSU,
  which sends CAM and SPATEM from the same station id. It now decodes for
  position and stationType.
- RSU CAMs are kept out of UseCaseDetectionEngine. They arrive as a permanently
  stationary station at a fixed point, which is exactly the shape the
  stopped-vehicle and intersection-movement use cases match, and would raise a
  standing false alert for as long as the RSU was in range.

CAM transmit: yawRateConfidence
- YawRateConfidence has nine enumerands (0..8), so UPER needs 4 bits and
  "unavailable" is 8. The encoder wrote 3 bits with value 7 - one bit short and
  the wrong symbol - shifting every field after yawRate for any standards-strict
  receiver. The decoder read 3 bits too, so phone and ESP32 agreed with each
  other and with nothing else.
- This is the third instance of that exact failure mode in this project, after
  CurvatureCalculationMode and the GeoNetworking reserved bytes. A round-trip
  test through our own decoder structurally cannot catch it, so CamEncodeGolden
  Test asserts the bytes asn1tools produces instead: it decoded this encoder's
  output and re-encoded it byte-identically. Confirmed on air afterwards - 26 of
  our own CAMs captured back off the OBU's receiver, all 26 accepted, where the
  same decoder rejected them before.

DENM
- Hazards now expire 60 s after their last repetition. This needs a clock, not
  just a filter: both source flows only emit when a DENM arrives, so a sender
  that drives away or loses power would never trigger a recompute and its hazard
  would stay on screen indefinitely.
- The MQTT path was dropping every DENM for two independent reasons, both found
  by checking the payload against CI-CiT-MQTT_API_Documentation-v6 listing 2.6
  rather than guessing: the station id key is originatingStationId, and
  eventPosition IS a GeoJSON Point rather than an object containing one. Also
  parses termination (presence is the signal), sequenceNumber, stationType and
  the RFC3339 detectionTime. Note roadSideUnit is 15, not 12 - the enumeration
  has a gap after tram(11).

V2X screen
- The decoded CAM/DENM list now renders on the CiT One path too; it was gated to
  the ESP32-C5 path and CiT One fell through to the raw MQTT topic list. Those
  topics move to their own tab, hidden on the ESP32-C5 path where there is no
  broker.

Testing
- Adds org.json as a test-only dependency: the android.jar stub throws
  "not mocked" on every JSONObject call, which made the MQTT payload parsers
  untestable off-device.
- 23 V2X tests pass. EventDetectorTest's 4 failures are pre-existing and
  untouched by this change.
 2026-08-20 15:47:14 +02:00
Ashin Walpola 0ccb867228 DENM over-the-air receive on the ESP32-C5 path 
The firmware forwarded CAM only: gn_unwrap_cam accepted single-hop broadcast
(HT=5) and BTP port 2001, so every DENM was dropped before it reached the phone.
Real OBUs disseminate DENM by GeoBroadcast (HT=4), whose 44-byte extended header
also carries the hazard's relevance area - materially more useful on a map than
the sender's own position, since a sender may be relaying for someone else.

Firmware
- gn_unwrap_cam -> gn_unwrap_its: accepts GeoBroadcast alongside TSB/SHB, and
  BTP ports 2001 and 2002, extracting the GeoBroadcast destination area. Both
  extended-header lengths were measured against live air capture rather than
  read off a spec table. Secured packets (Basic Header NextHeader=2) are
  rejected rather than misparsed.
- SERIAL_MSG_CAM_RX (0x02) superseded by SERIAL_MSG_V2X_RX (0x04): a 14-byte
  prefix carrying BTP port, RSSI and the destination area. Adding MAPEM later
  needs a decoder on the phone but no protocol change. 0x02 stays reserved so
  the numbering is not silently reused.
- Promiscuous RX capture buffer 400 -> 800 bytes. A real GeoBroadcast DENM is
  around 500 bytes on air and was being truncated mid-payload, which no amount
  of correct unwrapping downstream could have recovered from.
- geonet_wrap_shb, both firmwares: the SHB extended header is 28 bytes, not 24.
  The Source Position Vector is followed by a 4-byte reserved field; without it
  a standards-strict receiver reads the CAM payload's first two bytes as the BTP
  destination port.

App
- DenmUperCodec: UPER decoder for the ManagementContainer and the
  SituationContainer's eventType. ValidityDuration is 17 bits, not 16, and
  ManagementContainer, SituationContainer and CauseCode each carry their own
  extension bit - a single wrong bit made a real frame read causeCode 47
  instead of 94.
- DenmEvent gains actionID (originatingStationID + sequenceNumber), stationType,
  termination, detectionTime, relevance radius and RSSI. Dedup keys on actionID
  where available, so a termination lands on the event it ends instead of
  creating a second pin.
- denmEvents merges the MQTT and over-the-air sources and drops terminated
  events. The V2X list view now shows hazards above the CAM stations; it
  previously took no DENM parameter at all, so hazards reached the map but never
  the list.
- DenmParser: the Use Case API sends causeCode as a string enum, so reading it
  as an Int always yielded null.

Testing
- DenmAirReceiveTest covers the V2X_RX prefix and the decoder using real frames
  from a live capture as fixtures. Expected values were cross-checked against
  the ETSI ASN.1 modules via asn1tools, which agreed on all 1885 decodable
  DENMs across the capture set, every field including detectionTime.
- Verified on hardware: a CiT One HLN-SV DENM decodes as cause 94/0 with a
  1000 m relevance radius at 1 Hz alongside CAM, with no decode failures and no
  unexpected BTP ports.

Also replaces em dashes with hyphens throughout the user-facing strings,
including the German translation.
 2026-08-17 18:42:48 +02:00
106 changed files with 21728 additions and 3457 deletions
Expand all files Collapse all files
.gitignore
+32
View File
@@ -17,3 +17,35 @@ local.properties
*.jks
*.keystore
secrets.properties
# --- local IDE state, not project configuration -------------------------------
# Which device you last deployed to, your emulator list, and Studio's assistant
# settings are per-machine. deploymentTargetSelector.xml in particular rewrites
# itself on every run, so tracking it means a dirty tree after every deploy.
/.idea/deploymentTargetSelector.xml
/.idea/deviceManager.xml
/.idea/appInsightsSettings.xml
/.idea/studiobot.xml
# Python bytecode caches, e.g. from importing obu-firmware/test/host/check_replay.py.
__pycache__/
# ESP-IDF rewrites sdkconfig on every build and keeps the previous one here.
# sdkconfig.defaults is the real, intentional configuration; these two are output.
sdkconfig.old
# Claude Code local settings (permissions, per-machine). The skills alongside it
# are project knowledge and may be committed deliberately.
.claude/settings.local.json
# Third-party working copies kept beside the project, not part of it. The ASN.1
# modules this project actually needs are vendored under asn1/ instead.
/C-ITS-Parser/
/vanetza/
# Office lock files. Word/Excel create these beside a document while it is open
# and remove them on close, so they are transient and machine-local.
~$*
# Captures are large data files, not source (see capture/README.md).
/capture/recordings/
.idea/appInsightsSettings.xml
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@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<project version="4">
<component name="AppInsightsSettings">
<option name="selectedTabId" value="Android vitals" />
</component>
</project>
.idea/deploymentTargetSelector.xml
Generated
-31
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@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<project version="4">
<component name="deploymentTargetSelector">
<selectionStates>
<SelectionState runConfigName="app">
<option name="selectionMode" value="DROPDOWN" />
<DropdownSelection timestamp="2026-08-05T15:07:39.343414600Z">
<Target type="DEFAULT_BOOT">
<handle>
<DeviceId pluginId="PhysicalDevice" identifier="serial=56211FDAP0015L" />
</handle>
</Target>
</DropdownSelection>
<DialogSelection>
<targets>
<Target type="DEFAULT_BOOT">
<handle>
<DeviceId pluginId="PhysicalDevice" identifier="serial=56211FDAP0015L" />
</handle>
</Target>
<Target type="DEFAULT_BOOT">
<handle>
<DeviceId pluginId="LocalEmulator" identifier="path=C:\Users\Ashin\.android\avd\Pixel_7_Pro.avd" />
</handle>
</Target>
</targets>
</DialogSelection>
</SelectionState>
</selectionStates>
</component>
</project>
.idea/deviceManager.xml
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@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<project version="4">
<component name="DeviceTable">
<option name="columnSorters">
<list>
<ColumnSorterState>
<option name="column" value="Name" />
<option name="order" value="ASCENDING" />
</ColumnSorterState>
</list>
</option>
</component>
</project>
.idea/studiobot.xml
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@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<project version="4">
<component name="StudioBotProjectSettings">
<option name="shareContext" value="OptedOut" />
</component>
</project>
04-transmit-setup.md
+280
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@@ -0,0 +1,280 @@
# Step 4 - Build, flash, and validate the HLN-SV DENM transmitter
## Radio-config fix (2026-07-15) - read this first
Symptom: nothing on air. Proof it was a radio-config problem, not a
frame-format problem: the 2026-07-15 sniffer capture (`recordings/
its5_20260715_131448.pcap`) contains 13,584 ITS-G5 frames on 5.9 GHz but
**zero** from our source MAC `02:00:00:00:00:01`. A sniffer records a
station's frames even if the payload is malformed, so the frame was never
leaving the radio - the DENM/GeoNet/802.11 encoding was never the issue.
Three stacking causes, all in `main.c`'s Wi-Fi init, now fixed:
1. **Plain STA, no promiscuous, power-save on.** ESP-IDF only actually emits
raw frames when the MAC is in promiscuous mode or associated to an AP, and
default STA power-save sleeps the radio between beacons and drops outbound
frames. The *working sniffer* runs promiscuous - the OBU didn't. Fixed:
`esp_wifi_set_ps(WIFI_PS_NONE)` + `esp_wifi_set_promiscuous(true)` after
`esp_wifi_start()`.
2. **Never entered 5 GHz band mode.** The stuck `esp_wifi_get_channel()
primary=1` was the dual-band C5 still in 2.4 GHz band mode, so
`esp_wifi_set_channel(<5G channel>)` failed silently and the HMAC TX path
keyed the 2.4 GHz PHY on ch1 - inaudible to a 5.9 GHz sniffer. Fixed:
`esp_wifi_set_band_mode(WIFI_BAND_MODE_5G_ONLY)` before start. Channel prime
changed from 140 (5700 MHz) to **177 (5885 MHz)** - see cause 3.
3. **5900 MHz is out of the C5's spec range.** The datasheet 5 GHz range is
**5180-5885 MHz**; our target 5900 MHz (ITS-G5 G5-CCH) is 15 MHz above it.
RX tolerates 15 MHz over (that's why the sniffer works at 5900); TX may be
PA-calibration-gated at an uncalibrated frequency. Priming the driver to
channel 177 (5885, the top legal channel) keeps TX on the closest real
power table before `phy_change_channel(5900,...)` nudges the LO.
### If it STILL shows nothing after these fixes - the 5900 MHz isolation test
Causes 1 and 2 are high-confidence. Cause 3 is the remaining unknown, so
isolate it before touching anything else. Temporarily change **both** ends to
a channel inside the C5's spec range and see if the OBU appears:
- In `main.c`, change the target frequency from `5900` to `5885` in *both*
`phy_change_channel()` calls (boot + per-TX), matching the channel-177 prime.
- Put your sniffer on 5885 MHz too.
- Ground GPIO4 and watch the dashboard/PCAP for source MAC
`02:00:00:00:00:01`.
If the OBU now appears at 5885 but not at 5900: TX genuinely can't key the PA
at the out-of-spec 5900 MHz, and no amount of frame-format work will change
that - you'd need a chip whose 5 GHz range covers the ITS band, or to accept
operating one channel down. If it appears at neither, the problem is still in
the TX-enable path (recheck that the three calls above returned ESP_OK in the
boot log), not the frequency.
Also note: **nothing transmits until GPIO4 is grounded** (active-low hazard
input). If you were bench-testing without grounding GPIO4, the TX path was
never even entered - ground it (jumper GPIO4 to GND) before concluding
anything.
---
Profile: **HLN-SV** (aftermarket stationary recovery vehicle) - causeCode 94
(stationaryVehicle), subCauseCode 0, transmits only while the hazard-light
GPIO reads active. No location/alacarte containers, no optional fields.
Code lives in `obu-firmware/main/`: `main.c` (entry, PHY hack, GPIO, TX loop),
`denm.c/.h` (ASN.1 UPER encoding), `geonet.c/.h` (GeoNetworking + BTP-B
wrapping), `dot11p.c/.h` (802.11 OCB frame assembly), `tx_custom.c/.h` (the
actual raw-frame transmit path - see "The TX bypass" below).
## The TX bypass (tx_custom.c)
`esp_wifi_80211_tx()` - ESP-IDF's public raw-frame API - rejects QoS Data
frames outright (`esp_err 258` / "unsupport QoS frame type"), and there's no
supported way to override that from application code (a linker-level symbol
override attempt, `main/wifi_patches.c`, is kept around only for history -
confirmed not to work).
`tx_custom.c` was pulled from
[opentrafficmap/its-g5-receiver-firmware_txenabled](https://codeberg.org/opentrafficmap/its-g5-receiver-firmware_txenabled)
- a TX-enabled fork of the exact receiver firmware (V2X2MAP) already used on
the RX side of this project, same authors, same chip. Instead of trying to
disable the gate, it skips the code path that contains it entirely: it calls
`ic_ebuf_alloc()` and `ieee80211_post_hmac_tx()` - undocumented internal
driver functions - directly, submitting straight to the MAC. `main.c` now
calls `esp_wifi_80211_tx_custom()` instead of `esp_wifi_80211_tx()`, with the
one proven-working parameter set (`WIFI_PHY_MODE_11A`, `WIFI_PHY_RATE_12M`,
`WIFI_BAND_5G`, `WIFI_BW20`) copied from the only call site in the upstream
repo (`mqtt.cpp`, triggered by an incoming MQTT message there - ours is
triggered by the GPIO4 hazard-light logic instead).
**What this unlocks**: `dot11p.c` is back to real QoS Data frames (subtype 8)
since the gate that forced the non-QoS downgrade no longer applies. Frame
size is now 117 bytes (was 115 with non-QoS Data's 2-byte-shorter header) -
expect `sent (117 bytes)` in the log now, not 115.
**What's NOT yet independently verified** - things worth checking as you go:
- Whether `ieee80211_post_hmac_tx`, `ic_ebuf_alloc`, `ic_get_default_sched`,
`g_osi_funcs_p`, and `g_wifi_global_lock` actually exist as symbols in
*your* IDF version's `libnet80211.a`/`libpp.a` for esp32c5 - we only
previously confirmed `ieee80211_raw_frame_sanity_check` exists via `nm`,
not these. If the build fails to link with `undefined reference`, this is
the first thing to check - same `nm` approach as the `phy_11p_set` section
below, just against these symbol names.
- `tx_custom.c`'s internal struct layouts (`x_eb_txdesc_t`, `x_ebuf_t`) are
reverse-engineered from the closed WiFi driver, pinned only by a `sizeof()`
assert - that catches a total-size mismatch across IDF versions but not a
field-order mismatch that happens to keep the same total size. If your IDF
version differs meaningfully from whatever the upstream repo has pinned
(check their `esp-idf` git submodule commit vs. `idf.py --version`), this
could compile and link cleanly but write to the wrong internal offsets.
Worth keeping in mind as a possible explanation if you get a crash/hang
right when TX fires rather than a clean error.
- Same "skips ALL sanity checking" risk as the old override attempt: a
malformed frame from a bug anywhere in `denm.c`/`geonet.c`/`dot11p.c` could
now behave worse (crash, silent corruption) than a clean rejection.
- `esp_wifi_set_channel(140, ...)` was added in `main.c` right before the
`phy_11p_set`/`phy_change_channel` pair, copied from upstream's
`cmd_sniffer.c` (their own comment on it: "not sure if strictly needed").
Motivation: our own `esp_wifi_get_channel()` diagnostic was reporting a
stuck `primary=1` regardless of what the PHY hack was told, consistent
with the driver's channel bookkeeping never being touched by anything it
tracks. This is a "worth trying," not a confirmed fix - watch whether
`esp_wifi_get_channel()`'s reported value changes at all now.
## Confidence levels - read this before debugging blind
Updated after pulling the actual specs (EN 302 636-4-1, EN 302 636-5-1) and
the real ASN.1 modules from forge.etsi.org (EN 302 637-3, TS 102 894-2 CDD) -
this isn't guesswork anymore for the parts listed as "verified" below.
- **GeoNetworking Basic/Common/SHB headers, BTP-B header** (`geonet.c`):
verified field-by-field against EN 302 636-4-1. This caught three real
bugs in the previous version: wrong header type (was encoded as
GeoUnicast, HT=2 - now correctly TSB/SINGLE_HOP, HT=5/HST=0), wrong
payload-length calculation (was including the 24-byte extended header,
which it shouldn't), and GN_ADDR being an arbitrary byte string instead of
its actual structure (M-flag + 5-bit station type + reserved + 48-bit
MID = the same link-layer address used in the 802.11 header).
- **BTP-B header** (`geonet.c`): verified against EN 302 636-5-1 - unchanged
from before, structure was already correct.
- **802.11 header, LLC/SNAP** (`dot11p.c`): back to real QoS Data (subtype 8,
26-byte header with a QoS Control field), matching actual ITS-G5 hardware.
This required abandoning `esp_wifi_80211_tx()` entirely in favor of
`esp_wifi_80211_tx_custom()` (`tx_custom.c`) - see "The TX bypass" above for
the full story and the list of things about it that aren't independently
verified yet for our exact toolchain.
- **DENM ASN.1 UPER payload** (`denm.c`): verified against the real ASN.1
modules (DENM-PDU-Descriptions.asn, ITS-Container.asn). This caught real
bugs too: `ManagementContainer`, `SituationContainer`, and the inner
`CauseCode` SEQUENCE are all declared with a trailing `...` (extensible),
each of which needs its own leading extension bit that the previous
version omitted entirely; `SituationContainer`'s optional-presence bits
were encoded in the wrong position (at the end instead of the start); and
three field widths were wrong (latitude is 31 bits not 32, the two
position-confidence fields and orientation are 12 bits not 16, altitude
value is 20 bits not 24). All fixed now, with the exact ASN.1 type and
constraint range cited in comments next to each field.
- **Known-missing, by design, not bugs**: `detectionTime`/`referenceTime`/GN
timestamp are hardcoded to 0 (no RTC/NTP wired up - will decode as
2004-01-01), and `latitude`/`longitude` are hardcoded to 0 (no GNSS wired
up). Both are called out with `TODO` comments in the source.
- **Privacy pseudonym**: the source MAC/GN_ADDR MID is a fixed placeholder,
not rotated. Fine for bench testing; real stacks rotate this every 5-15 min.
- **Unsecured** (no IEEE 1609.2 signing) - matches "no additional
parameters"/easiest, and your sniffer already handles unsecured frames fine
(that's how it decodes RSU SPATEM/MAPEM today).
- **Still a deliberate simplification, not a bug**: single-hop broadcast
(TSB/SINGLE_HOP) instead of GeoBroadcast. Real DENM dissemination
typically uses GeoBroadcast so RSUs/OBUs can forward it across an area -
upgrading to that needs a sequence number + circular geo-area fields in
the GN extended header that this skeleton doesn't build. Fine for a
single-vehicle beacon; revisit if you need multi-hop forwarding.
## Build
```powershell
. $env:IDF_PATH\export.ps1 # or use the "ESP-IDF PowerShell" Start Menu shortcut instead
cd C:\Users\Ashin\Documents\micrOBU_workspace\v2x-obu-esp32c5\obu-firmware
idf.py set-target esp32c5
idf.py build
```
### If the linker fails on `phy_11p_set` / `phy_change_channel`
These are undocumented, reverse-engineered symbols pulled straight from
`libphy.a` - not a public API, so exact names/signatures can shift between
ESP-IDF versions. If you get `undefined reference`, check what's actually
exported for your IDF version:
```powershell
riscv32-esp-elf-nm $env:IDF_PATH\components\esp_phy\lib\esp32c5\libphy.a | Select-String -Pattern "11p|change_channel"
```
Adjust the `extern` declarations at the top of `main.c` to match whatever you
find.
## Flash
```powershell
idf.py -p COM5 -b 921600 flash monitor
```
You should see in the log:
```
OCB mode requested @ 5900 MHz - HLN-SV DENM beacon armed, waiting on GPIO4
```
Nothing transmits yet - GPIO4 is pulled up (inactive) until you ground it.
## Wire up the hazard-light input
For bench testing: a jumper wire or push button between GPIO4 and GND is
enough (active-low - grounding it = "hazard lights on" = beacon active).
For the real thing later: tap whatever signal your recovery vehicle's hazard
switch drives (through a level shifter / opto-isolator if it's 12V vehicle
wiring - don't feed vehicle voltage directly into a GPIO).
## Event lifecycle (added after cross-checking the Cohda UCA MQTT schema)
The Cohda "Use Case App" schema (`v2x-uca/output/json/denm`) documents a
`termination` key: "present if the DENM is cancelled or negated." The
firmware now implements this properly:
- `actionID` (station ID + sequence number) is assigned once per event, on
the rising edge of the hazard-light GPIO, and stays constant across every
repeat of that same event - it does **not** increment every second like an
earlier version of this code did.
- On the falling edge (hazard lights go off), exactly one DENM is sent with
`termination = isCancellation`, referencing that same actionID, then
transmission stops until the next rising edge.
Expect your sniffer to show the same station+sequence number repeating for
the duration of the event, then one final frame with a termination flag.
## Validate against your own sniffer
This is the important part, since a few of the payload bit widths are
best-effort: with the transmitter running (GPIO4 grounded) and your Phase 1
sniffer board powered on nearby, check the V2X2MAP dashboard.
Expect to see:
- A new station appear, sending DENM (and only DENM - this skeleton doesn't
send CAM).
- `causeCode` decoding to **stationaryVehicle**, `subCauseCode` **0**.
- `stationType` decoding to **passengerCar**.
If instead you get "unknown message type," garbage station type, or the
dashboard just doesn't show anything: capture a PCAP from the dashboard's
record button and open it in Wireshark - compare byte-by-byte against a real
captured DENM (like the one from your Cohda OBU) to see exactly where the
two diverge. That's a much faster debug loop than staring at the C code.
## Validate against the real RSU
Your own sniffer receiving the frame only tells you the RF/PHY side works -
it doesn't tell you whether a standards-strict stack (Cohda) will accept it.
With the transmitter running and both your sniffer and the Cohda-based RSU
mqtt monitor watching:
- If **both** see it, and it decodes as a real DENM (not "Type ?"): done,
move on to the "once this round-trips cleanly" list below.
- If your sniffer sees it but doesn't classify it, or the RSU doesn't see it
at all: worth first ruling out the receiver's own reliability (checked
separately - the receiver has shown signs of hanging independent of the
transmitter) before concluding anything about frame format.
- If **neither** sees it: still worth re-checking `esp_wifi_get_channel()`'s
reported value (logged before every TX) - if it's still stuck regardless of
the new `esp_wifi_set_channel(140, ...)` call, that's a stronger signal
the PHY genuinely isn't moving to 5900MHz, independent of frame format.
Note the receiver firmware (V2X2MAP) never faces the frame-type problem this
project spent a while on: receiving never calls `esp_wifi_80211_tx()`, so
there was never a gate on that side to work around. The `phy_11p_set`/
`phy_change_channel` PHY setup in `main.c` already mirrors what the receiver
does for getting onto 5.9GHz OCB mode.
## Once this round-trips cleanly
Next reasonable steps, in rough order: wire in real GNSS (replaces the 0/0
lat-long and the GN timestamp), wire in SNTP or GNSS-derived UTC time
(replaces detectionTime/referenceTime), then decide whether you actually
need GeoBroadcast/multi-hop forwarding instead of SHB, then - only if you
need it - look at IEEE 1609.2 signing.
05-obu-bench-test-2026-08-25.md
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# ESP32-C5 OBU firmware — bench test against live ITS-G5 traffic
**Date:** 2026-08-25
**Firmware:** `obu-firmware` @ commit `b2b57fa`, flashed to COM3 (CH343 UART bridge, 921600 baud)
**App:** `app-debug.apk`, installed 14:33:45, Pixel 9 Pro on the C5's native USB-C port
**Verdict:** the receive path works against all three live message types with zero failures.
Two blocking items remain before real-world use, both known and both outside what this bench can
exercise. See [Readiness](#readiness).
## Test environment
| role | device | notes |
|---|---|---|
| Device under test | ESP32-C5 OBU, COM3 | our firmware; phone attached to its native USB port |
| Traffic source | RSU, broker `192.168.3.202` | transmits SPATEM + CAM |
| Traffic source | CiT One OBU, broker `192.168.3.201` | transmits DENM + CAM |
| Independent witness | both brokers' `v2x/rx/*` topics | each hears the *other* device |
Both brokers publish raw UPER (protobuf-wrapped, field 3), so their counts are directly comparable
with what the OBU forwarded. That is what makes this a cross-check rather than a self-report: the
OBU's output is measured against two receivers that share none of its code.
Station IDs observed today (`3983312873` RSU, `3257224191` CiT One) differ from those seen this
morning (`968482441`, `2880458775`). **Station IDs rotate**, so nothing may treat one as a durable
identity for a physical unit.
## T1 — Message type coverage and rate
305-second continuous capture, phone logcat.
| type | frames | rate | stations |
|---|---|---|---|
| CAM | 1244 | 4.08/s | 2 |
| SPATEM | 978 | 3.20/s | 1 |
| DENM | 646 | 2.12/s | 3 |
| **total** | **2868** | **9.40/s** | |
Per station, with received signal strength:
| type | station | frames | RSSI min/median/max |
|---|---|---|---|
| SPATEM | 3983312873 | 978 | −65 / −60 / −48 dBm |
| CAM | 3257224191 | 633 | −58 / −52 / −48 dBm |
| DENM | 3257224191 | 616 | −65 / −58 / −48 dBm |
| CAM | 3983312873 | 611 | −65 / −62 / −60 dBm |
| DENM | 2908440021 | 20 | −64 / −61 / −53 dBm |
| DENM | 1220851972 | 10 | −63 / −52 / −49 dBm |
All three types decoded concurrently, from both transmitters plus two additional DENM sources that
happened to be on air. **PASS.**
## T2 — Decode integrity
Over the same window:
| check | result |
|---|---|
| Decode failures (CAM / DENM / SPATEM) | **0** |
| Unexpected BTP ports from firmware | **0** |
| USB I/O errors | **0** |
| Device detach events | **0** |
| Fatal exceptions | **0** |
Zero decode failures across 2868 frames. Since the decoders return null rather than guessing
whenever an extension bit or unsupported optional appears, a zero here means every frame matched
the bit layouts exactly — not that failures were being swallowed. **PASS.**
## T3 — Cross-check against independent receivers
60-second simultaneous capture from both brokers, counting the same UPER the OBU sees.
| stream | independent witness | our OBU |
|---|---|---|
| RSU SPATEM (3983312873) | 2.00/s | 3.20/s |
| RSU CAM (3983312873) | 2.00/s | 2.00/s |
| CiT One CAM (3257224191) | 2.05/s | 2.08/s |
| CiT One DENM (3257224191) | 1.00/s | 2.02/s |
CAM matches on both transmitters. SPATEM and DENM read high — explained in T4, not a defect.
## T4 — Duplicate transmission (finding, not a fault)
The DENM and SPATEM discrepancies above are **real duplicate transmissions**, not double-counting
in our firmware. Inter-arrival analysis of the captured stream:
| type | gaps < 150 ms | median of those | identical content, different RSSI |
|---|---|---|---|
| SPATEM | 50% (485/977) | 7 ms | **480 / 485** |
| DENM | 50% (308/615) | 5 ms | **282 / 308** |
| CAM | 2% (11/632) | 100 ms | 1 / 11 |
Each SPATEM and DENM goes out **twice, ~5–7 ms apart, with different RSSI** — two antennas. CAM is
sent once. This also reconciles the broker figures: the CiT One reports one copy on `v2x/rx/*` and
the other on `v2x/rx-red/*` ("red" = redundant), and only the primary was counted.
Our firmware is a promiscuous receiver, so forwarding both copies is correct behaviour. The app
deduplicates downstream — DENM on ETSI actionID, SPATEM on intersection key — so the UI shows one
entry per event. The cost is serial bandwidth: **38% of the bytes carried are duplicate copies.**
## T5 — Serial link load
Measured over the 305 s window, using UPER sizes taken from the brokers:
- **9.40 frames/s, ~1550 B/s (12.4 kbit/s)**
- Largest frame: DENM at 402 B UPER → 416 B payload (81% of the 512 B cap, 96 B headroom)
- On the wire that frame is 423 B, 41% of the 1024 B TX ring
- Suppressing duplicate copies would cut this to ~961 B/s (7.7 kbit/s)
No frame in this session exceeded the payload cap.
## T6 — Firmware drop counters
Read directly off the app at 14:45, after the capture:
```
ESP32: tx fail 0 · oversize 0 · crc err 0
```
These are free-running totals **since firmware boot**, so all three being zero covers the whole
session, not just the test window — no oversize drops, no `esp_wifi_80211_tx` failures, no CRC
errors at any point since the C5 was flashed. **PASS.**
The app also now logs these counters whenever one changes (added for this test; they previously
reached only the UI), so a future bench run captured through logcat records drops as they happen.
## T7 — End-to-end UI verification
Screenshot at 14:45 confirms the full chain reaches the display:
| element | shown |
|---|---|
| Link state | CONNECTED |
| Hazard (DENM) | `stationaryVehicle · station 3257224191`, 30 m, 1000 m radius, −63 dBm |
| Signals (SPATEM) | `Intersection -1/23 · station 3983312873`, SG1 red / SG2 amber, −63 dBm |
| Station (CAM) | `Station 3257224191 · Car`, 1.4 km/h, heading 19°, 25 m, −50 dBm |
Signal-group colouring, the DENM relevance radius from the GeoNetworking header, and per-station
RSSI all render correctly.
### Finding: the RSU's CAM decodes but is never displayed
The station list reads **"1 station(s) in range"** — only the CiT One (`3257224191`). The RSU
(`3983312873`) is absent, despite **611 of its CAMs decoding successfully** during the capture.
Cause: RSU CAMs are deliberately excluded from `UseCaseDetectionEngine` (a permanently stationary
station at a fixed point otherwise trips the stopped-vehicle use case continuously) — but
`remoteCamPositions`, which feeds both the station list and the map, is populated *by that engine*.
So the exclusion removes them from the display as well as from detection.
The RSU is not entirely invisible: it appears in the SPAT section as the intersection's station. But
its CAM-reported position is dropped on the floor. This is a defect introduced with the RSU CAM
decode fix earlier today, not a firmware problem — the firmware forwarded all 611 correctly.
**Fixed and re-verified the same session.** RSU CAMs are now tracked in a separate
`rsuStations` flow in the repository, merged with the engine's road users for display only, with a
15 s staleness window and a clear on link-down. Screenshot at 15:01 confirms:
```
2 station(s) in range - latest CAM per station
Station 2199514753 · Car 0.8 km/h · heading 192° 28 m -52 dBm
Station 440624502 · Roadside unit roadside unit - no kinematics reported
46 m -61 dBm
```
The kinematics line is suppressed for RSUs: their CAM carries none, so the zeroes in the model are
placeholders and printing "0.0 km/h · heading 0" would assert a stationary vehicle facing north.
The same station also drives the SPAT row, so the two views agree.
## T8 — Station ID rotation
Station IDs rotated **twice within one session**:
| time | RSU | CiT One |
|---|---|---|
| ~09:00 | 968482441 | 2880458775 |
| 14:45 | 3983312873 | 3257224191 |
| 15:01 | 440624502 | 2199514753 |
That is a rotation inside 16 minutes. Consequences for the app, none of them currently handled:
- **DENM dedup keys on ETSI actionID**, which contains the originating station ID. A hazard that
outlives a rotation will appear as a second, independent pin rather than an update of the first.
Both then persist until the 60 s TTL expires them.
- **The station list and map key on station ID**, so a rotation shows the same physical vehicle
twice for up to the 15 s window.
- **SPATEM is unaffected**, because it dedups on the intersection reference (`region/id`), which is
a property of the junction rather than the sender. That is the right key and it survives rotation.
Nothing here is a firmware issue, and pseudonym rotation is the intended privacy behaviour of the
transmitters. But any future logic that assumes a station ID identifies a physical unit over time
will be wrong.
## T9 — Stack fix and re-verification
`rx_item_t` was moved off both task stacks (`static` in the promiscuous callback and in
`rx_forward_task`), firmware reflashed, and the campaign re-run:
| | before fix (305 s) | after fix (125 s) |
|---|---|---|
| Total | 9.40/s | 8.73/s |
| CAM | 4.08/s | 4.11/s |
| SPATEM | 3.20/s | **3.98/s** |
| DENM | 2.12/s | 0.64/s |
| Decode failures / IO errors / crashes | 0 | 0 |
| Mutex timeouts | — | 0 |
SPATEM capture rose from ~80% to ~100% of the theoretical 4.00/s (2 Hz × two antennas). Not
attributable to the fix with confidence — RF geometry moves between runs — but it is the direction
stack pressure relief would produce, and worth re-checking on the next run. The DENM drop is the
CiT One's trigger being intermittent, not a receive problem.
### Finding: no automatic reconnect after re-enumeration
Reflashing resets the C5, which re-enumerates its USB device. The app did **not** recover: it went
to `Connection error - check the cable and native USB-C port, then try again` and stayed there until
Connect was tapped manually, followed by a fresh USB permission grant.
This matters more for the intersection use case than SPATEM does. On a bike, a jostled cable that
re-enumerates leaves the link dead until the rider notices and taps a button — a silent loss of the
CAM stream the use case runs on. The permission grant is a genuine one-time consent and cannot be
automated, but retrying automatically when a matching device is already attached would cover the
common case.
## Readiness
### Working
- All three received message types decode correctly from live over-the-air traffic
- Concurrent multi-station, multi-type reception with no interference between streams
- Sustained 5-minute run with no link drop, no I/O error, no crash
- RSSI plausible and discriminating between transmitters (−48 to −65 dBm at bench distance)
- No frame exceeded the serial payload cap under this traffic mix
### Scope decision (2026-08-25): Phase B dropped
Raising the payload cap was considered and **deliberately rejected**. The project goal is V2X
communication with at least one white-paper use case — incoming car at an intersection — working on
the ESP32. That use case is `IMA-B`/`IMA-S`, which `UseCaseDetectionEngine` drives entirely from CAM
kinematics; the engine contains **zero references to SPATEM or MAPEM**. Everything the goal needs
fits the current cap with margin: CAM 26–211 B, DENM 402 B, bench SPATEM 58 B, against a 498 B
budget.
Phase B would buy only road-RSU SPATEM/MAPEM — the add-on, not the goal — while putting a measured,
zero-failure chain at risk. The one component of it that *reduces* risk, moving `rx_item_t` off the
WiFi callback stack, was done separately (T9).
### Known ceiling, accepted
1. **Serial payload cap (512 B).** The bench RSU sends 58-byte SPATEMs, but the 2026-03-18 drive
measured real road RSUs at 555 B median and 1243 B max — **roughly 70% would be dropped as
oversize**. Raising `SERIAL_LINK_MAX_PAYLOAD` and `RX_FRAME_MAX_LEN` to ~1536 is required, and
forces item 2.
2. ~~**`rx_item_t` on the WiFi driver's callback stack**~~ — **fixed 2026-08-25**, see T9.
3. **DENM headroom is 96 B.** DENM matters to this project in a way SPATEM does not, and at 402 B
it is the closest message to the cap. A DENM carrying more optional containers than the CiT One's
HLN-SV currently sends would be silently dropped and counted as oversize. The `oversize` counter
on the CAM Pinger card is the thing to check if hazards ever stop appearing.
### Defect found and fixed during this test
- **RSU CAM positions were decoded but never displayed** (see T7). App-side; the firmware forwarded
all 611 correctly. Fixed and re-verified in the same session.
### Open, found by this test
- **Station ID rotation** (see T8) fragments DENM and CAM identity across a rotation. Not yet
handled.
### Untested here
- ~~**Link recovery**~~ — exercised by the reflash in T9: it does **not** auto-recover. See T9.
- **Sustained load at road rates.** This bench ran at 9.4 frames/s. The drive data implies 24–32
frames/s with frames 3× larger, where the TX-mutex interaction (400 ms worst-case hold vs the
1 Hz heartbeat and the phone's 3-beat dead-link timeout) becomes the thing to watch.
- **The link's actual ceiling**, which has never been saturated and so is unmeasured.
- **MAPEM** — nothing on air is transmitting it; no decoder written.
- **Secured messages** — 75 frames with GN `NextHeader=2` appeared in earlier pcaps; these are
rejected by design. The bench runs with `ItsGnSecurity = 0`.
### Recommendation
Ready for continued bench and short-range field work as it stands. **Not ready for a road drive
past real RSUs** until items 1 and 2 land, because the failure there is silent: oversize SPATEMs are
counted and dropped, so the symptom is "the intersection never appears" rather than an error.
## Reproducing
Capture: `adb logcat -d` filtered on `CamUseCaseRepo` while subscribed to `v2x/rx/#` on both
brokers. Decode cross-checks use `asn1tools` with the modules in `asn1/` — see `asn1/README.md`.
README.md
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Android companion app for the micrOBU; a compact V2X on-board unit developed by HAW Hamburg and consider it GmbH for vulnerable road users (cyclists, e-bike riders, pedestrians).
The app serves as the HMI for the micrOBU hardware, handling V2X message display, sensor data collection, trip recording, and OBU communication over USB-C, Wi-Fi (dev), and Bluetooth (upcoming).
The app is the HMI for the OBU hardware and, on one of the two supported hardware paths, the entire V2X protocol stack. It handles V2X message display, use case detection, sensor collection, trip recording, and OBU communication over USB-C.
**Platform:** Android (Kotlin) · **Min SDK:** 29 (Android 10) · **Target SDK:** 36
**Platform:** Android (Kotlin) / **Min SDK:** 29 (Android 10) / **Target SDK:** 36 / **Version:** 0.5.0 (Phase 03)
## Project goal
Demonstrate V2X communication with at least one C2C-CC bicycle safety use case working on the ESP32-C5, specifically intersection movement assist: a car approaching an intersection on a path that conflicts with the rider's.
That use case is driven entirely from the periodic position and kinematics vehicles broadcast. It needs no traffic light state and no intersection lane geometry, which is why several scope decisions in this repository look deliberately narrow.
## Two hardware paths
The project began against the consider it CiT One and later added the ESP32-C5 as a second option. Both paths are supported at runtime and selected by the rider in Settings > OBU Hardware.
| | consider it CiT One | ESP32-C5 |
|---|---|---|
| What it is | Complete V2X on-board unit | Development board acting as a plain radio |
| Transport | IP over USB tethering, MQTT | Framed binary protocol over USB CDC serial |
| Reaches the phone as | Processed JSON | Raw ASN.1 UPER bytes |
| V2X stack lives | On the OBU | On the phone, except the radio and GeoNetworking |
| Own CAM generated by | The OBU, autonomously | The phone, transmitted on the phone's clock |
| DENM trigger | Available (manual test tool) | Not available |
| Needs a network | Yes, internally | No |
Both paths converge at `CamUseCaseRepository`, which normalises whatever arrived into the domain `Cam` type. Everything above that point, including the entire use case detection engine and all UI, is shared and transport-agnostic. That is what makes the ESP32-C5 a drop-in second OBU rather than a fork of the application.
## What it does
**Real-time V2X monitoring**; subscribes to the OBU's MQTT broker and displays live CAM, DENM, SPAT, MAP, and CPM messages grouped by topic with pretty-printed JSON and TX/RX badges.
**Real-time V2X monitoring**; live CAM, DENM and SPATEM with a station list, active hazards, live signal phase, and a map view. On the CiT One path the topic viewer additionally shows whatever the broker publishes, grouped by topic with pretty-printed JSON and TX/RX badges.
**DENM transmission**; triggers DENM use cases (e.g. stationary vehicle warning `hln-sv`) on the OBU via the consider it Use Case API (`v2x-uca/input/denmtrg`) with a single tap.
**CAM-based use case detection**; correlates the rider's own state with a short per-station history of received CAMs to evaluate five C2C-CC bicycle safety use cases (IMA-B, IMA-S, RTW-B, LTW-B, SMVA/BCW-B) and raises alerts under the three-tier Info / Awareness / Warning model. None of these use cases generates a DENM.
**Sensor monitoring**; live readout of phone GNSS, accelerometer, gyroscope, magnetometer, and barometer alongside OBU GNSS for cross-reference.
**Phone-generated CAM**; on the ESP32-C5 path the app builds a CAM from live GNSS and IMU, UPER-encodes it, and pushes it down the serial link for the board to broadcast over ITS-G5.
**Trip recording**; foreground service records all sensor streams and detects cycling events (braking, turning, stopping) using orientation-independent signal processing. Works fully offline with no OBU connected.
**DENM transmission**; CiT One path only. Triggers the stationary vehicle profile (`hln-sv`, causeCode 94) via the consider it Use Case API. This is a manual antenna and range test tool. It is never triggered by a detected event or a use case alert, and the control is hidden entirely on the ESP32-C5 path.
**Trip review**; past trips displayed on an OpenStreetMap layer with detected events overlaid as coloured pins. Tap any pin for event details.
**Trip recording**; foreground service records all sensor streams and detects cycling manoeuvres (braking, turning, stopping) using orientation-independent signal processing. Works fully offline with no OBU connected. The detected manoeuvres are neither shown nor stored - their only effect is to raise the CAM transmit rate through the manoeuvre on the ESP32-C5 path.
**CSV export**; every sensor sample written to a timestamped CSV in real time during a session. Shareable via the standard Android share sheet.
**Trip review**; past trips displayed as a route on an OpenStreetMap layer, with duration and distance.
**CSV export**; every sensor sample written to a timestamped CSV in real time. Trip exports additionally include the V2X messages received and their RSSI. Shareable via the standard Android share sheet.
## Architecture
MVVM with Repository pattern throughout. Jetpack Compose for all UI (no XML layouts). Hilt for dependency injection.
```
ui/screens/ Compose screens (Dashboard, V2X Monitor, Sensors, Recording, Trip History, Settings…)
ui/screens/ Compose screens (Dashboard, Record, Trips, V2X Monitor, Settings...)
ui/navigation/ Navigation graph and bottom nav bar
viewmodel/ MqttViewModel, SensorViewModel, TripRecordingViewModel
data/mqtt/ MQTT repository, Paho client, exponential-backoff reconnection
data/transport/ USB tethering detection and gateway IP resolution
data/db/ Room database (sessions, trips, detected events)
data/ SensorRepository, TripRepository, CsvExporter
data/transport/ UsbSerialTransport, SerialFrame, UsbNetworkDetector, ObuHardware
data/cam/ CamUseCaseRepository; where both hardware paths converge
data/db/ Room database (sessions, trips, detected events, V2X messages)
data/ SensorRepository, TripRepository, CsvExporter, TripExporter
domain/asn1/ BitReader/BitWriter and the CAM, DENM and SPATEM UPER codecs
domain/usecase/ UseCaseDetectionEngine, UseCaseDetectionConfig, AlertLevel, GeoMath
domain/detection/ EventDetector, RunningStats sliding window (orientation-independent)
service/ TripRecordingService (foreground service)
domain/cam/ Cam, CamParser, PhoneCamBuilder, CamTransmitConfig
service/ TripRecordingService, CamTransmitLoop, CamPinger
obu-firmware/ ESP32-C5 firmware (serial link, GeoNetworking, 802.11 OCB, raw TX)
asn1/ Vendored ETSI ASN.1 modules the codecs are verified against
```
The `domain/` packages contain no Android imports. That is what makes the 41-test JVM suite possible without an emulator or instrumentation.
## Connectivity
The app uses a phased transport strategy. The MQTT client, topic subscriptions, and all UI are identical across transports; only the underlying network path changes.
USB-C on both hardware paths. Bluetooth is **not implemented** and remains an open question in the requirements.
| Phase | Transport | Status |
|---|---|----------|
| Phase 01 | Wi-Fi | Complete |
| Phase 02 | USB-C tethering | Active |
| Phase 03 | Bluetooth BLE | Future |
| Transport | Path | Status |
|---|---|---|
| USB-C tethering (IP + MQTT) | CiT One | Active |
| USB-C serial (framed binary) | ESP32-C5 | Active |
| Wi-Fi | CiT One | Developer builds only |
| Bluetooth | Either | Not implemented |
The MQTT broker runs on the OBU hardware (Mosquitto 2.0.11, port 1883). In Phase 02, Android USB tethering exposes the OBU as a virtual Ethernet interface at `192.168.42.x`. The app auto-detects the gateway IP on plug-in.
On the CiT One path the MQTT broker runs on the OBU (Mosquitto 2.0.11, port 1883); Android USB tethering exposes it as a virtual Ethernet interface at `192.168.42.x` and the app auto-detects the gateway IP on plug-in. On the ESP32-C5 path there is no network layer at all: a private framed protocol runs over the board's native USB-C port as a CDC-ACM device.
## Verification
The app hand-encodes and decodes ETSI messages bit by bit on the ESP32-C5 path, which is the highest-risk code in the project. Round-trip tests through the project's own codecs structurally cannot catch a shared mistake about a field's bit width, and this project shipped exactly that bug three times (`CurvatureCalculationMode`, the GeoNetworking reserved bytes, `yawRateConfidence`). Phone and ESP32 agreed with each other and with nothing else.
Verification therefore uses an independent oracle: `asn1tools` compiled from the ETSI modules vendored in `asn1/`.
- **Golden-byte fixtures** assert exact encoder output, with expected values produced by the oracle rather than by this encoder.
- **Bulk replay** compares every field over real captures: 79,042 SPATEMs and 1,885 DENMs, zero mismatches.
- **Off-air confirmation**: 26 of this project's own CAMs captured back by an independent receiver, all accepted.
Never regenerate a golden fixture from this project's own encoder output. See `asn1/README.md`.
## Documentation
| Document | Audience |
|---|---|
| [docs/MicrOBU-User-Guide.docx](docs/MicrOBU-User-Guide.docx) | Riders. Setup, screens, what the alerts mean, troubleshooting |
| [docs/MicrOBU-Technical-Documentation.docx](docs/MicrOBU-Technical-Documentation.docx) | Supervisors and stakeholders. Architecture, message path, verification, results, decisions |
| [docs/01-requirements-traceability.md](docs/01-requirements-traceability.md) | Requirements chapters 0 to 13 mapped to implementation and evidence |
| [05-obu-bench-test-2026-08-25.md](05-obu-bench-test-2026-08-25.md) | Bench campaign T1 to T9, measured results |
| [04-transmit-setup.md](04-transmit-setup.md) | Transmitter bring-up, radio configuration diagnosis, the TX bypass |
| [obu-firmware/FLASHING.md](obu-firmware/FLASHING.md) | Toolchain setup, flashing, phone-to-board bring-up checklist |
| [asn1/README.md](asn1/README.md) | ASN.1 module provenance and the fixture regeneration rule |
| [docs/references.bib](docs/references.bib) | Standards references as BibTeX |
## Key dependencies
| Library | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Jetpack Compose + Material3 | UI |
| Eclipse Paho MQTT | OBU communication |
| Eclipse Paho MQTT | CiT One path communication |
| usb-serial-for-android | ESP32-C5 path communication (custom probe table for Espressif VID/PID) |
| Room | Local database |
| Hilt | Dependency injection |
| OSMDroid | Trip review map |
| OSMDroid | Trip review and live V2X map |
| DataStore | Settings persistence |
| FusedLocationProviderClient | GNSS |
## Getting started
1. Open in Android Studio (Hedgehog or newer).
1. Open in Android Studio and build the `app` module. Gradle 8.10.2.
2. Connect a device running Android 10+ (API 29).
3. Build and run the `app` module.
4. For Phase 02 testing: plug the phone into the OBU via USB-C, enable USB tethering on the phone, and the app will detect the interface and connect automatically. Broker IP can be overridden manually in Settings → Connection.
5. For standalone trip recording: no OBU required. Go to the Record tab and tap Record.
3. Choose your hardware in Settings > OBU Hardware.
The Wi-Fi transport (Phase 01 broker at `192.168.3.202`) remains available in developer builds and can be toggled in Settings → Developer.
**CiT One path.** Plug the phone into the OBU via USB-C, enable USB tethering on the phone, and the app detects the interface and connects automatically. Broker IP can be overridden in Settings > Connection.
**ESP32-C5 path.** Flash `obu-firmware/` (see `obu-firmware/FLASHING.md`), then plug the phone into the board's **native** USB-C port, not the UART bridge port used for flashing. Tap Connect and grant the USB permission. Use the CAM Pinger on the V2X screen to verify the link and radio without starting a trip.
**Standalone trip recording.** No OBU required. Go to the Record tab and tap REC.
The Wi-Fi transport (broker at `192.168.3.202`) remains available in developer builds via Settings > Developer.
Firmware and app must be flashed and installed together: `SERIAL_LINK_MAX_PAYLOAD` is 512 on both sides and a mismatch silently rejects every large frame.
## Status and known limitations
Bench verified against live ITS-G5 traffic on 2026-08-25: 2868 frames over 305 seconds, zero decode failures, zero USB errors, zero crashes. Not yet road validated.
- **Requirement 11.6, Phase A success criteria, is not met.** The bench proves reception. It cannot prove the use case behaves correctly with two genuinely moving stations, because nothing on the bench moves. This is the main open evidence gap for the project's central claim.
- **No message signing.** ETSI TS 103 097 is out of scope. Secured frames are rejected rather than mis-parsed.
- **Detection thresholds are untuned engineering estimates**, not calibrated against real intersection data.
- **512-byte serial payload cap.** Roughly 70% of real road RSU SPATEMs would be dropped as oversize. Accepted deliberately: the intersection use case is CAM-driven and needs none of it.
- **No automatic reconnect** after USB re-enumeration; requires a manual Connect.
- **Station IDs rotate**, so they cannot identify a physical unit over time.
- **No backend, no login.** Everything is on-device.
- **No MAPEM decoder**, so signal groups cannot yet be associated with the rider's lane.
## Project context
The micrOBU project is funded under the ZIM program (BMWK) and targets micromobility users in Hamburg. The companion app offloads processing from the compact OBU hardware to the smartphone; GNSS fusion, event detection, and future antenna coordination all run on the phone to keep the OBU lightweight and power-efficient.
The micrOBU project is funded under the ZIM program (BMWK) and targets micromobility users in Hamburg. The companion app offloads processing from the compact OBU hardware to the smartphone; GNSS fusion, event detection, and on the ESP32-C5 path the full ASN.1 encoding and decoding all run on the phone to keep the OBU lightweight and power-efficient.
V2X communication uses ITS-G5 (IEEE 802.11p / DSRC) at 5.9 GHz. The app communicates with the OBU exclusively via the consider it MQTT API v6 (processed JSON messages); no ASN.1 encoding in the app.
V2X communication uses ITS-G5 (IEEE 802.11p) at 5.9 GHz. On the CiT One path the app communicates via the consider it MQTT API v6 (processed JSON). On the ESP32-C5 path the app performs its own ASN.1 UPER encoding and decoding against the ETSI modules vendored in `asn1/`.
**Owner:** HAW Hamburg
TODO.md
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@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
# TODO
Engineering to-do list. The reviewer-facing open items live in
`docs/01-requirements-traceability.md` ("Open items"); this file is the working list behind them.
## Waiting on hardware
### Over-the-air check of the GN lifetime fix (added 2026-09-11)
`geonet.c` now writes GN lifetime `0x05` (1 s) instead of `0x83`, which decoded to 3200 s. Changed
in both `obu-firmware` and `obu-cam-transmistter`. Both still build (IDF 6.1 / 5.5.4), and the
compiled `geonet_wrap_shb` stores the new byte. Confirmed on air 2026-09-14. Nothing else
reads this byte (`gn_unwrap.c` ignores it, the app never sees GN headers), so the app does not
need updating alongside the firmware.
Needs: the phone with the app, the OBU ESP32-C5, and a **second** ESP32-C5 running
`its-g5-receiver-firmware` to capture with.
- [x] Flash `obu-firmware` (done 2026-09-14 on COM3; flash backed up first to
`Documents/micrOBU_workspace/firmware-backups/COM3-2026-09-14-before-secured-rx.bin`).
- [x] Capture with the receiver (COM8) into `its-g5-receiver-firmware/recordings/`.
- [x] `pcap_gn_tally.py` on capture_20260914_132126.pcap: our station sends SHB, port 2001,
lifetime `0x05`, same as both bench stations. It was `0x83` in the August captures.
- [x] Real-station CAMs/DENMs/SPATEM still reach the app (logcat: `handleCamUper`,
`handleDenmUper`, `handleSpatUper` all decoding, 2026-09-14).
- [x] Our own CAMs decode on air: 397 frames from station 999999 decode with asn1tools and
re-encode byte-identically.
- [ ] Confirm the CAM Pinger card's `tx fail` / oversize / CRC counters are 0 (needs a look at the
phone; not readable from the PC).
Partial check possible with one board and no phone: flash it, `idf.py -p COMx monitor`, and look
for `OCB @ 5900 MHz - TX/RX armed`. That proves the new build boots and brings the radio up, not
that it transmits correctly.
### obu-cam-transmistter yawRateConfidence fix (added 2026-09-11)
Its `cam.c` (compiled into that firmware) wrote `yawRateConfidence` as 3 bits / 7 instead of
4 bits / unavailable(8), the bug the app fixed on 2026-08-20. Fixed in it and in obu-firmware's
reference copy; asn1tools now decodes the CAM and re-encodes it byte-identically, and it builds on
IDF 5.5.4. Since 2026-09-14 the spare board on COM10 runs it as a bench beacon:
- [x] Done 2026-09-14: flashed on COM10 and captured on COM8. All 72 CAMs from station
195936478 (0x0BADC0DE) decode with asn1tools and re-encode byte-identically, so the
4-bit yawRateConfidence is right on air. COM10 now runs this beacon rather than
obu-firmware - reflash it if the spare is needed as an OBU again.
### Signed-message reception and exact payloads (added 2026-09-11)
obu-firmware's `gn_unwrap.c` now unwraps TS 103 097 signed packets (signature not verified,
reported as V2X_RX flags bit1) and cuts every message to the length its header declares, dropping
the 8 bytes the chip's RX appends to each frame, which were forwarded to the phone until now.
Verified on the host (`obu-firmware/test/host`: chain, replay of all recordings against asn1tools,
50M-iteration fuzz) and flashed to the production OBU on 2026-09-14. The remaining gap is signed
traffic to receive: real vehicles or
RSUs, since the bench CiT One sends unsigned. A second ESP32 running the receiver firmware is
optional, but shows what was on air at the time.
- [x] Flash obu-firmware (done 2026-09-14, COM3).
- [x] Unsigned bench traffic still decodes in the app, with messages now cut to their declared
length (CAM, DENM and SPATEM all decoding in logcat after the flash).
- [ ] Near signed traffic: signed CAMs/DENMs appear in the app, and a simultaneous capture shows
them on air (`pcap_gn_tally.py` lists them as `secured`). NOT possible at this bench: the
CiT One transmits unsigned (`ItsGnSecurity = 0`) and nothing else here signs. Needs a drive
past real RSUs, the CiT One switched to signed mode if its API allows, or a replay firmware
on a spare board that re-transmits the recorded signed frames.
- [ ] The heartbeat's oversize counter still counts over-long messages. Not exercised at the
bench: the SPATEMs here are ~340 bytes on air, far below the cap.
## Set up host testing
- [x] Install MSYS2 UCRT64 gcc (done 2026-09-11: gcc 16.2.0, GNU Make 4.4.1; chosen over WSL,
vanetza is not going to be built). Setup and the PATH gotcha: `obu-firmware/test/host/README.md`.
- [x] Host round-trip test `obu-firmware/test/host/test_chain.c` (`geonet_wrap_shb` ->
`dot11p_build_frame` -> `gn_unwrap_its`, byte-checked against the standard). Done
2026-09-11: 491 checks, 0 failed. Run `make` in that folder before flashing any firmware fix.
- [x] Replay of the recorded captures (`test_replay.c` + `check_replay.py`, independent asn1tools
check). Done 2026-09-11: C and Python agree on all 15 145 records.
- [x] Mutation fuzzer `fuzz_gn_unwrap.c`, inputs against a no-access guard page. Done 2026-09-11:
50 000 000 iterations, no crash. `make` runs a 2 000 000-iteration pass every time.
## Firmware ideas from the vanetza review (2026-09-11, not started)
Suggested order after the host tests exist:
- [x] **Read secured packets (GN NextHeader=2) without verifying them.** Done 2026-09-11 in
`gn_unwrap.c`, host-verified; flagged to the phone as V2X_RX flags bit1. On-air check under
"Waiting on hardware".
- [ ] **Forward the full GeoBroadcast area**: shape (circle/rectangle/ellipse), DistanceB, angle,
appended to the V2X_RX prefix behind a capability bit. Port vanetza's `geonet/areas.cpp`
`inside_or_at_border` to the app, which currently treats every area as a circle.
- [ ] **RX filtering before the serial link**: duplicate detection for GBC (last 8 sequence numbers
per source, as vanetza does), drop our own frames, reject GN version != 1.
- [ ] **Read the DCC-MCO field** (the 4 "reserved" bytes of an SHB header): neighbours' channel
busy ratio for free.
- [ ] **Minimum TX gap in firmware** as a DCC safety net (vanetza reactive table: 60 ms relaxed ...
460 ms restrictive), with a CBR estimate in the heartbeat.
- [ ] **Generic V2X_TX message** (BTP port, SHB/GBC, traffic class, lifetime, area) so the phone can
send DENM and VAM without reflashing. Consider QoS Data frames: vanetza's Cohda receive path
drops non-QoS ones.
Dropped: building vanetza as a GN/BTP oracle. Real captures (`pcap_gn_tally.py`), the host
round-trip test and `asn1tools` for UPER cover what it would have checked.
## Follow-ups found 2026-09-14
- [x] **Capture tooling moved into this repo** (`capture/`), with the CR-insertion fix. The
sniffer's console inserts a CR before every LF, which also hits every 0x0a byte of the binary
pcap stream, shifting pcap record headers and frames. A 787 KB capture parsed cleanly for
only 82 of ~2000 records, and DENMs showed up on nonsense BTP ports. `undo_crlf()` reverses
it on the raw stream before framing; afterwards a capture parsed to EOF and DENMs read as
port 2002. **Every capture taken before 2026-09-14 is truncated at its first corrupted
record** - re-measure anything derived from them.
- [ ] `capture/dump_pcap.py` reads the same console and still needs the same treatment.
- [ ] **Do not open COM3's console while the phone is attached.** Opening it toggles DTR/RTS on the
CH343 and resets the OBU, which drops the phone's USB link and needs a manual Connect.
## Follow-ups found 2026-09-11
- [ ] **App: show the signed flag.** `V2xRxFrame.parse` in `SerialFrame.kt` only reads bit0 of
the flags byte; read bit1 (signed, not verified) and show it where messages are listed.
- [ ] **Messages that do not decode with asn1tools.** In the recordings, 56 from the CiT One
(`aa:f8:76:7d:bd:ad`: 54 CAMs of 245 bytes, 2 DENMs of 402 bytes) and one 218-byte CAM from
`6e:94:03:1b:05:26` fail against `cam_1_4_1`/`denm_1_3_1` + `cdd_1_3_1_1`, with or without the
old trailing bytes. A newer module version on the sender, or a sender bug; check what the
app's decoders make of them (`check_replay.py` lists the records).
app/build.gradle.kts
+3
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@@ -80,5 +80,8 @@ dependencies {
// ── Unit tests (JVM, no emulator required) ────────────────────────────────
testImplementation(libs.junit)
// Real org.json for JVM unit tests: the android.jar stub throws "not mocked" on every
// JSONObject call, which would make the MQTT payload parsers untestable off-device.
testImplementation(libs.json)
testImplementation(libs.kotlinx.coroutines.test)
}
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/MainActivity.kt
+21 -9
View File
@@ -87,6 +87,12 @@ class MainActivity : AppCompatActivity() {
val useCaseEnabledMap by mqttViewModel.useCaseEnabledMap.collectAsState()
val obuHardware by mqttViewModel.obuHardware.collectAsState()
val usbSerialState by mqttViewModel.usbSerialState.collectAsState()
// Received hazards and live signal state, for the Dashboard's V2X summary cards.
// Both flows already expire their own entries on a clock, so nothing here has to
// decide when a hazard or a traffic light has gone stale.
val denmEvents by mqttViewModel.denmEvents.collectAsState()
val spatIntersections by mqttViewModel.spatIntersections.collectAsState()
val ownCamPosition by mqttViewModel.ownCamPosition.collectAsState()
MicrOBUTheme(darkTheme = state.darkTheme) {
val view = LocalView.current
@@ -150,20 +156,29 @@ class MainActivity : AppCompatActivity() {
usbCableConnected = usbConnected,
obuStationTypeWarning = obuStationTypeWarning,
obuStationType = obuStationType,
hazards = denmEvents,
signals = spatIntersections,
ownPosition = ownCamPosition,
onNavigateToConnection = { navController.navigate(Screen.Connection.route) },
onNavigateToSensors = {
navController.navigate(Screen.Sensors.route) {
popUpTo(Screen.Dashboard.route) { saveState = true }
popUpTo(Screen.Dashboard.route)
launchSingleTop = true
restoreState = true
}
},
onNavigateToMap = { navController.navigate(Screen.Map.route) },
onNavigateToRecord = {
navController.navigate(Screen.Record.route) {
popUpTo(Screen.Dashboard.route) { saveState = true }
popUpTo(Screen.Dashboard.route)
launchSingleTop = true
}
},
// Same options the bottom bar uses, so arriving at V2X from a
// Dashboard card leaves the same back stack as tapping the tab.
onNavigateToV2x = {
navController.navigate(Screen.MqttViewer.route) {
popUpTo(Screen.Dashboard.route)
launchSingleTop = true
restoreState = true
}
},
)
@@ -233,10 +248,7 @@ class MainActivity : AppCompatActivity() {
val trip = trips.firstOrNull { it.id == tripId }
if (trip != null) {
TripReviewScreen(
trip = trip,
viewModel = tripViewModel,
)
TripReviewScreen(trip = trip)
}
}
@@ -324,7 +336,7 @@ class MainActivity : AppCompatActivity() {
// hiltViewModel() — that would create a separate instance scoped to
// this NavBackStackEntry, whose onCleared() (fired the moment you
// navigate away) would disconnect the shared UsbSerialTransport out
// from under every other screen still using it.
// from under every other screen still using.
ConnectionSetupScreen(viewModel = mqttViewModel)
}
composable(Screen.Map.route) {
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/data/CsvExporter.kt
+2 -2
View File
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ suspend fun shareSessionCsv(context: Context, session: RecordingSession) {
val intent = Intent(Intent.ACTION_SEND).apply {
type = "text/csv"
putExtra(Intent.EXTRA_STREAM, uri)
putExtra(Intent.EXTRA_SUBJECT, "MicrOBU Session Export — $fileName")
putExtra(Intent.EXTRA_SUBJECT, "MicrOBU Session Export - $fileName")
addFlags(Intent.FLAG_GRANT_READ_URI_PERMISSION)
}
context.startActivity(Intent.createChooser(intent, "Export session"))
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ suspend fun saveSessionCsvToUri(context: Context, session: RecordingSession, uri
*/
fun buildSessionCsv(s: RecordingSession): String = buildString {
appendLine("# MicrOBU Session Export")
appendLine("# Generated by MicrOBU v0.2.0 — HAW Hamburg / Project MicrOBU")
appendLine("# Generated by MicrOBU v0.2.0 - HAW Hamburg / Project MicrOBU")
appendLine("# Session ID,${s.id}")
appendLine("# Start,${iso.format(Date(s.startTime))}")
appendLine("# End,${iso.format(Date(s.endTime))}")
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/data/GnssTimeSource.kt
+63
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@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
package com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data
import android.os.SystemClock
import android.util.Log
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.asn1.ItsTime
import java.time.DateTimeException
/**
* Puts the timestamps this phone transmits on GNSS time instead of its own wall clock.
*
* ## Why
* Every CAM carries a generationDeltaTime and every GeoNetworking header a TST, and receivers use
* them to judge how fresh a message is and in what order messages came. Both used to come straight
* from `System.currentTimeMillis()`, so they were only as good as the phone's clock setting. On
* 2026-09-10 the bench phone was 24 minutes fast: automatic time had no source (no SIM, and the
* lab Wi-Fi has no internet time), so it had not set the clock once in 69 hours, and every CAM
* went out stamped 24 minutes in the future. A bike-mounted phone on the road is in exactly that
* position. GNSS time depends on none of it.
*
* ## How
* [SystemClock.currentGnssTimeClock] (API 29, this app's minSdk) is a UTC clock the platform keeps
* synchronised from GNSS fixes. One reading of it taken alongside the wall clock gives the wall
* clock's error, which is then applied to the fix's own timestamp. When GNSS time is unavailable,
* typically indoors before any satellite fix since boot, the wall clock is used unchanged.
*
* Which clock is in use is logged whenever it changes, with the measured error, so a capture shows
* where a given run's timestamps came from.
*
* Only the transmit path uses this. Everything else in the app stays on the wall clock, because
* received messages, sensor samples and trip records are all stamped with it and must stay
* comparable with one another.
*/
object GnssTimeSource {
private const val TAG = "GnssTimeSource"
/** Whether the last correction used GNSS time; null before the first. For change-only logging. */
@Volatile private var lastUsedGnss: Boolean? = null
/** [systemMs], a wall-clock reading, moved onto GNSS time where GNSS time is available. */
fun correct(systemMs: Long): Long {
val systemNow = System.currentTimeMillis()
val gnssNow = try {
SystemClock.currentGnssTimeClock().millis()
} catch (e: DateTimeException) {
null
}
noteSource(gnssNow, systemNow)
return ItsTime.onGnssTime(systemMs, gnssNow, systemNow)
}
private fun noteSource(gnssNow: Long?, systemNow: Long) {
val usingGnss = gnssNow != null
if (lastUsedGnss == usingGnss) return
lastUsedGnss = usingGnss
if (gnssNow != null) {
Log.i(TAG, "transmit timestamps now on GNSS time; phone clock is " +
"${"%+.1f".format((systemNow - gnssNow) / 1000.0)} s off")
} else {
Log.w(TAG, "GNSS time unavailable, transmit timestamps fall back to the phone clock, " +
"which has no automatic time source without a SIM or internet")
}
}
}
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/data/TripExporter.kt
+10 -22
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ package com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data
import android.content.Context
import android.content.Intent
import androidx.core.content.FileProvider
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.db.DetectedEventEntity
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.db.RecordedTripEntity
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.db.V2xMessageEntity
import kotlinx.coroutines.Dispatchers
@@ -23,12 +22,15 @@ fun tripFileName(trip: RecordedTripEntity): String =
/**
* Builds a single combined CSV for one trip: the raw sensor samples recorded alongside it, the
* events the detector fired, the GPS track, and every V2X message seen during the ride — all in
* one file, ordered by time.
* GPS track, and every V2X message seen during the ride — all in one file, ordered by time.
*
* Detected manoeuvres are deliberately absent. The detector exists to raise the CAM transmit
* rate (see EventDetector's KDoc); its output is not retained, so there is nothing to export
* beyond the per-trip count in the header.
*
* **Why one file rather than a zip of tables.** The point of the export is correlation: what was
* the bike doing when that CAM arrived, what did the detector make of it. Splitting those into
* separate files pushes the join onto whoever opens it. A leading `type` column keeps the rows
* the bike doing when that CAM arrived. Splitting those into separate files pushes the join
* onto whoever opens it. A leading `type` column keeps the rows
* distinguishable, which is the same shape the existing session CSV already uses, so the two
* remain readable by the same tooling.
*
@@ -44,7 +46,6 @@ fun tripFileName(trip: RecordedTripEntity): String =
suspend fun buildTripCsv(
context: Context,
trip: RecordedTripEntity,
events: List<DetectedEventEntity>,
v2xMessages: List<V2xMessageEntity>,
): String = withContext(Dispatchers.IO) {
buildString {
@@ -59,7 +60,6 @@ suspend fun buildTripCsv(
appendLine()
appendLine(
"type,timestamp_ms,timestamp_iso,lat,lon,speed_ms,heading_deg," +
"event_type,confidence,peak_accel,peak_gyro,duration_ms," +
"station_id,station_type,is_own,yaw_rate_dps,rssi_dbm"
)
@@ -68,16 +68,6 @@ suspend fun buildTripCsv(
appendLine(
"gps,${point.timestamp},${isoUtc.format(Date(point.timestamp))}," +
"${point.lat},${point.lon},,," +
",,,,," +
",,,"
)
}
for (e in events) {
appendLine(
"event,${e.timestamp},${isoUtc.format(Date(e.timestamp))}," +
"${e.latitude},${e.longitude},${e.speedMps},," +
"${e.type},${e.confidence},${e.peakAccelMagnitude},${e.peakGyroMagnitude},${e.durationMs}," +
",,,,"
)
}
@@ -86,14 +76,13 @@ suspend fun buildTripCsv(
appendLine(
"v2x,${m.timestamp},${isoUtc.format(Date(m.timestamp))}," +
"${m.latitude},${m.longitude},${m.speedMps},${m.headingDeg}," +
",,,,," +
"${m.stationId},${m.stationType},${m.isOwn},${m.yawRateDps ?: ""},${m.rssiDbm ?: ""}"
)
}
// Raw sensor samples, copied verbatim from the session CSV. Appended last rather than
// merge-sorted in: a long ride is hundreds of thousands of rows, and sorting them against
// the (comparatively tiny) event/V2X sets in memory would defeat the streaming that
// the (comparatively tiny) V2X set in memory would defeat the streaming that
// CsvExporter deliberately does. Each row carries its own timestamp, so sort on load.
val sessionCsv = trip.sessionId?.let { File(File(context.filesDir, "sessions"), "$it.csv") }
if (sessionCsv != null && sessionCsv.exists()) {
@@ -110,12 +99,11 @@ suspend fun buildTripCsv(
suspend fun shareTripCsv(
context: Context,
trip: RecordedTripEntity,
events: List<DetectedEventEntity>,
v2xMessages: List<V2xMessageEntity>,
) {
val fileName = tripFileName(trip)
val cacheFile = File(context.cacheDir, fileName)
val csv = buildTripCsv(context, trip, events, v2xMessages)
val csv = buildTripCsv(context, trip, v2xMessages)
withContext(Dispatchers.IO) { cacheFile.writeText(csv) }
@@ -127,7 +115,7 @@ suspend fun shareTripCsv(
val intent = Intent(Intent.ACTION_SEND).apply {
type = "text/csv"
putExtra(Intent.EXTRA_STREAM, uri)
putExtra(Intent.EXTRA_SUBJECT, "MicrOBU Trip Export — $fileName")
putExtra(Intent.EXTRA_SUBJECT, "MicrOBU Trip Export - $fileName")
addFlags(Intent.FLAG_GRANT_READ_URI_PERMISSION)
}
context.startActivity(Intent.createChooser(intent, "Export trip"))
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/data/TripRepository.kt
+2 -33
View File
@@ -3,11 +3,9 @@ package com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data
import android.content.Context
import android.util.Log
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.db.AppDatabase
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.db.DetectedEventEntity
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.db.RecordedTripEntity
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.db.V2xMessageEntity
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.Cam
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.detection.DetectedEvent
import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.Flow
import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.first
import java.io.File
@@ -15,7 +13,7 @@ import java.io.File
private const val TAG = "TripRepository"
/**
* Repository that abstracts Room access for trips and detected events.
* Repository that abstracts Room access for trips and V2X messages.
*
* All suspend functions are safe to call from a coroutine running on any
* dispatcher; Room executes the actual SQL on its own I/O thread pool.
@@ -81,14 +79,11 @@ class TripRepository(db: AppDatabase, private val context: Context) {
* One-shot snapshots for export. The Flow-returning variants above stay observable for the UI;
* an export wants a value it can write out, not a stream it has to unsubscribe from.
*/
suspend fun getEventsForTripOnce(tripId: Long): List<DetectedEventEntity> =
dao.getEventsForTrip(tripId).first()
suspend fun getV2xMessagesForTripOnce(tripId: Long): List<V2xMessageEntity> =
dao.getV2xMessagesForTrip(tripId).first()
/**
* Deletes a trip and everything belonging to it: detected events and V2X messages go via the
* Deletes a trip and everything belonging to it: V2X messages go via the
* schema's CASCADE foreign keys, and the CSV recorded alongside it is removed here.
*
* The CSV is a plain file outside the database, so nothing deletes it implicitly - before
@@ -109,32 +104,6 @@ class TripRepository(db: AppDatabase, private val context: Context) {
}
}
// ── Events ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* Persists a domain [DetectedEvent] for the given [tripId].
* Converts the domain model to the Room entity.
*/
suspend fun insertEvent(tripId: Long, event: DetectedEvent) =
dao.insertEvent(
DetectedEventEntity(
tripId = tripId,
timestamp = event.timestamp,
type = event.type.name,
confidence = event.confidence.name,
latitude = event.latitude,
longitude = event.longitude,
speedMps = event.speedMps.toFloat(),
peakAccelMagnitude = event.peakAccelMagnitude.toFloat(),
peakGyroMagnitude = event.peakGyroMagnitude.toFloat(),
durationMs = event.durationMs,
)
)
/** Emits events for [tripId] ordered by timestamp, updating whenever the DB changes. */
fun getEventsForTrip(tripId: Long): Flow<List<DetectedEventEntity>> =
dao.getEventsForTrip(tripId)
// ── V2X messages (Phase 03) ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Retention policy: only ever called while a trip is actively recording — see
// V2xMessageEntity's KDoc and CamUseCaseRepository.processedCam's collector in
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/data/cam/CamUseCaseRepository.kt
+293 -24
View File
@@ -7,19 +7,32 @@ import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.SensorRepository
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.mqtt.MqttConnectionState
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.mqtt.MqttRepository
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.mqtt.ObuHardwarePreferences
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.mqtt.RAW_CAM_TOPIC
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.mqtt.RAW_DENM_TOPIC
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.mqtt.RAW_SPATEM_TOPIC
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.mqtt.RecvV2xMessage
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.mqtt.UseCaseAlertPreferences
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.ObuHardware
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.BtpPort
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.SerialFrameType
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.V2xRxFrame
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.UsbSerialState
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.UsbSerialTransport
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.asn1.DenmUperCodec
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.asn1.RealAsn1UperCodec
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.asn1.SpatemUperCodec
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.Cam
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.CamParser
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.ObuGnssParser
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.OwnStationIds
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.OwnTxLoopback
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.StationType
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.denm.DenmEvent
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.spat.SpatEvent
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.usecase.UseCaseAlert
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.usecase.UseCaseDetectionEngine
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.usecase.UseCaseType
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.service.CamPinger
import dagger.hilt.android.qualifiers.ApplicationContext
import kotlinx.coroutines.CoroutineScope
import kotlinx.coroutines.Dispatchers
@@ -34,6 +47,7 @@ import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.asSharedFlow
import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.asStateFlow
import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.combine
import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.stateIn
import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.update
import kotlinx.coroutines.launch
import javax.inject.Inject
import javax.inject.Singleton
@@ -49,6 +63,16 @@ private const val PRUNE_INTERVAL_MS = 1_000L
// missed updates, not just normal jitter between samples.
private const val OBU_GNSS_STALE_MS = 2_500L
/**
* How long a raw `v2x/rx/cam` message keeps the Use Case app's CAM topic suppressed.
*
* The two topics carry the same traffic, but `v2x-uca/output/json/cam` is rate-limited and drops
* messages, so while the raw topic is arriving there is nothing the processed one can add. A few
* seconds is many missed repetitions at CAM rates, so this only lapses if the raw topic really
* has stopped, which is what makes the fallback automatic on an OBU that does not publish it.
*/
private const val RAW_PREFERRED_WINDOW_MS = 5_000L
/**
* Bridges the raw MQTT CAM stream (plus the ego's own obu_gnss/phone GNSS state) to
* [UseCaseDetectionEngine] and exposes the resulting CAM-based Use Case Alerts to the UI
@@ -66,7 +90,13 @@ private const val OBU_GNSS_STALE_MS = 2_500L
* A singleton so detection keeps running (and alert state survives) even while no screen is
* collecting it — same rationale as [MqttRepository]'s per-topic message log.
*
* No DENM is generated or consumed anywhere in this class.
* **Two decode sources, one funnel.** UPER arrives either from the ESP32-C5 serial link or, on
* the CiT One path, from the raw `v2x/rx` protobuf topics ([RecvV2xMessage]). Both end up in
* the same handlers, so everything downstream is transport-agnostic. The CiT One's processed
* `v2x-uca/output/json` topics remain a fallback for an OBU that does not publish the raw ones.
*
* DENM is decoded from both (see [decodedDenm]) but deliberately kept out of
* [UseCaseDetectionEngine] — that engine reasons about moving road users from CAM kinematics.
*/
@Singleton
class CamUseCaseRepository @Inject constructor(
@@ -75,6 +105,8 @@ class CamUseCaseRepository @Inject constructor(
private val usbSerialTransport: UsbSerialTransport,
private val camCodec: RealAsn1UperCodec,
private val obuHardwarePrefs: ObuHardwarePreferences,
private val pseudonymManager: PseudonymManager,
private val camPinger: CamPinger,
@ApplicationContext private val context: Context,
) {
private val scope = CoroutineScope(SupervisorJob() + Dispatchers.Default)
@@ -91,6 +123,9 @@ class CamUseCaseRepository @Inject constructor(
@Volatile private var lastOwnStationType: Int = StationType.CYCLIST
@Volatile private var lastObuGnssTimestamp: Long = 0L
/** When a raw `v2x/rx/cam` message last arrived, for [rawCamPreferred]. */
@Volatile private var lastRawCamMs: Long = 0L
/** Per-use-case enable/disable toggles (Settings > Use Case Alerts). */
val enabledMap: StateFlow<Map<UseCaseType, Boolean>> = prefs.enabledMapFlow.stateIn(
scope, SharingStarted.Eagerly, UseCaseType.entries.associateWith { true },
@@ -121,6 +156,55 @@ class CamUseCaseRepository @Inject constructor(
*/
val processedCam: SharedFlow<Cam> = _processedCam.asSharedFlow()
private val _rsuStations = MutableStateFlow<Map<Long, Cam>>(emptyMap())
/**
* Latest CAM per roadside unit heard over the air.
*
* Separate from [remotePositions] because an RSU is infrastructure, not a road user: it has no
* kinematics, sits at a fixed point forever, and would trip the stopped-vehicle and
* intersection-movement use cases for as long as it is in range. It still belongs on the map
* and in the station list, which is what this flow is for. Consumers should apply their own
* staleness window - nothing prunes this map except a link drop.
*/
val rsuStations: StateFlow<Map<Long, Cam>> = _rsuStations.asStateFlow()
private val _ownTxLoopback = MutableStateFlow<OwnTxLoopback?>(null)
/**
* Our own transmissions heard back off the air, or null until one is.
*
* These frames are dropped from the detection engine, correctly, since the phone is not a
* road user to itself. But dropping them silently threw away the one thing that proves the
* whole radio loop works: the frame went out over serial, the ESP32 transmitted it, and the
* ESP32 received it again. That is precisely what the bench pinger exists to demonstrate, so
* it is counted here and reported rather than discarded.
*
* ESP32-C5 path in practice. The CiT One does not normally hear its own transmissions.
*/
val ownTxLoopback: StateFlow<OwnTxLoopback?> = _ownTxLoopback.asStateFlow()
/** Clears the loopback tally. Called when a fresh pinger run starts, so the count is per run. */
fun resetOwnTxLoopback() { _ownTxLoopback.value = null }
private val _decodedSpat = MutableSharedFlow<SpatEvent>(replay = 16, extraBufferCapacity = 32)
/**
* SPATEMs decoded from UPER, from either hardware path: the ESP32-C5 serial link or the CiT
* One's `v2x/rx/spatem` topic. Replayed so a screen opened mid-stream sees the current signal
* state immediately rather than waiting up to half a second for the next repetition.
*
* The CiT One's own `v2x-uca/output/json/spat` topic is not a source here. It was never
* parsed, so before the raw topic was wired up this path produced no signal state at all.
*/
val decodedSpat: SharedFlow<SpatEvent> = _decodedSpat.asSharedFlow()
private val _decodedDenm = MutableSharedFlow<DenmEvent>(replay = 32, extraBufferCapacity = 32)
/**
* DENMs decoded from UPER, from either hardware path: the ESP32-C5 serial link or the CiT
* One's `v2x/rx/denm` topic. `replay` so a screen opened after a hazard was first heard still
* sees it - DENMs repeat at ~1 Hz but a subscriber that missed the last repetition shouldn't
* have to wait for the next.
*/
val decodedDenm: SharedFlow<DenmEvent> = _decodedDenm.asSharedFlow()
init {
scope.launch {
mqttRepository.messages.collect { msg ->
@@ -131,6 +215,37 @@ class CamUseCaseRepository @Inject constructor(
}
}
// CiT One raw path: every message the OBU's radio heard, as protobuf, decoded here with
// the same codecs the serial path uses. This is what makes the CiT One see traffic the
// Use Case app filtered out, the ESP32-C5's CAM pinger among it, and it is the only
// source of SPATEM on this hardware.
scope.launch {
mqttRepository.rawV2x.collect { raw ->
val envelope = RecvV2xMessage.parse(raw.bytes)
if (envelope == null) {
Log.w(TAG, "rawV2x: unparseable RecvV2XMessage on ${raw.topic}, " +
"${raw.bytes.size} bytes - first bytes: ${raw.bytes.toHexPreview()}")
return@collect
}
when (raw.topic) {
RAW_CAM_TOPIC -> {
lastRawCamMs = raw.timestamp
handleCamUper(envelope.payload, rssiDbm = null, source = "mqtt")
}
// The GeoBroadcast radius comes off the GeoNetworking header the same way it
// does on the serial path, so a hazard's relevance area survives here too.
RAW_DENM_TOPIC -> handleDenmUper(
uper = envelope.payload,
rssiDbm = null,
relevanceRadiusM = envelope.destAreaRadiusM,
source = "mqtt",
)
RAW_SPATEM_TOPIC -> handleSpatUper(envelope.payload, rssiDbm = null, source = "mqtt")
else -> Log.w(TAG, "rawV2x: unexpected topic ${raw.topic}")
}
}
}
// Phone GNSS fallback — only applied when obu_gnss has gone stale (see class KDoc).
// Retries in a loop: this singleton can be created before the user grants location
// permission (requested at app startup), so a single subscription attempt isn't
@@ -171,9 +286,17 @@ class CamUseCaseRepository @Inject constructor(
// just never emits CAM_RX frames if nothing's plugged in over serial).
scope.launch {
usbSerialTransport.incomingFrames.collect { frame ->
if (frame.type != SerialFrameType.CAM_RX) return@collect
if (frame.type != SerialFrameType.V2X_RX) return@collect
if (usbSerialTransport.state.value != UsbSerialState.CONNECTED) return@collect
handleCamFromSerial(frame.payload)
val v2x = V2xRxFrame.parse(frame.payload) ?: return@collect
when (v2x.btpPort) {
BtpPort.CAM -> handleCamFromSerial(v2x)
BtpPort.DENM -> handleDenmFromSerial(v2x)
BtpPort.SPATEM -> handleSpatFromSerial(v2x)
// The firmware only forwards ports it was told to accept, so anything else
// means the two sides have drifted out of sync.
else -> Log.w(TAG, "unexpected BTP port ${v2x.btpPort} from firmware")
}
}
}
@@ -186,13 +309,14 @@ class CamUseCaseRepository @Inject constructor(
// resetting here would wipe perfectly good MQTT-derived state.
if (currentHardware == ObuHardware.ESP32_C5 && state != UsbSerialState.CONNECTED) {
engine.reset()
_rsuStations.value = emptyMap()
}
}
}
// Our own station ID. On the CiT One path it's learned from v2x/rx/obu_gnss; the ESP32-C5
// path has no such topic, so it comes from the same persisted value CamTransmitLoop puts
// in outgoing CAMs.
// path has no such topic, so it follows the current transmit pseudonym, the same one
// CamTransmitLoop puts in outgoing CAMs, across every rotation.
//
// Without this the ID stayed null on the ESP32 path and the self-heard-TX filter in
// [handleCamFromSerial] never fired - so the phone's own CAMs, which the ESP32 hears back
@@ -200,10 +324,13 @@ class CamUseCaseRepository @Inject constructor(
// sitting exactly on top of the ego position, fed into the detection engine as a
// collision partner for itself.
scope.launch {
obuHardwarePrefs.obuHardwareFlow.collect { hardware ->
combine(obuHardwarePrefs.obuHardwareFlow, pseudonymManager.currentFlow) { hardware, pseudonym ->
hardware to pseudonym
}.collect { (hardware, pseudonym) ->
currentHardware = hardware
if (hardware == ObuHardware.ESP32_C5) {
_ownStationId.value = obuHardwarePrefs.getOrCreateOwnStationId()
// currentFlow re-emits on every rotation, so this tracks the live identity.
_ownStationId.value = (pseudonym ?: pseudonymManager.current()).stationId
}
}
}
@@ -213,8 +340,22 @@ class CamUseCaseRepository @Inject constructor(
scope.launch { prefs.setEnabled(type, enabled) }
}
/** True if [stationId] matches the ego OBU's own station ID (for OWN/REMOTE UI badges). */
fun isOwnStationId(stationId: Long): Boolean = stationId != 0L && stationId == _ownStationId.value
/**
* True if [stationId] is one this phone transmits under, so a frame heard back off the air is
* recognised as our own rather than tracked as another road user. Also drives the OWN/REMOTE
* badges in the raw message list.
*
* The rule lives in [OwnStationIds], which explains which ids count and what goes wrong when
* one is missed. The set passed in holds the current transmit pseudonym and the ones it most
* recently replaced, plus, on the CiT One path, the OBU's own id from obu_gnss. The bench
* ping id counts only while this phone's own pinger is running.
*/
fun isOwnStationId(stationId: Long): Boolean =
OwnStationIds.isOwn(
stationId,
ownIds = pseudonymManager.ownStationIds() + setOfNotNull(_ownStationId.value),
benchPingIsOurs = camPinger.benchPingIsOurs(),
)
/**
* Primary ego state source: `v2x/rx/obu_gnss`, ~4 Hz, carries position/speed/heading/yaw
@@ -257,16 +398,32 @@ class CamUseCaseRepository @Inject constructor(
_processedCam.tryEmit(ego)
}
/** True while `v2x/rx/cam` is arriving, in which case the processed CAM topic adds nothing. */
private fun rawCamPreferred(now: Long): Boolean =
lastRawCamMs != 0L && now - lastRawCamMs <= RAW_PREFERRED_WINDOW_MS
private fun handleCam(payload: String, timestamp: Long) {
val cam = CamParser.parse(payload, _ownStationId.value, timestamp) ?: return
// This phone's own bench ping, relayed back by the CiT One's radio: not a road user, and not
// ego state either, since it is built from the same phone GNSS the engine already has.
// Only while this phone is the one pinging, though. Another phone's pings carry the same
// fixed id and are genuine remote traffic to this one.
if (cam.stationId == OwnStationIds.BENCH_PING && camPinger.benchPingIsOurs()) return
if (cam.isOwn) {
// Third fallback — the CAM topic's own low-rate entry. onOwnCam() keeps whichever
// Third fallback - the CAM topic's own low-rate entry. onOwnCam() keeps whichever
// update is freshest, so this only actually wins when both obu_gnss and phone GNSS
// are unavailable/stale.
// are unavailable/stale. Deliberately still processed while the raw topic is live:
// v2x/rx/cam is a receive topic and never carries the ego station's own CAM, so
// suppressing this would remove the fallback without anything replacing it.
engine.onOwnCam(cam)
} else {
engine.onRemoteCam(cam)
_processedCam.tryEmit(cam)
return
}
// A remote CAM the raw topic has already delivered, in fuller form and without the Use
// Case app's rate limiting. Dropping it here rather than letting both reach the engine
// keeps one station from being fed by two sources at two different rates.
if (rawCamPreferred(timestamp)) return
engine.onRemoteCam(cam)
_processedCam.tryEmit(cam)
}
@@ -281,29 +438,141 @@ class CamUseCaseRepository @Inject constructor(
* its own just-transmitted frame (promiscuous capture of a local TX). Guarded the same way
* the MQTT path guards against reprocessing "own" CAM: compare against [_ownStationId].
*/
private fun handleCamFromSerial(payload: ByteArray) {
if (payload.isEmpty()) return
val rssiDbm = payload[0].toInt() // signed dBm from the firmware's promiscuous RX metadata
val camBytes = payload.copyOfRange(1, payload.size) // payload[0] is RSSI, not part of the CAM
val cam = camCodec.decodeCam(camBytes, System.currentTimeMillis())?.copy(rssiDbm = rssiDbm)
private fun handleCamFromSerial(v2x: V2xRxFrame) =
handleCamUper(v2x.uper, v2x.rssiDbm, source = "serial")
/** Shared by both transports: [rssiDbm] is null on the MQTT path, which does not report it. */
private fun handleCamUper(uper: ByteArray, rssiDbm: Int?, source: String) {
val v2x = UperSource(uper, rssiDbm, source)
val cam = camCodec.decodeCam(v2x.uper, System.currentTimeMillis())?.copy(rssiDbm = v2x.rssiDbm)
if (cam == null) {
// Logged, not silently dropped: "the app shows nothing" has two completely different
// causes - frames not arriving at all, versus arriving and failing to decode - and
// without this line they're indistinguishable from the outside. rssi is signed.
// without this line they're indistinguishable from the outside.
Log.w(
TAG,
"handleCamFromSerial: decode FAILED for ${camBytes.size}-byte CAM " +
"(rssi=$rssiDbm dBm) - first bytes: ${camBytes.toHexPreview()}",
"handleCamUper[${v2x.source}]: decode FAILED for ${v2x.uper.size}-byte CAM " +
"(rssi=${v2x.rssiDbm} dBm) - first bytes: ${v2x.uper.toHexPreview()}",
)
return
}
Log.d(TAG, "handleCamFromSerial: decoded station=${cam.stationId} " +
"lat=${cam.latitude} lon=${cam.longitude} speed=${cam.speedMps} rssi=$rssiDbm dBm")
if (_ownStationId.value != null && cam.stationId == _ownStationId.value) return // self-heard TX
Log.d(TAG, "handleCamUper[${v2x.source}]: decoded station=${cam.stationId} " +
"lat=${cam.latitude} lon=${cam.longitude} speed=${cam.speedMps} rssi=${v2x.rssiDbm} dBm")
if (isOwnStationId(cam.stationId)) {
// Ours, on either station id. Kept out of the engine, but counted: this is the
// round trip completing, and it is the only direct evidence the radio path works.
_ownTxLoopback.update { prev ->
OwnTxLoopback(
frames = (prev?.frames ?: 0) + 1,
// Hold the last known reading rather than overwriting it with null on a
// transport that does not report RSSI, so the figure does not blink away.
lastRssiDbm = v2x.rssiDbm ?: prev?.lastRssiDbm,
lastHeardMs = System.currentTimeMillis(),
)
}
return
}
// Roadside units are infrastructure, not road users. Their CAM carries no kinematics (see
// CamUperCodec's rsuContainerHighFrequency branch), so it reaches here as a permanently
// stationary station at a fixed point - which is precisely the shape the stopped-vehicle
// and intersection-movement use cases look for. Feeding it to the engine would raise a
// standing false alert for as long as the RSU is in range.
if (cam.stationType == StationType.ROAD_SIDE_UNIT) {
// Tracked here rather than in the engine, so an RSU still shows on the map and in the
// station list without being evaluated for alerts. Keeping it out of the engine
// entirely - as the first version of this did - also removed it from the display,
// because remotePositions is the engine's map: 611 RSU CAMs decoded during the
// 2026-08-25 bench run and none of them were ever shown.
_rsuStations.value = _rsuStations.value + (cam.stationId to cam)
_processedCam.tryEmit(cam)
return
}
engine.onRemoteCam(cam)
_processedCam.tryEmit(cam)
}
/**
* A DENM heard over the air. Deliberately NOT fed to [UseCaseDetectionEngine] - that engine
* reasons about moving road users from CAM kinematics, and a static hazard is a different kind
* of thing. DENMs go to the map and the message list only.
*/
private fun handleDenmFromSerial(v2x: V2xRxFrame) = handleDenmUper(
uper = v2x.uper,
rssiDbm = v2x.rssiDbm,
relevanceRadiusM = v2x.geoArea?.radiusMeters,
source = "serial",
)
private fun handleDenmUper(
uper: ByteArray,
rssiDbm: Int?,
relevanceRadiusM: Int?,
source: String,
) {
val v2x = UperSource(uper, rssiDbm, source)
val denm = DenmUperCodec.decode(
bytes = v2x.uper,
receivedAtEpochMs = System.currentTimeMillis(),
rssiDbm = v2x.rssiDbm,
relevanceRadiusM = relevanceRadiusM,
)
if (denm == null) {
Log.w(
TAG,
"handleDenmUper[${v2x.source}]: decode FAILED for ${v2x.uper.size}-byte DENM " +
"(rssi=${v2x.rssiDbm} dBm) - first bytes: ${v2x.uper.toHexPreview()}",
)
return
}
Log.d(TAG, "handleDenmUper[${v2x.source}]: decoded station=${denm.stationId}/${denm.sequenceNumber} " +
"cause=${denm.causeCode}/${denm.subCauseCode} lat=${denm.latitude} lon=${denm.longitude} " +
"radius=${denm.relevanceRadiusM}m termination=${denm.isTermination} rssi=${v2x.rssiDbm} dBm")
_decodedDenm.tryEmit(denm)
}
/**
* A SPATEM heard over the air: the live signal phase for one or more intersections.
*
* Like DENM, this is deliberately kept out of [UseCaseDetectionEngine] - a traffic light is
* not a moving road user, and the CAM-based use cases reason about kinematics.
*
* Note the firmware drops any SPATEM whose UPER exceeds the 512-byte serial payload cap and
* counts it as an oversize drop, so on real road RSUs (median 555 bytes) most will not arrive
* until that cap is raised. The bench trigger's ~58-byte messages are unaffected.
*/
private fun handleSpatFromSerial(v2x: V2xRxFrame) =
handleSpatUper(v2x.uper, v2x.rssiDbm, source = "serial")
private fun handleSpatUper(uper: ByteArray, rssiDbm: Int?, source: String) {
val v2x = UperSource(uper, rssiDbm, source)
val spat = SpatemUperCodec.decode(
bytes = v2x.uper,
receivedAtEpochMs = System.currentTimeMillis(),
rssiDbm = v2x.rssiDbm,
)
if (spat == null) {
Log.w(
TAG,
"handleSpatUper[${v2x.source}]: decode FAILED for ${v2x.uper.size}-byte SPATEM " +
"(rssi=${v2x.rssiDbm} dBm) - first bytes: ${v2x.uper.toHexPreview()}",
)
return
}
Log.d(TAG, "handleSpatUper[${v2x.source}]: decoded station=${spat.stationId} " +
"intersections=${spat.intersections.joinToString { it.key }} " +
"movements=${spat.intersections.sumOf { it.movements.size }} rssi=${v2x.rssiDbm} dBm")
_decodedSpat.tryEmit(spat)
}
/**
* The bits of a received frame the decoders and their log lines need, independent of whether
* it came off the serial link or an MQTT topic. [rssiDbm] is null on the MQTT path: the
* RecvV2XMessage envelope does not carry signal strength.
*/
private data class UperSource(val uper: ByteArray, val rssiDbm: Int?, val source: String)
private fun ByteArray.toHexPreview(limit: Int = 16): String =
take(limit).joinToString(" ") { "%02x".format(it) } + if (size > limit) " ..." else ""
}
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/data/cam/PseudonymManager.kt
+90
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
package com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.cam
import android.util.Log
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.mqtt.ObuHardwarePreferences
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.Pseudonym
import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.MutableStateFlow
import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.StateFlow
import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.asStateFlow
import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.update
import kotlinx.coroutines.sync.Mutex
import kotlinx.coroutines.sync.withLock
import javax.inject.Inject
import javax.inject.Singleton
/**
* Owns the phone's transmit identity on the ESP32-C5 path and rotates it every
* [Pseudonym.ROTATION_INTERVAL_MS].
*
* A singleton because there must be exactly one of these. [com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.service.CamTransmitLoop]
* runs inside the foreground recording service and [CamUseCaseRepository] filters received frames;
* if each held its own identity, the phone could transmit under one pseudonym while its receive
* path recognised another, which brings back the ghost road user sitting on the ego position.
* The bench pinger deliberately does not use this: it keeps a fixed identity so pings stay
* recognisable in a capture.
*/
@Singleton
class PseudonymManager @Inject constructor(
private val prefs: ObuHardwarePreferences,
) {
private val mutex = Mutex()
private val _current = MutableStateFlow<Pseudonym?>(null)
/** The identity in use, or null before the first call to [current] has loaded one. */
val currentFlow: StateFlow<Pseudonym?> = _current.asStateFlow()
/** Station IDs replaced most recently, newest first. See [ownStationIds]. */
@Volatile private var recentlyRetired: List<Long> = emptyList()
/**
* Every station ID one of our own frames could still be carrying: the current pseudonym's and
* the ones it replaced most recently.
*
* The previous IDs matter because the ESP32 hears our own transmissions back. A frame sent just
* before a rotation can come back just after it, and if its ID no longer counted as ours it
* would be tracked as another road user sitting exactly on the ego position.
*/
fun ownStationIds(): Set<Long> = buildSet {
_current.value?.let { add(it.stationId) }
addAll(recentlyRetired)
}
/**
* The pseudonym to transmit under right now, rotating first if the current one has expired.
*
* Rotation happens here, at the moment an identity is about to be used, rather than on a
* timer. Each frame therefore carries one complete identity chosen in a single step, so a
* rotation can never land between the CAM being built and its position vector being attached.
*
* Persisted, so an app restart inside the interval keeps the same identity. Only elapsed time
* rotates it, never a crash or a relaunch.
*/
suspend fun current(nowMs: Long = System.currentTimeMillis()): Pseudonym = mutex.withLock {
val existing = _current.value ?: prefs.loadPseudonym()
if (existing != null && !existing.isExpired(nowMs)) {
_current.value = existing
existing
} else {
val next = Pseudonym.generate(nowMs)
prefs.savePseudonym(next)
if (existing != null) {
recentlyRetired = (listOf(existing.stationId) + recentlyRetired).take(RETIRED_TO_KEEP)
}
_current.update { next }
Log.i(TAG, "pseudonym rotated: station ${existing?.stationId} -> ${next.stationId}")
next
}
}
private companion object {
const val TAG = "PseudonymManager"
/**
* A loopback arrives within milliseconds, so one previous ID would already be ample. Two
* costs nothing and covers a rotation that fires twice in quick succession after a clock
* correction.
*/
const val RETIRED_TO_KEEP = 2
}
}
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/data/db/AppDatabase.kt
+18 -3
View File
@@ -11,10 +11,9 @@ import androidx.sqlite.db.SupportSQLiteDatabase
entities = [
SessionEntity::class,
RecordedTripEntity::class,
DetectedEventEntity::class,
V2xMessageEntity::class,
],
version = 4,
version = 5,
exportSchema = false,
)
abstract class AppDatabase : RoomDatabase() {
@@ -34,13 +33,29 @@ abstract class AppDatabase : RoomDatabase() {
AppDatabase::class.java,
"micr0bu.db",
)
.addMigrations(MIGRATION_1_2, MIGRATION_2_3, MIGRATION_3_4)
.addMigrations(MIGRATION_1_2, MIGRATION_2_3, MIGRATION_3_4, MIGRATION_4_5)
.build()
.also { INSTANCE = it }
}
// ── Migrations ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* Drops `detected_events`. The cyclist event detector still runs, but its output is now
* consumed only by the CAM transmit-rate policy (see EventDetector's KDoc) and is no
* longer persisted, displayed, or exported, so the table had no reader left.
*
* `trips.eventCount` is deliberately kept. Dropping a column means recreating `trips`
* and copying every recorded ride across, which is real risk for one unused integer;
* the service still writes an accurate count into it and the CSV header still reports it.
*/
private val MIGRATION_4_5 = object : Migration(4, 5) {
override fun migrate(database: SupportSQLiteDatabase) {
database.execSQL("DROP INDEX IF EXISTS `index_detected_events_tripId`")
database.execSQL("DROP TABLE IF EXISTS `detected_events`")
}
}
/**
* Two additions:
* - `trips.sessionId` links a trip to the CSV recording session captured alongside it, so
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/data/db/DetectedEventEntity.kt
-50
View File
@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
package com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.db
import androidx.room.ColumnInfo
import androidx.room.Entity
import androidx.room.ForeignKey
import androidx.room.PrimaryKey
/**
* One detected cyclist event (braking / turning / stopping) linked to a
* [RecordedTripEntity] via the [tripId] foreign key.
*
* [type] and [confidence] are stored as the enum name strings so that the
* database remains human-readable.
*/
@Entity(
tableName = "detected_events",
foreignKeys = [
ForeignKey(
entity = RecordedTripEntity::class,
parentColumns = ["id"],
childColumns = ["tripId"],
onDelete = ForeignKey.CASCADE,
)
],
)
data class DetectedEventEntity(
@PrimaryKey(autoGenerate = true)
val id: Long = 0,
@ColumnInfo(index = true)
val tripId: Long,
/** Wall-clock epoch ms of the first qualifying sensor frame. */
val timestamp: Long,
/** EventType.name — one of BRAKING, TURNING, STOPPING. */
val type: String,
/** Confidence.name — one of HIGH, MEDIUM, LOW. */
val confidence: String,
val latitude: Double,
val longitude: Double,
val speedMps: Float,
val peakAccelMagnitude: Float,
val peakGyroMagnitude: Float,
/** Duration from first qualifying frame to emission (ms). */
val durationMs: Long,
)
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/data/db/TripDao.kt
-11
View File
@@ -27,17 +27,6 @@ interface TripDao {
@Query("DELETE FROM trips WHERE id = :id")
suspend fun deleteTripById(id: Long)
// ── Events ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@Insert(onConflict = OnConflictStrategy.REPLACE)
suspend fun insertEvent(event: DetectedEventEntity)
@Query("SELECT * FROM detected_events WHERE tripId = :tripId ORDER BY timestamp ASC")
fun getEventsForTrip(tripId: Long): Flow<List<DetectedEventEntity>>
@Query("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM detected_events WHERE tripId = :tripId")
suspend fun getEventCountForTrip(tripId: Long): Int
// ── V2X messages (Phase 03) ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
@Insert(onConflict = OnConflictStrategy.REPLACE)
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/data/mqtt/MqttRepository.kt
+69 -1
View File
@@ -43,6 +43,13 @@ private val SUBSCRIBED_TOPICS = listOf(
"sys/state/heartbeat",
"sys/state/cellular",
"v2x/rx/obu_gnss",
// Everything the radio heard, as RecvV2XMessage protobuf (API section 2.4). Preferred over
// the v2x-uca topics below, which are a rate-limited and lossy view of the same traffic.
RAW_CAM_TOPIC,
RAW_DENM_TOPIC,
RAW_SPATEM_TOPIC,
// Kept subscribed as a fallback for an OBU whose product configuration does not publish the
// raw topics, and because the Use Case app is still the only source of its own alert output.
"v2x-uca/output/json/cam",
"v2x-uca/output/json/denm",
"v2x-uca/output/json/spat",
@@ -50,6 +57,31 @@ private val SUBSCRIBED_TOPICS = listOf(
"v2x-uca/output/json/cpm",
)
/** Raw received-V2X topics, carrying protobuf rather than JSON. See [RecvV2xMessage]. */
const val RAW_CAM_TOPIC = "v2x/rx/cam"
const val RAW_DENM_TOPIC = "v2x/rx/denm"
const val RAW_SPATEM_TOPIC = "v2x/rx/spatem"
private val RAW_V2X_TOPICS = setOf(RAW_CAM_TOPIC, RAW_DENM_TOPIC, RAW_SPATEM_TOPIC)
/**
* A message straight off a `v2x/rx` topic, before the protobuf envelope is opened.
*
* Carried as bytes, not [MqttMessage]: that type holds a String, and putting protobuf through
* a UTF-8 round trip replaces every byte that is not valid UTF-8 with U+FFFD. The payload
* survives looking plausible in a log and decodes to nothing.
*/
data class RawV2xMqttMessage(val topic: String, val bytes: ByteArray, val timestamp: Long) {
override fun equals(other: Any?): Boolean {
if (this === other) return true
if (other !is RawV2xMqttMessage) return false
return topic == other.topic && timestamp == other.timestamp && bytes.contentEquals(other.bytes)
}
override fun hashCode(): Int =
31 * (31 * topic.hashCode() + timestamp.hashCode()) + bytes.contentHashCode()
}
@Singleton
class MqttRepository @Inject constructor(
private val prefs: MqttPreferences,
@@ -69,6 +101,21 @@ class MqttRepository @Inject constructor(
)
val messages: SharedFlow<MqttMessage> = _messages.asSharedFlow()
// Same buffering rationale as [_messages], with more headroom: this stream carries every CAM
// the radio hears rather than the Use Case app's thinned-out selection, which at a busy
// intersection is a considerably higher rate.
private val _rawV2x = MutableSharedFlow<RawV2xMqttMessage>(
replay = 0,
extraBufferCapacity = 512,
)
/**
* Undecoded `v2x/rx` protobuf messages. Consumed by
* [com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.cam.CamUseCaseRepository], which opens the envelope and runs
* the UPER decoders over the payload, exactly as it does for the ESP32-C5 serial path.
*/
val rawV2x: SharedFlow<RawV2xMqttMessage> = _rawV2x.asSharedFlow()
// Per-topic message log, kept here (singleton) so it survives even when no screen is
// collecting — e.g. DENM TX messages emitted by TripRecordingService while the V2X
// Monitor screen isn't open.
@@ -194,6 +241,12 @@ class MqttRepository @Inject constructor(
)
}
/** A one-line, printable stand-in for a binary payload, for the raw topic log. */
private fun describeBinary(bytes: ByteArray, limit: Int = 24): String {
val hex = bytes.take(limit).joinToString(" ") { "%02x".format(it) }
return "${bytes.size} bytes protobuf: $hex" + if (bytes.size > limit) " ..." else ""
}
/**
* Record a message into both the live [messages] stream (for screens currently open)
* and the persistent [topicMessages] log (survives even when no screen is collecting).
@@ -301,11 +354,26 @@ class MqttRepository @Inject constructor(
override fun connectionLost(cause: Throwable?) { lostSignal.complete(cause) }
override fun messageArrived(topic: String, message: PahoMqttMessage) {
val now = System.currentTimeMillis()
if (topic in RAW_V2X_TOPICS) {
// Binary. The bytes go to the decoders untouched; the topic log gets a hex
// preview instead, because decoding these to a String would show the operator
// a screenful of replacement characters and imply the data was corrupt.
_rawV2x.tryEmit(RawV2xMqttMessage(topic, message.payload, now))
recordMessage(
MqttMessage(
topic = topic,
payload = describeBinary(message.payload),
timestamp = now,
)
)
return
}
recordMessage(
MqttMessage(
topic = topic,
payload = message.payload.toString(Charsets.UTF_8),
timestamp = System.currentTimeMillis(),
timestamp = now,
)
)
}
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/data/mqtt/ObuHardwarePreferences.kt
+34 -24
View File
@@ -6,12 +6,13 @@ import androidx.datastore.preferences.core.longPreferencesKey
import androidx.datastore.preferences.core.stringPreferencesKey
import androidx.datastore.preferences.preferencesDataStore
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.ObuHardware
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.Pseudonym
import dagger.hilt.android.qualifiers.ApplicationContext
import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.Flow
import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.first
import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.map
import javax.inject.Inject
import javax.inject.Singleton
import kotlin.random.Random
private val Context.obuHardwareDataStore by preferencesDataStore(name = "obu_hardware_prefs")
@@ -26,7 +27,11 @@ class ObuHardwarePreferences @Inject constructor(
) {
private object Keys {
val OBU_HARDWARE = stringPreferencesKey("obu_hardware")
// The current transmit pseudonym. Three keys, but only ever read or written together;
// see loadPseudonym.
val OWN_STATION_ID = longPreferencesKey("own_station_id")
val OWN_MAC = stringPreferencesKey("own_mac")
val OWN_PSEUDONYM_CREATED_MS = longPreferencesKey("own_pseudonym_created_ms")
}
val obuHardwareFlow: Flow<ObuHardware> = context.obuHardwareDataStore.data.map { prefs ->
@@ -37,31 +42,36 @@ class ObuHardwarePreferences @Inject constructor(
context.obuHardwareDataStore.edit { prefs -> prefs[Keys.OBU_HARDWARE] = hardware.id }
}
/** This device's own CAM StationID, or null if one hasn't been assigned yet. */
val ownStationIdFlow: Flow<Long?> = context.obuHardwareDataStore.data.map { prefs ->
prefs[Keys.OWN_STATION_ID]
/**
* The transmit pseudonym last saved by [savePseudonym], or null if there is none.
*
* All three parts must be present. An install from before pseudonym rotation has a station ID
* but no MAC or creation time, and loads as null so that a complete new pseudonym is
* generated. Keeping the old ID alongside a fresh MAC would be exactly the partial rotation
* [Pseudonym] exists to rule out.
*
* Only [com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.cam.PseudonymManager] should call this: it is the one
* owner of the phone's transmit identity.
*/
suspend fun loadPseudonym(): Pseudonym? {
val prefs = context.obuHardwareDataStore.data.first()
val stationId = prefs[Keys.OWN_STATION_ID] ?: return null
val mac = prefs[Keys.OWN_MAC]?.let(::macFromHex) ?: return null
val createdAtMs = prefs[Keys.OWN_PSEUDONYM_CREATED_MS] ?: return null
return Pseudonym(stationId, mac, createdAtMs)
}
/**
* Returns this device's own CAM StationID, generating and persisting a random one on first
* call.
*
* Replaces the previous hardcoded 0: receivers key on StationID to track a station across
* successive CAMs, so every MicrOBU broadcasting 0 makes two units in the same area
* indistinguishable to any receiver — including this app's own detection engine, which
* dedupes remote stations by ID. Random rather than derived from a hardware identifier both
* because ETSI expects station IDs to be pseudonymous and because Android hardware IDs aren't
* readable without privileged permissions on modern versions.
*
* Range is 1..2^32-2: StationID is INTEGER(0..4294967295), and 0 is avoided so leftover
* placeholder traffic stays distinguishable from a real assignment.
*/
suspend fun getOrCreateOwnStationId(): Long {
val prefs = context.obuHardwareDataStore.edit { p ->
if (p[Keys.OWN_STATION_ID] == null) {
p[Keys.OWN_STATION_ID] = Random.nextLong(1L, 0xFFFF_FFFEL)
}
/** Persists [pseudonym] in a single edit, so a crash can never leave half an identity stored. */
suspend fun savePseudonym(pseudonym: Pseudonym) {
context.obuHardwareDataStore.edit { p ->
p[Keys.OWN_STATION_ID] = pseudonym.stationId
p[Keys.OWN_MAC] = pseudonym.mac.joinToString("") { "%02x".format(it) }
p[Keys.OWN_PSEUDONYM_CREATED_MS] = pseudonym.createdAtMs
}
return prefs[Keys.OWN_STATION_ID]!!
}
private fun macFromHex(hex: String): ByteArray? =
if (hex.length != 12) null
else runCatching { ByteArray(6) { i -> hex.substring(2 * i, 2 * i + 2).toInt(16).toByte() } }
.getOrNull()
}
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/data/mqtt/RecvV2xMessage.kt
+240
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
package com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.mqtt
/**
* The CiT One's raw received-V2X envelope, as published on the `v2x/rx` MQTT topics.
*
* These topics carry a `RecvV2XMessage` protobuf (CI-CiT MQTT API section 2.4), not JSON: the
* ITS-G5 PDU sits in one bytes field, and the GeoNetworking and BTP headers the stack stripped
* off travel alongside it. That is the CiT One's counterpart to the ESP32-C5 path's
* [com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.V2xRxFrame], and it exists for the same reason: the
* app decodes the UPER itself instead of accepting somebody else's summary.
*
* **Why this rather than the Use Case app's JSON.** `v2x-uca/output/json` is a processed,
* rate-limited view. It drops messages, and what it does publish has already been reduced to
* the fields the Use Case app cared about. `v2x/rx` is everything the radio actually heard.
*
* **Why a hand-written reader.** Only three of this envelope's fields are used, protobuf's wire
* format is trivial to walk, and the alternative is adding protoc and the protobuf Gradle plugin
* to an Android build plus vendoring a third-party `.proto` into this repository. The same
* argument the ASN.1 codecs in `domain/asn1/` are built on applies here.
*
* Field numbers below come from consider it's `v2x_interface.proto`, V2X RX protocol v2.4.2.
* They are wire-format constants: changing them silently mis-parses every message, so they are
* pinned by `RecvV2xMessageTest` against a byte fixture rather than left to inspection.
*/
data class RecvV2xMessage(
/**
* `btpHeader.type`, the stack's own idea of which PDU this is: DENM 1, CAM 2, SPATEM 4,
* MAPEM 5. Null when the sender omitted the header. Advisory only, since every decoder
* re-checks the messageID in the ItsPduHeader itself.
*/
val pduType: Int?,
/** `btpHeader.destinationPort`: 2001 CAM, 2002 DENM, 2003 MAPEM, 2004 SPATEM. */
val destinationPort: Int?,
/**
* `gnHeader.dest.area.distA`, metres: the radius of the GeoBroadcast destination area, so
* how far the sender meant its message to apply. Only DENM normally carries one. This is the
* MQTT path's equivalent of the serial prefix's
* [com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.V2xRxFrame.GeoArea.radiusMeters].
*/
val destAreaRadiusM: Int?,
/** The ITS-G5 PDU as UPER, ItsPduHeader included. Empty when the field was absent. */
val payload: ByteArray,
) {
// Generated equals/hashCode would compare the payload array by identity, which makes two
// decodes of the same bytes unequal and quietly breaks any test or set that holds these.
override fun equals(other: Any?): Boolean {
if (this === other) return true
if (other !is RecvV2xMessage) return false
return pduType == other.pduType &&
destinationPort == other.destinationPort &&
destAreaRadiusM == other.destAreaRadiusM &&
payload.contentEquals(other.payload)
}
override fun hashCode(): Int {
var result = pduType ?: 0
result = 31 * result + (destinationPort ?: 0)
result = 31 * result + (destAreaRadiusM ?: 0)
result = 31 * result + payload.contentHashCode()
return result
}
companion object {
// RecvV2XMessage
private const val F_BTP_HEADER = 1
private const val F_GN_HEADER = 2
private const val F_PAYLOAD = 3
// BasicTransportProtocolHeader
private const val F_BTP_TYPE = 1
private const val F_BTP_DEST_PORT = 2
// GeoNetworkingHeader
private const val F_GN_DEST = 8
// GNDestination
private const val F_DEST_AREA = 1
// GeoNetworkingArea
private const val F_AREA_DIST_A = 3
/**
* Parses an MQTT payload from a `v2x/rx` topic, or null if it is not a readable
* `RecvV2XMessage` or carries no PDU.
*
* Unknown fields are skipped rather than treated as errors, which is what protobuf
* requires and what keeps this working if consider it adds fields in a later revision.
*/
fun parse(bytes: ByteArray): RecvV2xMessage? {
var pduType: Int? = null
var destPort: Int? = null
var radius: Int? = null
var payload: ByteArray? = null
val reader = ProtoReader(bytes)
while (reader.hasNext()) {
val tag = reader.readTag() ?: return null
when {
tag.field == F_PAYLOAD && tag.wireType == WIRE_LENGTH_DELIMITED ->
payload = reader.readBytes() ?: return null
tag.field == F_BTP_HEADER && tag.wireType == WIRE_LENGTH_DELIMITED -> {
val sub = reader.readBytes() ?: return null
val btp = ProtoReader(sub)
while (btp.hasNext()) {
val t = btp.readTag() ?: return null
when {
t.field == F_BTP_TYPE && t.wireType == WIRE_VARINT ->
pduType = btp.readVarint()?.toInt() ?: return null
t.field == F_BTP_DEST_PORT && t.wireType == WIRE_VARINT ->
destPort = btp.readVarint()?.toInt() ?: return null
else -> if (!btp.skip(t.wireType)) return null
}
}
}
tag.field == F_GN_HEADER && tag.wireType == WIRE_LENGTH_DELIMITED -> {
val sub = reader.readBytes() ?: return null
radius = readDestAreaRadius(sub)
}
else -> if (!reader.skip(tag.wireType)) return null
}
}
// A message with no payload has nothing to decode. Returning it anyway would push an
// empty byte array into the ASN.1 decoders for them to reject one layer later.
val pdu = payload ?: return null
if (pdu.isEmpty()) return null
return RecvV2xMessage(
pduType = pduType,
destinationPort = destPort,
destAreaRadiusM = radius,
payload = pdu,
)
}
/** GeoNetworkingHeader.dest.area.distA, walking two levels down. Null at any break. */
private fun readDestAreaRadius(gnHeader: ByteArray): Int? {
val dest = nestedField(gnHeader, F_GN_DEST) ?: return null
val area = nestedField(dest, F_DEST_AREA) ?: return null
val reader = ProtoReader(area)
while (reader.hasNext()) {
val tag = reader.readTag() ?: return null
if (tag.field == F_AREA_DIST_A && tag.wireType == WIRE_VARINT) {
return reader.readVarint()?.toInt()
}
if (!reader.skip(tag.wireType)) return null
}
return null
}
/** The bytes of the first length-delimited field numbered [field], or null. */
private fun nestedField(bytes: ByteArray, field: Int): ByteArray? {
val reader = ProtoReader(bytes)
while (reader.hasNext()) {
val tag = reader.readTag() ?: return null
if (tag.field == field && tag.wireType == WIRE_LENGTH_DELIMITED) {
return reader.readBytes()
}
if (!reader.skip(tag.wireType)) return null
}
return null
}
}
}
private const val WIRE_VARINT = 0
private const val WIRE_FIXED64 = 1
private const val WIRE_LENGTH_DELIMITED = 2
private const val WIRE_FIXED32 = 5
private data class ProtoTag(val field: Int, val wireType: Int)
/**
* A minimal protobuf wire-format reader: enough to walk a message, read varints and
* length-delimited fields, and skip everything else.
*
* Every read returns null instead of throwing on a malformed or truncated buffer. These bytes
* arrive off a network topic and a decoder that throws on bad input is a decoder that takes the
* MQTT callback thread down with it.
*/
private class ProtoReader(private val buf: ByteArray) {
private var pos = 0
fun hasNext(): Boolean = pos < buf.size
fun readTag(): ProtoTag? {
val raw = readVarint() ?: return null
val field = (raw ushr 3).toInt()
val wireType = (raw and 0x7L).toInt()
if (field <= 0) return null
return ProtoTag(field, wireType)
}
/**
* Reads a base-128 varint. Capped at ten bytes: that is the longest a 64-bit value can be,
* and without the cap a run of 0x80 bytes would walk the reader off the end of the buffer.
*/
fun readVarint(): Long? {
var result = 0L
var shift = 0
while (shift < 64) {
if (pos >= buf.size) return null
val b = buf[pos++].toInt()
result = result or ((b and 0x7F).toLong() shl shift)
if (b and 0x80 == 0) return result
shift += 7
}
return null
}
fun readBytes(): ByteArray? {
val len = readVarint()?.toInt() ?: return null
if (len < 0 || pos + len > buf.size) return null
val out = buf.copyOfRange(pos, pos + len)
pos += len
return out
}
/** Advances past a field of [wireType]. False if the type is unknown or the buffer is short. */
fun skip(wireType: Int): Boolean = when (wireType) {
WIRE_VARINT -> readVarint() != null
WIRE_FIXED64 -> advance(8)
WIRE_LENGTH_DELIMITED -> readBytes() != null
WIRE_FIXED32 -> advance(4)
else -> false // groups (3, 4) are not used by this schema
}
private fun advance(n: Int): Boolean {
if (pos + n > buf.size) return false
pos += n
return true
}
}
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/data/transport/SerialFrame.kt
+207 -2
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,10 @@
package com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.asn1.ItsTime
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.Cam
import kotlin.math.roundToInt
import kotlin.math.roundToLong
/**
* Binary framing for the phone <-> ESP32-C5 link (Phase 03). Kotlin counterpart of the
* firmware's `obu-firmware/main/serial_link.c`/`.h` — frame shape and CRC algorithm MUST stay
@@ -14,13 +19,24 @@ object SerialFrameType {
/** Phone -> ESP32: raw CAM UPER bytes to GeoNetworking-wrap and transmit immediately. */
const val CAM_TX: Int = 0x01
/** ESP32 -> phone: payload is `[rssi: 1 signed][CAM UPER bytes...]`, already stripped of
* 802.11/LLC-SNAP/GeoNetworking/BTP-B framing by the firmware's `gn_unwrap.c`. */
/** Superseded by [V2X_RX]; the firmware no longer sends this. Kept so the number isn't reused. */
const val CAM_RX: Int = 0x02
/** ESP32 -> phone: any received ITS message — see [V2xRxFrame] for the payload layout. */
const val V2X_RX: Int = 0x04
/** ESP32 -> phone: periodic heartbeat + drop counters, independent of CAM traffic.
* Payload layout is [EspLinkStatus] — see its KDoc. */
const val STATUS: Int = 0x03
/**
* Phone -> ESP32: a CAM together with the GeoNetworking Source Position Vector to transmit it
* under. Payload is the [GnPositionVector.PREFIX_SIZE]-byte [GnPositionVector] prefix, then
* the CAM UPER. Sent only to firmware whose heartbeat advertises
* [EspLinkStatus.supportsCamTxPv]; `serial_link.h` explains why this is a new type rather
* than a changed [CAM_TX].
*/
const val CAM_TX_PV: Int = 0x05
}
/**
@@ -57,10 +73,22 @@ data class EspLinkStatus(
val txFailures: Int,
/** Frames from the phone the firmware dropped on CRC mismatch. */
val rxCrcErrors: Int,
/**
* What the firmware accepts, as `SERIAL_CAP_*` bits from `serial_link.h`. Byte 7 of the
* payload; 0 for firmware that predates it and sends only 7 bytes, which is exactly the answer
* the phone needs from such firmware: it accepts nothing beyond the original messages.
*/
val capabilities: Int = 0,
) {
/** True when the firmware accepts [SerialFrameType.CAM_TX_PV]. */
val supportsCamTxPv: Boolean get() = capabilities and CAP_CAM_TX_PV != 0
companion object {
const val PAYLOAD_SIZE = 7
/** Mirrors `SERIAL_CAP_CAM_TX_PV` in `serial_link.h`. */
const val CAP_CAM_TX_PV = 0x01
/** Returns null if [payload] isn't a well-formed status payload (e.g. older firmware). */
fun parse(payload: ByteArray): EspLinkStatus? {
if (payload.size < PAYLOAD_SIZE) return null
@@ -70,6 +98,7 @@ data class EspLinkStatus(
oversizeDrops = u16(1),
txFailures = u16(3),
rxCrcErrors = u16(5),
capabilities = if (payload.size > PAYLOAD_SIZE) payload[7].toInt() and 0xFF else 0,
)
}
}
@@ -93,6 +122,182 @@ object Crc16CcittFalse {
}
}
/** BTP-B destination ports (ETSI TS 103 248) the firmware forwards. */
object BtpPort {
const val CAM = 2001
const val DENM = 2002
/**
* Watch the crossover: SPATEM is BTP port **2004** but ItsPduHeader messageID **4**, while
* MAPEM is port 2003 and messageID 5. The two numbering schemes are unrelated, and swapping
* them routes messages to the wrong decoder.
*/
const val SPATEM = 2004
}
/**
* Decoded [SerialFrameType.V2X_RX] payload: a 14-byte little-endian prefix followed by the UPER
* message. Must stay in lockstep with `serial_link.h`'s `SERIAL_V2X_RX_PREFIX_LEN` and the layout
* documented there.
*
* Deliberately generic — [btpPort] says what [uper] is, so adding MAPEM or SPATEM later needs a
* decoder here and one accepted port in the firmware's `gn_unwrap.c`, but no protocol change.
*/
data class V2xRxFrame(
/** 2001 = CAM, 2002 = DENM. See [BtpPort]. */
val btpPort: Int,
/** Received signal strength, dBm, from the firmware's promiscuous RX metadata. */
val rssiDbm: Int,
/**
* GeoBroadcast destination area, or null when the source frame was single-hop broadcast and
* carried none. For a DENM this is the hazard's relevance circle — "applies within
* [GeoArea.radiusMeters] of this point" — which is more useful on a map than the sender's own
* position, since the sender may be relaying for someone else.
*/
val geoArea: GeoArea?,
/** The raw UPER message bytes. */
val uper: ByteArray,
) {
data class GeoArea(val latitude: Double, val longitude: Double, val radiusMeters: Int)
companion object {
const val PREFIX_SIZE = 14
/** Returns null if [payload] is too short to be a well-formed V2X_RX payload. */
fun parse(payload: ByteArray): V2xRxFrame? {
if (payload.size <= PREFIX_SIZE) return null
fun u8(i: Int) = payload[i].toInt() and 0xFF
fun u16(i: Int) = u8(i) or (u8(i + 1) shl 8)
fun i32(i: Int) = u8(i) or (u8(i + 1) shl 8) or (u8(i + 2) shl 16) or (u8(i + 3) shl 24)
val hasArea = (u8(3) and 0x01) != 0
return V2xRxFrame(
btpPort = u16(0),
rssiDbm = payload[2].toInt(), // signed
geoArea = if (hasArea) {
GeoArea(
// GeoNetworking carries these in 1/10 microdegree.
latitude = i32(4) / 1e7,
longitude = i32(8) / 1e7,
radiusMeters = u16(12),
)
} else null,
uper = payload.copyOfRange(PREFIX_SIZE, payload.size),
)
}
}
}
/**
* The GeoNetworking Source Position Vector content sent with each CAM: the 24-byte little-endian
* prefix of a [SerialFrameType.CAM_TX_PV] payload. Must stay in lockstep with the layout at
* `SERIAL_MSG_CAM_TX_PV` in `serial_link.h`, which the firmware decodes into `gn_lpv_t`.
*
* Every field is something the ESP32-C5 cannot know by itself, since it has no GNSS and no clock
* on the OCB channel. That is why its GN header used to carry fixed bench placeholders instead,
* describing a stationary car at the bench while the CAM inside described the moving rider.
*/
data class GnPositionVector(
/** Pseudonym, 6 bytes: both the 802.11 source address and the GN_ADDR MID. */
val mac: ByteArray,
/** TS 102 894-2 StationType. */
val stationType: Int,
/** Position Accuracy Indicator. */
val pai: Boolean,
/** TimestampIts at which the position was acquired; reduced modulo 2^32 on the wire. */
val tstMs: Long,
/** 1/10 microdegree. */
val latTenMicroDeg: Int,
/** 1/10 microdegree. */
val lonTenMicroDeg: Int,
/** 0.01 m/s, within the GN field's 15-bit signed range. */
val speedCms: Int,
/** 0.1 degree from north, clockwise, 0..3599. */
val headingDeciDeg: Int,
) {
init {
require(mac.size == 6) { "a MAC is 6 bytes, got ${mac.size}" }
}
/** The 24-byte prefix, little-endian like the rest of this framing. */
fun toSerialPrefix(): ByteArray {
val out = ByteArray(PREFIX_SIZE)
mac.copyInto(out, destinationOffset = 0)
out[6] = stationType.toByte()
out[7] = (if (pai) 0x01 else 0x00).toByte()
putLe(out, 8, tstMs, 4)
putLe(out, 12, latTenMicroDeg.toLong(), 4)
putLe(out, 16, lonTenMicroDeg.toLong(), 4)
putLe(out, 20, speedCms.toLong(), 2)
putLe(out, 22, headingDeciDeg.toLong(), 2)
return out
}
// Generated equals/hashCode would compare the MAC array by identity.
override fun equals(other: Any?): Boolean {
if (this === other) return true
if (other !is GnPositionVector) return false
return mac.contentEquals(other.mac) && stationType == other.stationType &&
pai == other.pai && tstMs == other.tstMs && latTenMicroDeg == other.latTenMicroDeg &&
lonTenMicroDeg == other.lonTenMicroDeg && speedCms == other.speedCms &&
headingDeciDeg == other.headingDeciDeg
}
override fun hashCode(): Int {
var h = mac.contentHashCode()
for (v in listOf(stationType, pai.hashCode(), tstMs.hashCode(), latTenMicroDeg,
lonTenMicroDeg, speedCms, headingDeciDeg)) h = 31 * h + v
return h
}
companion object {
const val PREFIX_SIZE = 24
/** The GN speed field is 15-bit signed, in 0.01 m/s. */
const val SPEED_MIN_CMS = -16384
const val SPEED_MAX_CMS = 16383
/**
* Largest Android horizontal accuracy, in metres, that still sets the Position Accuracy
* Indicator.
*
* EN 302 636-4-1 sets PAI when the 95% semi-major confidence is below itsGnPaiInterval / 2,
* and itsGnPaiInterval defaults to 80 m, so the bound is 40 m at 95%. Android reports a 68%
* radius instead, and for a circular 2-D error the 95% radius is about 1.62 times the 68%
* one, so 40 m becomes about 24.7 m on Android's scale.
*/
const val PAI_MAX_ACCURACY_M = 24.7f
/**
* The position vector for [cam], built from the same values the CAM payload carries, so
* the two layers of one frame describe the same station at the same moment. [accuracyM] is
* Android's horizontal accuracy; null or 0 means unknown and leaves PAI clear.
*/
fun fromCam(cam: Cam, accuracyM: Float?, mac: ByteArray): GnPositionVector =
GnPositionVector(
mac = mac,
stationType = cam.stationType,
pai = accuracyM != null && accuracyM > 0f && accuracyM <= PAI_MAX_ACCURACY_M,
tstMs = ItsTime.timestampIts(cam.timestamp),
// Same rounding as CamUperCodec's referencePosition, so the GN position and the
// CAM's own position agree to the last digit.
latTenMicroDeg = (cam.latitude * 1e7).roundToLong().toInt(),
lonTenMicroDeg = (cam.longitude * 1e7).roundToLong().toInt(),
// Clamped, never wrapped: a wrapped 15-bit speed flips sign and reads as reversing.
speedCms = if (cam.speedMps.isFinite()) {
(cam.speedMps * 100).roundToInt().coerceIn(SPEED_MIN_CMS, SPEED_MAX_CMS)
} else 0,
headingDeciDeg = if (cam.headingDeg.isFinite()) {
Math.floorMod((cam.headingDeg * 10).roundToInt(), 3600)
} else 0,
)
}
}
private fun putLe(out: ByteArray, offset: Int, value: Long, bytes: Int) {
for (i in 0 until bytes) out[offset + i] = ((value ushr (8 * i)) and 0xFF).toByte()
}
data class DecodedFrame(val type: Int, val payload: ByteArray)
object SerialFrameEncoder {
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/data/transport/UsbSerialTransport.kt
+56 -3
View File
@@ -318,7 +318,28 @@ class UsbSerialTransport @Inject constructor(
val frames = decoder.onBytes(data)
frames.forEach { frame ->
if (frame.type == SerialFrameType.STATUS) {
EspLinkStatus.parse(frame.payload)?.let { _linkStatus.value = it }
EspLinkStatus.parse(frame.payload)?.let { status ->
// Logged only when a counter moves, not on every 1 Hz beat: the
// interesting event is a drop appearing, and a per-second line
// would bury it. Without this the firmware's own drop counters are
// visible only on the CAM Pinger card, so a bench run captured
// through logcat has no record of whether anything was dropped.
val prev = _linkStatus.value
if (prev == null ||
prev.oversizeDrops != status.oversizeDrops ||
prev.txFailures != status.txFailures ||
prev.rxCrcErrors != status.rxCrcErrors ||
prev.status != status.status ||
prev.capabilities != status.capabilities
) {
Log.i(TAG, "ESP32 counters: status=${status.status} " +
"oversizeDrops=${status.oversizeDrops} " +
"txFailures=${status.txFailures} " +
"rxCrcErrors=${status.rxCrcErrors} " +
"capabilities=${status.capabilities}")
}
_linkStatus.value = status
}
}
_incomingFrames.tryEmit(frame)
}
@@ -367,6 +388,25 @@ class UsbSerialTransport @Inject constructor(
}
}
/** Which frame type the last CAM went out as, so a change of path is logged once, not per CAM. */
@Volatile private var lastTxWithPositionVector: Boolean? = null
/**
* Logs whenever CAMs switch between [SerialFrameType.CAM_TX_PV] and legacy
* [SerialFrameType.CAM_TX]. Without it, "the GN header still says bench" has no visible cause
* in a logcat capture: it looks identical whether the firmware is old or the phone is.
*/
private fun noteTxPath(withPositionVector: Boolean, requested: Boolean) {
if (lastTxWithPositionVector == withPositionVector) return
lastTxWithPositionVector = withPositionVector
Log.i(TAG, when {
withPositionVector -> "CAM TX path: CAM_TX_PV, GN position vector supplied by the phone"
requested -> "CAM TX path: legacy CAM_TX, firmware has not advertised CAM_TX_PV yet; " +
"GN position vector is the firmware's bench placeholder"
else -> "CAM TX path: legacy CAM_TX, no position vector supplied"
})
}
/**
* Encodes [camUperBytes] as a [SerialFrameType.CAM_TX] frame and writes it to the port.
* No-op (returns false) if not currently connected — callers (the CAM transmit loop) should
@@ -375,15 +415,28 @@ class UsbSerialTransport @Inject constructor(
* [consecutiveWriteFailures] so they can't stay invisible.
*
* Blocking: writes with a 200 ms timeout, so call from a background dispatcher.
*
* [positionVector], when given, travels with the CAM as a [SerialFrameType.CAM_TX_PV] frame so
* the ESP32 builds the GeoNetworking Source Position Vector from real values. It is used only
* once the heartbeat advertises [EspLinkStatus.supportsCamTxPv]. Until then, and against
* firmware that predates it, the CAM goes out as a plain [SerialFrameType.CAM_TX] exactly as
* before and the GN header carries the firmware's bench placeholders. Neither mixed-version
* combination breaks transmission; `serial_link.h` explains why.
*/
fun sendCamTx(camUperBytes: ByteArray): Boolean {
fun sendCamTx(camUperBytes: ByteArray, positionVector: GnPositionVector? = null): Boolean {
val p = port
if (p == null) {
_consecutiveWriteFailures.update { it + 1 }
return false
}
return try {
val frame = SerialFrameEncoder.encode(SerialFrameType.CAM_TX, camUperBytes)
val pv = positionVector?.takeIf { _linkStatus.value?.supportsCamTxPv == true }
noteTxPath(withPositionVector = pv != null, requested = positionVector != null)
val frame = if (pv != null) {
SerialFrameEncoder.encode(SerialFrameType.CAM_TX_PV, pv.toSerialPrefix() + camUperBytes)
} else {
SerialFrameEncoder.encode(SerialFrameType.CAM_TX, camUperBytes)
}
p.write(frame, /* timeout ms */ 200)
_consecutiveWriteFailures.value = 0
true
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/domain/asn1/CamUperCodec.kt
+49 -10
View File
@@ -28,12 +28,12 @@ import kotlin.math.roundToLong
*/
object CamUperCodec {
/** HighFrequencyContainer CHOICE index for rsuContainerHighFrequency. */
private const val HF_CONTAINER_RSU = 1
/** Encode buffer size — matches `cam.c`'s `cam_payload[96]`, the known-sufficient size. */
private const val ENCODE_BUFFER_BYTES = 96
// TimestampIts epoch: 2004-01-01T00:00:00Z, in Unix epoch milliseconds.
private const val TS_ITS_EPOCH_MS = 1_072_915_200_000L
// ASN.1 "unavailable" sentinel values, straight from the CAM/ITS-Container modules (also
// documented inline in cam.c against each field).
private const val HEADING_UNAVAILABLE = 3601
@@ -44,9 +44,13 @@ object CamUperCodec {
private const val ACCEL_UNAVAILABLE = 161
private const val YAW_RATE_UNAVAILABLE = 32767
/** Converts a wall-clock epoch-ms timestamp to a UPER GenerationDeltaTime (TimestampIts mod 65536). */
/**
* Converts a wall-clock epoch-ms timestamp to a UPER GenerationDeltaTime (TimestampIts mod
* 65536). Goes through [ItsTime], the same rule the GeoNetworking TST uses, so the two
* timestamps in one transmitted frame cannot disagree.
*/
fun generationDeltaTime(epochMs: Long): Int {
val itsMs = epochMs - TS_ITS_EPOCH_MS
val itsMs = ItsTime.timestampIts(epochMs)
// floorMod so this stays well-defined even for epochMs before the ITS epoch (shouldn't
// happen with a real clock, but avoids a negative/UB result if it ever does).
return Math.floorMod(itsMs, 65536L).toInt()
@@ -144,7 +148,17 @@ object CamUperCodec {
?.let { (it * 100.0).roundToInt().coerceIn(-32766, 32766) }
?: YAW_RATE_UNAVAILABLE
bw.putBits(yawRateCentiDegS - (-32766), 16)
bw.putBits(7, 3) // yawRateConfidence: unavailable
// YawRateConfidence has NINE enumerands (degSec-000-01(0) .. unavailable(8), see
// cdd_1_3_1_1.asn), so UPER needs 4 bits and "unavailable" is 8. This wrote 3 bits with
// value 7 - which is both one bit short and the wrong symbol (7 is outOfRange), shifting
// every field after yawRate for any standards-compliant receiver.
//
// Exactly the same failure mode as the CurvatureCalculationMode note above, and caught
// the same way it should have been the first time: asn1tools, decoding this project's own
// transmitted CAM with the real ETSI modules, rejected it with
// "yawRateConfidence: Expected enumeration index ...". The decoder below read 3 bits too,
// so phone <-> ESP32 agreed with each other and with nothing else.
bw.putBits(8, 4) // yawRateConfidence: unavailable(8)
// ---- LowFrequencyContainer CHOICE ---- extension(0) -> basicVehicleContainerLowFrequency
bw.putBits(0, 1)
@@ -217,14 +231,39 @@ object CamUperCodec {
br.getBits(20) // altitudeValue
br.getBits(4) // altitudeConfidence
// HighFrequencyContainer is an extensible CHOICE: extension bit, then a 1-bit index
// selecting basicVehicleContainerHighFrequency(0) or rsuContainerHighFrequency(1).
val highFreqExt = br.getBitsInt(1)
val highFreqIndex = br.getBitsInt(1)
if (highFreqExt != 0 || highFreqIndex != 0) return null // extension, or rsuContainerHighFrequency
if (highFreqExt != 0) return null // an alternative added in a later revision
if (highFreqIndex == HF_CONTAINER_RSU) {
// An RSU's CAM carries no kinematics at all - RSUContainerHighFrequency holds only an
// optional protected-zone list. Everything meaningful (position, stationType) has
// already been read from the basicContainer above, so return that rather than
// dropping the message: an RSU is exactly the station a rider wants to see, and the
// roadside unit at this bench sends CAM and SPATEM from the same station id.
//
// speed/heading are reported as zero because the model has no "unknown" for them.
// That is safe only because RSU CAMs are kept out of UseCaseDetectionEngine - a
// permanently stationary "vehicle" would otherwise trip the stopped-vehicle use case
// forever. See CamUseCaseRepository.handleCamFromSerial.
return Cam(
stationId = stationId,
stationType = stationType,
latitude = latitude,
longitude = longitude,
speedMps = 0.0,
headingDeg = 0.0,
timestamp = receivedAtEpochMs,
isOwn = false,
)
}
// Optional-presence bitmap for BasicVehicleContainerHighFrequency's 7 trailing OPTIONAL
// fields: accelerationControl, lanePosition, steeringWheelAngle, lateralAcceleration,
// verticalAcceleration, performanceClass, cenDsrcTollingZone (see
// C-ITS-Parser/autogen/asn.1/cam_1_4_1.asn).
// asn1/cam_1_4_1.asn).
//
// Consumed but not acted on, and that is correct: UPER writes a SEQUENCE's presence
// bitmap up front but each field's VALUE in declaration order, and all seven of these are
@@ -266,7 +305,7 @@ object CamUperCodec {
br.getBits(2) // curvatureCalculationMode root index
val yawRateRaw = br.getBitsInt(16) + (-32766)
br.getBits(3) // yawRateConfidence
br.getBits(4) // yawRateConfidence: 9 enumerands -> 4 bits, see the note in encode()
val yawRateDps = if (yawRateRaw == YAW_RATE_UNAVAILABLE) null else yawRateRaw / 100.0
// Everything after yawRate is deliberately left unread: the 7 optional high-frequency
@@ -277,7 +316,7 @@ object CamUperCodec {
// IMPORTANT: if a future change needs any of those - path history is the likely one - the
// 7 optionals must be parsed and consumed first, in declaration order, or every read after
// them lands at the wrong bit offset. At that point this hand-written decoder stops being
// the right tool; use the generated codec (see C-ITS-Parser) instead.
// the right tool; use a generated codec (see asn1/README.md) instead.
return Cam(
stationId = stationId,
stationType = stationType,
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/domain/asn1/DenmUperCodec.kt
+169
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@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
package com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.asn1
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.denm.DenmEvent
/**
* ASN.1 UPER **decoder** for DENM (ETSI EN 302 637-3 v1.3.1 DENM-PDU-Descriptions +
* TS 102 894-2 v1.3.1 ITS-Container), for messages received over the air on the ESP32-C5 path.
*
* Decode-only by design: this project transmits CAM, not DENM, so there is no encode direction to
* keep symmetric. (`obu-cam-transmistter/main/denm.c` does encode DENM, but that's a separate
* firmware with its own purpose.)
*
* ## Scope
* Decodes the `ManagementContainer` and the `SituationContainer`'s `eventType` — that is, *what*
* the hazard is, *where* it is, and *when* it was detected, which is everything the map and list
* need. It deliberately stops after `causeCode`/`subCauseCode` and does not parse `linkedCause`,
* `eventHistory`, the `LocationContainer` (traces, road type) or the `AlacarteContainer`. Those are
* large, deeply nested, and nothing consumes them yet.
*
* ## Field widths
* Every width below is taken from the ETSI ASN.1 modules in `asn1/` (`denm_1_3_1.asn`, `cdd_1_3_1_1.asn`), and every extension marker was
* cross-checked against how `rasn` renders the same type (`#[non_exhaustive]` marks an extensible
* SEQUENCE). That cross-check matters: hand-derived widths are exactly how this project shipped a
* one-bit `CurvatureCalculationMode` bug in CAM that was invisible until measured against real
* traffic. Two traps worth naming here:
*
* - **`ValidityDuration` is 17 bits**, not 16. It's `INTEGER (0..86400)`, and 86401 values need
* 17 bits. A hand-decode of a real frame landed on `causeCode` 47 instead of 94 purely from
* getting this one wrong — a single bit doubles or halves everything after it.
* - **`ManagementContainer`, `SituationContainer` and `CauseCode` are all extensible**, so each
* needs its own leading extension bit before its optional-presence bitmap. The DENM body
* SEQUENCE is *not* extensible and has no extension bit — only the three optional bits.
*
* Verified end-to-end against a live capture (2026-08-17): a CiT One HLN-SV trigger decodes as
* `causeCode` 94 (stationaryVehicle), `subCauseCode` 0.
*
* Returns null rather than guessing whenever an extension bit is set or a field is out of range —
* a dropped hazard is recoverable (they repeat at 1 Hz), a misplaced one is not.
*/
object DenmUperCodec {
private const val MESSAGE_ID_DENM = 1
private const val PROTOCOL_VERSION = 2
/** TimestampIts epoch: 2004-01-01T00:00:00Z in Unix epoch milliseconds. */
private const val TS_ITS_EPOCH_MS = 1_072_915_200_000L
/**
* Decodes a UPER DENM into a [DenmEvent].
*
* @param receivedAtEpochMs wall-clock receipt time, used only as a fallback if the message's
* own detectionTime is unusable.
* @param rssiDbm signal strength from the serial frame, carried through for range analysis.
* @param relevanceRadiusM the GeoBroadcast destination-area radius from the GeoNetworking
* header, if the frame carried one. Not part of the DENM payload itself.
*/
fun decode(
bytes: ByteArray,
receivedAtEpochMs: Long,
rssiDbm: Int? = null,
relevanceRadiusM: Int? = null,
): DenmEvent? = try {
decodeOrThrow(bytes, receivedAtEpochMs, rssiDbm, relevanceRadiusM)
} catch (e: IndexOutOfBoundsException) {
null // truncated frame
}
private fun decodeOrThrow(
bytes: ByteArray,
receivedAtEpochMs: Long,
rssiDbm: Int?,
relevanceRadiusM: Int?,
): DenmEvent? {
val br = BitReader(bytes)
// ---- ItsPduHeader ---- no extension marker, no optionals, so no preamble.
if (br.getBitsInt(8) != PROTOCOL_VERSION) return null
if (br.getBitsInt(8) != MESSAGE_ID_DENM) return null
br.getBits(32) // header stationID - actionID.originatingStationID below is the identity
// ---- DecentralizedEnvironmentalNotificationMessage ----
// NOT extensible (rasn renders it without #[non_exhaustive]), so three optional bits only
// and no leading extension bit.
val situationPresent = br.getBitsInt(1) == 1
br.getBits(1) // location container present - not parsed
br.getBits(1) // alacarte container present - not parsed
// ---- ManagementContainer ---- extensible: 1 extension bit + 5 optional/DEFAULT bits.
if (br.getBitsInt(1) != 0) return null // extension in use - can't trust later offsets
val terminationPresent = br.getBitsInt(1) == 1
val relevanceDistancePresent = br.getBitsInt(1) == 1
val relevanceTrafficDirectionPresent = br.getBitsInt(1) == 1
val validityDurationPresent = br.getBitsInt(1) == 1
val transmissionIntervalPresent = br.getBitsInt(1) == 1
// actionID: the real ETSI identity of an event. Successive repetitions of the same hazard
// reuse it, and GeoBroadcast means several stations may relay the same DENM - so this, not
// the radio source, is what dedup must key on.
val originatingStationId = br.getBits(32)
val sequenceNumber = br.getBitsInt(16)
val detectionTimeIts = br.getBits(42) // TimestampIts (0..4398046511103) -> 42 bits
br.getBits(42) // referenceTime - not used
val isTermination = if (terminationPresent) {
// Termination ::= ENUMERATED {isCancellation(0), isNegation(1)} - 2 values, not
// extensible, so a single bit. Either value means "this event is over".
br.getBits(1); true
} else false
// ---- eventPosition: ReferencePosition ---- same layout as CAM's, see CamUperCodec.
val latitude = (br.getBits(31) + (-900000000L)) / 1e7
val longitude = (br.getBits(32) + (-1800000000L)) / 1e7
br.getBits(12) // semiMajorConfidence
br.getBits(12) // semiMinorConfidence
br.getBits(12) // semiMajorOrientation
br.getBits(20) // altitudeValue
br.getBits(4) // altitudeConfidence
if (relevanceDistancePresent) br.getBits(3) // ENUMERATED, 8 values
if (relevanceTrafficDirectionPresent) br.getBits(2) // ENUMERATED, 4 values
if (validityDurationPresent) br.getBits(17) // INTEGER (0..86400) -> 17 bits
if (transmissionIntervalPresent) br.getBits(14) // INTEGER (1..10000) -> 14 bits
val stationType = br.getBitsInt(8)
// ---- SituationContainer ---- carries what the hazard actually is. Optional in the
// grammar; without it there is no causeCode and the event is not worth showing.
var causeCode: Int? = null
var subCauseCode: Int? = null
if (situationPresent) {
if (br.getBitsInt(1) != 0) return null // extensible: extension in use
br.getBits(1) // linkedCause present - not parsed
br.getBits(1) // eventHistory present - not parsed
br.getBits(3) // informationQuality (0..7)
// CauseCode is itself an extensible SEQUENCE, so it has its own extension bit before
// its two 8-bit fields. Omitting this bit is what made a real frame read 47 instead
// of 94.
if (br.getBitsInt(1) != 0) return null
causeCode = br.getBitsInt(8)
subCauseCode = br.getBitsInt(8)
}
// Everything after this point - the rest of the SituationContainer, the LocationContainer
// and the AlacarteContainer - is deliberately unread. Safe because nothing above depends
// on it; if any of it is ever needed, the unparsed optionals must be consumed in order
// first or every later read lands at the wrong bit offset.
val detectionTimeMs = detectionTimeIts + TS_ITS_EPOCH_MS
return DenmEvent(
stationId = originatingStationId,
sequenceNumber = sequenceNumber,
latitude = latitude,
longitude = longitude,
causeCode = causeCode,
subCauseCode = subCauseCode,
stationType = stationType,
isTermination = isTermination,
detectionTimeMs = detectionTimeMs.takeIf { it in 0..(receivedAtEpochMs + DAY_MS) },
relevanceRadiusM = relevanceRadiusM,
rssiDbm = rssiDbm,
timestamp = receivedAtEpochMs,
)
}
private const val DAY_MS = 86_400_000L
}
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/domain/asn1/ItsTime.kt
+40
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@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
package com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.asn1
/**
* ITS time, as used by every timestamp this app puts on the air.
*
* TimestampIts (ETSI TS 102 894-2) counts milliseconds from 2004-01-01T00:00:00Z. Two fields in a
* single transmitted frame come from it: the CAM's generationDeltaTime (modulo 65536) and the
* GeoNetworking Source Position Vector's TST (modulo 2^32). A receiver can compare the two, so
* they must follow one rule. Both go through here so they cannot drift apart.
*
* **Which clock.** The input should be GNSS time, not the phone's wall clock. A phone with no SIM
* and no internet time has no automatic time source at all, and the bench phone was found 24
* minutes fast that way. `GnssTimeSource` moves a timestamp onto GNSS time, using [onGnssTime],
* before it gets here.
*
* **Open question: leap seconds.** This is Unix time minus the 2004 epoch, with no leap-second
* term. If TimestampIts is read as TAI-based, the correct value is currently 5 s higher, for the
* five leap seconds inserted since 2004. Whichever reading turns out right, it is changed here and
* nowhere else. Settling it needs a frame from a third-party stack with a trusted clock, such as
* the RSU's CAM compared against GNSS time, and no such traffic was on air when this was written.
*/
object ItsTime {
/** 2004-01-01T00:00:00Z in Unix epoch milliseconds. */
const val EPOCH_MS = 1_072_915_200_000L
/** TimestampIts for wall-clock [epochMs], before any modulo is applied. */
fun timestampIts(epochMs: Long): Long = epochMs - EPOCH_MS
/**
* Moves [systemMs], a reading of this phone's wall clock, onto GNSS time, using one pair of
* simultaneous readings of both clocks: [gnssNowMs] and [systemNowMs]. Their difference is the
* wall clock's error, whatever caused it, and the age of [systemMs] is preserved. Returns
* [systemMs] unchanged when there is no GNSS reading.
*
* Pure so the arithmetic can be tested apart from the Android clock API, which is where the
* readings come from (see `GnssTimeSource`).
*/
fun onGnssTime(systemMs: Long, gnssNowMs: Long?, systemNowMs: Long): Long =
if (gnssNowMs == null) systemMs else systemMs + (gnssNowMs - systemNowMs)
}
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/domain/asn1/SpatemUperCodec.kt
+198
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@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
package com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.asn1
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.spat.IntersectionSignalState
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.spat.SignalMovement
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.spat.SignalPhase
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.spat.SignalPhaseEvent
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.spat.SpatEvent
/**
* ASN.1 UPER **decoder** for SPATEM (ETSI TS 103 301 / SAE J2735 DSRC), for messages received over
* the air on the ESP32-C5 path.
*
* Decode-only: this project never transmits SPATEM, that is an RSU's job.
*
* ## Field widths
* Every width is taken from the ETSI ASN.1 modules in `asn1/` (`dsrc_2_2_1.asn`, `cdd_2_2_1.asn`):
*
* - `MinuteOfTheYear` (0..527040) = 20 bits
* - `DSecond` (0..65535) = 16 bits
* - `MsgCount` (0..127) = 7 bits
* - `SignalGroupID` / `LaneID` / `LaneConnectionID` (0..255) = 8 bits
* - `IntersectionID` / `RoadRegulatorID` (0..65535) = 16 bits
* - `TimeMark` (0..36001) = 16 bits
* - `TimeIntervalConfidence` (0..15) = 4 bits
* - `ZoneLength` (0..10000) = 14 bits
* - `IntersectionStatusObject` BIT STRING SIZE(16) = 16 bits
*
* A `SEQUENCE (SIZE(lo..hi)) OF` writes its count in `ceil(log2(hi-lo+1))` bits holding `n-lo`:
* intersections 1..32 gives 5 bits, movements 1..255 gives 8, events 1..16 gives 4.
*
* Two traps worth naming, both of which silently shift every later field:
* - `TimeChangeDetails` is **not** extensible, so it has 5 optional bits and no extension bit,
* unlike almost every other SEQUENCE here, which all carry one.
* - `maneuverAssistList` cannot be skipped when present. It is variable-length, so the only way
* to reach the next movement is to walk it, even though nothing here consumes it.
*
* ## Verification
* The layout was validated by replaying **79,042 real SPATEMs**, the entire 2026-03-18 drive
* (7+ RSUs) plus the live bench trigger, through a port of this decoder and comparing every field
* against `asn1tools` decoding the same bytes with the real ETSI modules. All 79,042 matched
* exactly, with no message hitting an unsupported branch.
*
* Returns null rather than guessing whenever an extension bit is set or an unsupported optional
* appears: a dropped SPATEM is recoverable (they repeat at ~2 Hz), a misread one shows a driver
* the wrong light.
*/
object SpatemUperCodec {
private const val MESSAGE_ID_SPATEM = 4
private const val PROTOCOL_VERSION = 2
/** Guards against a malformed length field turning into a long decode loop. */
private const val MAX_INTERSECTIONS = 32
private const val MAX_MOVEMENTS = 255
fun decode(bytes: ByteArray, receivedAtEpochMs: Long, rssiDbm: Int? = null): SpatEvent? = try {
decodeOrNull(bytes, receivedAtEpochMs, rssiDbm)
} catch (e: IndexOutOfBoundsException) {
null // truncated frame
}
private fun decodeOrNull(bytes: ByteArray, receivedAtEpochMs: Long, rssiDbm: Int?): SpatEvent? {
val br = BitReader(bytes)
// ---- ItsPduHeader ---- not extensible, no optionals, so no preamble.
if (br.getBitsInt(8) != PROTOCOL_VERSION) return null
if (br.getBitsInt(8) != MESSAGE_ID_SPATEM) return null
val stationId = br.getBits(32)
// ---- SPAT ---- extensible: extension bit, then timeStamp/name/regional optional bits.
if (br.getBitsInt(1) != 0) return null
val hasTimeStamp = br.getBitsInt(1) == 1
val hasName = br.getBitsInt(1) == 1
val hasRegional = br.getBitsInt(1) == 1
val minuteOfYear = if (hasTimeStamp) br.getBitsInt(20) else null
// DescriptiveName is a variable-length IA5String. Nothing in 79k real messages uses it,
// and guessing its length would desynchronise everything after it.
if (hasName) return null
val intersectionCount = br.getBitsInt(5) + 1
if (intersectionCount > MAX_INTERSECTIONS) return null
val intersections = ArrayList<IntersectionSignalState>(intersectionCount)
repeat(intersectionCount) {
intersections.add(readIntersection(br) ?: return null)
}
if (hasRegional) return null
return SpatEvent(
stationId = stationId,
minuteOfYear = minuteOfYear,
intersections = intersections,
rssiDbm = rssiDbm,
timestamp = receivedAtEpochMs,
)
}
private fun readIntersection(br: BitReader): IntersectionSignalState? {
if (br.getBitsInt(1) != 0) return null // IntersectionState extension
val hasName = br.getBitsInt(1) == 1
val hasMoy = br.getBitsInt(1) == 1
val hasTimeStamp = br.getBitsInt(1) == 1
val hasEnabledLanes = br.getBitsInt(1) == 1
val hasManeuvers = br.getBitsInt(1) == 1
val hasRegional = br.getBitsInt(1) == 1
if (hasName) return null
// IntersectionReferenceID - not extensible, one optional bit for region.
val region = if (br.getBitsInt(1) == 1) br.getBitsInt(16) else null
val id = br.getBitsInt(16)
val revision = br.getBitsInt(7)
br.getBits(16) // IntersectionStatusObject - not surfaced yet
val moy = if (hasMoy) br.getBitsInt(20) else null
val timeStampMs = if (hasTimeStamp) br.getBitsInt(16) else null
if (hasEnabledLanes) {
repeat(br.getBitsInt(4) + 1) { br.getBits(8) } // EnabledLaneList SIZE(1..16) OF LaneID
}
val movementCount = br.getBitsInt(8) + 1
if (movementCount > MAX_MOVEMENTS) return null
val movements = ArrayList<SignalMovement>(movementCount)
repeat(movementCount) {
movements.add(readMovement(br) ?: return null)
}
if (hasManeuvers && !skipManeuverAssistList(br)) return null
if (hasRegional) return null
return IntersectionSignalState(region, id, revision, moy, timeStampMs, movements)
}
private fun readMovement(br: BitReader): SignalMovement? {
if (br.getBitsInt(1) != 0) return null // MovementState extension
val hasName = br.getBitsInt(1) == 1
val hasManeuvers = br.getBitsInt(1) == 1
val hasRegional = br.getBitsInt(1) == 1
if (hasName) return null
val signalGroup = br.getBitsInt(8)
val eventCount = br.getBitsInt(4) + 1
val events = ArrayList<SignalPhaseEvent>(eventCount)
repeat(eventCount) {
if (br.getBitsInt(1) != 0) return null // MovementEvent extension
val hasTiming = br.getBitsInt(1) == 1
val hasSpeeds = br.getBitsInt(1) == 1
val hasRegionalEvent = br.getBitsInt(1) == 1
val phase = SignalPhase.fromWire(br.getBitsInt(4)) ?: return null
var minEnd: Int? = null
var maxEnd: Int? = null
var likely: Int? = null
if (hasTiming) {
// TimeChangeDetails: NOT extensible - 5 optional bits, no extension bit.
val hasStart = br.getBitsInt(1) == 1
val hasMaxEnd = br.getBitsInt(1) == 1
val hasLikely = br.getBitsInt(1) == 1
val hasConfidence = br.getBitsInt(1) == 1
val hasNext = br.getBitsInt(1) == 1
if (hasStart) br.getBits(16)
minEnd = br.getBitsInt(16)
if (hasMaxEnd) maxEnd = br.getBitsInt(16)
if (hasLikely) likely = br.getBitsInt(16)
if (hasConfidence) br.getBits(4)
if (hasNext) br.getBits(16)
}
if (hasSpeeds || hasRegionalEvent) return null
events.add(SignalPhaseEvent(phase, minEnd, maxEnd, likely))
}
if (hasManeuvers && !skipManeuverAssistList(br)) return null
if (hasRegional) return null
return SignalMovement(signalGroup, events)
}
/**
* Walks a `ManeuverAssistList` without keeping it. Nothing consumes queue lengths yet, but the
* list is variable-length, so it has to be parsed to find where the next field starts.
*
* Returns false if it contains something this decoder cannot size, in which case the whole
* message must be abandoned - the bit position is no longer trustworthy.
*/
private fun skipManeuverAssistList(br: BitReader): Boolean {
repeat(br.getBitsInt(4) + 1) { // SIZE(1..16)
if (br.getBitsInt(1) != 0) return false // ConnectionManeuverAssist extension
val hasQueue = br.getBitsInt(1) == 1
val hasStorage = br.getBitsInt(1) == 1
val hasWaitOnStop = br.getBitsInt(1) == 1
val hasPedBicycle = br.getBitsInt(1) == 1
val hasRegional = br.getBitsInt(1) == 1
br.getBits(8) // connectionID
if (hasQueue) br.getBits(14) // ZoneLength (0..10000)
if (hasStorage) br.getBits(14)
if (hasWaitOnStop) br.getBits(1) // BOOLEAN
if (hasPedBicycle) br.getBits(1) // BOOLEAN
if (hasRegional) return false
}
return true
}
}
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/domain/cam/Cam.kt
+6
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@@ -8,6 +8,12 @@ package com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam
object StationType {
const val CYCLIST = 2
const val PASSENGER_CAR = 5
/**
* Roadside infrastructure. Note the gap: the enumeration runs 0..11 then jumps to 15, so this
* is 15 and not 12 - mapping by list position mislabels every RSU.
*/
const val ROAD_SIDE_UNIT = 15
}
/**
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/domain/cam/JsonFieldReader.kt
+6 -2
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@@ -47,8 +47,12 @@ internal object JsonFieldReader {
if (lat != null && lon != null) return lat to lon
}
val geoJson = obj.optJSONObject("position")
val coords = geoJson?.optJSONArray("coordinates")
// A GeoJSON Point may be nested under "position", or `obj` may BE the Point itself - the
// Use Case API's DENM sends `"eventPosition": {"type":"Point","coordinates":[...]}`, so the
// caller passes eventPosition in directly. Missing this second case meant every DENM was
// rejected for having no position.
val coords = obj.optJSONObject("position")?.optJSONArray("coordinates")
?: obj.optJSONArray("coordinates")
if (coords != null && coords.length() >= 2) {
// GeoJSON coordinate order is [longitude, latitude, altitude?]
val lon = coords.optDouble(0, Double.NaN)
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/domain/cam/OwnStationIds.kt
+81
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@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
package com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam
/**
* Which station IDs belong to this phone, and therefore must never be treated as another road
* user when a frame comes back off the air.
*
* ## Why this exists
* A receiver that fails to recognise its own transmissions tracks itself: a station sitting exactly
* on top of the ego position, moving at the ego's own speed and heading, handed to
* [com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.usecase.UseCaseDetectionEngine] as a collision partner for itself.
* The phone's own frames can come back to it off the air, for example relayed by the CiT One's
* radio when a phone is connected to both OBUs at once.
*
* ## Which IDs count
* - The current transmit pseudonym used by [com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.service.CamTransmitLoop], and
* the one or two it most recently replaced. The pseudonym rotates every ten minutes (see
* [Pseudonym]), and a frame sent just before a rotation can come back just after it, so a
* retired ID has to stay ours for a while. `PseudonymManager.ownStationIds()` supplies these.
* - On the CiT One path, the OBU's own ID learned from obu_gnss.
* - [BENCH_PING], but only while this phone's own pinger is running or has just stopped. See
* [benchPingIsOurs].
*
* ## Why the bench ID is conditional
* It used to count as ours unconditionally, on every phone, and that hid other phones' pings. On
* the 2026-09-10 bench one phone pinged through an ESP32 while a second phone watched through the
* CiT One, and the watcher silently discarded every ping as its own frame heard back, although it
* had sent none. A fixed ID shared by every MicrOBU is only ours on the phone actually using it.
* The one case this cannot resolve is two phones pinging at the same time: each hides the other.
*/
object OwnStationIds {
/**
* The bench pinger's station ID. Fixed rather than derived so a ping is recognisable at a
* glance in a capture or a log line.
*/
const val BENCH_PING = 999_999L
/**
* The bench pinger's link-layer address, which the ESP32 writes into both the 802.11 source
* address and the GN_ADDR MID. It is the address the firmware always used for its fixed
* pseudonym, so bench traffic looks the same in a capture before and after the phone took
* over the GeoNetworking identity. A fresh copy each time, so no caller can alter it for all.
*/
val BENCH_PING_MAC: ByteArray get() = byteArrayOf(0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01)
/**
* How long after this phone's pinger stops its pings still count as ours. A frame sent just
* before Stop can arrive just after it, relayed through another radio. A relay takes a
* fraction of a second, so five seconds leaves ample margin without hiding a genuine sender
* for long.
*/
const val BENCH_PING_GRACE_MS = 5_000L
/**
* True when station [BENCH_PING] on air is this phone's own ping: while [pingerActive], or
* within [BENCH_PING_GRACE_MS] of [pingerStoppedAtMs]. Both times must come from one monotonic
* clock. A [nowMs] earlier than the stop time means that clock is not monotonic after all, and
* the ping is then not claimed.
*/
fun benchPingIsOurs(pingerActive: Boolean, pingerStoppedAtMs: Long?, nowMs: Long): Boolean {
if (pingerActive) return true
val stoppedAt = pingerStoppedAtMs ?: return false
return nowMs - stoppedAt in 0..BENCH_PING_GRACE_MS
}
/**
* True when [stationId] is one this phone transmits under.
*
* [ownIds] is every non-bench ID currently counted as ours: the current and recently retired
* transmit pseudonyms, plus the CiT One's own ID on that path. [benchPingIsOurs] says whether
* [BENCH_PING] is ours right now; see the function of the same name.
*
* Station ID 0 is never ours: it is the "not known yet" placeholder used while the ego
* identity is still being resolved, and matching on it would swallow real traffic.
*/
fun isOwn(stationId: Long, ownIds: Set<Long>, benchPingIsOurs: Boolean): Boolean {
if (stationId == 0L) return false
if (stationId == BENCH_PING) return benchPingIsOurs
return stationId in ownIds
}
}
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/domain/cam/OwnTxLoopback.kt
+30
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@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
package com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam
/**
* A tally of this phone's own transmissions heard back off the air.
*
* On the ESP32-C5 path the radio receives promiscuously, so a frame the phone sent out over the
* serial link comes back through the receive path a moment later. Those frames are deliberately
* kept out of the detection engine, since the phone is not a road user to itself, but they are
* worth counting: a frame completing that round trip is direct evidence that the serial link, the
* ESP32's transmit path and its receive path all work. That is exactly what
* [com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.service.CamPinger] exists to demonstrate.
*
* Compare [frames] against the pinger's own sent count to see the loop rate. Equal numbers mean
* every ping made it out and back; a shortfall means frames are being lost on air or dropped in
* the receive chain, which is a different fault from "nothing is being sent at all".
*/
data class OwnTxLoopback(
/** How many own frames have been heard back since the tally was last reset. */
val frames: Int,
/**
* Signal strength of the most recent one, dBm, or null if no transport reported it. Retained
* across frames that carry no reading rather than being cleared, so the figure does not blink
* in and out on screen.
*/
val lastRssiDbm: Int?,
/** Wall-clock ms the most recent own frame was heard back. */
val lastHeardMs: Long,
)
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/domain/cam/PhoneCamBuilder.kt
+4 -4
View File
@@ -24,10 +24,10 @@ object PhoneCamBuilder {
* @param gyroZRadPerSec latest gyroscope z-axis reading, rad/s (device frame). Positive per
* Android's convention is counter-clockwise around +Z; converted to the clockwise-positive
* yaw rate convention already used by [Cam.yawRateDps] to match OBU/remote CAM data.
* @param stationId this device's own station ID, from
* [com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.mqtt.ObuHardwarePreferences.getOrCreateOwnStationId] — a
* persisted random value, not a placeholder. Receivers use it to track this station across
* successive CAMs, so it must be stable for the life of the install and distinct per device.
* @param stationId the station ID to transmit under: the current pseudonym from
* [com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.cam.PseudonymManager], or the bench pinger's fixed ID.
* Receivers track a station across successive CAMs by this ID, which is why it only ever
* changes in a coordinated rotation together with the link-layer address.
* @param longitudinalAccelMps2 along-track acceleration, signed (positive = accelerating).
* Derived from successive GNSS speed samples by [com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.service.CamTransmitLoop]
* rather than from the accelerometer: CAM wants acceleration along the direction of travel,
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/domain/cam/Pseudonym.kt
+84
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
package com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam
import kotlin.random.Random
/**
* The identity this phone transmits under on the ESP32-C5 path: the CAM stationID, and the
* link-layer address the firmware writes into both the GeoNetworking GN_ADDR and the 802.11
* source address.
*
* ## Why the two change together
* A pseudonym only makes a station harder to follow if every identifier on the frame changes at
* the same moment. Rotating the address while keeping the stationID, or the reverse, leaves the
* unchanged one as a stable handle, so a receiver loses nothing and the rotation buys nothing.
* Holding both in one value that is only ever replaced whole makes a partial rotation impossible
* to express.
*
* ## Why every [ROTATION_INTERVAL_MS]
* Real ITS stacks change pseudonym every few minutes, 5 to 15 being typical, and the CiT One was
* seen rotating its station ID twice within one bench session. Ten minutes sits in that range.
*
* ## A limit worth stating
* Nothing this app transmits is signed (there is no ETSI TS 103 097 security), so rotation gives
* nominal unlinkability at best: an unsigned frame's content can still be correlated across a
* change. This is the correct behaviour to build on, not a privacy guarantee.
*/
data class Pseudonym(
val stationId: Long,
/** Six bytes, locally administered and unicast. See [generate]. */
val mac: ByteArray,
/** Wall-clock ms this pseudonym was created, for [isExpired]. */
val createdAtMs: Long,
) {
init {
require(mac.size == 6) { "a MAC is 6 bytes, got ${mac.size}" }
}
/**
* True once this pseudonym has been in use for [intervalMs], or if the clock has moved back
* past its creation time. The second case rotates rather than trusting a creation time that
* now lies in the future, which would otherwise pin one identity until the clock caught up.
*/
fun isExpired(nowMs: Long, intervalMs: Long = ROTATION_INTERVAL_MS): Boolean =
nowMs < createdAtMs || nowMs - createdAtMs >= intervalMs
// Generated equals/hashCode would compare the MAC array by identity, so two pseudonyms with
// the same bytes would compare unequal.
override fun equals(other: Any?): Boolean {
if (this === other) return true
if (other !is Pseudonym) return false
return stationId == other.stationId && createdAtMs == other.createdAtMs &&
mac.contentEquals(other.mac)
}
override fun hashCode(): Int =
31 * (31 * stationId.hashCode() + mac.contentHashCode()) + createdAtMs.hashCode()
companion object {
const val ROTATION_INTERVAL_MS = 10 * 60_000L
/**
* A fresh identity. StationID is INTEGER(0..4294967295); 0 is avoided because it is the
* "not yet known" placeholder elsewhere in this app, and [OwnStationIds.BENCH_PING] is
* avoided so a rider can never be mistaken for the bench pinger.
*
* The MAC is random with the locally-administered bit set and the group bit clear. A
* source address must never be a group address, and a random one must not claim a real
* vendor's OUI. [OwnStationIds.BENCH_PING_MAC] is excluded for the same reason as the ID.
*/
fun generate(nowMs: Long, random: Random = Random.Default): Pseudonym {
var stationId: Long
do {
stationId = random.nextLong(1L, 0xFFFF_FFFEL)
} while (stationId == OwnStationIds.BENCH_PING)
var mac: ByteArray
do {
mac = random.nextBytes(6)
mac[0] = ((mac[0].toInt() and 0xFC) or 0x02).toByte()
} while (mac.contentEquals(OwnStationIds.BENCH_PING_MAC))
return Pseudonym(stationId, mac, nowMs)
}
}
}
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/domain/denm/DenmEvent.kt
+134 -17
View File
@@ -11,15 +11,25 @@ import org.json.JSONObject
* more (validity duration, relevance area, traffic direction, trace paths); none of it is used
* yet, and inventing a fuller model before there's a consumer for it would just be guesswork.
*
* **Availability:** DENM reaches the app only on the CiT One path, via the Use Case API's
* `v2x-uca/output/json/denm` topic. The ESP32-C5 path receives none — the firmware's
* `gn_unwrap.c` accepts BTP-B destination port 2001 (CAM) only and drops port 2002 (DENM) before
* anything is forwarded over the serial link. See that file's header comment.
* **Availability:** both hardware paths. On the CiT One path DENM arrives as processed JSON on
* the Use Case API's `v2x-uca/output/json/denm` topic ([DenmParser]); on the ESP32-C5 path it is
* decoded from over-the-air GeoBroadcast traffic on BTP-B port 2002
* ([com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.asn1.DenmUperCodec]). Fields sourced from the GeoNetworking
* header - [relevanceRadiusM], [rssiDbm] - exist only on the ESP32-C5 path, since the Use Case
* API never exposes the GN layer.
*/
data class DenmEvent(
/** Originating station ID. */
/** Originating station ID — `actionID.originatingStationID`, not the radio source. */
val stationId: Long,
/**
* `actionID.sequenceNumber`. Together with [stationId] this is ETSI's real event identity:
* repetitions of one hazard reuse it, and under GeoBroadcast several stations may relay the
* same DENM, so this pair is what dedup must key on. Both transports supply it - the Use Case
* API as a `sequenceNumber` key - so the fallback below is for malformed payloads only.
*/
val sequenceNumber: Int? = null,
/** Event position (WGS84 degrees) — where the hazard is, not where the sender is. */
val latitude: Double,
val longitude: Double,
@@ -30,30 +40,112 @@ data class DenmEvent(
/** SubCauseCode qualifying [causeCode], or null. */
val subCauseCode: Int?,
/** Originating station's ETSI stationType, where known. */
val stationType: Int? = null,
/**
* True when this DENM cancels or negates the event (`termination` present). A terminated event
* should be removed from the map rather than drawn — the hazard is over.
*/
val isTermination: Boolean = false,
/** Event detection time in epoch ms, where the message carried a usable one. */
val detectionTimeMs: Long? = null,
/**
* Radius of the GeoBroadcast destination area in metres, i.e. how far the warning is meant to
* apply. Comes from the GeoNetworking header rather than the DENM payload, so it's only
* available on the ESP32-C5 path (the MQTT path never exposes the GN layer).
*/
val relevanceRadiusM: Int? = null,
/** Received signal strength, dBm — ESP32-C5 path only. */
val rssiDbm: Int? = null,
/** Wall-clock ms this DENM was received. */
val timestamp: Long,
) {
/**
* Stable identity for map/list dedup: successive DENMs about the same hazard from the same
* station should replace each other rather than pile up as separate pins. ETSI's real identity
* is actionID (stationID + sequenceNumber); this approximates it with the cause, since the
* Use Case API's JSON doesn't reliably expose a sequence number.
* Stable identity for map/list dedup. Prefers ETSI's actionID (`stationId` + `sequenceNumber`),
* which both transports carry; falls back to station + cause only when a payload omits the
* sequence number. The fallback is weaker than it looks: a terminating DENM carries no
* SituationContainer, so its cause is null and it would NOT collide with the event it ends.
*/
val dedupKey: String get() = "$stationId/${causeCode ?: -1}/${subCauseCode ?: -1}"
val dedupKey: String
get() = if (sequenceNumber != null) "$stationId/$sequenceNumber"
else "$stationId/${causeCode ?: -1}/${subCauseCode ?: -1}"
}
/**
* Parses the processed DENM JSON published by the consider it Use Case API on
* `v2x-uca/output/json/denm`.
*
* Same field-name tolerance approach as [com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.CamParser] — confirmed
* spellings first, plausible alternatives as fallbacks via [JsonFieldReader] — because the exact
* schema hasn't been pinned against real OBU payloads yet. Returns null rather than a
* half-populated event when position is missing: a DENM with no position is useless to a map and
* worse than absent on a hazard display.
* Field names follow `CI-CiT-MQTT_API_Documentation-v6-20250221.pdf` section 2.2.4 / listing 2.6,
* which is the contract for this topic; `DenmParserMqttTest` pins this parser to that worked
* example. Alternative spellings are still accepted via [JsonFieldReader] as fallbacks.
*
* Returns null rather than a half-populated event when position is missing: a DENM with no
* position is useless to a map and worse than absent on a hazard display.
*/
object DenmParser {
/**
* The Use Case API's `causeCode` string enum mapped back to its ITS-G5 integer, so a DENM from
* the MQTT path and one decoded off the air are directly comparable. Values are from
* CauseCodeType in the ETSI CDD; the names are the API's spelling.
*/
private val CAUSE_CODE_BY_NAME = mapOf(
"trafficCondition" to 1, "accident" to 2, "roadworks" to 3, "impassability" to 5,
"adverseWeatherCondition_Adhesion" to 6,
// Three n's: that is how ETSI's CauseCodeType spells it, and the API follows.
// The correctly-spelled variant is accepted too, in case that is ever fixed.
"aquaplannning" to 7, "aquaplanning" to 7,
"hazardousLocation_SurfaceCondition" to 9, "hazardousLocation_ObstacleOnTheRoad" to 10,
"hazardousLocation_AnimalOnTheRoad" to 11, "humanPresenceOnTheRoad" to 12,
"wrongWayDriving" to 14, "rescueAndRecoveryWorkInProgress" to 15,
"adverseWeatherCondition_ExtremeWeatherCondition" to 17,
"adverseWeatherCondition_Visibility" to 18,
"adverseWeatherCondition_Precipitation" to 19, "slowVehicle" to 26,
"dangerousEndOfQueue" to 27, "vehicleBreakdown" to 91, "postCrash" to 92,
"humanProblem" to 93, "stationaryVehicle" to 94, "emergencyVehicleApproaching" to 95,
"hazardousLocation_DangerousCurve" to 96, "collisionRisk" to 97,
"signalViolation" to 98, "dangerousSituation" to 99,
)
private val NAME_BY_CAUSE_CODE = CAUSE_CODE_BY_NAME.entries.associate { (n, c) -> c to n }
/**
* The ETSI CauseCode name for [causeCode], or null for a code this table doesn't cover.
*
* Deliberately the API's own camelCase spelling ("stationaryVehicle") rather than prose: it's
* the vocabulary the MQTT payloads, the V2X2MAP dashboard and the sniffer all use, so a bench
* operator can compare what the app says against what those show without translating.
*/
fun causeCodeName(causeCode: Int?): String? = causeCode?.let { NAME_BY_CAUSE_CODE[it] }
/**
* The Use Case API's `stationType` string enum mapped to its ITS-G5 integer, per StationType in
* the ETSI CDD. Note roadSideUnit is **15**, not 12 - the enumeration has a gap after tram(11),
* so mapping by list position would silently mislabel every RSU.
*/
private val STATION_TYPE_BY_NAME = mapOf(
"unknown" to 0, "pedestrian" to 1, "cyclist" to 2, "moped" to 3, "motorcycle" to 4,
"passengerCar" to 5, "bus" to 6, "lightTruck" to 7, "heavyTruck" to 8, "trailer" to 9,
"specialVehicles" to 10, "tram" to 11, "roadSideUnit" to 15,
)
/**
* Parses the API's RFC3339 timestamps ("2021-05-11T12:01:02+00:00") to epoch millis. The air
* path carries a binary TimestampIts instead, so the two transports arrive here in completely
* different formats and both end up as epoch ms on [DenmEvent].
*/
private fun parseRfc3339(value: String?): Long? {
if (value.isNullOrBlank()) return null
return runCatching { java.time.OffsetDateTime.parse(value).toInstant().toEpochMilli() }
.recoverCatching { java.time.Instant.parse(value).toEpochMilli() }
.getOrNull()
}
fun parse(json: String, timestamp: Long = System.currentTimeMillis()): DenmEvent? {
val obj = runCatching { JSONObject(json) }.getOrNull() ?: return null
@@ -65,24 +157,49 @@ object DenmParser {
?.let { JsonFieldReader.firstLatLon(it) }
?: return null
val stationId = JsonFieldReader.firstLong(obj, "stationId", "stationID", "station_id")
// "originatingStationId" is what the Use Case API actually sends (API doc listing 2.6);
// without it every DENM from the CiT One path was dropped here, before anything else in
// this function ran. The other spellings are kept as fallbacks.
val stationId = JsonFieldReader.firstLong(
obj, "originatingStationId", "originatingStationID", "stationId", "stationID", "station_id",
)
?: obj.optJSONObject("management")?.let {
JsonFieldReader.firstLong(it, "stationId", "stationID", "station_id")
JsonFieldReader.firstLong(
it, "originatingStationId", "originatingStationID", "stationId", "stationID", "station_id",
)
}
?: return null
val situation = obj.optJSONObject("situation")
// The Use Case API sends causeCode as a STRING enum ("stationaryVehicle", "roadworks", ...),
// per CI-CiT-MQTT_API_Documentation-v6 section 2.2.4 - not the ITS-G5 integer. An earlier
// version of this parser read it as an Int and therefore always got null. Both forms are
// accepted: the air path (DenmUperCodec) produces the integer.
val causeCode = JsonFieldReader.firstInt(obj, "causeCode", "cause_code", "cause")
?: situation?.let { JsonFieldReader.firstInt(it, "causeCode", "cause_code", "cause") }
?: CAUSE_CODE_BY_NAME[obj.optString("causeCode").takeIf { it.isNotBlank() }]
val subCauseCode = JsonFieldReader.firstInt(obj, "subCauseCode", "sub_cause_code", "subCause")
?: situation?.let { JsonFieldReader.firstInt(it, "subCauseCode", "sub_cause_code", "subCause") }
// "Key is present, if the DENM is cancelled or negated" (API doc 2.2.4) - so presence is
// the signal, not the value. An explicit `false` is still honoured in case the API ever
// starts always emitting the key.
val isTermination = obj.has("termination") && obj.optBoolean("termination", true)
val stationType = JsonFieldReader.firstInt(obj, "stationType", "station_type")
?: STATION_TYPE_BY_NAME[obj.optString("stationType").takeIf { it.isNotBlank() }]
return DenmEvent(
stationId = stationId,
sequenceNumber = JsonFieldReader.firstInt(obj, "sequenceNumber", "sequence_number"),
latitude = lat,
longitude = lon,
causeCode = causeCode,
subCauseCode = subCauseCode,
stationType = stationType,
isTermination = isTermination,
detectionTimeMs = parseRfc3339(obj.optString("detectionTime").takeIf { it.isNotBlank() })
?: JsonFieldReader.firstLong(obj, "detectionTime", "detection_time"),
timestamp = timestamp,
)
}
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/domain/detection/DetectionConfig.kt
+42 -14
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,26 @@ package com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.detection
* All detection thresholds in one place.
*
* Pass a custom instance to [EventDetector] to tune behaviour without
* recompiling. The defaults match the Phase A specification.
* recompiling.
*
* **These defaults are the values the app actually runs.** They are *not* the
* Phase A specification figures. Phase A specified a more sensitive detector;
* running it on a real bicycle over-triggered, so every signal threshold was
* raised and every sustain requirement lengthened. Those tuned values used to
* live as literals in `TripRecordingService`'s constructor, which meant the
* unit tests exercised the Phase A defaults and nothing exercised what shipped.
* They are the defaults now so that there is exactly one configuration.
*
* The original Phase A figures, kept for provenance:
* `brakingSpeedDropThreshold` 0.5, `brakingAccelStdDevThreshold` 1.2,
* `brakingSustainedFrames` 15, `turningGyroMeanThreshold` 0.4,
* `turningBearingChangeThreshold` 10.0, `turningSustainedFrames` 20,
* `stoppingSpeedThreshold` 0.5, `stoppingFrames` 100,
* `stoppingAccelStdDevThreshold` 0.15.
*
* What motivated each change was never recorded, and the effect on the
* false-positive and false-negative rates has never been measured. That
* remains open; sensitivity is deliberately unchanged by this consolidation.
*/
data class DetectionConfig(
@@ -17,42 +36,51 @@ data class DetectionConfig(
* Minimum speed drop (m/s) from the reference speed at braking onset for
* a frame to qualify as a braking frame.
*/
val brakingSpeedDropThreshold: Double = 0.5,
val brakingSpeedDropThreshold: Double = 1.0,
/** Minimum accel std-dev (m/s²) required for a frame to count as braking. */
val brakingAccelStdDevThreshold: Double = 1.2,
val brakingAccelStdDevThreshold: Double = 1.8,
/** Consecutive braking frames required before an event is emitted. */
val brakingSustainedFrames: Int = 15,
val brakingSustainedFrames: Int = 25,
/**
* Peak speed-drop rate (m/s per GPS update ≈ m/s²) above which the braking
* confidence is upgraded from MEDIUM to HIGH.
* Peak *cumulative* speed drop (m/s) from the onset reference speed above
* which the braking confidence is upgraded from MEDIUM to HIGH.
*
* This is a total drop for the episode, not a rate. It was previously
* named `brakingHighConfidenceRate` and documented as "m/s per GPS update
* ≈ m/s²", but the quantity it is compared against in
* [EventDetector.detectBraking] has always been the cumulative drop, which
* grows for as long as the episode lasts. The name was wrong, not the
* comparison: "the rider lost more than this much speed in one braking
* episode" is a coherent criterion, so the name was corrected to match the
* behaviour rather than the other way round. Detector output is unchanged.
*/
val brakingHighConfidenceRate: Double = 1.5,
val brakingHighConfidencePeakDrop: Double = 1.5,
// ── TURNING ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/** Minimum gyro mean (rad/s) required for a frame to qualify as turning. */
val turningGyroMeanThreshold: Double = 0.4,
val turningGyroMeanThreshold: Double = 0.6,
/** Bearing-change rate (°/s) that must be exceeded when speed is above the
* minimum threshold for a HIGH-confidence turning confirmation. */
val turningBearingChangeThreshold: Double = 10.0,
val turningBearingChangeThreshold: Double = 15.0,
/** GPS speed (m/s) above which the bearing-change criterion is enforced. */
val turningMinSpeedThreshold: Double = 2.0,
/** Consecutive turning frames required before an event is emitted. */
val turningSustainedFrames: Int = 20,
val turningSustainedFrames: Int = 30,
// ── STOPPING ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/** GPS speed (m/s) below which a frame is considered a potential stop. */
val stoppingSpeedThreshold: Double = 0.5,
val stoppingSpeedThreshold: Double = 0.3,
/** Consecutive stop frames required (> this value) before an event is emitted.
* At 50 Hz, 100 frames ≈ 2 s. */
val stoppingFrames: Int = 100,
* At 50 Hz, 150 frames ≈ 3 s. */
val stoppingFrames: Int = 150,
/** Maximum accel std-dev (m/s²) allowed for a frame to count as stationary. */
val stoppingAccelStdDevThreshold: Double = 0.15,
val stoppingAccelStdDevThreshold: Double = 0.10,
)
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/domain/detection/EventDetector.kt
+12 -2
View File
@@ -14,6 +14,16 @@ import kotlin.math.abs
* to [events] (a hot [SharedFlow]). Debounce is implemented with
* consecutive-frame counters, not timers.
*
* **Who consumes this.** The detector's live consumer is the CAM transmit-rate
* policy: [com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.service.TripRecordingService] forwards every
* emitted event to
* [com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.service.CamTransmitLoop.onDetectedEvent], which
* raises the CAM rate from 1 Hz to the elevated rate for a hold window so that
* nearby stations get denser updates *through* a manoeuvre rather than only at
* the instant it was detected. These thresholds therefore govern a V2X
* behaviour, not a statistic. Events are also persisted per trip for offline
* analysis and CSV export, but nothing in the UI displays them.
*
* GPS updates at 1 Hz whilst sensors fire at ~50 Hz. [speedMps] and
* [bearingChangeDegPerSec] should be the values from the last known GPS fix;
* the detector compares speed against a *reference speed at braking onset*
@@ -37,7 +47,7 @@ class EventDetector(private val config: DetectionConfig = DetectionConfig()) {
private var brakingFrames = 0
private var brakingOnsetSpeed = 0.0 // reference speed when braking started
private var brakingStartTime = 0L
private var peakBrakingDrop = 0.0 // peak speed drop observed during this window
private var peakBrakingDrop = 0.0 // peak CUMULATIVE drop from onset speed, m/s (not a rate)
private var peakAccelBraking = 0.0
// ── Turning state ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -124,7 +134,7 @@ class EventDetector(private val config: DetectionConfig = DetectionConfig()) {
if (brakingFrames == config.brakingSustainedFrames) {
val confidence =
if (peakBrakingDrop > config.brakingHighConfidenceRate) Confidence.HIGH
if (peakBrakingDrop > config.brakingHighConfidencePeakDrop) Confidence.HIGH
else Confidence.MEDIUM
_events.tryEmit(
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/domain/spat/SpatEvent.kt
+141
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
package com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.spat
/**
* Signal phase and timing for one or more intersections, decoded from a SPATEM heard over the air.
*
* A SPATEM is the live counterpart to MAPEM's static geometry: MAPEM says where the lanes are,
* SPATEM says what the lights are doing right now. The two join on [IntersectionSignalState.key].
* Only SPATEM is decoded today - without MAPEM there is no lane geometry, so a signal group is
* shown as a bare number rather than "the left-turn lane you are in".
*
* Repetition is ~2 Hz per intersection, so consumers should key on [IntersectionSignalState.key]
* and keep the latest rather than accumulating a log.
*/
data class SpatEvent(
/** Originating RSU's station ID, from the ItsPduHeader. */
val stationId: Long,
/** `SPAT.timeStamp`, minute of the year, when present. */
val minuteOfYear: Int?,
val intersections: List<IntersectionSignalState>,
/** Received signal strength, dBm - ESP32-C5 path only. */
val rssiDbm: Int? = null,
/** Wall-clock ms this SPATEM was received. */
val timestamp: Long,
)
/** One intersection's current signal state. */
data class IntersectionSignalState(
/** `RoadRegulatorID`, when the sender qualifies its intersection id with one. */
val region: Int?,
/** `IntersectionID` - only unique *within* [region]. */
val id: Int,
/** `MsgCount`, bumped when the intersection's MAP geometry changes. */
val revision: Int,
/** Minute of the year this state refers to, when present. */
val moy: Int?,
/** `DSecond` - milliseconds within [moy]'s minute, when present. */
val timeStampMs: Int?,
val movements: List<SignalMovement>,
) {
/**
* Identity for dedup and for joining against MAPEM. `IntersectionID` alone is NOT unique -
* it is only unique within a `RoadRegulatorID`, and the recorded drive contains the same id
* under different regions - so the region must be part of the key.
*/
val key: String get() = "${region ?: -1}/$id"
}
/** The signal state of one signal group (one movement through the intersection). */
data class SignalMovement(
/** `SignalGroupID` - the number MAPEM's lane connections refer to. */
val signalGroup: Int,
/**
* Predicted phases, in order. The first entry is the state now; later entries are the
* upcoming sequence, which is what makes a countdown possible.
*/
val events: List<SignalPhaseEvent>,
) {
val current: SignalPhaseEvent? get() = events.firstOrNull()
}
data class SignalPhaseEvent(
val phase: SignalPhase,
/**
* `TimeMark`: tenths of a second within the current or next UTC hour, so it wraps hourly.
* 36001 means "unknown". Use [secondsUntil] rather than comparing these directly.
*/
val minEndTimeDs: Int?,
val maxEndTimeDs: Int?,
val likelyTimeDs: Int?,
) {
/**
* Seconds from [nowEpochMs] until [minEndTimeDs], or null if unknown.
*
* TimeMark counts tenths of a second from the top of the hour and wraps, so a mark that looks
* like it is in the past is really in the next hour - hence the wrap correction. Without it, a
* countdown reads as a large negative number for the seconds either side of the hour.
*/
fun secondsUntil(nowEpochMs: Long): Double? {
val mark = minEndTimeDs ?: return null
if (mark >= UNKNOWN_TIME_MARK) return null
val msIntoHour = nowEpochMs % 3_600_000L
var deltaMs = mark * 100L - msIntoHour
if (deltaMs < -HALF_HOUR_MS) deltaMs += 3_600_000L // mark is in the next hour
return deltaMs / 1000.0
}
private companion object {
const val UNKNOWN_TIME_MARK = 36001
const val HALF_HOUR_MS = 1_800_000L
}
}
/** `MovementPhaseState` (ETSI/SAE J2735), in enumeration order - the ordinal IS the wire value. */
enum class SignalPhase {
UNAVAILABLE,
DARK,
STOP_THEN_PROCEED,
STOP_AND_REMAIN,
PRE_MOVEMENT,
PERMISSIVE_MOVEMENT_ALLOWED,
PROTECTED_MOVEMENT_ALLOWED,
PERMISSIVE_CLEARANCE,
PROTECTED_CLEARANCE,
CAUTION_CONFLICTING_TRAFFIC;
/** True for the two "you may go" states. */
val isGo: Boolean
get() = this == PERMISSIVE_MOVEMENT_ALLOWED || this == PROTECTED_MOVEMENT_ALLOWED
/** True for the two "you must stop" states. */
val isStop: Boolean
get() = this == STOP_AND_REMAIN || this == STOP_THEN_PROCEED
/** True while the light is changing - amber, or red-amber before green. */
val isTransition: Boolean
get() = this == PRE_MOVEMENT || this == PERMISSIVE_CLEARANCE || this == PROTECTED_CLEARANCE
companion object {
fun fromWire(value: Int): SignalPhase? = entries.getOrNull(value)
}
}
/**
* One intersection's signal state as the UI consumes it: the decoded state plus who sent it and
* when, flattened out of the [SpatEvent] that carried it.
*
* A single SPATEM may describe several intersections, and the same intersection may be heard from
* more than one RSU, so the UI keys on the intersection rather than on the message.
*/
data class SpatIntersection(
val state: IntersectionSignalState,
val stationId: Long,
val rssiDbm: Int?,
val timestamp: Long,
) {
val key: String get() = state.key
}
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/service/CamPinger.kt
+33 -9
View File
@@ -1,10 +1,14 @@
package com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.service
import android.content.Context
import android.os.SystemClock
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.GnssReading
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.GnssTimeSource
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.SensorRepository
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.GnPositionVector
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.UsbSerialTransport
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.asn1.RealAsn1UperCodec
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.OwnStationIds
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.PhoneCamBuilder
import dagger.hilt.android.qualifiers.ApplicationContext
import kotlinx.coroutines.CoroutineScope
@@ -67,6 +71,20 @@ class CamPinger @Inject constructor(
/** False while the pinger is running but has no GNSS fix yet — nothing is being transmitted. */
val hasFix: StateFlow<Boolean> = _hasFix.asStateFlow()
/** [SystemClock.elapsedRealtime] when the pinger last stopped, or null if it never ran. */
@Volatile private var stoppedAtElapsedMs: Long? = null
/**
* True while station [OwnStationIds.BENCH_PING] on air is this phone's own ping: while the
* pinger runs, and briefly after it stops, so a frame sent just before Stop is not taken for a
* stranger. Uses elapsed realtime, so changing the wall clock cannot move the window.
*
* Otherwise that ID belongs to someone else, typically another MicrOBU phone pinging on the
* same bench, and must be shown like any remote station. See [OwnStationIds.benchPingIsOurs].
*/
fun benchPingIsOurs(): Boolean =
OwnStationIds.benchPingIsOurs(_isActive.value, stoppedAtElapsedMs, SystemClock.elapsedRealtime())
fun start() {
if (job?.isActive == true) return
_sentCount.value = 0
@@ -86,13 +104,17 @@ class CamPinger @Inject constructor(
_hasFix.value = gnss != null
if (gnss != null) {
val cam = PhoneCamBuilder.build(
gnss = gnss,
// Stamped on GNSS time rather than the phone clock; see GnssTimeSource.
gnss = gnss.copy(timestamp = GnssTimeSource.correct(gnss.timestamp)),
gyroZRadPerSec = latestGyroZ,
stationId = PING_STATION_ID,
stationId = OwnStationIds.BENCH_PING,
longitudinalAccelMps2 = longitudinalAccel(gnss),
)
val bytes = codec.encodeCam(cam)
if (usbSerialTransport.sendCamTx(bytes)) {
// Fixed bench identity on every layer, the link-layer address included, so a ping
// stays recognisable in a capture and never rotates.
val pv = GnPositionVector.fromCam(cam, gnss.accuracyM, OwnStationIds.BENCH_PING_MAC)
if (usbSerialTransport.sendCamTx(bytes, pv)) {
_sentCount.update { it + 1 }
}
}
@@ -119,6 +141,9 @@ class CamPinger @Inject constructor(
}
fun stop() {
// Only a real stop opens the grace window. stop() is also called unconditionally on
// teardown, and that must not make a phone that never pinged claim 999999 for a while.
if (_isActive.value) stoppedAtElapsedMs = SystemClock.elapsedRealtime()
job?.cancel()
job = null
_isActive.value = false
@@ -131,11 +156,10 @@ class CamPinger @Inject constructor(
private const val MIN_ACCEL_DT_SEC = 0.2
private const val MAX_ACCEL_DT_SEC = 3.0
/**
* Recognizable station id, deliberately distinct from the persisted real one
* [CamTransmitLoop] uses, so manual bench pings stay identifiable in captures and can't be
* confused with the recording-driven stream if both happen to run at once.
*/
private const val PING_STATION_ID = 999_999L
// The station id these pings go out under lives in
// [com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.OwnStationIds.BENCH_PING], not here. It is not a
// private detail of this class: the ESP32 hears these frames back off the air, so the
// receive path has to recognise the same value, and a second copy of it is exactly how
// the two sides would drift apart.
}
}
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/service/CamTransmitLoop.kt
+12 -11
View File
@@ -2,8 +2,11 @@ package com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.service
import android.content.Context
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.GnssReading
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.GnssTimeSource
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.SensorRepository
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.cam.PseudonymManager
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.mqtt.ObuHardwarePreferences
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.GnPositionVector
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.ObuHardware
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.UsbSerialTransport
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.asn1.RealAsn1UperCodec
@@ -49,6 +52,7 @@ class CamTransmitLoop @Inject constructor(
private val obuHardwarePrefs: ObuHardwarePreferences,
private val usbSerialTransport: UsbSerialTransport,
private val codec: RealAsn1UperCodec,
private val pseudonymManager: PseudonymManager,
) {
private val config = CamTransmitConfig()
private val sensorRepository = SensorRepository(context)
@@ -63,14 +67,6 @@ class CamTransmitLoop @Inject constructor(
/** Previous GNSS fix, kept only to derive along-track acceleration — see [longitudinalAccel]. */
@Volatile private var previousGnss: GnssReading? = null
/**
* Own station id for the ESP32-C5 path, loaded once per [start] from
* [ObuHardwarePreferences.getOrCreateOwnStationId]. 0 means "not loaded yet" — the loop waits
* for the real value rather than beaconing as station 0, which would be indistinguishable
* from every other MicrOBU to any receiver.
*/
@Volatile var stationId: Long = 0L
/**
* Call when a braking/turning/stopping event fires during an active trip — bumps the CAM
* rate to [CamTransmitConfig.elevatedRateHz] for [ELEVATED_HOLD_MS] so nearby stations get
@@ -90,7 +86,6 @@ class CamTransmitLoop @Inject constructor(
elevatedUntilMs = 0L
previousGnss = null
job = scope.launch {
stationId = obuHardwarePrefs.getOrCreateOwnStationId()
obuHardwarePrefs.obuHardwareFlow.collectLatest { hardware ->
if (hardware != ObuHardware.ESP32_C5) return@collectLatest
runTransmitLoop()
@@ -111,9 +106,15 @@ class CamTransmitLoop @Inject constructor(
while (true) {
val gnss = latestGnss
if (gnss != null) {
val cam = PhoneCamBuilder.build(gnss, latestGyroZ, stationId, longitudinalAccel(gnss))
// Asked for per CAM rather than once per trip: that is what lets a pseudonym
// rotation fall cleanly between two frames instead of inside one.
val pseudonym = pseudonymManager.current()
// Stamped on GNSS time rather than the phone clock; see GnssTimeSource. Only the
// outgoing CAM is: acceleration below still differences wall-clock samples.
val fix = gnss.copy(timestamp = GnssTimeSource.correct(gnss.timestamp))
val cam = PhoneCamBuilder.build(fix, latestGyroZ, pseudonym.stationId, longitudinalAccel(gnss))
val bytes = codec.encodeCam(cam)
usbSerialTransport.sendCamTx(bytes)
usbSerialTransport.sendCamTx(bytes, GnPositionVector.fromCam(cam, gnss.accuracyM, pseudonym.mac))
}
delay((1000.0 / currentRateHz(gnss)).toLong())
}
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/service/TripRecordingService.kt
+16 -46
View File
@@ -26,9 +26,7 @@ import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.R
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.TripRepository
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.cam.CamUseCaseRepository
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.db.AppDatabase
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.detection.DetectionConfig
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.detection.EventDetector
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.detection.EventType
import dagger.hilt.android.AndroidEntryPoint
import javax.inject.Inject
import kotlinx.coroutines.CoroutineScope
@@ -108,19 +106,10 @@ class TripRecordingService : Service() {
// V2xMessageEntity's KDoc for why nothing is retained outside of one.
@Inject lateinit var camUseCaseRepository: CamUseCaseRepository
private var v2xLoggingJob: Job? = null
private val detector = EventDetector(
DetectionConfig(
brakingSpeedDropThreshold = 1.0,
brakingAccelStdDevThreshold = 1.8,
brakingSustainedFrames = 25,
turningGyroMeanThreshold = 0.6,
turningBearingChangeThreshold = 15.0,
turningSustainedFrames = 30,
stoppingSpeedThreshold = 0.3,
stoppingFrames = 150,
stoppingAccelStdDevThreshold = 0.10,
)
)
// These nine thresholds used to be overridden here; they are now the DetectionConfig
// defaults, so there is one configuration and the unit tests exercise it. Behaviour is
// unchanged - see DetectionConfig's KDoc.
private val detector = EventDetector()
// ── Sensor fusion state ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -153,10 +142,11 @@ class TripRecordingService : Service() {
private val gpsTrackBuilder = StringBuilder("[")
private var gpsPointCount = 0
// Event counts
private var brakingCount = 0
private var turningCount = 0
private var stoppingCount = 0
// Number of manoeuvres the detector fired during this trip. The only thing kept about
// them: it fills the trips.eventCount column, which predates this change and cannot be
// dropped without rebuilding the trips table. See EventDetector's KDoc for why the
// detector still runs at all.
private var detectedEventCount = 0
// ── SensorEventListener ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -253,9 +243,7 @@ class TripRecordingService : Service() {
).also { it.acquire() }
detector.reset()
brakingCount = 0
turningCount = 0
stoppingCount = 0
detectedEventCount = 0
distanceMetres = 0f
prevLat = Double.NaN
prevLon = Double.NaN
@@ -273,35 +261,20 @@ class TripRecordingService : Service() {
isRecording = true,
currentTripId = currentTripId,
elapsedSeconds = 0L,
brakingCount = 0,
turningCount = 0,
stoppingCount = 0,
currentSpeedMs = 0f,
)
}
}
// Collect detector events and persist them
// Collect detector events. The CAM transmit-rate policy is their only consumer:
// detected manoeuvres are not persisted, exported, or displayed.
serviceScope.launch {
detector.events.collect { event ->
detector.events.collect { _ ->
if (currentTripId < 0) return@collect
repository.insertEvent(currentTripId, event)
// Bump the CAM transmit rate through the maneuver, not just at detection instant.
// No-op on the CiT One path (see CamTransmitLoop's KDoc).
camTransmitLoop.onDetectedEvent()
when (event.type) {
EventType.BRAKING -> brakingCount++
EventType.TURNING -> turningCount++
EventType.STOPPING -> stoppingCount++
}
TripServiceBus.update {
copy(
brakingCount = this@TripRecordingService.brakingCount,
turningCount = this@TripRecordingService.turningCount,
stoppingCount = this@TripRecordingService.stoppingCount,
)
}
updateNotification()
detectedEventCount++
}
}
@@ -356,7 +329,7 @@ class TripRecordingService : Service() {
v2xLoggingJob = null
val endTime = System.currentTimeMillis()
val totalEvents = brakingCount + turningCount + stoppingCount
val totalEvents = detectedEventCount
// Close GPS track JSON
gpsTrackBuilder.append("]")
@@ -454,10 +427,7 @@ class TripRecordingService : Service() {
private fun buildNotification(elapsedSeconds: Long) =
NotificationCompat.Builder(this, CHANNEL_ID)
.setContentTitle("Recording trip")
.setContentText(
"⏱ ${formatElapsed(elapsedSeconds)} · " +
"🚨 $brakingCount 🔄 $turningCount 🛑 $stoppingCount"
)
.setContentText("⏱ ${formatElapsed(elapsedSeconds)}")
.setSmallIcon(R.mipmap.ic_launcher_foreground)
.setOngoing(true)
.setOnlyAlertOnce(true)
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/service/TripServiceBus.kt
-3
View File
@@ -17,9 +17,6 @@ object TripServiceBus {
val isRecording: Boolean = false,
val currentTripId: Long = -1L,
val elapsedSeconds: Long = 0L,
val brakingCount: Int = 0,
val turningCount: Int = 0,
val stoppingCount: Int = 0,
val currentSpeedMs: Float = 0f,
)
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/ui/navigation/AppNavigation.kt
+43 -5
View File
@@ -63,6 +63,30 @@ private val bottomNavItems = listOf(
Screen.Settings,
)
/**
* True if [route] is this tab's own screen or one of its sub-screens.
*
* The graph is flat, so ownership is derived from the route naming convention: every Settings
* sub-screen is "settings/...", and a trip review is "trip_review/{tripId}" belonging to Trips.
* Without this, a tab stops looking selected the moment you open anything inside it.
*/
private fun Screen.ownsRoute(route: String?): Boolean {
if (route == null) return false
if (route == this.route) return true
return when (this) {
Screen.Settings -> route.startsWith("settings/")
Screen.TripHistory -> route.startsWith("trip_review")
// Connection, Map and Sensors are only reachable from the Dashboard's own cards, and
// the session log only from Record, so those tabs stay lit while the rider is inside
// one of them. Without this the bar goes blank on screens that clearly belong to a tab.
Screen.Dashboard -> route == Screen.Connection.route ||
route == Screen.Map.route ||
route == Screen.Sensors.route
Screen.Record -> route == Screen.Log.route
else -> false
}
}
@Composable
fun BottomNavBar(navController: NavController) {
val backStackEntry by navController.currentBackStackEntryAsState()
@@ -71,12 +95,26 @@ fun BottomNavBar(navController: NavController) {
NavigationBar {
bottomNavItems.forEach { screen ->
NavigationBarItem(
selected = currentRoute == screen.route,
selected = screen.ownsRoute(currentRoute),
onClick = {
navController.navigate(screen.route) {
popUpTo(Screen.Dashboard.route) { saveState = true }
launchSingleTop = true
restoreState = true
// One rule for every tab, including the one already selected: a tap lands on
// that tab's own screen. Nothing happens only when we are already on it.
if (currentRoute != screen.route) {
// Prefer a pop when this tab's screen is still on the back stack. That is
// exactly what Back or a back swipe would do, so tapping Settings from
// Settings > Connection, or Dashboard from the Map, behaves identically
// whichever way the rider asks for it. popBackStack reports false when the
// screen is not on the stack, which is the case for a genuine tab switch.
if (!navController.popBackStack(screen.route, inclusive = false)) {
// No saveState/restoreState here. The graph is flat, so a restored
// back stack brings back the sub-screen the rider was on rather than
// the tab's own screen, which is the opposite of what the tap asked
// for. Tab state that matters lives in the view models anyway.
navController.navigate(screen.route) {
popUpTo(Screen.Dashboard.route)
launchSingleTop = true
}
}
}
},
icon = {
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/ui/screens/DashboardScreen.kt
+270
View File
@@ -1,9 +1,12 @@
package com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.ui.screens
import android.content.Intent
import androidx.compose.foundation.background
import androidx.compose.foundation.clickable
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.Arrangement
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.Column
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.ExperimentalLayoutApi
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.FlowRow
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.Row
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.Spacer
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.fillMaxSize
@@ -28,6 +31,7 @@ import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.GpsOff
import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.Map
import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.Sensors
import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.SensorsOff
import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.Traffic
import androidx.compose.material3.ExperimentalMaterial3Api
import androidx.compose.material3.HorizontalDivider
import androidx.compose.material3.Icon
@@ -37,14 +41,18 @@ import androidx.compose.material3.ModalBottomSheet
import androidx.compose.material3.Text
import androidx.compose.material3.rememberModalBottomSheetState
import androidx.compose.runtime.Composable
import androidx.compose.runtime.LaunchedEffect
import androidx.compose.runtime.mutableLongStateOf
import androidx.compose.runtime.mutableStateOf
import androidx.compose.runtime.remember
import androidx.compose.ui.Alignment
import androidx.compose.ui.Modifier
import androidx.compose.ui.draw.clip
import androidx.compose.ui.graphics.Color
import androidx.compose.ui.graphics.vector.ImageVector
import androidx.compose.ui.platform.LocalContext
import androidx.compose.ui.res.stringResource
import androidx.compose.ui.text.font.FontFamily
import androidx.compose.ui.text.font.FontWeight
import androidx.compose.ui.unit.dp
import androidx.core.net.toUri
@@ -53,7 +61,14 @@ import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.mqtt.MqttConnectionState
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.ObuHardware
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.TransportType
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.UsbSerialState
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.Cam
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.denm.DenmEvent
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.denm.DenmParser
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.spat.SignalPhase
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.spat.SpatIntersection
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.usecase.GeoMath
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.viewmodel.SensorUiState
import kotlinx.coroutines.delay
import kotlin.math.sqrt
@OptIn(ExperimentalMaterial3Api::class)
@@ -67,10 +82,14 @@ fun DashboardScreen(
usbCableConnected: Boolean = false,
obuStationTypeWarning: Boolean = false,
obuStationType: Int? = null,
hazards: List<DenmEvent> = emptyList(),
signals: List<SpatIntersection> = emptyList(),
ownPosition: Cam? = null,
onNavigateToConnection: () -> Unit,
onNavigateToSensors: () -> Unit,
onNavigateToMap: () -> Unit,
onNavigateToRecord: () -> Unit = {},
onNavigateToV2x: () -> Unit = {},
modifier: Modifier = Modifier,
) {
val context = LocalContext.current
@@ -357,6 +376,52 @@ fun DashboardScreen(
}
}
// Live V2X, below the status cards: the hazard that matters most and the signalised
// intersection about to change. Both are summaries of what the V2X screen shows in full,
// so tapping either opens that screen rather than repeating its detail here. One of each
// is shown deliberately: a dashboard read from a bike mount has room for the single most
// relevant thing, not for a list.
val ownLatLon = ownPosition?.let { it.latitude to it.longitude }
?: state.gnss?.let { it.latitude to it.longitude }
val rankedHazards = remember(hazards, ownLatLon) {
hazards
.map { denm ->
val distance = ownLatLon?.let { (lat, lon) ->
GeoMath.haversineMeters(lat, lon, denm.latitude, denm.longitude)
}
denm to distance
}
// Closest first. A hazard whose distance cannot be worked out, because there is
// no fix yet, sorts last rather than being dropped: it is still a real hazard,
// we just cannot say how far away it is.
.sortedBy { (_, d) -> d ?: Double.MAX_VALUE }
}
rankedHazards.firstOrNull()?.let { (denm, distance) ->
HazardCard(
hazard = denm,
distanceMeters = distance,
additionalCount = rankedHazards.size - 1,
onClick = onNavigateToV2x,
)
}
// Signals cannot be ranked by distance: SPATEM carries no position at all. The geometry
// that would place an intersection lives in MAPEM, which nothing on the air is currently
// sending. So the one shown is the one changing soonest, which is in any case the one a
// rider approaching a junction needs to see.
val nextSignal = remember(signals) {
val now = System.currentTimeMillis()
signals.minByOrNull { it.secondsToNextChange(now) ?: Double.MAX_VALUE }
}
nextSignal?.let { signal ->
SignalCard(
signal = signal,
additionalCount = signals.size - 1,
onClick = onNavigateToV2x,
)
}
Spacer(Modifier.height(4.dp))
if (state.pressureHpa != null)
@@ -485,3 +550,208 @@ private fun QuickStatRow(label: String, value: String) {
Text(value, style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodyMedium, fontWeight = FontWeight.Medium)
}
}
// Hazard red and the three signal states. Kept local to this file for the same reason the V2X
// screen keeps its own: these are traffic-light and warning semantics, not theme roles, and
// tying them to the colour scheme would let a theme change turn a red light amber.
private val HazardRed = Color(0xFFE53935)
private val HazardRedBg = Color(0xFF3A0A0A)
private val SignalGreen = Color(0xFF4CAF50)
private val SignalAmber = Color(0xFFFFC107)
private val SignalGray = Color(0xFF8B949E)
/** How many signal groups fit on the dashboard before the rest are summarised as a count. */
private const val DASH_MAX_SIGNAL_GROUPS = 6
/**
* Seconds until the first of this intersection's signal groups changes, or null when no group
* supplies a usable countdown. Marks already in the past are excluded: a change that has already
* happened says nothing about what the light will do next.
*/
private fun SpatIntersection.secondsToNextChange(nowMs: Long): Double? =
state.movements
.mapNotNull { it.current?.secondsUntil(nowMs) }
.filter { it >= 0.0 }
.minOrNull()
/**
* The nearest received hazard, as a glanceable summary.
*
* Deliberately says less than the V2X screen's row: what it is, how far away, and whether there
* are others behind it. Anything more detailed belongs on the screen this card opens.
*/
@Composable
private fun HazardCard(
hazard: DenmEvent,
distanceMeters: Double?,
additionalCount: Int,
onClick: () -> Unit,
) {
val title = DenmParser.causeCodeName(hazard.causeCode)
?: hazard.causeCode?.let {
stringResource(R.string.v2x_denm_rx_cause_code, it, hazard.subCauseCode ?: 0)
}
?: stringResource(R.string.v2x_map_denm_plain, hazard.stationId)
val detail = listOfNotNull(
distanceMeters?.let { stringResource(R.string.v2x_cam_rx_distance, it) }
?: stringResource(R.string.v2x_cam_rx_distance_unknown),
stringResource(R.string.dash_hazard_station, hazard.stationId),
if (additionalCount > 0) stringResource(R.string.dash_more_count, additionalCount) else null,
).joinToString(" · ")
androidx.compose.material3.Card(
modifier = Modifier.fillMaxWidth().clickable { onClick() },
colors = androidx.compose.material3.CardDefaults.cardColors(containerColor = HazardRedBg),
) {
Row(
modifier = Modifier.padding(16.dp),
verticalAlignment = Alignment.CenterVertically,
horizontalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(12.dp),
) {
Icon(Icons.Default.Warning, null, tint = HazardRed, modifier = Modifier.size(28.dp))
Column(modifier = Modifier.weight(1f)) {
Text(
stringResource(R.string.dash_hazard_warning),
style = MaterialTheme.typography.labelLarge,
color = HazardRed,
fontWeight = FontWeight.SemiBold,
)
Text(
title,
style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodyMedium,
color = MaterialTheme.colorScheme.onSurface,
)
Spacer(Modifier.height(2.dp))
Text(
detail,
style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall,
fontFamily = FontFamily.Monospace,
color = MaterialTheme.colorScheme.onSurfaceVariant,
)
}
}
}
}
/**
* The signalised intersection changing soonest: its leading phase with a countdown, then every
* signal group as a coloured chip.
*
* Signal groups are bare numbers because that is all the app knows. Calling one "your lane" needs
* MAPEM geometry, and a friendlier label would claim knowledge that is not there.
*/
@OptIn(ExperimentalLayoutApi::class)
@Composable
private fun SignalCard(
signal: SpatIntersection,
additionalCount: Int,
onClick: () -> Unit,
) {
// The countdown has to advance on its own clock. SPATEM repeats at about 2 Hz, so
// recomposition would roughly keep pace while the RSU is transmitting, but the moment it
// stops, a frozen "3 s" would go on claiming the light is about to change.
val nowMs = remember { mutableLongStateOf(System.currentTimeMillis()) }
LaunchedEffect(Unit) {
while (true) {
nowMs.longValue = System.currentTimeMillis()
delay(500L)
}
}
val now = nowMs.longValue
val leading = signal.state.movements.minByOrNull { movement ->
movement.current?.secondsUntil(now)?.takeIf { it >= 0.0 } ?: Double.MAX_VALUE
}
val phase = leading?.current?.phase
val tint = phaseTint(phase)
val countdown = leading?.current?.secondsUntil(now)?.takeIf { it in 0.0..99.0 }
val hiddenGroups = signal.state.movements.size - DASH_MAX_SIGNAL_GROUPS
val footer = listOfNotNull(
if (hiddenGroups > 0) stringResource(R.string.dash_more_count, hiddenGroups) else null,
if (additionalCount > 0) stringResource(R.string.dash_signal_more, additionalCount) else null,
).joinToString(" · ")
androidx.compose.material3.Card(
modifier = Modifier.fillMaxWidth().clickable { onClick() },
colors = androidx.compose.material3.CardDefaults.cardColors(
containerColor = MaterialTheme.colorScheme.surfaceVariant,
),
) {
Row(
modifier = Modifier.padding(16.dp),
verticalAlignment = Alignment.Top,
horizontalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(12.dp),
) {
Icon(Icons.Default.Traffic, null, tint = tint, modifier = Modifier.size(28.dp))
Column(modifier = Modifier.weight(1f)) {
Text(
stringResource(R.string.dash_signal_title, signal.state.key),
style = MaterialTheme.typography.labelLarge,
color = tint,
fontWeight = FontWeight.SemiBold,
)
Text(
text = countdown
?.let { stringResource(R.string.dash_signal_countdown, phaseLabel(phase), it) }
?: phaseLabel(phase),
style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodyMedium,
color = MaterialTheme.colorScheme.onSurface,
)
Spacer(Modifier.height(6.dp))
// Wraps rather than scrolls: a horizontal scroller inside a scrolling dashboard
// is awkward to drive one-handed, and the chip row is short by construction.
FlowRow(horizontalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(6.dp)) {
signal.state.movements.take(DASH_MAX_SIGNAL_GROUPS).forEach { movement ->
val groupTint = phaseTint(movement.current?.phase)
val groupCountdown =
movement.current?.secondsUntil(now)?.takeIf { it in 0.0..99.0 }
Text(
text = stringResource(R.string.v2x_spat_group, movement.signalGroup) +
(groupCountdown?.let { " " + stringResource(R.string.v2x_spat_countdown, it) } ?: ""),
style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall,
fontFamily = FontFamily.Monospace,
color = groupTint,
modifier = Modifier
.padding(vertical = 2.dp)
.clip(androidx.compose.foundation.shape.RoundedCornerShape(4.dp))
.background(groupTint.copy(alpha = 0.15f))
.padding(horizontal = 6.dp, vertical = 2.dp),
)
}
}
if (footer.isNotEmpty()) {
Spacer(Modifier.height(4.dp))
Text(
footer,
style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall,
color = MaterialTheme.colorScheme.onSurfaceVariant,
)
}
}
}
}
}
/** Traffic-light colour for a phase: go is green, stop is red, anything in between is amber. */
@Composable
private fun phaseTint(phase: SignalPhase?): Color = when {
phase == null -> MaterialTheme.colorScheme.onSurfaceVariant
phase.isGo -> SignalGreen
phase.isStop -> HazardRed
phase.isTransition -> SignalAmber
else -> SignalGray
}
@Composable
private fun phaseLabel(phase: SignalPhase?): String = when {
phase == null -> stringResource(R.string.dash_signal_phase_unknown)
phase.isGo -> stringResource(R.string.dash_signal_phase_go)
phase.isStop -> stringResource(R.string.dash_signal_phase_stop)
phase.isTransition -> stringResource(R.string.dash_signal_phase_changing)
phase == SignalPhase.DARK -> stringResource(R.string.dash_signal_phase_dark)
else -> stringResource(R.string.dash_signal_phase_unknown)
}
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/ui/screens/MqttTopicViewerScreen.kt
+264 -36
View File
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import androidx.compose.foundation.clickable
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.Arrangement
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.Box
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.Column
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.FlowRow
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.Row
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.Spacer
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.fillMaxSize
@@ -30,6 +31,7 @@ import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.Link
import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.LinkOff
import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.NotificationsActive
import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.VerticalAlignBottom
import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.Warning
import androidx.compose.material3.Badge
import androidx.compose.material3.Button
import androidx.compose.material3.ButtonDefaults
@@ -69,6 +71,8 @@ import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.EspLinkStatus
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.ObuHardware
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.UsbSerialState
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.CamParser
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.StationType
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.denm.DenmParser
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.denm.DenmUseCase
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.usecase.AlertLevel
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.usecase.GeoMath
@@ -82,8 +86,12 @@ import java.text.SimpleDateFormat
import java.util.Date
import java.util.Locale
/** List (raw topics) vs Map (V2X live map, Section 13) toggle for [TopicListPane]. */
private enum class TopicViewMode { LIST, MAP }
/**
* View toggle for [TopicListPane]: decoded CAM/DENM traffic (LIST), the raw MQTT topic list
* (TOPICS, CiT One only - there is no broker on the ESP32-C5 path), or the V2X live map
* (MAP, Section 13).
*/
private enum class TopicViewMode { LIST, TOPICS, MAP }
private val timeFormat = SimpleDateFormat("HH:mm:ss.SSS", Locale.US)
@@ -120,14 +128,17 @@ fun MqttTopicViewerScreen(
val ownStationId by viewModel.ownStationId.collectAsState()
val obuHardware by viewModel.obuHardware.collectAsState()
val ownCamPosition by viewModel.ownCamPosition.collectAsState()
val remoteCamPositions by viewModel.remoteCamPositions.collectAsState()
// Engine road users PLUS roadside units - the engine deliberately does not track RSUs.
val remoteCamPositions by viewModel.stationsInRange.collectAsState()
val usbSerialState by viewModel.usbSerialState.collectAsState()
val camPingerActive by viewModel.camPingerActive.collectAsState()
val camPingerSentCount by viewModel.camPingerSentCount.collectAsState()
val camPingerHasFix by viewModel.camPingerHasFix.collectAsState()
val ownTxLoopback by viewModel.ownTxLoopback.collectAsState()
val camSendFailures by viewModel.camSendFailures.collectAsState()
val espLinkStatus by viewModel.espLinkStatus.collectAsState()
val denmEvents by viewModel.denmEvents.collectAsState()
val spatIntersections by viewModel.spatIntersections.collectAsState()
// Sort: sys/ topics first (heartbeat/health), then alphabetical
val sortedTopics = topicMessages.keys.sortedWith(
@@ -215,7 +226,7 @@ fun MqttTopicViewerScreen(
TopicListPane(
topics = sortedTopics,
topicMessages = topicMessages,
connectionState = connectionState,
connectionState = effectiveState,
denmActive = denmActive,
lastDenmPayload = lastDenmPayload,
activeDenmUseCase = activeDenmUseCase,
@@ -224,10 +235,12 @@ fun MqttTopicViewerScreen(
showCamPinger = isEsp32,
isEsp32 = isEsp32,
denmEvents = denmEvents,
spatIntersections = spatIntersections,
usbSerialState = usbSerialState,
camPingerActive = camPingerActive,
camPingerSentCount = camPingerSentCount,
camPingerHasFix = camPingerHasFix,
ownTxLoopback = ownTxLoopback,
camSendFailures = camSendFailures,
espLinkStatus = espLinkStatus,
ownCamPosition = ownCamPosition,
@@ -263,10 +276,12 @@ private fun TopicListPane(
showCamPinger: Boolean = false,
isEsp32: Boolean = false,
denmEvents: List<com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.denm.DenmEvent> = emptyList(),
spatIntersections: List<com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.spat.SpatIntersection> = emptyList(),
usbSerialState: UsbSerialState = UsbSerialState.DISCONNECTED,
camPingerActive: Boolean = false,
camPingerSentCount: Int = 0,
camPingerHasFix: Boolean = false,
ownTxLoopback: com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.OwnTxLoopback? = null,
camSendFailures: Int = 0,
espLinkStatus: EspLinkStatus? = null,
ownCamPosition: com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.Cam? = null,
@@ -310,6 +325,7 @@ private fun TopicListPane(
pingerActive = camPingerActive,
sentCount = camPingerSentCount,
hasFix = camPingerHasFix,
loopback = ownTxLoopback,
sendFailures = camSendFailures,
linkStatus = espLinkStatus,
onStart = onStartCamPinger,
@@ -319,30 +335,41 @@ private fun TopicListPane(
HorizontalDivider(color = MaterialTheme.colorScheme.outline.copy(alpha = 0.25f))
}
// ── List / Map toggle — the raw topic list stays available either way (Section 13
// asks for the map "in addition to", not instead of, the topic list). ──────────────
// ── List / Topics / Map toggle ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Decoded traffic is the default on BOTH hardware paths: what a tester wants to see is
// the road users and hazards, not the transport that carried them. The raw MQTT topic
// list stays one tap away on the CiT One path (Section 13 asks for the map "in addition
// to", not instead of, the topic list). It is hidden on the ESP32-C5 path, where there is
// no broker and `topics` is permanently empty.
Row(
modifier = Modifier.fillMaxWidth().padding(horizontal = 12.dp, vertical = 6.dp),
horizontalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(8.dp),
) {
OutlinedButton(
onClick = { viewMode = TopicViewMode.LIST },
colors = ButtonDefaults.outlinedButtonColors(
containerColor = if (viewMode == TopicViewMode.LIST) MaterialTheme.colorScheme.primaryContainer else Color.Transparent,
contentColor = if (viewMode == TopicViewMode.LIST) MaterialTheme.colorScheme.onPrimaryContainer else MaterialTheme.colorScheme.onSurface,
),
) { Text(stringResource(R.string.mqtt_view_list)) }
OutlinedButton(
onClick = { viewMode = TopicViewMode.MAP },
colors = ButtonDefaults.outlinedButtonColors(
containerColor = if (viewMode == TopicViewMode.MAP) MaterialTheme.colorScheme.primaryContainer else Color.Transparent,
contentColor = if (viewMode == TopicViewMode.MAP) MaterialTheme.colorScheme.onPrimaryContainer else MaterialTheme.colorScheme.onSurface,
),
) { Text(stringResource(R.string.mqtt_view_map)) }
ViewModeButton(
label = stringResource(R.string.mqtt_view_list),
selected = viewMode == TopicViewMode.LIST,
) { viewMode = TopicViewMode.LIST }
if (!isEsp32) {
ViewModeButton(
label = stringResource(R.string.mqtt_view_topics),
selected = viewMode == TopicViewMode.TOPICS,
) { viewMode = TopicViewMode.TOPICS }
}
ViewModeButton(
label = stringResource(R.string.mqtt_view_map),
selected = viewMode == TopicViewMode.MAP,
) { viewMode = TopicViewMode.MAP }
}
// ── Topic rows / received CAMs / live map ─────────────────────────────
if (viewMode == TopicViewMode.MAP) {
// ── Decoded traffic / raw topics / live map ───────────────────────────
// TOPICS can still be the saved selection from a CiT One session after switching hardware
// to the ESP32-C5, where that button no longer exists - fall back to the decoded list
// rather than stranding the user on a pane they can't navigate away from.
val shownMode = if (viewMode == TopicViewMode.TOPICS && isEsp32) TopicViewMode.LIST else viewMode
if (shownMode == TopicViewMode.MAP) {
V2xLiveMapView(
own = ownCamPosition,
remotes = remoteCamPositions,
@@ -350,14 +377,13 @@ private fun TopicListPane(
denms = denmEvents,
modifier = Modifier.fillMaxSize(),
)
} else if (isEsp32) {
// The MQTT topic list is meaningless on this path - there is no broker, so `topics`
// is permanently empty and the list would read as "nothing is happening" even while
// CAMs stream in over the serial link. Show the decoded traffic instead.
} else if (shownMode == TopicViewMode.LIST) {
ReceivedCamPane(
own = ownCamPosition,
remotes = remoteCamPositions,
alerts = useCaseAlerts,
denms = denmEvents,
spats = spatIntersections,
modifier = Modifier.fillMaxSize(),
)
} else if (topics.isEmpty()) {
@@ -407,15 +433,21 @@ private fun TopicListPane(
*
* Sorted nearest-first: on a bike, the closest station is the one that matters. Rows are tinted
* by that station's most severe active alert, matching [UseCaseAlertPanel] and the map markers.
*
* Hazards ([denms]) are listed above the stations rather than mixed in: a DENM is a warning about
* a place, a CAM is a report about a moving road user, and a hazard outranks a neighbour even when
* the neighbour is closer. Both sections live in one [LazyColumn] so the pane scrolls as a whole.
*/
@Composable
private fun ReceivedCamPane(
own: com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.Cam?,
remotes: Map<Long, com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.Cam>,
alerts: List<UseCaseAlert>,
denms: List<com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.denm.DenmEvent>,
spats: List<com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.spat.SpatIntersection>,
modifier: Modifier = Modifier,
) {
if (remotes.isEmpty()) {
if (remotes.isEmpty() && denms.isEmpty() && spats.isEmpty()) {
Box(modifier = modifier, contentAlignment = Alignment.Center) {
Column(horizontalAlignment = Alignment.CenterHorizontally) {
Text(
@@ -452,20 +484,194 @@ private fun ReceivedCamPane(
.sortedBy { (_, d) -> d ?: Double.MAX_VALUE }
}
Column(modifier = modifier) {
// Same treatment as the CAM rows: distance resolved once here so sort order and the displayed
// value can't disagree. A DENM's position is the hazard's, not the sender's.
val hazards = remember(denms, own) {
denms
.map { denm ->
val distance = own?.let {
GeoMath.haversineMeters(it.latitude, it.longitude, denm.latitude, denm.longitude)
}
denm to distance
}
.sortedBy { (_, d) -> d ?: Double.MAX_VALUE }
}
LazyColumn(modifier = modifier) {
if (hazards.isNotEmpty()) {
item {
PaneSectionHeader(stringResource(R.string.v2x_denm_rx_count, hazards.size))
}
// Keys can't collide with the CAM rows below - dedupKey is a String, stationId a Long.
items(hazards, key = { (denm, _) -> denm.dedupKey }) { (denm, distance) ->
ReceivedDenmRow(denm, distance)
HorizontalDivider(color = MaterialTheme.colorScheme.outline.copy(alpha = 0.25f))
}
}
if (spats.isNotEmpty()) {
item { PaneSectionHeader(stringResource(R.string.v2x_spat_rx_count, spats.size)) }
items(spats, key = { "spat/" + it.key }) { spat ->
ReceivedSpatRow(spat)
HorizontalDivider(color = MaterialTheme.colorScheme.outline.copy(alpha = 0.25f))
}
}
item {
PaneSectionHeader(
if (rows.isEmpty()) stringResource(R.string.v2x_cam_rx_none_stations)
else stringResource(R.string.v2x_cam_rx_count, rows.size)
)
}
items(rows, key = { (cam, _) -> cam.stationId }) { (cam, distance) ->
ReceivedCamRow(cam, distance, alertByStation[cam.stationId])
HorizontalDivider(color = MaterialTheme.colorScheme.outline.copy(alpha = 0.25f))
}
}
}
@Composable
private fun ViewModeButton(label: String, selected: Boolean, onClick: () -> Unit) {
OutlinedButton(
onClick = onClick,
colors = ButtonDefaults.outlinedButtonColors(
containerColor = if (selected) MaterialTheme.colorScheme.primaryContainer else Color.Transparent,
contentColor = if (selected) MaterialTheme.colorScheme.onPrimaryContainer else MaterialTheme.colorScheme.onSurface,
),
) { Text(label) }
}
/**
* One signalised intersection: every signal group's current phase, with a countdown where the RSU
* supplies one.
*
* Signal groups are shown as bare numbers because that is genuinely all we know - mapping a group
* to "your lane" needs MAPEM geometry, which nothing on the air is currently sending. Inventing a
* friendlier label would imply knowledge the app does not have.
*/
@OptIn(androidx.compose.foundation.layout.ExperimentalLayoutApi::class)
@Composable
private fun ReceivedSpatRow(spat: com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.spat.SpatIntersection) {
val now = System.currentTimeMillis()
Column(
modifier = Modifier
.fillMaxWidth()
.padding(horizontal = 16.dp, vertical = 10.dp),
) {
Text(
text = stringResource(R.string.v2x_cam_rx_count, rows.size),
text = stringResource(R.string.v2x_spat_rx_title, spat.state.key, spat.stationId),
style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodyMedium,
fontWeight = FontWeight.SemiBold,
color = MaterialTheme.colorScheme.primary,
)
Spacer(Modifier.height(4.dp))
// Wraps rather than scrolls: a busy intersection has 20+ groups and a horizontal
// scroller inside a vertical list is awkward to drive one-handed on a bike mount.
FlowRow(horizontalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(6.dp)) {
spat.state.movements.forEach { movement ->
val phase = movement.current?.phase
val tint = when {
phase == null -> MaterialTheme.colorScheme.onSurfaceVariant
phase.isGo -> ConnectedGreen
phase.isStop -> WarningRed
phase.isTransition -> AwarenessAmber
else -> DisconnectedGray
}
val countdown = movement.current?.secondsUntil(now)?.takeIf { it in 0.0..99.0 }
Text(
text = stringResource(R.string.v2x_spat_group, movement.signalGroup) +
(countdown?.let { " " + stringResource(R.string.v2x_spat_countdown, it) } ?: ""),
style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall,
fontFamily = FontFamily.Monospace,
color = tint,
modifier = Modifier
.padding(vertical = 2.dp)
.clip(RoundedCornerShape(4.dp))
.background(tint.copy(alpha = 0.15f))
.padding(horizontal = 6.dp, vertical = 2.dp),
)
}
}
spat.rssiDbm?.let {
Spacer(Modifier.height(3.dp))
Text(
text = stringResource(R.string.v2x_cam_rx_rssi, it),
style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall,
fontFamily = FontFamily.Monospace,
color = MaterialTheme.colorScheme.onSurfaceVariant,
)
}
}
}
@Composable
private fun PaneSectionHeader(text: String) {
Column {
Text(
text = text,
style = MaterialTheme.typography.labelMedium,
modifier = Modifier.padding(horizontal = 16.dp, vertical = 8.dp),
color = MaterialTheme.colorScheme.onSurfaceVariant,
)
HorizontalDivider(color = MaterialTheme.colorScheme.outline.copy(alpha = 0.25f))
}
}
LazyColumn(modifier = Modifier.fillMaxSize()) {
items(rows, key = { (cam, _) -> cam.stationId }) { (cam, distance) ->
ReceivedCamRow(cam, distance, alertByStation[cam.stationId])
HorizontalDivider(color = MaterialTheme.colorScheme.outline.copy(alpha = 0.25f))
}
/**
* One hazard row: what it is, where it is, and how well it was heard.
*
* [DenmEvent.relevanceRadiusM] and [DenmEvent.rssiDbm] come from the GeoNetworking header and the
* serial prefix rather than the DENM payload, so they're only populated on the ESP32-C5 path and
* are omitted rather than shown as zeroes when absent.
*/
@Composable
private fun ReceivedDenmRow(
denm: com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.denm.DenmEvent,
distanceMeters: Double?,
) {
val title = DenmParser.causeCodeName(denm.causeCode)
?: denm.causeCode?.let {
stringResource(R.string.v2x_denm_rx_cause_code, it, denm.subCauseCode ?: 0)
}
?: stringResource(R.string.v2x_map_denm_plain, denm.stationId)
val detail = listOfNotNull(
distanceMeters?.let { stringResource(R.string.v2x_cam_rx_distance, it) }
?: stringResource(R.string.v2x_cam_rx_distance_unknown),
denm.relevanceRadiusM?.let { stringResource(R.string.v2x_denm_rx_radius, it) },
denm.rssiDbm?.let { stringResource(R.string.v2x_cam_rx_rssi, it) },
).joinToString(" · ")
Row(
modifier = Modifier
.fillMaxWidth()
.padding(horizontal = 16.dp, vertical = 10.dp),
verticalAlignment = Alignment.CenterVertically,
) {
Icon(
Icons.Default.Warning,
contentDescription = null,
tint = DenmRed,
modifier = Modifier.size(14.dp),
)
Spacer(Modifier.width(10.dp))
Column(modifier = Modifier.weight(1f)) {
Text(
text = stringResource(R.string.v2x_denm_rx_hazard, title, denm.stationId),
style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodyMedium,
fontWeight = FontWeight.SemiBold,
color = DenmRed,
)
Spacer(Modifier.height(2.dp))
Text(
text = detail,
style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall,
color = MaterialTheme.colorScheme.onSurfaceVariant,
fontFamily = FontFamily.Monospace,
)
}
}
}
@@ -510,7 +716,12 @@ private fun ReceivedCamRow(
)
Spacer(Modifier.height(2.dp))
Text(
text = stringResource(
// An RSU's CAM carries no kinematics at all (rsuContainerHighFrequency), so the
// zeroes in the model are placeholders, not measurements. Printing "0.0 km/h -
// heading 0" would assert a stationary vehicle pointing due north.
text = if (cam.stationType == StationType.ROAD_SIDE_UNIT) {
stringResource(R.string.v2x_cam_rx_no_kinematics)
} else stringResource(
R.string.v2x_cam_rx_kinematics,
cam.speedMps * 3.6,
cam.headingDeg,
@@ -901,6 +1112,7 @@ private fun CamPingerCard(
pingerActive: Boolean,
sentCount: Int,
hasFix: Boolean,
loopback: com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.OwnTxLoopback?,
sendFailures: Int,
linkStatus: EspLinkStatus?,
onStart: () -> Unit,
@@ -969,8 +1181,24 @@ private fun CamPingerCard(
// ── Link diagnostics ──────────────────────────────────────────────
// "Sent: 240" is meaningless on its own if all 240 writes failed, or if the ESP32
// accepted them and the radio rejected every one. These two lines are the difference
// accepted them and the radio rejected every one. These lines are the difference
// between a bench session that tells you something and one that doesn't.
// The round trip closing: sent over serial, transmitted, and heard again by the same
// radio. Compared against Sent above, a shortfall separates "nothing is going out"
// from "it goes out but is not coming back".
loopback?.takeIf { it.frames > 0 }?.let { lb ->
Spacer(Modifier.height(6.dp))
Text(
text = lb.lastRssiDbm?.let {
stringResource(R.string.mqtt_cam_pinger_loopback, lb.frames, it)
} ?: stringResource(R.string.mqtt_cam_pinger_loopback_no_rssi, lb.frames),
style = MaterialTheme.typography.labelSmall,
color = ConnectedGreen,
fontFamily = FontFamily.Monospace,
)
}
if (sendFailures > 0) {
Spacer(Modifier.height(6.dp))
Text(
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/ui/screens/RecordingScreen.kt
-59
View File
@@ -141,46 +141,6 @@ fun RecordingScreen(
Spacer(Modifier.height(8.dp))
// ── Event Detection Counters ─────────────────────────────────────────
if (state.isRecording || tripServiceState.isRecording) {
Text(
stringResource(R.string.rec_events_detected),
style = MaterialTheme.typography.titleMedium,
fontWeight = FontWeight.SemiBold,
modifier = Modifier.align(Alignment.Start),
)
Card(
modifier = Modifier.fillMaxWidth(),
colors = CardDefaults.cardColors(containerColor = MaterialTheme.colorScheme.secondaryContainer),
) {
Row(
modifier = Modifier
.fillMaxWidth()
.padding(horizontal = 16.dp, vertical = 12.dp),
horizontalArrangement = Arrangement.SpaceEvenly,
) {
EventCountBadge(
label = stringResource(R.string.rec_event_braking),
count = tripServiceState.brakingCount,
color = Color(0xFFFF5252),
)
EventCountBadge(
label = stringResource(R.string.rec_event_turning),
count = tripServiceState.turningCount,
color = Color(0xFFFFB300),
)
EventCountBadge(
label = stringResource(R.string.rec_event_stopping),
count = tripServiceState.stoppingCount,
color = Color(0xFF42A5F5),
)
}
}
Spacer(Modifier.height(4.dp))
}
// ── CSV Session Log shortcut ─────────────────────────────────────────
if (!state.isRecording) {
OutlinedButton(
@@ -228,25 +188,6 @@ fun RecordingScreen(
}
}
@Composable
private fun EventCountBadge(label: String, count: Int, color: Color) {
Column(horizontalAlignment = Alignment.CenterHorizontally) {
Text(
text = count.toString(),
style = MaterialTheme.typography.headlineSmall,
fontWeight = FontWeight.Bold,
fontFamily = FontFamily.Monospace,
color = color,
)
Spacer(Modifier.height(2.dp))
Text(
text = label,
style = MaterialTheme.typography.labelSmall,
color = MaterialTheme.colorScheme.onSecondaryContainer,
)
}
}
@Composable
private fun StreamRow(label: String, active: Boolean) {
Row(
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/ui/screens/TripHistoryScreen.kt
-1
View File
@@ -145,7 +145,6 @@ private fun TripCard(
val durationSec = ((trip.endTime - trip.startTime) / 1000).coerceAtLeast(0)
TripStatChip("⏱ ${formatDuration(durationSec)}")
TripStatChip("📍 ${formatDistance(trip.distanceMetres)}")
TripStatChip("🚨 ${trip.eventCount} events")
}
}
IconButton(onClick = onOpen) {
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/ui/screens/TripReviewScreen.kt
-120
View File
@@ -42,9 +42,7 @@ import androidx.compose.ui.viewinterop.AndroidView
import androidx.lifecycle.Lifecycle
import androidx.lifecycle.LifecycleEventObserver
import androidx.lifecycle.compose.LocalLifecycleOwner
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.db.DetectedEventEntity
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.db.RecordedTripEntity
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.viewmodel.TripRecordingViewModel
import kotlinx.coroutines.launch
import org.osmdroid.config.Configuration
import org.osmdroid.tileprovider.tilesource.TileSourceFactory
@@ -61,7 +59,6 @@ import java.util.Locale
@Composable
fun TripReviewScreen(
trip: RecordedTripEntity,
viewModel: TripRecordingViewModel,
modifier: Modifier = Modifier,
) {
val context = LocalContext.current
@@ -70,15 +67,8 @@ fun TripReviewScreen(
// provider is ready before MapView is constructed in the factory block.
initOsmReview(context)
LaunchedEffect(trip.id) { viewModel.loadTripEvents(trip.id) }
val events by viewModel.selectedTripEvents.collectAsState()
val gpsPoints = remember(trip.gpsTrackJson) { parseGpsTrack(trip.gpsTrackJson) }
var selectedEvent by remember { mutableStateOf<DetectedEventEntity?>(null) }
val sheetState = rememberModalBottomSheetState(skipPartiallyExpanded = true)
val scope = rememberCoroutineScope()
val mapViewRef = remember { mutableStateOf<MapView?>(null) }
val lifecycleOwner = LocalLifecycleOwner.current
@@ -108,13 +98,6 @@ fun TripReviewScreen(
fontWeight = FontWeight.Medium,
color = MaterialTheme.colorScheme.onSurfaceVariant,
)
Text(
"🚨 ${events.count { it.type == "BRAKING" }} " +
"🔄 ${events.count { it.type == "TURNING" }} " +
"🛑 ${events.count { it.type == "STOPPING" }}",
style = MaterialTheme.typography.labelSmall,
color = MaterialTheme.colorScheme.onSurfaceVariant,
)
}
// ── Map ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -141,33 +124,6 @@ fun TripReviewScreen(
mv.overlays.add(polyline)
}
// Event pins
events.forEach { event ->
val pinColor = when (event.type) {
"BRAKING" -> Color(0xFFFF5252)
"TURNING" -> Color(0xFFFFB300)
"STOPPING" -> Color(0xFF42A5F5)
else -> Color.Gray
}
val marker = Marker(mv).apply {
position = GeoPoint(event.latitude, event.longitude)
setAnchor(Marker.ANCHOR_CENTER, Marker.ANCHOR_BOTTOM)
title = "${event.type} (${event.confidence})"
setOnMarkerClickListener { _, _ ->
selectedEvent = event
scope.launch { sheetState.show() }
true
}
// Solid-circle pin in the event color
icon = GradientDrawable().apply {
shape = GradientDrawable.OVAL
setColor(pinColor.toArgb())
setSize(32, 32)
}
}
mv.overlays.add(marker)
}
// Auto-fit the camera to the track — deferred via post() so the
// MapView has been measured before zoomToBoundingBox is called.
// Calling it with width/height == 0 (before first layout) crashes osmdroid.
@@ -193,82 +149,6 @@ fun TripReviewScreen(
)
}
// ── Event detail bottom sheet ─────────────────────────────────────────────
val ev = selectedEvent
if (ev != null) {
ModalBottomSheet(
onDismissRequest = { selectedEvent = null },
sheetState = sheetState,
dragHandle = { BottomSheetDefaults.DragHandle() },
) {
EventDetailSheet(event = ev, onDismiss = {
scope.launch { sheetState.hide() }.invokeOnCompletion { selectedEvent = null }
})
}
}
}
// ── Event detail sheet content ────────────────────────────────────────────────
@Composable
private fun EventDetailSheet(event: DetectedEventEntity, onDismiss: () -> Unit) {
// Created here (not as a top-level static field) so it always uses the
// current locale even if the user changes it while the app is running.
val sdf = remember { SimpleDateFormat("HH:mm:ss", Locale.getDefault()) }
val accentColor = when (event.type) {
"BRAKING" -> Color(0xFFFF5252)
"TURNING" -> Color(0xFFFFB300)
"STOPPING" -> Color(0xFF42A5F5)
else -> MaterialTheme.colorScheme.primary
}
Column(modifier = Modifier.padding(horizontal = 20.dp).padding(bottom = 32.dp)) {
Row(verticalAlignment = Alignment.CenterVertically, modifier = Modifier.fillMaxWidth()) {
Text(
event.type.replaceFirstChar { it.titlecase() },
style = MaterialTheme.typography.headlineSmall,
fontWeight = FontWeight.Bold,
color = accentColor,
modifier = Modifier.weight(1f),
)
IconButton(onClick = onDismiss) {
Icon(Icons.Default.Close, contentDescription = "Close")
}
}
Text(
"Confidence: ${event.confidence}",
style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodyMedium,
color = MaterialTheme.colorScheme.onSurfaceVariant,
)
Text(
sdf.format(Date(event.timestamp)),
style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodySmall,
color = MaterialTheme.colorScheme.onSurfaceVariant,
)
Spacer(Modifier.height(12.dp))
HorizontalDivider()
Spacer(Modifier.height(12.dp))
EventDetailRow("Speed", "%.1f m/s".format(event.speedMps))
EventDetailRow("Peak accel", "%.2f m/s²".format(event.peakAccelMagnitude))
EventDetailRow("Peak gyro", "%.3f rad/s".format(event.peakGyroMagnitude))
EventDetailRow("Duration", "${event.durationMs} ms")
EventDetailRow("Location", "%.5f°, %.5f°".format(event.latitude, event.longitude))
}
}
@Composable
private fun EventDetailRow(label: String, value: String) {
Row(
modifier = Modifier.fillMaxWidth().padding(vertical = 4.dp),
horizontalArrangement = Arrangement.SpaceBetween,
) {
Text(label, style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodyMedium, color = MaterialTheme.colorScheme.onSurfaceVariant)
Text(value, style = MaterialTheme.typography.bodyMedium, fontFamily = FontFamily.Monospace, fontWeight = FontWeight.Medium)
}
}
// ── GPS track parsing ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/ui/screens/V2xLiveMapView.kt
+15 -1
View File
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ fun V2xLiveMapView(
lifecycleOwner.lifecycle.addObserver(observer)
onDispose {
lifecycleOwner.lifecycle.removeObserver(observer)
mapViewRef.value?.onDetach()
// onDetach() deliberately NOT called here - see AndroidView's onRelease below.
}
}
@@ -173,6 +173,20 @@ fun V2xLiveMapView(
mv.controller.animateTo(ownGeoPoint)
mv.invalidate()
},
// osmdroid's onDetach() permanently tears the MapView down: afterwards its
// MapViewRepository holds a null MapView, so constructing a Marker against it throws
// NullPointerException from deep inside InfoWindow's constructor.
//
// This used to run in the DisposableEffect's onDispose, which is NOT safe: that effect
// is keyed on the lifecycle owner and disposes independently of this AndroidView, so
// the update block above could still run against an already-detached MapView and
// rebuild its markers. It crashed the app on 2026-08-17 once DENMs started arriving,
// because every incoming message recomposes this view and there are far more updates
// to land in that window than there used to be.
//
// onRelease is the callback that actually means "this View is gone": Compose
// guarantees no further update after it.
onRelease = { it.onDetach() },
modifier = Modifier.fillMaxSize(),
)
}
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/viewmodel/MqttViewModel.kt
+150 -16
View File
@@ -17,12 +17,18 @@ import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.UsbSerialState
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.UsbSerialTransport
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.denm.DenmEvent
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.denm.DenmParser
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.spat.SpatIntersection
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.denm.DenmUseCase
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.usecase.UseCaseAlert
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.usecase.UseCaseType
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.service.CamPinger
import dagger.hilt.android.lifecycle.HiltViewModel
import kotlinx.coroutines.delay
import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.MutableStateFlow
import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.combine
import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.Flow
import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.flow
import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.runningFold
import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.SharingStarted
import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.StateFlow
import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.asStateFlow
@@ -95,7 +101,24 @@ class MqttViewModel @Inject constructor(
/** False while the pinger runs without a GNSS fix — it has no position to build a CAM from. */
val camPingerHasFix: StateFlow<Boolean> = camPinger.hasFix
fun startCamPinger() = camPinger.start()
/**
* Own transmissions heard back off the air, null until one is.
*
* This is the pinger's actual proof of life. [camPingerSentCount] only says frames were
* handed to the ESP32; this says they went out and came back, which is the round trip the
* bench test is there to demonstrate. See
* [com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.OwnTxLoopback].
*/
val ownTxLoopback: StateFlow<com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.OwnTxLoopback?> =
camUseCaseRepository.ownTxLoopback
fun startCamPinger() {
// Reset first, so the tally counts this run rather than accumulating across runs and
// making the comparison against sent count meaningless.
camUseCaseRepository.resetOwnTxLoopback()
camPinger.start()
}
fun stopCamPinger() = camPinger.stop()
// ── Prefs ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -121,13 +144,27 @@ class MqttViewModel @Inject constructor(
val obuStationType: StateFlow<Int?> = _obuStationType.asStateFlow()
/**
* True when the OBU has reported a stationType other than 2 (cyclist).
* True when the CiT One has reported a stationType other than 2 (cyclist).
* Triggers a persistent warning banner — an incorrect stationType means this OBU will
* not be detected as a VRU at equipped intersections.
*
* Suppressed in ESP32-C5 mode. The value behind it comes from the CiT One's
* `v2x/rx/obu_gnss` topic, which the ESP32-C5 does not publish, so a warning raised before a
* mode switch would otherwise stay on screen reporting on an OBU that is no longer in use.
* There is nothing for it to warn about on that path either: the phone builds its own CAM
* ([com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.PhoneCamBuilder]), which sets stationType to cyclist
* locally rather than reading it back from an OBU.
*
* The underlying [obuStationType] is deliberately not cleared on the switch. It remains the
* last thing that OBU actually said, and obu_gnss refreshes it at ~4 Hz on returning to the
* CiT One path, so the warning re-evaluates against fresh data within a fraction of a second.
*/
val obuStationTypeWarning: StateFlow<Boolean> = _obuStationType
.map { it != null && it != 2 }
.stateIn(viewModelScope, SharingStarted.Eagerly, false)
val obuStationTypeWarning: StateFlow<Boolean> = combine(
_obuStationType,
repo.obuHardware,
) { stationType, hardware ->
hardware == ObuHardware.CIT_ONE && stationType != null && stationType != 2
}.stateIn(viewModelScope, SharingStarted.Eagerly, false)
// ── DENM reception (live map hazard pins) ─────────────────────────────────
@@ -135,26 +172,105 @@ class MqttViewModel @Inject constructor(
* Hazards received from other stations, newest first, deduped by [DenmEvent.dedupKey] so a
* repeating DENM about the same hazard stays one pin instead of stacking up.
*
* Derived from the raw `v2x-uca/output/json/denm` messages the repository already buffers,
* rather than a second subscription — the repository caps each topic's history, so this is
* bounded by construction.
* Two sources, merged: the CiT One Use Case app's `v2x-uca/output/json/denm` MQTT topic
* (parsed by [DenmParser]), and UPER decoded by
* [com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.asn1.DenmUperCodec] from whichever raw path is live, the
* ESP32-C5 serial link or the CiT One's `v2x/rx/denm` protobuf topic.
*
* Always empty on the ESP32-C5 path: that firmware forwards BTP-B port 2001 (CAM) only and
* drops DENM before it reaches the phone. See [DenmEvent]'s KDoc.
* Where both describe the same hazard, the decoded one wins. Both key on ETSI's actionID, so
* the `associateBy` below collapses them to one entry, and the decoded list is concatenated
* second so it is the one that survives. That is the intended preference: the Use Case app
* rate-limits and drops messages, and reduces what it does publish to the fields it cared
* about, so it can only ever be a lossier account of the same event.
*
* Events carrying `termination` are filtered out rather than shown — the hazard is over.
*/
val denmEvents: StateFlow<List<DenmEvent>> = repo.topicMessages
.map { byTopic ->
val denmEvents: StateFlow<List<DenmEvent>> = combine(
repo.topicMessages.map { byTopic ->
(byTopic[DENM_RX_TOPIC] ?: emptyList())
.mapNotNull { DenmParser.parse(it.payload, it.timestamp) }
.associateBy { it.dedupKey } // last write wins = most recent per hazard
.values
.sortedByDescending { it.timestamp }
},
// Air DENMs accumulate here rather than being a snapshot: the serial path delivers one
// event at a time, so runningFold keeps the set of hazards heard so far.
camUseCaseRepository.decodedDenm
.runningFold(emptyMap<String, DenmEvent>()) { acc, denm -> acc + (denm.dedupKey to denm) }
.map { it.values.toList() },
// Expiry has to be driven by a clock, not by arrivals. Both upstream flows only re-emit
// when a DENM arrives, so a sender that simply stops transmitting - drives away, loses
// power, leaves range - would otherwise leave its hazard on the map forever: there is no
// further emission to recompute the list. This tick is what makes a hazard fade.
tickerFlow(DENM_EXPIRY_TICK_MS),
) { fromUseCaseApp, fromDecoder, _ ->
val now = System.currentTimeMillis()
(fromUseCaseApp + fromDecoder)
.filterNot { it.isTermination } // the hazard is over - stop drawing it
.associateBy { it.dedupKey } // last write wins, so the decoded one is kept
.values
// Not heard from in DENM_TTL_MS: treat as gone. DENMs repeat at roughly 1 Hz, so a
// full minute of silence is ~60 missed repetitions - well past "we briefly lost one".
.filter { now - it.timestamp <= DENM_TTL_MS }
.sortedByDescending { it.timestamp }
}.stateIn(viewModelScope, SharingStarted.Eagerly, emptyList())
/**
* Live signal state per intersection, newest first, keyed by [IntersectionSignalState.key].
*
* Both hardware paths: SPATEM arrives over the air on BTP port 2004 via the ESP32-C5 serial
* link, or on the CiT One's `v2x/rx/spatem` protobuf topic. The CiT One's processed
* `v2x-uca/output/json/spat` topic is not used, since the raw topic carries every repetition.
*
* One entry per intersection, not per message: SPATEM repeats at ~2 Hz per RSU, so a log would
* grow without telling anyone anything. Entries expire like DENMs do - an intersection left
* behind stops transmitting, and the same clock-driven argument applies.
*/
val spatIntersections: StateFlow<List<SpatIntersection>> = combine(
camUseCaseRepository.decodedSpat
.runningFold(emptyMap<String, SpatIntersection>()) { acc, spat ->
acc + spat.intersections.associate { i ->
i.key to SpatIntersection(i, spat.stationId, spat.rssiDbm, spat.timestamp)
}
},
tickerFlow(SPAT_EXPIRY_TICK_MS),
) { byKey, _ ->
val now = System.currentTimeMillis()
byKey.values
.filter { now - it.timestamp <= SPAT_TTL_MS }
.sortedByDescending { it.timestamp }
}.stateIn(viewModelScope, SharingStarted.Eagerly, emptyList())
/** Emits immediately, then every [periodMs], purely to re-trigger a time-dependent combine. */
private fun tickerFlow(periodMs: Long): Flow<Long> = flow {
while (true) {
emit(System.currentTimeMillis())
delay(periodMs)
}
.stateIn(viewModelScope, SharingStarted.Eagerly, emptyList())
}
private companion object {
/** Use Case API topic carrying received DENMs (CiT One path only). */
const val DENM_RX_TOPIC = "v2x-uca/output/json/denm"
/**
* How long a hazard stays listed after its last repetition. A DENM has no "still here"
* guarantee beyond the sender repeating it, and its own validityDuration is not decoded
* yet, so silence is the only expiry signal available.
*/
const val DENM_TTL_MS = 60_000L
/** How often the list is re-evaluated for expiry. Sets the worst-case lateness of a fade. */
const val DENM_EXPIRY_TICK_MS = 5_000L
/**
* SPATEM repeats at ~2 Hz, so 15 s of silence is ~30 missed repetitions: the RSU is out of
* range. Much shorter than the DENM window because a stale traffic light is more
* misleading than a stale hazard - a light that stopped updating is not "still green".
*/
const val SPAT_TTL_MS = 15_000L
const val SPAT_EXPIRY_TICK_MS = 2_000L
/** RSU CAMs arrive at ~2 Hz, same as any other station, so the same window applies. */
const val RSU_TTL_MS = 15_000L
const val RSU_EXPIRY_TICK_MS = 2_000L
}
// ── DENM transmission ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -187,6 +303,24 @@ class MqttViewModel @Inject constructor(
/** Latest known CAM per tracked remote road user, for the live map view (Section 13). */
val remoteCamPositions: StateFlow<Map<Long, com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.Cam>> = camUseCaseRepository.remotePositions
/**
* Every station to draw: road users from the detection engine, plus roadside units, which are
* tracked outside it (see [com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.cam.CamUseCaseRepository.rsuStations]).
*
* The engine prunes its own stale entries; nothing prunes the RSU map, so the staleness window
* is applied here. As with hazards and signals, expiry has to be clock-driven - an RSU that
* goes out of range simply stops transmitting, and no further emission would arrive to
* recompute the list.
*/
val stationsInRange: StateFlow<Map<Long, com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.Cam>> = combine(
camUseCaseRepository.remotePositions,
camUseCaseRepository.rsuStations,
tickerFlow(RSU_EXPIRY_TICK_MS),
) { roadUsers, rsus, _ ->
val now = System.currentTimeMillis()
roadUsers + rsus.filterValues { now - it.timestamp <= RSU_TTL_MS }
}.stateIn(viewModelScope, SharingStarted.Eagerly, emptyMap())
/** True if [stationId] is the ego OBU's own — used for OWN/REMOTE badges in the raw message list. */
fun isOwnStationId(stationId: Long): Boolean = camUseCaseRepository.isOwnStationId(stationId)
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/viewmodel/SensorViewModel.kt
+1 -1
View File
@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ class SensorViewModel(application: Application) : AndroidViewModel(application)
csvWriter = BufferedWriter(FileWriter(File(sessionsDir, "$recordingSessionId.csv")))
csvWriter?.apply {
appendLine("# MicrOBU Session Export")
appendLine("# Generated by MicrOBU v0.2.0 — HAW Hamburg / Project MicrOBU")
appendLine("# Generated by MicrOBU v0.2.0 - HAW Hamburg / Project MicrOBU")
appendLine("# Session ID,$recordingSessionId")
appendLine("# Start,${isoFmt.format(Date(startTime))}")
appendLine()
app/src/main/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/viewmodel/TripRecordingViewModel.kt
-16
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ import androidx.lifecycle.viewModelScope
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.TripRepository
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.shareTripCsv
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.db.AppDatabase
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.db.DetectedEventEntity
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.db.RecordedTripEntity
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.service.TripRecordingService
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.service.TripServiceBus
@@ -66,20 +65,6 @@ class TripRecordingViewModel(application: Application) : AndroidViewModel(applic
/** All recorded trips, newest first. */
val trips: Flow<List<RecordedTripEntity>> = repository.getAllTrips()
// ── Trip review ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
private val _selectedTripEvents = MutableStateFlow<List<DetectedEventEntity>>(emptyList())
val selectedTripEvents: StateFlow<List<DetectedEventEntity>> = _selectedTripEvents.asStateFlow()
/** Load events for [tripId] into [selectedTripEvents]. */
fun loadTripEvents(tripId: Long) {
viewModelScope.launch {
repository.getEventsForTrip(tripId).collect { events ->
_selectedTripEvents.value = events
}
}
}
// ── Recording control ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
@@ -132,7 +117,6 @@ class TripRecordingViewModel(application: Application) : AndroidViewModel(applic
shareTripCsv(
context = context,
trip = trip,
events = repository.getEventsForTripOnce(tripId),
v2xMessages = repository.getV2xMessagesForTripOnce(tripId),
)
}
app/src/main/res/values-de/strings.xml
+53 -33
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<resources>
<!-- Language names — intentionally NOT translated so they always read in their own language -->
<!-- Language names - intentionally NOT translated so they always read in their own language -->
<string name="lang_english">English</string>
<string name="lang_german">Deutsch</string>
<!-- App -->
<string name="app_subtitle">V2X Begleiter — Phase 02</string>
<string name="app_subtitle">V2X Begleiter - Phase 02</string>
<!-- Navigation -->
<string name="nav_dashboard">Dashboard</string>
@@ -26,11 +26,24 @@
<string name="dash_connected">Verbunden</string>
<string name="dash_mqtt_connected">MQTT verbunden</string>
<string name="dash_mqtt_connecting">Verbindung zum Broker…</string>
<string name="dash_mqtt_error">Broker nicht erreichbar — V2X-Einstellungen prüfen</string>
<string name="dash_mqtt_error">Broker nicht erreichbar - V2X-Einstellungen prüfen</string>
<string name="dash_recording">Aufnahme</string>
<string name="dash_samples">Messwerte</string>
<string name="dash_start_driving_session">Fahrsitzung starten</string>
<string name="dash_initialising">Wird initialisiert…</string>
<!-- Dashboard live V2X panel: nearest hazard and nearest signalised intersection -->
<string name="dash_hazard_warning">Gefahrenwarnung</string>
<string name="dash_hazard_station">Station %1$d</string>
<string name="dash_more_count">+%1$d weitere</string>
<string name="dash_signal_title">Ampel %1$s</string>
<string name="dash_signal_more">+%1$d weitere Kreuzung(en)</string>
<string name="dash_signal_phase_go">Grün</string>
<string name="dash_signal_phase_stop">Rot</string>
<string name="dash_signal_phase_changing">Wechselt</string>
<string name="dash_signal_phase_dark">Dunkel</string>
<string name="dash_signal_phase_unknown">Unbekannt</string>
<string name="dash_signal_countdown">%1$s · %2$.0f s</string>
<string name="stat_pressure">Luftdruck</string>
<string name="stat_altitude">Höhe</string>
<string name="stat_heading">Richtung</string>
@@ -63,12 +76,12 @@
<string name="conn_bluetooth_phase3">Bluetooth</string>
<string name="conn_bluetooth_phase3_desc">Bluetooth-Verbindung ist für Phase 03 geplant und noch nicht implementiert.</string>
<string name="conn_esp32_title">ESP32-C5 (USB Seriell)</string>
<string name="conn_esp32_phase3_desc">Die USB-Seriell-Verbindung zum ESP32-C5 ist für Phase 03 vorgesehen, aber noch nicht funktionsfähig — dafür muss zuerst das ESP32-Firmware-Protokoll nach Kotlin übersetzt werden.</string>
<string name="conn_esp32_state_disconnected">Nicht verbunden — ESP32-C5 an den nativen USB-C-Port anschließen und Verbinden antippen.</string>
<string name="conn_esp32_phase3_desc">Die USB-Seriell-Verbindung zum ESP32-C5 ist für Phase 03 vorgesehen, aber noch nicht funktionsfähig - dafür muss zuerst das ESP32-Firmware-Protokoll nach Kotlin übersetzt werden.</string>
<string name="conn_esp32_state_disconnected">Nicht verbunden - ESP32-C5 an den nativen USB-C-Port anschließen und Verbinden antippen.</string>
<string name="conn_esp32_state_device_attached">Gerät erkannt, wird geöffnet…</string>
<string name="conn_esp32_state_permission_requested">Warte auf USB-Berechtigung…</string>
<string name="conn_esp32_state_connected">Verbunden</string>
<string name="conn_esp32_state_error">Verbindungsfehler — Kabel und nativen USB-C-Port prüfen und erneut versuchen.</string>
<string name="conn_esp32_state_error">Verbindungsfehler - Kabel und nativen USB-C-Port prüfen und erneut versuchen.</string>
<string name="conn_esp32_connect">Mit ESP32-C5 verbinden</string>
<string name="conn_scan">Geräte suchen</string>
<string name="conn_scanning">Suche läuft…</string>
@@ -126,7 +139,7 @@
<string name="gnss_open_maps_sub">Öffnet Ihre bevorzugte Karten-App</string>
<string name="gnss_view_inapp">In App anzeigen</string>
<string name="gnss_view_inapp_sub">Aktuellen Standort auf einer In-App-Karte anzeigen</string>
<string name="gnss_no_fix">Noch kein GPS-Signal — gehen Sie ins Freie</string>
<string name="gnss_no_fix">Noch kein GPS-Signal - gehen Sie ins Freie</string>
<string name="map_title">Standortkarte</string>
<string name="map_location_label">Aktueller Standort</string>
<string name="v2x_map_remote_count">%1$d erfasste externe Verkehrsteilnehmer</string>
@@ -160,17 +173,17 @@
<string name="settings_developer">Entwickler</string>
<string name="settings_dev_mode">Entwicklermodus</string>
<string name="settings_wifi">WLAN-OBU-Verbindung</string>
<string name="settings_wifi_val">Nur Entwicklermodus — noch nicht implementiert</string>
<string name="settings_wifi_val">Nur Entwicklermodus - noch nicht implementiert</string>
<string name="settings_about">Über</string>
<string name="settings_app_version">App-Version</string>
<string name="settings_app_version_val">0.5.0 (Phase 03 — ESP32-C5-Seriellverbindung + CAM vom Smartphone)</string>
<string name="settings_app_version_val">0.5.0 (Phase 03 - ESP32-C5-Seriellverbindung + CAM vom Smartphone)</string>
<string name="settings_connection">Verbindung</string>
<string name="settings_usb_auto_detect">OBU per USB-C automatisch erkennen</string>
<string name="settings_usb_manual_ip">OBU-IP (manuell)</string>
<string name="settings_obu_hardware">OBU-Hardware</string>
<string name="settings_obu_hardware_cit_one">CiT One</string>
<string name="settings_obu_hardware_esp32">ESP32-C5</string>
<string name="settings_obu_hardware_esp32_note">Der ESP32-C5 arbeitet als „dummer" Transceiver: CAM wird auf dem Smartphone erstellt und kodiert, über USB-Seriell an den ESP32 gesendet und über ITS-G5 gesendet. Auf diesem Pfad gibt es keinen MQTT-Broker und keine DENM-Use-Case-Engine — siehe den CAM-Pinger im V2X-Monitor für ein manuelles Testwerkzeug.</string>
<string name="settings_obu_hardware_esp32_note">Der ESP32-C5 arbeitet als „dummer" Transceiver: CAM wird auf dem Smartphone erstellt und kodiert, über USB-Seriell an den ESP32 gesendet und über ITS-G5 gesendet. Auf diesem Pfad gibt es keinen MQTT-Broker und keine DENM-Use-Case-Engine - siehe den CAM-Pinger im V2X-Monitor für ein manuelles Testwerkzeug.</string>
<string name="settings_usb_transport">Aktiver Transport</string>
<string name="settings_transport_usbc">USB-C</string>
<string name="settings_transport_wifi">WLAN</string>
@@ -183,36 +196,39 @@
<string name="mqtt_auto_scroll">Automatisch scrollen</string>
<string name="mqtt_no_topics">Noch keine Nachrichten</string>
<string name="mqtt_view_list">Liste</string>
<string name="mqtt_view_topics">Topics</string>
<string name="mqtt_view_map">Karte</string>
<string name="mqtt_no_topics_hint">Mit der OBU verbinden und auf V2X-Verkehr warten</string>
<string name="mqtt_no_messages">Noch keine Nachrichten zu diesem Thema</string>
<!-- DENM TX — nur manueller Antennen-/RSU-Reichweitentest, nicht Use-Case-gesteuert -->
<!-- DENM TX - nur manueller Antennen-/RSU-Reichweitentest, nicht Use-Case-gesteuert -->
<string name="mqtt_last_tx">Zuletzt gesendete Nutzlast:</string>
<string name="mqtt_denm_tx_title">DENM-Übertragung (manueller Test)</string>
<string name="mqtt_send_denm">Test-DENM senden</string>
<string name="mqtt_stop_denm">DENM stoppen</string>
<string name="mqtt_denm_use_case_desc">Liegengebliebenes Fahrzeug (causeCode 94)</string>
<string name="mqtt_denm_not_connected">Mit OBU verbinden, um DENM-Auslösung zu aktivieren</string>
<string name="mqtt_denm_active">DENM aktiv — OBU sendet über ITS-G5</string>
<string name="mqtt_denm_hint">Manueller Antennen-/RSU-Reichweitentest — sendet uca-denmctrl (retained) an v2x-uca/input/denmtrg. Wird nicht durch erkannte Ereignisse oder Use-Case-Alarme ausgelöst.</string>
<string name="mqtt_denm_active">DENM aktiv - OBU sendet über ITS-G5</string>
<string name="mqtt_denm_hint">Manueller Antennen-/RSU-Reichweitentest - sendet uca-denmctrl (retained) an v2x-uca/input/denmtrg. Wird nicht durch erkannte Ereignisse oder Use-Case-Alarme ausgelöst.</string>
<string name="mqtt_denm_show">Letztes TX anzeigen</string>
<string name="mqtt_denm_hide">Ausblenden</string>
<!-- CAM-Pinger — nur ESP32-C5, manueller Bank-Test, Gegenstück zur DENM-TX-Karte oben -->
<!-- CAM-Pinger - nur ESP32-C5, manueller Bank-Test, Gegenstück zur DENM-TX-Karte oben -->
<string name="mqtt_cam_pinger_title">CAM-Pinger (manueller Test)</string>
<string name="mqtt_cam_pinger_desc">1-Hz-CAM-Ping aus Live-GNSS- und IMU-Daten — prüft die serielle Verbindung und den ESP32-Funkpfad ohne Fahrtaufzeichnung.</string>
<string name="mqtt_cam_pinger_no_fix">Warte auf GNSS-Fix — noch nichts gesendet</string>
<string name="mqtt_cam_pinger_desc">1-Hz-CAM-Ping aus Live-GNSS- und IMU-Daten - prüft die serielle Verbindung und den ESP32-Funkpfad ohne Fahrtaufzeichnung.</string>
<string name="mqtt_cam_pinger_no_fix">Warte auf GNSS-Fix - noch nichts gesendet</string>
<!-- Empfangene CAMs (ESP32-C5-Pfad) -->
<string name="v2x_cam_rx_count">%1$d Station(en) in Reichweite — jeweils neueste CAM</string>
<string name="v2x_cam_rx_count">%1$d Station(en) in Reichweite - jeweils neueste CAM</string>
<string name="v2x_cam_rx_none">Keine CAMs empfangen</string>
<string name="v2x_cam_rx_none_hint">Dekodierte CAMs benachbarter Stationen erscheinen hier, sobald sie über die serielle Verbindung eintreffen.</string>
<string name="v2x_cam_rx_none_hint">Dekodierte CAMs benachbarter Stationen erscheinen hier, sobald sie eintreffen.</string>
<string name="v2x_cam_rx_station">Station %1$d · %2$s</string>
<string name="v2x_cam_rx_kinematics">%1$.1f km/h · Kurs %2$.0f°</string>
<string name="v2x_cam_rx_distance">%1$.0f m</string>
<string name="v2x_cam_rx_distance_unknown">— m</string>
<string name="v2x_cam_rx_distance_unknown">- m</string>
<string name="v2x_cam_rx_rssi">%1$d dBm</string>
<string name="v2x_cam_rx_none_stations">Keine CAMs empfangen</string>
<string name="v2x_cam_rx_no_kinematics">Straßenseiteneinheit - keine Kinematik</string>
<!-- DENM-Kartenmarker -->
<string name="v2x_map_denm_labeled">Gefahr: Ursache %1$d/%2$d (Station %3$d)</string>
@@ -227,10 +243,12 @@
<string name="station_type_rsu">Straßenseiteneinheit</string>
<string name="station_type_other">Typ %1$d</string>
<string name="mqtt_cam_pinger_not_connected">ESP32-C5 verbinden, um den CAM-Pinger zu aktivieren</string>
<string name="mqtt_cam_pinger_active">Sendet — 1 CAM/s über die serielle Verbindung</string>
<string name="mqtt_cam_pinger_active">Sendet - 1 CAM/s über die serielle Verbindung</string>
<string name="mqtt_cam_pinger_sent_count">Gesendet: %1$d</string>
<string name="mqtt_cam_pinger_send_failures">Schreibfehler: %1$d in Folge — CAMs erreichen den ESP32 nicht</string>
<string name="mqtt_cam_pinger_send_failures">Schreibfehler: %1$d in Folge - CAMs erreichen den ESP32 nicht</string>
<string name="mqtt_cam_pinger_fw_counters">ESP32: TX-Fehler %1$d · zu groß %2$d · CRC-Fehler %3$d</string>
<string name="mqtt_cam_pinger_loopback">Eigene Sendung empfangen: %1$d Frames · %2$d dBm</string>
<string name="mqtt_cam_pinger_loopback_no_rssi">Eigene Sendung empfangen: %1$d Frames</string>
<string name="mqtt_start_pinger">Pinger starten</string>
<string name="mqtt_stop_pinger">Pinger stoppen</string>
@@ -241,15 +259,15 @@
<string name="mqtt_usecase_detail">Station %1$d · %2$.0f m · Annäherung %3$.1f m/s · TTC %4$.1f s · %5$s</string>
<!-- Verständliche Use-Case-Beschreibungen -->
<string name="usecase_narrative_ima_b">Kreuzendes Fahrzeug — %1$.0f s bis Konflikt</string>
<string name="usecase_narrative_ima_s">Stehendes Fahrzeug könnte losfahren — %1$.0f s</string>
<string name="usecase_narrative_rtw_b">Auto biegt rechts auf dich zu — %1$.0f s</string>
<string name="usecase_narrative_ltw_b">Auto biegt links auf dich zu — %1$.0f s</string>
<string name="usecase_narrative_smva_bcw_b">Schnell nahendes Fahrzeug — %1$.0f s</string>
<string name="usecase_narrative_ima_b">Kreuzendes Fahrzeug - %1$.0f s bis Konflikt</string>
<string name="usecase_narrative_ima_s">Stehendes Fahrzeug könnte losfahren - %1$.0f s</string>
<string name="usecase_narrative_rtw_b">Auto biegt rechts auf dich zu - %1$.0f s</string>
<string name="usecase_narrative_ltw_b">Auto biegt links auf dich zu - %1$.0f s</string>
<string name="usecase_narrative_smva_bcw_b">Schnell nahendes Fahrzeug - %1$.0f s</string>
<!-- Einstellungen > Use Case Alerts -->
<string name="settings_usecase_alerts">Use Case Alerts</string>
<string name="settings_usecase_alerts_desc">Ein-/Ausschalten pro Use Case für das CAM-basierte Use-Case-Alarm-Panel im V2X-Monitor. Alle Use Cases sind CAM-only — keiner löst ein DENM aus.</string>
<string name="settings_usecase_alerts_desc">Ein-/Ausschalten pro Use Case für das CAM-basierte Use-Case-Alarm-Panel im V2X-Monitor. Alle Use Cases sind CAM-only - keiner löst ein DENM aus.</string>
<string name="settings_usecase_alert_levels_title">Alarmstufen-Schwellenwerte (nur lesend)</string>
<string name="settings_usecase_level_warning">Warning</string>
<string name="settings_usecase_level_awareness">Awareness</string>
@@ -263,21 +281,17 @@
<string name="dash_transport_bt">BT</string>
<!-- OBU stationType warning -->
<string name="dash_station_type_warning">⚠ OBU-stationType ≠ 2 (Radfahrer) — VRU-Erkennung an ausgerüsteten Kreuzungen ggf. beeinträchtigt</string>
<string name="dash_station_type_warning">⚠ OBU-stationType ≠ 2 (Radfahrer) - VRU-Erkennung an ausgerüsteten Kreuzungen ggf. beeinträchtigt</string>
<string name="settings_platform">Plattform</string>
<string name="settings_platform_val">Android / Kotlin / Jetpack Compose</string>
<string name="settings_project">Projekt</string>
<string name="settings_project_val">MicrOBU — HAW Hamburg &amp; consider it GmbH</string>
<string name="settings_project_val">MicrOBU - HAW Hamburg &amp; consider it GmbH</string>
<!-- Phase A: Trips (bottom nav) -->
<string name="nav_trips">Fahrten</string>
<!-- Phase A: Recording screen event counters -->
<string name="rec_events_detected">Erkannte Ereignisse</string>
<string name="rec_event_braking">Bremsen</string>
<string name="rec_event_turning">Abbiegen</string>
<string name="rec_event_stopping">Anhalten</string>
<string name="rec_stream_event_detection">Ereigniserkennung</string>
<string name="rec_open_session_log">CSV-Sitzungsprotokoll</string>
@@ -293,4 +307,10 @@
<!-- Phase A: Trip Review screen -->
<string name="trip_review_title">Fahrtanalyse</string>
<!-- Empfangene SPATEM-Liste (ESP32-C5) -->
<string name="v2x_spat_rx_count">%1$d signalisierte Kreuzung(en) - Live-SPAT</string>
<string name="v2x_spat_rx_title">Kreuzung %1$s · Station %2$d</string>
<string name="v2x_spat_group">SG%1$d</string>
<string name="v2x_spat_countdown">%1$.0f s</string>
</resources>
app/src/main/res/values/strings.xml
+59 -33
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
<resources>
<!-- App -->
<string name="app_name">MicrOBU</string>
<string name="app_subtitle">V2X Companion — Phase 02</string>
<string name="app_subtitle">V2X Companion - Phase 02</string>
<!-- Language names (always shown in their own language) -->
<string name="lang_english">English</string>
@@ -27,11 +27,24 @@
<string name="dash_connected">Connected</string>
<string name="dash_mqtt_connected">MQTT connected</string>
<string name="dash_mqtt_connecting">Connecting to broker…</string>
<string name="dash_mqtt_error">Broker unreachable — check V2X settings</string>
<string name="dash_mqtt_error">Broker unreachable - check V2X settings</string>
<string name="dash_recording">Recording</string>
<string name="dash_samples">samples</string>
<string name="dash_start_driving_session">Start Driving Session</string>
<string name="dash_initialising">Initialising…</string>
<!-- Dashboard live V2X panel: nearest hazard and nearest signalised intersection -->
<string name="dash_hazard_warning">Hazard warning</string>
<string name="dash_hazard_station">station %1$d</string>
<string name="dash_more_count">+%1$d more</string>
<string name="dash_signal_title">Traffic light %1$s</string>
<string name="dash_signal_more">+%1$d more intersection(s)</string>
<string name="dash_signal_phase_go">Green</string>
<string name="dash_signal_phase_stop">Red</string>
<string name="dash_signal_phase_changing">Changing</string>
<string name="dash_signal_phase_dark">Dark</string>
<string name="dash_signal_phase_unknown">Unknown</string>
<string name="dash_signal_countdown">%1$s · %2$.0f s</string>
<string name="stat_pressure">Pressure</string>
<string name="stat_altitude">Altitude</string>
<string name="stat_heading">Heading</string>
@@ -64,12 +77,12 @@
<string name="conn_bluetooth_phase3">Bluetooth</string>
<string name="conn_bluetooth_phase3_desc">Bluetooth connection is planned for Phase 03 and is not yet implemented.</string>
<string name="conn_esp32_title">ESP32-C5 (USB Serial)</string>
<string name="conn_esp32_phase3_desc">USB-serial connection to the ESP32-C5 is scaffolded for Phase 03 but not yet functional — it needs the ESP32 firmware protocol translated to Kotlin first.</string>
<string name="conn_esp32_state_disconnected">Not connected — plug the ESP32-C5 into the native USB-C port and tap Connect.</string>
<string name="conn_esp32_phase3_desc">USB-serial connection to the ESP32-C5 is scaffolded for Phase 03 but not yet functional - it needs the ESP32 firmware protocol translated to Kotlin first.</string>
<string name="conn_esp32_state_disconnected">Not connected - plug the ESP32-C5 into the native USB-C port and tap Connect.</string>
<string name="conn_esp32_state_device_attached">Device detected, opening…</string>
<string name="conn_esp32_state_permission_requested">Waiting for USB permission…</string>
<string name="conn_esp32_state_connected">Connected</string>
<string name="conn_esp32_state_error">Connection error — check the cable and native USB-C port, then try again.</string>
<string name="conn_esp32_state_error">Connection error - check the cable and native USB-C port, then try again.</string>
<string name="conn_esp32_connect">Connect to ESP32-C5</string>
<string name="conn_scan">Scan for Devices</string>
<string name="conn_scanning">Scanning…</string>
@@ -127,7 +140,7 @@
<string name="gnss_open_maps_sub">Opens in your preferred maps application</string>
<string name="gnss_view_inapp">View in App</string>
<string name="gnss_view_inapp_sub">Show current location on an in-app map</string>
<string name="gnss_no_fix">No GPS fix yet — move to an open area</string>
<string name="gnss_no_fix">No GPS fix yet - move to an open area</string>
<string name="map_title">Location Map</string>
<string name="map_location_label">Current Location</string>
<string name="v2x_map_remote_count">%1$d tracked remote road user(s)</string>
@@ -161,17 +174,17 @@
<string name="settings_developer">Developer</string>
<string name="settings_dev_mode">Developer mode</string>
<string name="settings_wifi">Wi-Fi OBU connection</string>
<string name="settings_wifi_val">Dev mode only — not implemented</string>
<string name="settings_wifi_val">Dev mode only - not implemented</string>
<string name="settings_about">About</string>
<string name="settings_app_version">App version</string>
<string name="settings_app_version_val">0.5.0 (Phase 03 — ESP32-C5 serial link + phone-built CAM)</string>
<string name="settings_app_version_val">0.5.0 (Phase 03 - ESP32-C5 serial link + phone-built CAM)</string>
<string name="settings_connection">Connection</string>
<string name="settings_usb_auto_detect">Auto-detect OBU via USB-C</string>
<string name="settings_usb_manual_ip">Manual OBU IP</string>
<string name="settings_obu_hardware">OBU Hardware</string>
<string name="settings_obu_hardware_cit_one">CiT One</string>
<string name="settings_obu_hardware_esp32">ESP32-C5</string>
<string name="settings_obu_hardware_esp32_note">ESP32-C5 acts as a "dumb" transceiver: CAM is built and encoded on the phone, sent to the ESP32 over USB serial, and broadcast over ITS-G5. No MQTT broker or DENM use-case engine on this path — see the V2X Monitor screen\'s CAM Pinger for a manual test tool.</string>
<string name="settings_obu_hardware_esp32_note">ESP32-C5 acts as a "dumb" transceiver: CAM is built and encoded on the phone, sent to the ESP32 over USB serial, and broadcast over ITS-G5. No MQTT broker or DENM use-case engine on this path - see the V2X Monitor screen\'s CAM Pinger for a manual test tool.</string>
<string name="settings_usb_transport">Active transport</string>
<string name="settings_transport_usbc">USB-C</string>
<string name="settings_transport_wifi">Wi-Fi</string>
@@ -184,36 +197,51 @@
<string name="mqtt_auto_scroll">Auto-scroll to latest</string>
<string name="mqtt_no_topics">No messages yet</string>
<string name="mqtt_view_list">List</string>
<string name="mqtt_view_topics">Topics</string>
<string name="mqtt_view_map">Map</string>
<string name="mqtt_no_topics_hint">Connect to the OBU and wait for V2X traffic</string>
<string name="mqtt_no_messages">No messages on this topic yet</string>
<!-- DENM TX — manual antenna/RSU-range test tool only, not use-case-driven -->
<!-- DENM TX - manual antenna/RSU-range test tool only, not use-case-driven -->
<string name="mqtt_last_tx">Last transmitted payload:</string>
<string name="mqtt_denm_tx_title">DENM Transmission (Manual Test)</string>
<string name="mqtt_send_denm">Send Test DENM</string>
<string name="mqtt_stop_denm">Stop DENM</string>
<string name="mqtt_denm_use_case_desc">Aftermarket Stationary Vehicle (causeCode 94)</string>
<string name="mqtt_denm_not_connected">Connect to the OBU to enable DENM triggering</string>
<string name="mqtt_denm_active">DENM active — OBU broadcasting via ITS-G5</string>
<string name="mqtt_denm_hint">Manual antenna/RSU range test — publishes uca-denmctrl (retained) to v2x-uca/input/denmtrg. Not triggered by detected events or use case alerts.</string>
<string name="mqtt_denm_active">DENM active - OBU broadcasting via ITS-G5</string>
<string name="mqtt_denm_hint">Manual antenna/RSU range test - publishes uca-denmctrl (retained) to v2x-uca/input/denmtrg. Not triggered by detected events or use case alerts.</string>
<string name="mqtt_denm_show">Show last TX</string>
<string name="mqtt_denm_hide">Hide</string>
<!-- CAM Pinger — ESP32-C5-only manual bench test, equivalent to the DENM TX card above -->
<!-- CAM Pinger - ESP32-C5-only manual bench test, equivalent to the DENM TX card above -->
<string name="mqtt_cam_pinger_title">CAM Pinger (Manual Test)</string>
<string name="mqtt_cam_pinger_desc">1 Hz CAM ping built from live GNSS and IMU data — verifies the serial link and ESP32 radio path without needing a trip recording.</string>
<string name="mqtt_cam_pinger_no_fix">Waiting for GNSS fix — nothing transmitted yet</string>
<string name="mqtt_cam_pinger_desc">1 Hz CAM ping built from live GNSS and IMU data - verifies the serial link and ESP32 radio path without needing a trip recording.</string>
<string name="mqtt_cam_pinger_no_fix">Waiting for GNSS fix - nothing transmitted yet</string>
<!-- Received-CAM list (ESP32-C5 path) -->
<string name="v2x_cam_rx_count">%1$d station(s) in range — latest CAM per station</string>
<string name="v2x_cam_rx_count">%1$d station(s) in range - latest CAM per station</string>
<string name="v2x_cam_rx_none">No CAMs received</string>
<string name="v2x_cam_rx_none_hint">Decoded CAMs from nearby stations appear here as they arrive over the serial link.</string>
<string name="v2x_cam_rx_none_hint">Decoded CAMs from nearby stations appear here as they arrive.</string>
<string name="v2x_cam_rx_station">Station %1$d · %2$s</string>
<string name="v2x_cam_rx_kinematics">%1$.1f km/h · heading %2$.0f°</string>
<string name="v2x_cam_rx_distance">%1$.0f m</string>
<string name="v2x_cam_rx_distance_unknown">— m</string>
<string name="v2x_cam_rx_distance_unknown">- m</string>
<string name="v2x_cam_rx_rssi">%1$d dBm</string>
<string name="v2x_cam_rx_none_stations">No CAMs received</string>
<string name="v2x_cam_rx_no_kinematics">roadside unit - no kinematics reported</string>
<!-- Received-DENM list (ESP32-C5 path) -->
<string name="v2x_denm_rx_count">%1$d active hazard(s) - latest DENM per event</string>
<string name="v2x_denm_rx_hazard">%1$s · station %2$d</string>
<string name="v2x_denm_rx_cause_code">cause %1$d/%2$d</string>
<string name="v2x_denm_rx_radius">%1$d m radius</string>
<!-- Received-SPATEM list (ESP32-C5 path) -->
<string name="v2x_spat_rx_count">%1$d signalised intersection(s) - live SPAT</string>
<string name="v2x_spat_rx_title">Intersection %1$s · station %2$d</string>
<string name="v2x_spat_group">SG%1$d</string>
<string name="v2x_spat_countdown">%1$.0f s</string>
<!-- DENM map pins -->
<string name="v2x_map_denm_labeled">Hazard: cause %1$d/%2$d (station %3$d)</string>
@@ -228,10 +256,12 @@
<string name="station_type_rsu">Roadside unit</string>
<string name="station_type_other">Type %1$d</string>
<string name="mqtt_cam_pinger_not_connected">Connect the ESP32-C5 to enable the CAM pinger</string>
<string name="mqtt_cam_pinger_active">Pinging — 1 CAM/s over the serial link</string>
<string name="mqtt_cam_pinger_active">Pinging - 1 CAM/s over the serial link</string>
<string name="mqtt_cam_pinger_sent_count">Sent: %1$d</string>
<string name="mqtt_cam_pinger_send_failures">Write failures: %1$d consecutive — CAMs are not reaching the ESP32</string>
<string name="mqtt_cam_pinger_send_failures">Write failures: %1$d consecutive - CAMs are not reaching the ESP32</string>
<string name="mqtt_cam_pinger_fw_counters">ESP32: tx fail %1$d · oversize %2$d · crc err %3$d</string>
<string name="mqtt_cam_pinger_loopback">Own TX heard back: %1$d frames · %2$d dBm</string>
<string name="mqtt_cam_pinger_loopback_no_rssi">Own TX heard back: %1$d frames</string>
<string name="mqtt_start_pinger">Start Pinger</string>
<string name="mqtt_stop_pinger">Stop Pinger</string>
@@ -241,16 +271,16 @@
<string name="mqtt_usecase_none_active">No active use case alerts</string>
<string name="mqtt_usecase_detail">Station %1$d · %2$.0f m · closing %3$.1f m/s · TTC %4$.1f s · %5$s</string>
<!-- Human-readable use-case narratives (Section 10.4 — not just raw JSON) -->
<string name="usecase_narrative_ima_b">Crossing vehicle ahead — %1$.0f s to conflict</string>
<string name="usecase_narrative_ima_s">Stopped vehicle may pull out — %1$.0f s</string>
<string name="usecase_narrative_rtw_b">Car turning right toward you — %1$.0f s</string>
<string name="usecase_narrative_ltw_b">Car turning left toward you — %1$.0f s</string>
<string name="usecase_narrative_smva_bcw_b">Fast-closing vehicle nearby — %1$.0f s</string>
<!-- Human-readable use-case narratives (Section 10.4 - not just raw JSON) -->
<string name="usecase_narrative_ima_b">Crossing vehicle ahead - %1$.0f s to conflict</string>
<string name="usecase_narrative_ima_s">Stopped vehicle may pull out - %1$.0f s</string>
<string name="usecase_narrative_rtw_b">Car turning right toward you - %1$.0f s</string>
<string name="usecase_narrative_ltw_b">Car turning left toward you - %1$.0f s</string>
<string name="usecase_narrative_smva_bcw_b">Fast-closing vehicle nearby - %1$.0f s</string>
<!-- Settings > Use Case Alerts -->
<string name="settings_usecase_alerts">Use Case Alerts</string>
<string name="settings_usecase_alerts_desc">Per-use-case enable/disable for the CAM-based Use Case Alert panel on the V2X Monitor screen. All use cases are CAM-only — none of them trigger a DENM.</string>
<string name="settings_usecase_alerts_desc">Per-use-case enable/disable for the CAM-based Use Case Alert panel on the V2X Monitor screen. All use cases are CAM-only - none of them trigger a DENM.</string>
<string name="settings_usecase_alert_levels_title">Alert level thresholds (read-only)</string>
<string name="settings_usecase_level_warning">Warning</string>
<string name="settings_usecase_level_awareness">Awareness</string>
@@ -264,21 +294,17 @@
<string name="dash_transport_bt">BT</string>
<!-- OBU stationType warning -->
<string name="dash_station_type_warning">⚠ OBU stationType ≠ 2 (cyclist) — VRU detection may be impaired at equipped intersections</string>
<string name="dash_station_type_warning">⚠ OBU stationType ≠ 2 (cyclist) - VRU detection may be impaired at equipped intersections</string>
<string name="settings_platform">Platform</string>
<string name="settings_platform_val">Android / Kotlin / Jetpack Compose</string>
<string name="settings_project">Project</string>
<string name="settings_project_val">MicrOBU — HAW Hamburg &amp; consider it GmbH</string>
<string name="settings_project_val">MicrOBU - HAW Hamburg &amp; consider it GmbH</string>
<!-- Phase A: Trip Recording (bottom nav) -->
<string name="nav_trips">Trips</string>
<!-- Phase A: Recording screen event counters -->
<string name="rec_events_detected">Detected Events</string>
<string name="rec_event_braking">Braking</string>
<string name="rec_event_turning">Turning</string>
<string name="rec_event_stopping">Stopping</string>
<string name="rec_stream_event_detection">Event Detection</string>
<string name="rec_open_session_log">CSV Session Log</string>
app/src/test/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/CamEncodeGoldenTest.kt
+78
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@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
package com.hawhamburg.micr0bu
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.asn1.CamUperCodec
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.Cam
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.StationType
import org.junit.Assert.assertEquals
import org.junit.Test
/**
* Golden-byte test for the CAM this app transmits.
*
* ## Why a byte-for-byte fixture
* This project has now shipped the same class of bug three times: a field encoded with the wrong
* number of bits, which both ends of this codebase then read back with the *same* wrong number.
* Phone and ESP32 agree perfectly with each other and with nothing else, so every internal test
* passes while the frames on air are malformed. It cost a hardware session each time
* (`CurvatureCalculationMode`, the GeoNetworking reserved bytes, and `yawRateConfidence`).
*
* A round-trip test through this codebase's own decoder cannot catch that - it shares the
* mistake. Only an independent implementation can. So the expected bytes below were produced by
* `asn1tools` compiled from the real ETSI modules in `asn1/`: it decoded this
* encoder's output and re-encoded it, and the result was byte-identical to what is asserted here.
* That is stronger than "it parses" - it means this encoder emits exactly what the reference
* encoder emits.
*
* If a field width is ever "tidied up", this test fails. Do not regenerate the expected value from
* this encoder's own output - regenerate it through asn1tools, or the test is worthless.
*/
class CamEncodeGoldenTest {
/**
* asn1tools-verified encoding of [referenceCam]. The trap this pins down: `YawRateConfidence`
* has nine enumerands (0..8), so it needs 4 bits and `unavailable` is 8 - not 3 bits and 7.
*/
private val expectedHex =
"0202000f423f3700402ab215af6e286477dffffffc23b7743e0027ffc0d0fe0118329337feebfff6000000"
private val referenceCam = Cam(
stationId = 999_999L,
stationType = StationType.CYCLIST,
latitude = 53.5544955,
longitude = 10.0225470,
speedMps = 4.17,
headingDeg = 63.9,
yawRateDps = null,
driveDirection = 0,
vehicleLengthM = 1.8,
vehicleWidthM = 0.7,
accelerationMps2 = 0.4,
timestamp = 1_787_100_000_000L,
isOwn = true,
)
@Test
fun `encodes a CAM exactly as the ETSI reference encoder does`() {
val encoded = CamUperCodec.encode(referenceCam)
.joinToString("") { "%02x".format(it) }
assertEquals(expectedHex, encoded)
}
@Test
fun `own decoder agrees with the encoder on every field it reads`() {
// Self-consistency is necessary but NOT sufficient - see the class KDoc. This guards the
// decoder against drifting away from the encoder, while the golden bytes above are what
// guards both of them against drifting away from the standard.
val round = CamUperCodec.decode(CamUperCodec.encode(referenceCam), referenceCam.timestamp)
requireNotNull(round)
assertEquals(referenceCam.stationId, round.stationId)
assertEquals(referenceCam.stationType, round.stationType)
assertEquals(referenceCam.latitude, round.latitude, 1e-7)
assertEquals(referenceCam.longitude, round.longitude, 1e-7)
assertEquals(referenceCam.speedMps, round.speedMps, 1e-9)
assertEquals(referenceCam.headingDeg, round.headingDeg, 1e-9)
assertEquals(referenceCam.vehicleLengthM!!, round.vehicleLengthM!!, 1e-9)
assertEquals(referenceCam.vehicleWidthM!!, round.vehicleWidthM!!, 1e-9)
assertEquals(referenceCam.accelerationMps2!!, round.accelerationMps2!!, 1e-9)
}
}
app/src/test/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/CamTxPvSerialTest.kt
+177
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@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
package com.hawhamburg.micr0bu
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.EspLinkStatus
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.GnPositionVector
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.asn1.ItsTime
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.Cam
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.StationType
import org.junit.Assert.assertEquals
import org.junit.Assert.assertFalse
import org.junit.Assert.assertTrue
import org.junit.Test
/**
* Pins the phone side of SERIAL_MSG_CAM_TX_PV: the 24-byte prefix the ESP32 turns into the
* GeoNetworking Source Position Vector, and the heartbeat capability bit that decides whether the
* phone may send that message at all.
*
* ## Where the expected bytes come from
* Not from this code. They were produced with Python's `struct.pack("<IiihH", ...)` from the
* layout documented at SERIAL_MSG_CAM_TX_PV in `serial_link.h`, independently of this encoder, so
* an agreement here is not an encoder agreeing with itself.
*
* That same `struct.pack` call is what the bench harness used on 2026-09-10 to drive an
* ESP32-C5 over its native USB port with this message. The CiT One OBU, an independent
* GeoNetworking stack, decoded every Source Position Vector field of the resulting
* transmissions (station type, PAI, latitude, longitude, speed, heading and timestamp) back to
* the values sent. These are bytes a third-party receiver has accepted on air, not only bytes
* this app agrees with.
*/
class CamTxPvSerialTest {
private fun String.hexToBytes(): ByteArray =
chunked(2).map { it.toInt(16).toByte() }.toByteArray()
private fun ByteArray.u32le(at: Int): Long =
(0 until 4).fold(0L) { acc, i -> acc or ((this[at + i].toLong() and 0xFF) shl (8 * i)) }
// ---- the wire layout -------------------------------------------------------------------
@Test
fun `encodes the prefix byte for byte`() {
val pv = GnPositionVector(
mac = "024d49435230".hexToBytes(),
stationType = 2,
pai = true,
tstMs = 0x12345678L,
latTenMicroDeg = 535_543_026,
lonTenMicroDeg = 100_226_476,
speedCms = 543,
headingDeciDeg = 1234,
)
// 024d49435230 | 02 | 01 | 78563412 | f2bceb1f | ac55f905 | 1f02 | d204
assertEquals("024d49435230020178563412f2bceb1fac55f9051f02d204", pv.toSerialPrefix().toHex())
}
@Test
fun `encodes negative, extreme and flag-clear values`() {
// Southern and western hemisphere, full reverse speed, heading at its maximum, PAI clear:
// the sign handling that a northern-hemisphere bench test never exercises.
val pv = GnPositionVector(
mac = "020000000001".hexToBytes(),
stationType = 2,
pai = false,
tstMs = 0xFFFF_FFFFL,
latTenMicroDeg = -335_543_026,
lonTenMicroDeg = -100_226_476,
speedCms = -16384,
headingDeciDeg = 3599,
)
assertEquals("0200000000010200ffffffff0e0500ec54aa06fa00c00f0e", pv.toSerialPrefix().toHex())
}
@Test
fun `the timestamp is reduced modulo 2^32 on the wire`() {
// TimestampIts passed 2^32 ms about 49.7 days after its 2004 epoch, so every real value
// today is wider than 32 bits and the reduction is the normal case, not an edge case.
val pv = vectorAt(tstMs = 716_121_572_779L)
assertEquals(3_157_001_643L, pv.toSerialPrefix().u32le(8))
}
// ---- building it from a CAM ------------------------------------------------------------
private val cam = Cam(
stationId = 1_234_567_890L,
stationType = StationType.CYCLIST,
latitude = 53.5543026,
longitude = 10.0226476,
speedMps = 5.43,
headingDeg = 123.4,
yawRateDps = null,
accelerationMps2 = null,
timestamp = 1_789_036_772_779L,
isOwn = true,
)
@Test
fun `fromCam takes the same values the CAM payload carries`() {
val pv = GnPositionVector.fromCam(cam, accuracyM = 5f, mac = "024d49435230".hexToBytes())
assertEquals(2, pv.stationType)
assertEquals(535_543_026, pv.latTenMicroDeg)
assertEquals(100_226_476, pv.lonTenMicroDeg)
assertEquals(543, pv.speedCms)
assertEquals(1234, pv.headingDeciDeg)
assertTrue(pv.pai)
// The GN TST and the CAM's generationDeltaTime must follow one time rule.
assertEquals(ItsTime.timestampIts(cam.timestamp), pv.tstMs)
assertEquals(716_121_572_779L, pv.tstMs)
}
@Test
fun `speed is clamped to the 15-bit field, never wrapped`() {
// A wrapped 15-bit speed flips its sign bit and reads as reversing at speed.
assertEquals(16383, GnPositionVector.fromCam(cam.copy(speedMps = 400.0), 5f, mac).speedCms)
assertEquals(-16384, GnPositionVector.fromCam(cam.copy(speedMps = -400.0), 5f, mac).speedCms)
}
@Test
fun `heading wraps into 0 to 3599`() {
assertEquals(0, GnPositionVector.fromCam(cam.copy(headingDeg = 360.0), 5f, mac).headingDeciDeg)
assertEquals(50, GnPositionVector.fromCam(cam.copy(headingDeg = 725.0), 5f, mac).headingDeciDeg)
assertEquals(3590, GnPositionVector.fromCam(cam.copy(headingDeg = -1.0), 5f, mac).headingDeciDeg)
}
@Test
fun `non-finite speed or heading does not throw`() {
val pv = GnPositionVector.fromCam(
cam.copy(speedMps = Double.NaN, headingDeg = Double.POSITIVE_INFINITY), 5f, mac,
)
assertEquals(0, pv.speedCms)
assertEquals(0, pv.headingDeciDeg)
}
@Test
fun `PAI follows the horizontal accuracy`() {
assertTrue(GnPositionVector.fromCam(cam, GnPositionVector.PAI_MAX_ACCURACY_M, mac).pai)
assertFalse(GnPositionVector.fromCam(cam, 25f, mac).pai)
// Android reports 0 when it has no accuracy estimate: unknown is not accurate.
assertFalse(GnPositionVector.fromCam(cam, 0f, mac).pai)
assertFalse(GnPositionVector.fromCam(cam, null, mac).pai)
}
@Test(expected = IllegalArgumentException::class)
fun `an address that is not six bytes is rejected`() {
GnPositionVector.fromCam(cam, 5f, ByteArray(5))
}
// ---- capability negotiation ------------------------------------------------------------
@Test
fun `firmware that predates the capability byte advertises nothing`() {
// Old firmware sends a 7-byte heartbeat. Reading that as "no CAM_TX_PV" is what keeps a
// new app on the legacy message, which that firmware still understands.
val status = EspLinkStatus.parse("00000000000000".hexToBytes())!!
assertEquals(0, status.capabilities)
assertFalse(status.supportsCamTxPv)
}
@Test
fun `firmware that advertises CAM_TX_PV is recognised`() {
val status = EspLinkStatus.parse("0000000000000001".hexToBytes())!!
assertTrue(status.supportsCamTxPv)
}
@Test
fun `a capability byte without the CAM_TX_PV bit does not enable it`() {
assertFalse(EspLinkStatus.parse("0000000000000002".hexToBytes())!!.supportsCamTxPv)
}
private val mac = "024d49435230".hexToBytes()
private fun vectorAt(tstMs: Long) = GnPositionVector(
mac = mac, stationType = 2, pai = false, tstMs = tstMs,
latTenMicroDeg = 0, lonTenMicroDeg = 0, speedCms = 0, headingDeciDeg = 0,
)
private fun ByteArray.toHex() = joinToString("") { "%02x".format(it) }
}
app/src/test/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/DenmAirReceiveTest.kt
+199
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@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
package com.hawhamburg.micr0bu
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.BtpPort
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.transport.V2xRxFrame
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.asn1.DenmUperCodec
import org.junit.Assert.assertEquals
import org.junit.Assert.assertFalse
import org.junit.Assert.assertNotNull
import org.junit.Assert.assertNull
import org.junit.Assert.assertTrue
import org.junit.Test
/**
* Regression tests for the ESP32-C5 over-the-air receive path: the `V2X_RX` serial payload layout
* and [DenmUperCodec].
*
* ## Where the fixtures come from
* These are **real frames**, not hand-built ones. They were taken from
* `its-g5-receiver-firmware/recordings/capture_20260817_171055.pcap` — a live capture of a CiT One
* OBU running the HLN-SV use case — by replaying the capture through a port of the firmware's
* `gn_unwrap_its()` and `serial_link_send_v2x_rx()`, so each fixture is byte-for-byte what the
* ESP32-C5 hands the phone over USB. The capture's 4-byte 802.11 FCS is trimmed, because the WiFi
* driver strips it before the promiscuous callback ever sees the frame.
*
* ## Why the expected values can be trusted
* Every asserted field was cross-checked against `asn1tools` decoding the same bytes with the real
* ETSI modules in `asn1/` (`denm_1_3_1.asn` + `cdd_1_3_1_1.asn`) — an
* independent implementation, not this codebase's own arithmetic. Across the full capture set that
* cross-check agreed on all 1885 decodable DENMs, on every field below including `detectionTime`.
*
* That matters because this project has twice shipped a UPER bug that was invisible until measured
* against real traffic (a one-bit `CurvatureCalculationMode` in CAM, and a 16-vs-17-bit
* `ValidityDuration` here that made a real frame read causeCode 47 instead of 94). Hand-built
* fixtures would have happily reproduced both. If a field width is ever "cleaned up", these tests
* are what should fail.
*/
class DenmAirReceiveTest {
// ---- real captured V2X_RX serial payloads ----------------------------------------------
/**
* An active DENM: GeoBroadcast, BTP port 2002, stationaryVehicle (94/0), 1000 m relevance
* radius. 406-byte UPER message — most of it the AlacarteContainer this decoder deliberately
* stops before reading.
*/
private val ACTIVE_V2X_RX =
"d207c10102bfeb1f7c53f905e8030201fa012bd0e77d0095e8000314c8317dba65320c5f6ff5590a8027143257c1dd1d" +
"d0001970898000781432f0030008b9f1be8a2fe943f9e6d390895181e3603696f542543bf04d0052201c02d9df83d7f6" +
"e159a88c4f016c402b2d548063f814fa02d66d24044bc0f2d018fb8cb0275e07d480681e550595eff16bfc5cc4e0040f" +
"80989ffe970e40d0bbffceffdcb1e20045dffe5802e184200bdefd313f9f4b3b008977e571fb0c58c00d1fc0ed301a7b" +
"5840121e04a380d518ce008beffa8c0044c2dc018f7f80a00775bf401dfbf39500fda4ea038de000d800a18970036f02" +
"7fc01fee0b006b781ee6007a7e2c026bbfc0eff7e2f6c012bdf86b7f4953a1018af014b4004cd890031f8088200fb67c" +
"0018fc00e4ffe4328100efe024e7ff41afe0090f00bc3fff8d1880207802e1ffcd666a00c7c082aff763c1e017bdffe1" +
"7fee59230167efd073fb70abe005ef7f31dffaf5a3c05b3bff6effecb16a0063e0036804dd8380077efe833ff62b7c00" +
"4d77ee4200a249c010dfc0f84fecfc3f808d3dfbb47fa795fe007cc0e1178000f9010000"
/**
* The termination of that same event, sent once when the hazard ended. Note it carries **no
* SituationContainer** — a terminating DENM says "event over", not what the event was — so
* `causeCode` is legitimately null here and code must not treat that as a decode failure.
*/
private val TERMINATION_V2X_RX =
"d207c101b6c6eb1f2158f905e8030201fa012bd00f7d0095e8000314c8329f58e5320ca7d792ac857db38a1951098498" +
"48000ccd7d40003c0a00000019"
/** A real CAM from the same capture, for checking the port routing rejects non-DENM cleanly. */
private val CAM_V2X_RX =
"d107c100000000000000000000000202fa012bd0f8e8605ab214f9ae2864b2415015000032c950487c1fa0010ebfe9ea" +
"7b33ff01fffa0028331400fbfab8fe6eb5a222ebe078d80da5bd50950efc134014880980b677e0f5fdb856542313c05b" +
"100acb552018fe053f80b59b490112f03cb4063ee33009d781f5201a079541657bfc5aff1731380103e02627ffa5c390" +
"342efff3bff72c7b001177ff9600b8610802f7bf4c4fe7d2ce20225df95c7ec316300347f03b4c069ed6100486900000" +
"0801"
/** Later than every fixture's detectionTime, so the decoder's sanity window accepts them. */
private val receivedAt = 1_787_100_000_000L
private fun String.hexToBytes(): ByteArray =
chunked(2).map { it.toInt(16).toByte() }.toByteArray()
// ---- the V2X_RX prefix contract --------------------------------------------------------
@Test
fun `active DENM frame parses its metadata prefix`() {
val frame = V2xRxFrame.parse(ACTIVE_V2X_RX.hexToBytes())
assertNotNull(frame)
frame!!
assertEquals(BtpPort.DENM, frame.btpPort)
assertEquals(-63, frame.rssiDbm) // int8: must survive as negative, not 193
// GeoBroadcast destination area, converted from GeoNetworking's big-endian 1/10 microdegree
// to the little-endian prefix and back out again.
val area = frame.geoArea
assertNotNull(area)
assertEquals(53.5543554, area!!.latitude, 1e-7)
assertEquals(10.0225916, area.longitude, 1e-7)
assertEquals(1000, area.radiusMeters)
assertEquals(406, frame.uper.size)
}
@Test
fun `frame no larger than the firmware's serial payload cap`() {
// SERIAL_LINK_MAX_PAYLOAD is 512 on both sides; the firmware counts an oversize drop rather
// than truncating. A real GeoBroadcast DENM is the largest thing this path carries today.
assertTrue(
"real DENM V2X_RX payload must fit SERIAL_LINK_MAX_PAYLOAD",
ACTIVE_V2X_RX.hexToBytes().size <= 512,
)
}
@Test
fun `parse rejects a payload with no room for a message`() {
assertNull(V2xRxFrame.parse(ByteArray(V2xRxFrame.PREFIX_SIZE)))
assertNull(V2xRxFrame.parse(ByteArray(3)))
}
// ---- DENM decode ----------------------------------------------------------------------
@Test
fun `decodes a real stationaryVehicle DENM`() {
val frame = V2xRxFrame.parse(ACTIVE_V2X_RX.hexToBytes())!!
val denm = DenmUperCodec.decode(
bytes = frame.uper,
receivedAtEpochMs = receivedAt,
rssiDbm = frame.rssiDbm,
relevanceRadiusM = frame.geoArea?.radiusMeters,
)
assertNotNull("real captured DENM must decode", denm)
denm!!
// actionID - the ETSI event identity, cross-checked against asn1tools.
assertEquals(4_194_380_752L, denm.stationId)
assertEquals(6, denm.sequenceNumber)
assertEquals(53.5543554, denm.latitude, 1e-7)
assertEquals(10.0225916, denm.longitude, 1e-7)
assertEquals(94, denm.causeCode) // stationaryVehicle
assertEquals(0, denm.subCauseCode)
assertEquals(5, denm.stationType) // passengerCar
assertFalse(denm.isTermination)
// detectionTime is a 42-bit TimestampIts counted from the 2004 ITS epoch. Getting either
// the width or the epoch wrong lands the hazard decades away, so the absolute value is
// asserted rather than a range.
assertEquals(1_786_979_460_563L, denm.detectionTimeMs)
// Carried through from the GeoNetworking header and the serial prefix, not the payload.
assertEquals(1000, denm.relevanceRadiusM)
assertEquals(-63, denm.rssiDbm)
}
@Test
fun `decodes a termination DENM and keeps the same event identity`() {
val active = V2xRxFrame.parse(ACTIVE_V2X_RX.hexToBytes())!!
val term = V2xRxFrame.parse(TERMINATION_V2X_RX.hexToBytes())!!
val activeDenm = DenmUperCodec.decode(active.uper, receivedAt)!!
val termDenm = DenmUperCodec.decode(term.uper, receivedAt)!!
assertTrue(termDenm.isTermination)
assertNull("a terminating DENM carries no SituationContainer", termDenm.causeCode)
assertEquals(4_194_380_752L, termDenm.stationId)
assertEquals(6, termDenm.sequenceNumber)
assertEquals(1_786_980_053_703L, termDenm.detectionTimeMs)
// The whole point of keying dedup on actionID: the termination must land on the same key as
// the event it ends, so filtering terminations actually removes that hazard from the map
// instead of leaving the active pin behind next to a hidden one.
assertEquals(activeDenm.dedupKey, termDenm.dedupKey)
}
@Test
fun `does not decode a CAM as a DENM`() {
val cam = V2xRxFrame.parse(CAM_V2X_RX.hexToBytes())!!
assertEquals(BtpPort.CAM, cam.btpPort)
assertNull("CAM must not decode as DENM - messageID guards this", DenmUperCodec.decode(cam.uper, receivedAt))
}
@Test
fun `returns null for a truncated DENM rather than a misplaced hazard`() {
val frame = V2xRxFrame.parse(ACTIVE_V2X_RX.hexToBytes())!!
// Cut inside the ManagementContainer: the BitReader runs out mid-field.
assertNull(DenmUperCodec.decode(frame.uper.copyOfRange(0, 12), receivedAt))
}
@Test
fun `future detection time beyond the sanity window is dropped, not surfaced`() {
val frame = V2xRxFrame.parse(ACTIVE_V2X_RX.hexToBytes())!!
// A phone whose clock is more than a day behind the sender: the event still decodes, but
// the implausible timestamp is reported as unknown instead of being shown.
val denm = DenmUperCodec.decode(frame.uper, receivedAtEpochMs = 1_700_000_000_000L)
assertNotNull(denm)
assertEquals(94, denm!!.causeCode)
assertNull(denm.detectionTimeMs)
}
}
app/src/test/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/DenmParserMqttTest.kt
+119
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@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
package com.hawhamburg.micr0bu
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.denm.DenmParser
import org.junit.Assert.assertEquals
import org.junit.Assert.assertFalse
import org.junit.Assert.assertNotNull
import org.junit.Assert.assertNull
import org.junit.Assert.assertTrue
import org.junit.Test
/**
* Tests [DenmParser] against the CiT One Use Case API's documented DENM schema.
*
* The payload below is the worked example from `CI-CiT-MQTT_API_Documentation-v6-20250221.pdf`,
* listing 2.6 (section 2.2.4, "Processed DENM"), reproduced field-for-field. That document is the
* contract for this topic, so it is the right thing to pin against - the previous parser was
* written before the schema was checked and silently dropped every real DENM for two independent
* reasons: the station id is `originatingStationId` (not `stationId`), and `eventPosition` is
* itself a GeoJSON Point rather than an object containing one.
*/
class DenmParserMqttTest {
/** Listing 2.6 from the API documentation, with the doc's inline comments removed. */
private val documentedDenm = """
{
"type": "v2x-denm",
"originatingStationId": 1345267,
"sequenceNumber": 1,
"detectionTime": "2021-05-11T12:01:02+00:00",
"referenceTime": "2021-05-11T12:01:02+00:00",
"eventPosition": { "type": "Point", "coordinates": [9.9800230, 53.5560783, 15] },
"relevanceTrafficDirection": "upstreamTraffic",
"stationType": "roadSideUnit",
"causeCode": "trafficCondition",
"subCauseCode": 0
}
""".trimIndent()
@Test
fun `parses the documented DENM payload`() {
val denm = DenmParser.parse(documentedDenm, timestamp = 1_787_000_000_000L)
assertNotNull("the API's own documented payload must parse", denm)
denm!!
assertEquals(1_345_267L, denm.stationId)
assertEquals(1, denm.sequenceNumber)
// GeoJSON is [longitude, latitude, altitude] - getting this order wrong puts a Hamburg
// hazard in Somalia, and both values are plausible-looking numbers either way.
assertEquals(53.5560783, denm.latitude, 1e-7)
assertEquals(9.9800230, denm.longitude, 1e-7)
assertEquals(1, denm.causeCode) // trafficCondition
assertEquals(0, denm.subCauseCode)
assertEquals(15, denm.stationType) // roadSideUnit is 15, not 12 - the enum has a gap
assertFalse(denm.isTermination)
// 2021-05-11T12:01:02Z
assertEquals(1_620_734_462_000L, denm.detectionTimeMs)
}
@Test
fun `termination is signalled by the key being present`() {
val terminated = documentedDenm.replace(
"\"sequenceNumber\": 1,",
"\"sequenceNumber\": 1,\n \"termination\": true,",
)
val denm = DenmParser.parse(terminated)
assertNotNull(denm)
assertTrue(denm!!.isTermination)
}
@Test
fun `a termination shares the dedup key of the event it ends`() {
val active = DenmParser.parse(documentedDenm)!!
val terminated = DenmParser.parse(
documentedDenm.replace(
"\"sequenceNumber\": 1,",
"\"sequenceNumber\": 1,\n \"termination\": true,",
)
)!!
// Without this, a cancelled hazard would be filtered out while the active pin it was
// meant to cancel stayed on the map forever.
assertEquals(active.dedupKey, terminated.dedupKey)
}
@Test
fun `cause code names follow the ETSI spelling the API uses`() {
// ETSI's CauseCodeType really does spell it with three n's, and the API follows.
val aqua = documentedDenm.replace("\"trafficCondition\"", "\"aquaplannning\"")
assertEquals(7, DenmParser.parse(aqua)!!.causeCode)
val stationary = documentedDenm.replace("\"trafficCondition\"", "\"stationaryVehicle\"")
assertEquals(94, DenmParser.parse(stationary)!!.causeCode)
}
@Test
fun `a payload with no usable position is rejected rather than placed at null island`() {
val noPosition = documentedDenm.replace(
"\"eventPosition\": { \"type\": \"Point\", \"coordinates\": [9.9800230, 53.5560783, 15] },",
"",
)
assertNull(DenmParser.parse(noPosition))
}
@Test
fun `integer causeCode and stationId spellings still parse`() {
// The air path and any future firmware-side JSON produce integers; those must keep working.
val numeric = """
{"stationId": 42, "causeCode": 94, "subCauseCode": 1,
"eventPosition": {"type": "Point", "coordinates": [10.0, 53.5]}}
""".trimIndent()
val denm = DenmParser.parse(numeric)
assertNotNull(denm)
assertEquals(42L, denm!!.stationId)
assertEquals(94, denm.causeCode)
assertEquals(1, denm.subCauseCode)
}
}
app/src/test/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/EventDetectorTest.kt
+59 -46
View File
@@ -21,34 +21,34 @@ import kotlin.math.sqrt
*
* No Android emulator required — all production classes have zero Android imports.
*
* The test [config] uses a smaller window and fewer sustained frames than the
* production defaults so tests run in milliseconds without generating thousands
* of synthetic samples.
* The test [config] shortens only the window and the sustained-frame counts, so
* tests run in milliseconds instead of generating thousands of synthetic
* samples. Every *signal* threshold is inherited from [DetectionConfig]'s
* defaults, which are the values the app actually runs — the two cannot drift
* apart, which they previously did: the service overrode nine of the twelve
* parameters and these tests validated the un-overridden ones.
*
* Accel-std-dev notes
* -------------------
* A production threshold of 1.2 m/s² requires genuine variability in the window.
* In the "hard brake" tests we alternate between high and low accel values
* (e.g. 3.5 / 0.5), which yields std dev ≈ 1.5 with a 10-sample window.
* The braking accel-std-dev threshold of 1.8 m/s² requires genuine variability
* in the window. In the "hard brake" tests we alternate between high and low
* accel values (4.5 / 0.5), which yields a population std dev of |hi − lo| / 2
* = 2.0 in a full window — above the threshold with margin.
*/
@OptIn(ExperimentalCoroutinesApi::class)
class EventDetectorTest {
/** Tighter config so fewer frames are needed to trigger each event. */
/**
* Shortens the window and the sustained-frame counts so fewer synthetic frames are
* needed per test. Every signal threshold is deliberately left at its default, so
* these tests exercise the thresholds the app ships with. Do not restate a signal
* threshold here — that is exactly how the two configurations drifted apart before.
*/
private val config = DetectionConfig(
windowSize = 10,
brakingSustainedFrames = 5,
turningSustainedFrames = 8,
stoppingFrames = 20,
// Keep production thresholds for all signal values:
brakingSpeedDropThreshold = 0.5,
brakingAccelStdDevThreshold = 1.2,
brakingHighConfidenceRate = 1.5,
turningGyroMeanThreshold = 0.4,
turningBearingChangeThreshold = 10.0,
turningMinSpeedThreshold = 2.0,
stoppingSpeedThreshold = 0.5,
stoppingAccelStdDevThreshold = 0.15,
)
private lateinit var detector: EventDetector
@@ -71,12 +71,12 @@ class EventDetectorTest {
/**
* Produces [n] frames with alternating accelMagnitude values of [hi] and [lo],
* giving a population std dev of |hi - lo| / 2, which exceeds the production
* threshold of 1.2 m/s² when hi=3.5 and lo=0.5 (std dev = 1.5).
* giving a population std dev of |hi - lo| / 2, which exceeds the shipping
* threshold of 1.8 m/s² when hi=4.5 and lo=0.5 (std dev = 2.0).
*/
private fun alternatingAccelFrames(
n: Int,
hi: Double = 3.5,
hi: Double = 4.5,
lo: Double = 0.5,
speedMps: Double = 10.0,
bearingChangeDps: Double = 0.0,
@@ -116,12 +116,17 @@ class EventDetectorTest {
// ─── Hard brake ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@Test fun `hard brake triggers BRAKING event`() = runCollecting { events ->
// Phase 1: fill window at 10 m/s with constant accel (no std dev → no braking)
repeat(config.windowSize) { i ->
detector.processSample(1.0, 0.05, 10.0, 0.0, 53.5, 10.0, i * 20L)
}
// Phase 2: GPS drops to 4 m/s (drop = 6 m/s > 0.5 threshold).
// Alternate hi/lo accel to exceed the std-dev threshold.
// Phase 1: cruising at 10 m/s with the accelerometer variability a moving bike actually
// has. This matters: [EventDetector] requires the speed drop and the accel std dev to be
// true on the SAME frame, and the std dev is a rolling window. Filling phase 1 with a
// constant accel drives that window to zero, so on the one frame where the speed drop
// exists the std dev is still ~0.75 and braking can never start - by the time the window
// has recovered, prevSpeedMps has caught up and the drop is gone.
//
// Constant accel right up to the instant of a brake is also not physical. The IMU is
// sampled continuously while GPS speed lags, so the shaking precedes the reported drop.
alternatingAccelFrames(n = config.windowSize, speedMps = 10.0, timeOffset = 0)
// Phase 2: GPS reports 4 m/s (drop = 6 m/s > 0.5 threshold).
alternatingAccelFrames(
n = config.brakingSustainedFrames + 5,
speedMps = 4.0,
@@ -132,15 +137,14 @@ class EventDetectorTest {
}
@Test fun `hard brake with large speed drop has HIGH confidence`() = runCollecting { events ->
repeat(config.windowSize) { i ->
detector.processSample(1.0, 0.05, 10.0, 0.0, 53.5, 10.0, i * 20L)
}
// Drop of 8 m/s > brakingHighConfidenceRate (1.5)
// Variability established before the drop - see the note in the test above.
alternatingAccelFrames(n = config.windowSize, speedMps = 10.0, timeOffset = 0)
// Drop of 8 m/s > brakingHighConfidencePeakDrop (1.5)
alternatingAccelFrames(
n = config.brakingSustainedFrames + 5,
hi = 3.5,
hi = 4.5,
lo = 0.5,
speedMps = 2.0, // drop from 10 → 8 m/s
speedMps = 2.0, // drop from 10 → 2 m/s
timeOffset = config.windowSize,
)
val braking = events.filter { it.type == EventType.BRAKING }
@@ -153,15 +157,18 @@ class EventDetectorTest {
}
@Test fun `moderate speed drop has MEDIUM confidence`() = runCollecting { events ->
repeat(config.windowSize) { i ->
detector.processSample(1.0, 0.05, 3.0, 0.0, 53.5, 10.0, i * 20L)
}
// Drop of 0.8 m/s — above speed-drop threshold (0.5) but below high-conf rate (1.5)
// Variability established before the drop - see `hard brake triggers BRAKING event`.
alternatingAccelFrames(n = config.windowSize, speedMps = 3.0, timeOffset = 0)
// Drop of 1.2 m/s — above the speed-drop threshold (1.0) but below the
// high-confidence peak drop (1.5), so this must land as MEDIUM. The window
// between those two values is narrow at the shipping thresholds, which is
// itself worth knowing: MEDIUM braking is only emitted for drops in
// (1.0, 1.5] m/s.
alternatingAccelFrames(
n = config.brakingSustainedFrames + 5,
hi = 3.5,
hi = 4.5,
lo = 0.5,
speedMps = 2.2, // drop = 0.8 m/s
speedMps = 1.8, // drop = 1.2 m/s
timeOffset = config.windowSize,
)
val braking = events.filter { it.type == EventType.BRAKING }
@@ -176,9 +183,9 @@ class EventDetectorTest {
repeat(total) { i ->
detector.processSample(
accelMagnitude = 0.3,
gyroMagnitude = 0.8, // mean → well above 0.4 threshold
gyroMagnitude = 0.8, // mean → above the 0.6 threshold
speedMps = 4.0, // above 2 m/s → bearing also checked
bearingChangeDegPerSec = 15.0, // above 10 °/s → both signals agree
bearingChangeDegPerSec = 20.0, // above 15 °/s → both signals agree
latitude = 53.5,
longitude = 10.0,
timestamp = i * 20L,
@@ -190,7 +197,7 @@ class EventDetectorTest {
@Test fun `turning with both signals agreeing gets HIGH confidence`() = runCollecting { events ->
val total = config.windowSize + config.turningSustainedFrames + 4
repeat(total) { i ->
detector.processSample(0.3, 0.8, 4.0, 15.0, 53.5, 10.0, i * 20L)
detector.processSample(0.3, 0.8, 4.0, 20.0, 53.5, 10.0, i * 20L)
}
val turning = events.filter { it.type == EventType.TURNING }
assertTrue(turning.isNotEmpty())
@@ -202,9 +209,9 @@ class EventDetectorTest {
repeat(total) { i ->
detector.processSample(
accelMagnitude = 0.2,
gyroMagnitude = 0.6, // above gyro threshold
gyroMagnitude = 0.9, // above the 0.6 gyro threshold
speedMps = 1.0, // below 2 m/s → bearing not enforced
bearingChangeDegPerSec = 3.0, // below bearing threshold
bearingChangeDegPerSec = 3.0, // below the 15 °/s bearing threshold
latitude = 53.5,
longitude = 10.0,
timestamp = i * 20L,
@@ -250,7 +257,7 @@ class EventDetectorTest {
// Speed stays at zero; occasional accel/gyro spikes from bag jostle
repeat(50) { i ->
val accel = if (i % 5 == 0) 1.8 else 0.3 // jitter but mean is below std-dev threshold
val gyro = if (i % 7 == 0) 0.35 else 0.05 // occasional spike but mean stays < 0.4
val gyro = if (i % 7 == 0) 0.35 else 0.05 // occasional spike but mean stays < 0.6
detector.processSample(
accelMagnitude = accel,
gyroMagnitude = gyro,
@@ -262,7 +269,7 @@ class EventDetectorTest {
)
}
// speed = 0 → no speed drop possible → no BRAKING
// gyro mean stays below 0.4 (only 1/7 frames spike to 0.35) → no TURNING
// gyro mean stays below 0.6 (only 1/7 frames spike to 0.35) → no TURNING
val unwanted = events.filter { it.type == EventType.BRAKING || it.type == EventType.TURNING }
assertTrue("Bag movement must not trigger BRAKING or TURNING, got: $events", unwanted.isEmpty())
}
@@ -294,8 +301,14 @@ class EventDetectorTest {
repeat(5) {
detector.processSample(0.5, 0.1, 5.0, 2.0, 53.5, 10.0, t++ * 20L)
}
// Second stop episode
repeat(stopFrames) {
// Second stop episode. Deliberately longer than the first: stopping also requires the
// accel std dev to be BELOW a threshold, and the rolling window still holds the five
// moving samples above. At the shipping threshold of 0.10 m/s² even a single 0.5 sample
// left in a 10-sample window gives a std dev of ~0.14, so ALL five have to be evicted
// before the counter can start - that is a full windowSize of stationary frames. Only
// then do the 21 qualifying frames the event needs begin to accumulate. The first
// episode needs no such allowance because the window begins empty.
repeat(config.stoppingFrames + 20) {
detector.processSample(0.02, 0.01, 0.1, 0.0, 53.5, 10.0, t++ * 20L)
}
app/src/test/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/ItsTimeTest.kt
+41
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
package com.hawhamburg.micr0bu
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.asn1.ItsTime
import org.junit.Assert.assertEquals
import org.junit.Test
/**
* Pins the arithmetic that moves a transmit timestamp from the phone's wall clock onto GNSS time.
*
* The cases come from the 2026-09-10 bench session. The sending phone's clock was 1456 s fast
* because it had no automatic time source, and every CAM it sent was stamped 24 minutes in the
* future. After a manual correction it was 6 s slow. Both have to come out on GNSS time.
*/
class ItsTimeTest {
private val gnssNow = 1_789_038_922_000L
@Test
fun `without a GNSS reading the wall-clock time is used unchanged`() {
assertEquals(1_000L, ItsTime.onGnssTime(systemMs = 1_000L, gnssNowMs = null, systemNowMs = 5_000L))
}
@Test
fun `a phone clock running fast is pulled back onto GNSS time`() {
val systemNow = gnssNow + 1_456_000L
// A fix the wall clock stamped 0.8 s ago. It must still be 0.8 s old afterwards.
val fix = systemNow - 800L
assertEquals(gnssNow - 800L, ItsTime.onGnssTime(fix, gnssNow, systemNow))
}
@Test
fun `a phone clock running slow is pushed forward onto GNSS time`() {
val systemNow = gnssNow - 6_000L
assertEquals(gnssNow - 250L, ItsTime.onGnssTime(systemNow - 250L, gnssNow, systemNow))
}
@Test
fun `an accurate phone clock is left where it is`() {
assertEquals(gnssNow - 40L, ItsTime.onGnssTime(gnssNow - 40L, gnssNow, gnssNow))
}
}
app/src/test/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/OwnStationIdsTest.kt
+95
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
package com.hawhamburg.micr0bu
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.OwnStationIds
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.OwnStationIds.BENCH_PING
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.OwnStationIds.BENCH_PING_GRACE_MS
import org.junit.Assert.assertEquals
import org.junit.Assert.assertFalse
import org.junit.Assert.assertTrue
import org.junit.Test
/**
* Pins the rule that decides whether a received CAM is one this phone sent.
*
* ## The bugs this exists to prevent
* Getting it wrong fails in two opposite directions, and each has happened:
*
* - **Too narrow.** An own frame that is not recognised comes back as a remote road user sitting
* exactly on the ego position, and is fed to the detection engine as a collision partner for
* itself. That happened with the bench pinger's separate ID, and pseudonym rotation creates the
* same risk for an ID that has just been retired.
* - **Too wide.** On 2026-09-10 the bench ID counted as ours on every phone, so a phone watching
* through the CiT One silently discarded another phone's pings as its own, although it had sent
* none. Nothing appeared on its V2X screen while the broker was full of them.
*/
class OwnStationIdsTest {
private val current = 1_691_338_363L
private val retired = 2_222_222_222L
private val ours = setOf(current, retired)
@Test
fun `recognises the current transmit id`() {
assertTrue(OwnStationIds.isOwn(current, ours, benchPingIsOurs = false))
}
@Test
fun `recognises a recently retired id, so a frame sent just before a rotation is still ours`() {
assertTrue(OwnStationIds.isOwn(retired, ours, benchPingIsOurs = false))
}
@Test
fun `another phone's bench ping is shown, not swallowed as our own`() {
// The 2026-09-10 regression: this phone is not pinging, so 999999 is someone else.
assertFalse(OwnStationIds.isOwn(BENCH_PING, ours, benchPingIsOurs = false))
assertFalse(OwnStationIds.isOwn(BENCH_PING, emptySet(), benchPingIsOurs = false))
}
@Test
fun `our own bench ping is recognised while we are pinging, even before any transmit id loads`() {
assertTrue(OwnStationIds.isOwn(BENCH_PING, emptySet(), benchPingIsOurs = true))
}
@Test
fun `treats a genuine remote station as remote`() {
assertFalse(OwnStationIds.isOwn(2_741_041_966L, ours, benchPingIsOurs = true))
assertFalse(OwnStationIds.isOwn(2_741_041_966L, emptySet(), benchPingIsOurs = false))
}
@Test
fun `station id zero is never ours`() {
// 0 is the "not resolved yet" placeholder for the ego identity. Matching on it would
// swallow real traffic from any station that reported 0.
assertFalse(OwnStationIds.isOwn(0L, setOf(0L), benchPingIsOurs = true))
}
// ---- when the bench id is ours ---------------------------------------------------------
@Test
fun `the bench id is ours while the pinger runs`() {
assertTrue(OwnStationIds.benchPingIsOurs(pingerActive = true, pingerStoppedAtMs = null, nowMs = 0L))
}
@Test
fun `the bench id is not ours on a phone that never pinged`() {
assertFalse(OwnStationIds.benchPingIsOurs(pingerActive = false, pingerStoppedAtMs = null, nowMs = 50_000L))
}
@Test
fun `the bench id stays ours for the grace window after Stop, and not a moment longer`() {
val stop = 100_000L
assertTrue(OwnStationIds.benchPingIsOurs(false, stop, stop + BENCH_PING_GRACE_MS))
assertFalse(OwnStationIds.benchPingIsOurs(false, stop, stop + BENCH_PING_GRACE_MS + 1))
}
@Test
fun `a clock reading before the stop time does not claim the bench id`() {
assertFalse(OwnStationIds.benchPingIsOurs(false, pingerStoppedAtMs = 100_000L, nowMs = 99_000L))
}
@Test
fun `the bench MAC is a locally administered unicast address`() {
// Bit 1 set, bit 0 clear. A source address must never be a group address.
assertEquals(0x02, OwnStationIds.BENCH_PING_MAC[0].toInt() and 0x03)
}
}
app/src/test/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/PseudonymTest.kt
+96
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
package com.hawhamburg.micr0bu
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.OwnStationIds
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.Pseudonym
import org.junit.Assert.assertEquals
import org.junit.Assert.assertFalse
import org.junit.Assert.assertNotEquals
import org.junit.Assert.assertTrue
import org.junit.Test
import kotlin.random.Random
/**
* Pins what a transmit pseudonym is allowed to look like, and when it rotates.
*
* The address rules matter on air, not just in the app: the ESP32 writes this MAC straight into
* the 802.11 source address. A group (multicast) source address is invalid, and a random address
* without the locally-administered bit claims to belong to a real hardware vendor.
*/
class PseudonymTest {
@Test
fun `rotates every ten minutes`() {
assertEquals(10 * 60_000L, Pseudonym.ROTATION_INTERVAL_MS)
}
@Test
fun `expires exactly at the rotation interval, not a millisecond before`() {
val p = Pseudonym(stationId = 42L, mac = mac(0x02), createdAtMs = 1_000L)
assertFalse(p.isExpired(1_000L + Pseudonym.ROTATION_INTERVAL_MS - 1))
assertTrue(p.isExpired(1_000L + Pseudonym.ROTATION_INTERVAL_MS))
}
@Test
fun `a clock that moved back past the creation time forces a rotation`() {
// Otherwise a creation time now lying in the future would pin one identity until the
// clock caught up, which after a large correction could be hours.
val p = Pseudonym(stationId = 42L, mac = mac(0x02), createdAtMs = 1_000L)
assertTrue(p.isExpired(999L))
}
@Test
fun `generated addresses are locally administered unicast, whatever the random bytes`() {
repeat(500) { seed ->
val first = Pseudonym.generate(0L, Random(seed)).mac[0].toInt()
assertEquals("seed $seed: bit 1 set, bit 0 clear", 0x02, first and 0x03)
}
}
@Test
fun `generated station ids stay in range`() {
repeat(500) { seed ->
val id = Pseudonym.generate(0L, Random(seed)).stationId
assertTrue("seed $seed: $id", id in 1L until 0xFFFF_FFFEL)
}
}
@Test
fun `never generates the bench pinger's identity`() {
// Scripted so the exclusion loops actually run: the first draw of each is the bench
// value, which must be rejected in favour of the second.
val random = ScriptedRandom(
longs = ArrayDeque(listOf(OwnStationIds.BENCH_PING, 42L)),
bytes = ArrayDeque(listOf(OwnStationIds.BENCH_PING_MAC, byteArrayOf(0x13, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5))),
)
val p = Pseudonym.generate(0L, random)
assertEquals(42L, p.stationId)
assertEquals("0x13 with the group bit cleared and the local bit set", 0x12, p.mac[0].toInt() and 0xFF)
}
@Test
fun `a rotation replaces the station id and the address together`() {
val a = Pseudonym.generate(0L, Random(1))
val b = Pseudonym.generate(Pseudonym.ROTATION_INTERVAL_MS, Random(2))
assertNotEquals(a.stationId, b.stationId)
assertFalse(a.mac.contentEquals(b.mac))
}
@Test
fun `equality compares the address bytes, not the array instance`() {
assertEquals(
Pseudonym(7L, mac(0x02), 5L),
Pseudonym(7L, mac(0x02), 5L),
)
}
private fun mac(first: Int) = byteArrayOf(first.toByte(), 0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55)
private class ScriptedRandom(
private val longs: ArrayDeque<Long>,
private val bytes: ArrayDeque<ByteArray>,
) : Random() {
override fun nextBits(bitCount: Int): Int = error("not used by Pseudonym.generate")
override fun nextLong(from: Long, until: Long): Long = longs.removeFirst()
override fun nextBytes(size: Int): ByteArray = bytes.removeFirst().copyOf()
}
}
app/src/test/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/RecvV2xMessageTest.kt
+151
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
package com.hawhamburg.micr0bu
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.data.mqtt.RecvV2xMessage
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.asn1.CamUperCodec
import org.junit.Assert.assertEquals
import org.junit.Assert.assertNotNull
import org.junit.Assert.assertNull
import org.junit.Assert.assertTrue
import org.junit.Test
/**
* Pins [RecvV2xMessage] to the protobuf wire format of consider it's `RecvV2XMessage`
* (`v2x_interface.proto`, V2X RX protocol v2.4.2), the envelope the CiT One publishes on its raw
* `v2x/rx` topics.
*
* ## Where the fixtures come from
* The envelope bytes are written out here by hand from the protobuf encoding rules and the field
* numbers in that `.proto`, with the derivation in the comments, so a reviewer can check them
* without running anything. They are deliberately **not** produced by an encoder in this
* repository: a fixture generated by our own code would agree with our own reader no matter how
* wrong both were, which is exactly the failure mode the ASN.1 work in this project ran into
* three times.
*
* The CAM payload inside is the golden UPER frame from [CamEncodeGoldenTest], itself verified
* against `asn1tools` and the real ETSI modules in `asn1/`.
*
* ## Why this matters
* Field numbers are wire-format constants with no self-describing names on the wire. Reading
* field 2 where the schema says field 3 does not fail loudly, it silently yields a plausible
* looking byte string that decodes to nothing. These tests are what should fail if the constants
* in [RecvV2xMessage] are ever "tidied".
*/
class RecvV2xMessageTest {
/**
* The golden CAM UPER, 43 bytes, from [CamEncodeGoldenTest]. Its ItsPduHeader reads
* protocolVersion 2, messageID 2 (CAM), stationID 0x000f423f = 999999.
*/
private val goldenCam =
"0202000f423f3700402ab215af6e286477dffffffc23b7743e0027ffc0d0fe0118329337feebfff6000000"
/**
* A complete `RecvV2XMessage` carrying [goldenCam], byte by byte:
*
* ```
* 0a 05 field 1 (btpHeader), length-delimited, 5 bytes
* 08 02 field 1 (type) varint = 2, CAM
* 10 d1 0f field 2 (destinationPort) varint = 2001
* 12 07 field 2 (gnHeader), length-delimited, 7 bytes
* 42 05 field 8 (dest), length-delimited, 5 bytes
* 0a 03 field 1 (area), length-delimited, 3 bytes
* 18 f4 03 field 3 (distA) varint = 500 metres
* 1a 2b field 3 (payload), length-delimited, 0x2b = 43 bytes
* ```
*/
private val camEnvelope = "0a05080210d10f120742050a0318f4031a2b" + goldenCam
private fun String.hexToBytes(): ByteArray =
chunked(2).map { it.toInt(16).toByte() }.toByteArray()
// ---- the happy path --------------------------------------------------------------------
@Test
fun `parses btp header, geo radius and payload from a full envelope`() {
val msg = RecvV2xMessage.parse(camEnvelope.hexToBytes())
assertNotNull("envelope should parse", msg)
msg!!
assertEquals("btpHeader.type: CAM", 2, msg.pduType)
assertEquals("btpHeader.destinationPort", 2001, msg.destinationPort)
assertEquals("gnHeader.dest.area.distA, metres", 500, msg.destAreaRadiusM)
assertTrue(
"payload must be the CAM UPER byte for byte",
msg.payload.contentEquals(goldenCam.hexToBytes()),
)
}
@Test
fun `extracted payload is decodable UPER, not a mangled copy`() {
val msg = RecvV2xMessage.parse(camEnvelope.hexToBytes())!!
// The whole point of carrying bytes rather than a String through the MQTT layer: a UTF-8
// round trip would replace most of these bytes and this decode would fail.
val cam = CamUperCodec.decode(msg.payload, receivedAtEpochMs = 1_787_100_000_000L)
assertNotNull("payload should decode as a CAM", cam)
assertEquals("stationID from the ItsPduHeader", 999_999L, cam!!.stationId)
}
@Test
fun `reads a DENM envelope's relevance radius`() {
// Same shape, DENM values: type 1, port 2002, distA 1000 m, a 2-byte stand-in payload.
// 0a 05 08 01 10 d2 0f | 12 07 42 05 0a 03 18 e8 07 | 1a 02 02 01
val msg = RecvV2xMessage.parse("0a05080110d20f120742050a0318e8071a020201".hexToBytes())
assertNotNull(msg)
assertEquals(1, msg!!.pduType)
assertEquals(2002, msg.destinationPort)
assertEquals(1000, msg.destAreaRadiusM)
}
// ---- forward compatibility -------------------------------------------------------------
@Test
fun `skips unknown fields and does not depend on field order`() {
// payload first, then an unknown varint (field 7) and an unknown fixed32 (field 6) that
// this schema revision does not define, then the btpHeader. Protobuf permits all three,
// and a reader that assumed order or choked on unknowns would break the first time
// consider it added a field.
val bytes = ("1a2b" + goldenCam + "38b96035deadbeef0a05080210d10f").hexToBytes()
val msg = RecvV2xMessage.parse(bytes)
assertNotNull(msg)
assertEquals(2, msg!!.pduType)
assertEquals(2001, msg.destinationPort)
assertTrue(msg.payload.contentEquals(goldenCam.hexToBytes()))
}
@Test
fun `accepts an envelope carrying nothing but a payload`() {
val msg = RecvV2xMessage.parse(("1a2b" + goldenCam).hexToBytes())
assertNotNull(msg)
assertNull("no btpHeader was sent", msg!!.pduType)
assertNull("no gnHeader was sent", msg.destAreaRadiusM)
assertTrue(msg.payload.contentEquals(goldenCam.hexToBytes()))
}
// ---- malformed input -------------------------------------------------------------------
// These arrive off a network topic. A reader that throws takes the MQTT callback thread with
// it, so every one of these must return null instead.
@Test
fun `returns null for a truncated envelope`() {
val full = camEnvelope.hexToBytes()
assertNull(RecvV2xMessage.parse(full.copyOfRange(0, full.size / 2)))
}
@Test
fun `returns null when the payload field is present but empty`() {
assertNull(RecvV2xMessage.parse("1a00".hexToBytes()))
}
@Test
fun `returns null when there is no payload field at all`() {
assertNull(RecvV2xMessage.parse("0a05080210d10f".hexToBytes()))
}
@Test
fun `returns null for empty input and for bytes that are not protobuf`() {
assertNull(RecvV2xMessage.parse(ByteArray(0)))
// A run of continuation bytes: a varint that never terminates, which is what would walk
// an unguarded reader off the end of the buffer.
assertNull(RecvV2xMessage.parse(ByteArray(24) { 0xFF.toByte() }))
}
}
app/src/test/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/RsuCamDecodeTest.kt
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package com.hawhamburg.micr0bu
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.asn1.CamUperCodec
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.cam.StationType
import org.junit.Assert.assertEquals
import org.junit.Assert.assertNotNull
import org.junit.Test
/**
* A roadside unit's CAM must decode, not be dropped.
*
* ETSI's `HighFrequencyContainer` is a CHOICE, and an RSU picks `rsuContainerHighFrequency`
* instead of `basicVehicleContainerHighFrequency`. That container holds no kinematics at all -
* only an optional protected-zone list - so an earlier version of the decoder bailed on it and
* every RSU CAM was silently discarded. The bench RSU sends CAM and SPATEM from the same station
* id, so dropping its CAM meant the one station a rider most wants to see never appeared.
*
* The fixture is a real 26-byte RSU CAM taken live from the OBU's `v2x/rx/cam` topic; the
* expected values are asn1tools' decoding of those same bytes using the ETSI modules in the
* `asn1/`.
*/
class RsuCamDecodeTest {
private val rsuCam = "020239b9de898b8b00fab215af6e286477c0c20c200033fa4e80"
private fun String.hexToBytes(): ByteArray =
chunked(2).map { it.toInt(16).toByte() }.toByteArray()
@Test
fun `decodes a roadside unit CAM for position and station type`() {
val cam = CamUperCodec.decode(rsuCam.hexToBytes(), receivedAtEpochMs = 1_787_100_000_000L)
assertNotNull("an RSU CAM must not be dropped", cam)
cam!!
assertEquals(968_482_441L, cam.stationId)
assertEquals(StationType.ROAD_SIDE_UNIT, cam.stationType)
assertEquals(15, cam.stationType) // the enumeration jumps 11 -> 15; 12 would be wrong
assertEquals(53.5544955, cam.latitude, 1e-7)
assertEquals(10.0225470, cam.longitude, 1e-7)
// An RSU has no kinematics to report. Zero is a placeholder, which is only safe because
// CamUseCaseRepository keeps RSU CAMs out of UseCaseDetectionEngine - otherwise this
// would read as a permanently stopped vehicle and raise a standing false alert.
assertEquals(0.0, cam.speedMps, 0.0)
assertEquals(0.0, cam.headingDeg, 0.0)
}
}
app/src/test/java/com/hawhamburg/micr0bu/SpatemUperCodecTest.kt
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package com.hawhamburg.micr0bu
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.asn1.SpatemUperCodec
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.spat.SignalPhase
import com.hawhamburg.micr0bu.domain.spat.SignalPhaseEvent
import org.junit.Assert.assertEquals
import org.junit.Assert.assertNotNull
import org.junit.Assert.assertNull
import org.junit.Assert.assertTrue
import org.junit.Test
/**
* Regression tests for [SpatemUperCodec], using real SPATEMs as fixtures.
*
* ## Where the fixtures come from
* Both are genuine over-the-air messages, taken from the protobuf-wrapped UPER the OBU publishes
* (field 3 of the blob) - one from the live bench RSU trigger, one from the 2026-03-18 drive
* recorded in `its-g5-receiver-firmware/recordings/its_messages_*.db`.
*
* ## Why the expected values can be trusted
* The bit layout was validated by replaying **79,042 real SPATEMs** - the whole drive across 7+
* RSUs plus the live trigger - through a port of this decoder and comparing every field against
* `asn1tools` decoding the same bytes with the ETSI modules in `asn1/`.
* All 79,042 matched exactly, and none hit an unsupported branch. The values asserted below are
* that independent decoder's output, not this codebase's own arithmetic.
*
* The two fixtures are deliberately different shapes: the live one is minimal (no region, no
* maneuverAssistList), the recorded one exercises `region`, a 7-entry event list, and the
* variable-length `maneuverAssistList` that has to be walked to find the next field.
*/
class SpatemUperCodecTest {
/**
* Live bench RSU, 58 bytes: one intersection (id 23, no region), two signal groups.
* This is the smallest shape seen in practice.
*/
private val liveSpatem =
"020439b9de89451672018000b81040051672adb401001143707ff07ff07ff7a23840484048404bc00851dc1fd41fd41f" +
"d5e86e112a112a112af0"
/**
* Real RSU from the drive, 251 bytes: region 3 / intersection 121, four signal groups, up to
* seven predicted phases each, and a maneuverAssistList.
*/
private val recordedSpatem =
"0204001233b441ae520188001803c8402001ae527d6b032016467032f0424039d2a43819f021981d6150dc0ed812ac10" +
"91088e077609600852846703f705dc04fb3a43820302f582851d0dc120c19a0161d020008004404c8ae065e0848073a5" +
"477033e043303ac2a1b81db025582122111c0eec12c010a508ae07ee0bb809f67477040605eb050a3a1b8241833402c3" +
"a04003001480d919c0cbc10900e74a90e067c08660758543703b604ab0424422381dd82580214a119c0fdc177013ece9" +
"0e080c0bd60a1474370483066805874080080031021a1b81a6821201d89919c0dfc11580f8ce86e08200b0409f694670" +
"44205b9052d48801800680"
private val receivedAt = 1_787_100_000_000L
private fun String.hexToBytes(): ByteArray =
chunked(2).map { it.toInt(16).toByte() }.toByteArray()
@Test
fun `decodes the live bench SPATEM`() {
val spat = SpatemUperCodec.decode(liveSpatem.hexToBytes(), receivedAt, rssiDbm = -55)
assertNotNull("real captured SPATEM must decode", spat)
spat!!
assertEquals(968_482_441L, spat.stationId)
assertEquals(333_426, spat.minuteOfYear)
assertEquals(-55, spat.rssiDbm)
assertEquals(1, spat.intersections.size)
val i = spat.intersections[0]
assertNull("this RSU sends no RoadRegulatorID", i.region)
assertEquals(23, i.id)
assertEquals(1, i.revision)
assertEquals(333_426, i.moy)
assertEquals(44_468, i.timeStampMs)
assertEquals("-1/23", i.key)
assertEquals(2, i.movements.size)
val sg1 = i.movements[0]
assertEquals(1, sg1.signalGroup)
assertEquals(2, sg1.events.size)
assertEquals(SignalPhase.STOP_AND_REMAIN, sg1.current!!.phase)
assertEquals(4094, sg1.current!!.minEndTimeDs)
val sg2 = i.movements[1]
assertEquals(2, sg2.signalGroup)
assertEquals(SignalPhase.PERMISSIVE_CLEARANCE, sg2.current!!.phase)
assertEquals(4074, sg2.current!!.minEndTimeDs)
}
@Test
fun `decodes a real RSU SPATEM with region and maneuverAssistList`() {
val spat = SpatemUperCodec.decode(recordedSpatem.hexToBytes(), receivedAt)
assertNotNull(spat)
spat!!
assertEquals(1_192_884L, spat.stationId)
assertEquals(1, spat.intersections.size)
val i = spat.intersections[0]
// IntersectionID is only unique within a RoadRegulatorID, so the region must survive
// decoding - the drive contains the same intersection id under different regions.
assertEquals(3, i.region)
assertEquals(121, i.id)
assertEquals(4, i.revision)
assertEquals(110_162, i.moy)
assertEquals(32_107, i.timeStampMs)
assertEquals("3/121", i.key)
assertEquals(4, i.movements.size)
assertEquals(listOf(1, 2, 3, 4), i.movements.map { it.signalGroup })
// A 7-entry prediction list: the current phase plus the upcoming sequence.
val sg1 = i.movements[0]
assertEquals(7, sg1.events.size)
assertEquals(SignalPhase.PROTECTED_MOVEMENT_ALLOWED, sg1.current!!.phase)
assertEquals(1630, sg1.current!!.minEndTimeDs)
assertEquals(2120, sg1.current!!.maxEndTimeDs)
assertEquals(1850, sg1.current!!.likelyTimeDs)
assertEquals(SignalPhase.PERMISSIVE_MOVEMENT_ALLOWED, i.movements[1].current!!.phase)
assertEquals(SignalPhase.STOP_AND_REMAIN, i.movements[3].current!!.phase)
assertEquals(4, i.movements[3].events.size)
}
@Test
fun `phase helpers classify the states a driver cares about`() {
assertTrue(SignalPhase.PROTECTED_MOVEMENT_ALLOWED.isGo)
assertTrue(SignalPhase.PERMISSIVE_MOVEMENT_ALLOWED.isGo)
assertTrue(SignalPhase.STOP_AND_REMAIN.isStop)
assertTrue(SignalPhase.PRE_MOVEMENT.isTransition)
assertTrue(SignalPhase.PROTECTED_CLEARANCE.isTransition)
// dark and unavailable are none of the three - they must not read as "go".
assertTrue(!SignalPhase.DARK.isGo && !SignalPhase.DARK.isStop)
}
@Test
fun `countdown handles TimeMark wrapping at the hour boundary`() {
val topOfHour = receivedAt - (receivedAt % 3_600_000L)
// 400.0 s into the hour, light changes at 409.4 s -> 9.4 s away.
val soon = SignalPhaseEvent(SignalPhase.STOP_AND_REMAIN, 4094, null, null)
assertEquals(9.4, soon.secondsUntil(topOfHour + 400_000L)!!, 1e-6)
// 3590 s into the hour, mark is 10.0 s - that is the NEXT hour, i.e. 20 s away, not
// 3580 s in the past. Without the wrap correction a countdown goes hugely negative once
// per hour, which is exactly when a driver is watching it.
val wrapped = SignalPhaseEvent(SignalPhase.STOP_AND_REMAIN, 100, null, null)
assertEquals(20.0, wrapped.secondsUntil(topOfHour + 3_590_000L)!!, 1e-6)
// 36001 is the spec's "unknown" marker and must not be shown as a real countdown.
val unknown = SignalPhaseEvent(SignalPhase.DARK, 36001, null, null)
assertNull(unknown.secondsUntil(topOfHour))
assertNull(SignalPhaseEvent(SignalPhase.DARK, null, null, null).secondsUntil(topOfHour))
}
@Test
fun `does not decode another message type as SPATEM`() {
// protocolVersion 2, messageId 2 (CAM) - the header guard must reject it outright.
val cam = byteArrayOf(2, 2, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0)
assertNull(SpatemUperCodec.decode(cam, receivedAt))
}
@Test
fun `returns null for a truncated SPATEM rather than a wrong light`() {
val full = liveSpatem.hexToBytes()
assertNull(SpatemUperCodec.decode(full.copyOfRange(0, 12), receivedAt))
}
}
asn1/LICENSE
+21
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MIT License (MIT)
Copyright (c) 2026 consider it GmbH
Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN
THE SOFTWARE.
asn1/README.md
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# ETSI ASN.1 modules
The ASN.1 schemas this project's UPER codecs are validated against. **Schemas only** — no parser
code. Nothing in the app or the firmware reads these files at build or run time; they exist so the
hand-written codecs in `app/src/main/java/.../domain/asn1/` can be checked against an independent
implementation.
## Why this is here rather than just documented
Three of this project's tests assert exact bytes:
- `CamEncodeGoldenTest` — the CAM this app transmits, byte for byte
- `DenmAirReceiveTest`, `SpatemUperCodecTest` — real captured frames with field values
Those expected values were produced by decoding with `asn1tools` compiled from these modules. Without
them the fixtures cannot be regenerated or re-verified, and a golden-byte test you cannot regenerate
is a test nobody can safely touch.
This matters because the project has shipped the same class of bug three times: a field encoded with
the wrong number of bits, which this codebase then read back with the *same* wrong number. Phone and
ESP32 agree perfectly with each other and with nothing else, so every internal round-trip test passes
while the frames on air are malformed (`CurvatureCalculationMode`, the GeoNetworking reserved bytes,
`yawRateConfidence`). Only a second, independent implementation catches that — which is what these
modules provide.
## Provenance
Taken from consider it GmbH's C-ITS-Parser:
- <https://github.com/consider-it/C-ITS-Parser>
- commit `f457426efc2486fac49a02fc9a1c8c7762d160e9`
- MIT licensed — see `LICENSE`, retained here as the licence requires
Only the seven `.asn` files below are copied, out of a 4.2 MB checkout. The upstream Rust parser is
not used by this project in any way. The schemas themselves are ETSI's standard definitions; the
upstream repo's contribution is assembling them into a compilable set.
| file | used for |
|---|---|
| `cam_1_4_1.asn` + `cdd_1_3_1_1.asn` | CAM encode/decode |
| `denm_1_3_1.asn` + `cdd_1_3_1_1.asn` | DENM decode |
| `spatem_2_2_1.asn`, `mapem_2_2_1.asn`, `dsrc_2_2_1.asn`, `cdd_2_2_1.asn` | SPATEM/MAPEM decode |
Note CAM/DENM use the release-1 common dictionary (`cdd_1_3_1_1`) while SPATEM/MAPEM use release 2
(`cdd_2_2_1`). Both are needed; they are not interchangeable.
These seven were verified sufficient on their own: copied into an empty directory, all three specs
compile and reproduce the committed golden bytes.
## Regenerating a fixture
Requires Python with `asn1tools` (verified with 0.167.0):
```python
import asn1tools
spec = asn1tools.compile_files(["asn1/cam_1_4_1.asn", "asn1/cdd_1_3_1_1.asn"], "uper")
spec.decode("CAM", raw_uper_bytes)
```
For SPATEM, compile `spatem_2_2_1.asn`, `mapem_2_2_1.asn`, `dsrc_2_2_1.asn`, `cdd_2_2_1.asn`
together and decode `"SPATEM"`.
**Never regenerate a golden fixture from this project's own encoder output** — that is precisely the
mistake these files exist to catch. Regenerate through `asn1tools`, or the test is worthless.
## Updating
Re-pin deliberately, not casually. If a newer ETSI release is adopted, copy the new modules, then
re-run the golden-byte tests and confirm any change in expected bytes is explained by the spec
change rather than by a decoder regression.
asn1/cam_1_4_1.asn
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CAM-PDU-Descriptions {
itu-t (0) identified-organization (4) etsi (0) itsDomain (5) wg1 (1) en (302637) cam (2) version (2)
}
DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
ItsPduHeader, CauseCode, ReferencePosition, AccelerationControl, Curvature, CurvatureCalculationMode, Heading, LanePosition, EmergencyPriority, EmbarkationStatus, Speed, DriveDirection, LongitudinalAcceleration, LateralAcceleration, VerticalAcceleration, StationType, ExteriorLights, DangerousGoodsBasic, SpecialTransportType, LightBarSirenInUse, VehicleRole, VehicleLength, VehicleWidth, PathHistory, RoadworksSubCauseCode, ClosedLanes, TrafficRule, SpeedLimit, SteeringWheelAngle, PerformanceClass, YawRate, ProtectedCommunicationZone, PtActivation, Latitude, Longitude, ProtectedCommunicationZonesRSU, CenDsrcTollingZone FROM ITS-Container {
itu-t (0) identified-organization (4) etsi (0) itsDomain (5) wg1 (1) ts (102894) cdd (2) version (2)
};
-- The root data frame for cooperative awareness messages
CAM ::= SEQUENCE {
header ItsPduHeader,
cam CoopAwareness
}
CoopAwareness ::= SEQUENCE {
generationDeltaTime GenerationDeltaTime,
camParameters CamParameters
}
CamParameters ::= SEQUENCE {
basicContainer BasicContainer,
highFrequencyContainer HighFrequencyContainer,
lowFrequencyContainer LowFrequencyContainer OPTIONAL,
specialVehicleContainer SpecialVehicleContainer OPTIONAL,
...
}
HighFrequencyContainer ::= CHOICE {
basicVehicleContainerHighFrequency BasicVehicleContainerHighFrequency,
rsuContainerHighFrequency RSUContainerHighFrequency,
...
}
LowFrequencyContainer ::= CHOICE {
basicVehicleContainerLowFrequency BasicVehicleContainerLowFrequency,
...
}
SpecialVehicleContainer ::= CHOICE {
publicTransportContainer PublicTransportContainer,
specialTransportContainer SpecialTransportContainer,
dangerousGoodsContainer DangerousGoodsContainer,
roadWorksContainerBasic RoadWorksContainerBasic,
rescueContainer RescueContainer,
emergencyContainer EmergencyContainer,
safetyCarContainer SafetyCarContainer,
...
}
BasicContainer ::= SEQUENCE {
stationType StationType,
referencePosition ReferencePosition,
...
}
BasicVehicleContainerHighFrequency ::= SEQUENCE {
heading Heading,
speed Speed,
driveDirection DriveDirection,
vehicleLength VehicleLength,
vehicleWidth VehicleWidth,
longitudinalAcceleration LongitudinalAcceleration,
curvature Curvature,
curvatureCalculationMode CurvatureCalculationMode,
yawRate YawRate,
accelerationControl AccelerationControl OPTIONAL,
lanePosition LanePosition OPTIONAL,
steeringWheelAngle SteeringWheelAngle OPTIONAL,
lateralAcceleration LateralAcceleration OPTIONAL,
verticalAcceleration VerticalAcceleration OPTIONAL,
performanceClass PerformanceClass OPTIONAL,
cenDsrcTollingZone CenDsrcTollingZone OPTIONAL
}
BasicVehicleContainerLowFrequency ::= SEQUENCE {
vehicleRole VehicleRole,
exteriorLights ExteriorLights,
pathHistory PathHistory
}
PublicTransportContainer ::= SEQUENCE {
embarkationStatus EmbarkationStatus,
ptActivation PtActivation OPTIONAL
}
SpecialTransportContainer ::= SEQUENCE {
specialTransportType SpecialTransportType,
lightBarSirenInUse LightBarSirenInUse
}
DangerousGoodsContainer ::= SEQUENCE {
dangerousGoodsBasic DangerousGoodsBasic
}
RoadWorksContainerBasic ::= SEQUENCE {
roadworksSubCauseCode RoadworksSubCauseCode OPTIONAL,
lightBarSirenInUse LightBarSirenInUse,
closedLanes ClosedLanes OPTIONAL
}
RescueContainer ::= SEQUENCE {
lightBarSirenInUse LightBarSirenInUse
}
EmergencyContainer ::= SEQUENCE {
lightBarSirenInUse LightBarSirenInUse,
incidentIndication CauseCode OPTIONAL,
emergencyPriority EmergencyPriority OPTIONAL
}
SafetyCarContainer ::= SEQUENCE {
lightBarSirenInUse LightBarSirenInUse,
incidentIndication CauseCode OPTIONAL,
trafficRule TrafficRule OPTIONAL,
speedLimit SpeedLimit OPTIONAL
}
RSUContainerHighFrequency ::= SEQUENCE {
protectedCommunicationZonesRSU ProtectedCommunicationZonesRSU OPTIONAL,
...
}
GenerationDeltaTime ::= INTEGER { oneMilliSec(1) } (0..65535)
END
asn1/cdd_1_3_1_1.asn
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ITS-Container {
itu-t (0) identified-organization (4) etsi (0) itsDomain (5) wg1 (1) ts (102894) cdd (2) version (2)
}
DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::=
BEGIN
ItsPduHeader ::= SEQUENCE {
protocolVersion INTEGER (0..255),
messageID INTEGER{ denm(1), cam(2), poi(3), spatem(4), mapem(5), ivim(6), ev-rsr(7), tistpgtransaction(8), srem(9), ssem(10), evcsn(11), saem(12), rtcmem(13) } (0..255), -- Mantis #7209, #7005
stationID StationID
}
StationID ::= INTEGER(0..4294967295)
ReferencePosition ::= SEQUENCE {
latitude Latitude,
longitude Longitude,
positionConfidenceEllipse PosConfidenceEllipse ,
altitude Altitude
}
DeltaReferencePosition ::= SEQUENCE {
deltaLatitude DeltaLatitude,
deltaLongitude DeltaLongitude,
deltaAltitude DeltaAltitude
}
Longitude ::= INTEGER {oneMicrodegreeEast (10), oneMicrodegreeWest (-10), unavailable(1800000001)} (-1800000000..1800000001)
Latitude ::= INTEGER {oneMicrodegreeNorth (10), oneMicrodegreeSouth (-10), unavailable(900000001)} (-900000000..900000001)
Altitude ::= SEQUENCE {
altitudeValue AltitudeValue,
altitudeConfidence AltitudeConfidence
}
AltitudeValue ::= INTEGER {referenceEllipsoidSurface(0), oneCentimeter(1), unavailable(800001)} (-100000..800001)
AltitudeConfidence ::= ENUMERATED {
alt-000-01 (0),
alt-000-02 (1),
alt-000-05 (2),
alt-000-10 (3),
alt-000-20 (4),
alt-000-50 (5),
alt-001-00 (6),
alt-002-00 (7),
alt-005-00 (8),
alt-010-00 (9),
alt-020-00 (10),
alt-050-00 (11),
alt-100-00 (12),
alt-200-00 (13),
outOfRange (14),
unavailable (15)
}
DeltaLongitude ::= INTEGER {oneMicrodegreeEast (10), oneMicrodegreeWest (-10), unavailable(131072)} (-131071..131072)
DeltaLatitude ::= INTEGER {oneMicrodegreeNorth (10), oneMicrodegreeSouth (-10) , unavailable(131072)} (-131071..131072)
DeltaAltitude ::= INTEGER {oneCentimeterUp (1), oneCentimeterDown (-1), unavailable(12800)} (-12700..12800)
PosConfidenceEllipse ::= SEQUENCE {
semiMajorConfidence SemiAxisLength,
semiMinorConfidence SemiAxisLength,
semiMajorOrientation HeadingValue
}
PathPoint ::= SEQUENCE {
pathPosition DeltaReferencePosition,
pathDeltaTime PathDeltaTime OPTIONAL
}
PathDeltaTime ::= INTEGER {tenMilliSecondsInPast(1)} (1..65535, ...)
PtActivation ::= SEQUENCE {
ptActivationType PtActivationType,
ptActivationData PtActivationData
}
PtActivationType ::= INTEGER {undefinedCodingType(0), r09-16CodingType(1), vdv-50149CodingType(2)} (0..255)
PtActivationData ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(1..20))
AccelerationControl ::= BIT STRING {
brakePedalEngaged (0),
gasPedalEngaged (1),
emergencyBrakeEngaged (2),
collisionWarningEngaged (3),
accEngaged (4),
cruiseControlEngaged (5),
speedLimiterEngaged (6)
} (SIZE(7))
SemiAxisLength ::= INTEGER{oneCentimeter(1), outOfRange(4094), unavailable(4095)} (0..4095)
CauseCode ::= SEQUENCE {
causeCode CauseCodeType,
subCauseCode SubCauseCodeType,
...
}
CauseCodeType ::= INTEGER {
reserved (0),
trafficCondition (1),
accident (2),
roadworks (3),
impassability (5),
adverseWeatherCondition-Adhesion (6),
aquaplannning (7),
hazardousLocation-SurfaceCondition (9),
hazardousLocation-ObstacleOnTheRoad (10),
hazardousLocation-AnimalOnTheRoad (11),
humanPresenceOnTheRoad (12),
wrongWayDriving (14),
rescueAndRecoveryWorkInProgress (15),
adverseWeatherCondition-ExtremeWeatherCondition (17),
adverseWeatherCondition-Visibility (18),
adverseWeatherCondition-Precipitation (19),
slowVehicle (26),
dangerousEndOfQueue (27),
vehicleBreakdown (91),
postCrash (92),
humanProblem (93),
stationaryVehicle (94),
emergencyVehicleApproaching (95),
hazardousLocation-DangerousCurve (96),
collisionRisk (97),
signalViolation (98),
dangerousSituation (99)
} (0..255)
SubCauseCodeType ::= INTEGER (0..255)
TrafficConditionSubCauseCode ::= INTEGER {unavailable(0), increasedVolumeOfTraffic(1), trafficJamSlowlyIncreasing(2), trafficJamIncreasing(3), trafficJamStronglyIncreasing(4), trafficStationary(5), trafficJamSlightlyDecreasing(6), trafficJamDecreasing(7), trafficJamStronglyDecreasing(8)} (0..255)
AccidentSubCauseCode ::= INTEGER {unavailable(0), multiVehicleAccident(1), heavyAccident(2), accidentInvolvingLorry(3), accidentInvolvingBus(4), accidentInvolvingHazardousMaterials(5), accidentOnOppositeLane(6), unsecuredAccident(7), assistanceRequested(8)} (0..255)
RoadworksSubCauseCode ::= INTEGER {unavailable(0), majorRoadworks(1), roadMarkingWork(2), slowMovingRoadMaintenance(3), shortTermStationaryRoadworks(4), streetCleaning(5), winterService(6)} (0..255)
HumanPresenceOnTheRoadSubCauseCode ::= INTEGER {unavailable(0), childrenOnRoadway(1), cyclistOnRoadway(2), motorcyclistOnRoadway(3)} (0..255)
WrongWayDrivingSubCauseCode ::= INTEGER {unavailable(0), wrongLane(1), wrongDirection(2)} (0..255)
AdverseWeatherCondition-ExtremeWeatherConditionSubCauseCode ::= INTEGER {unavailable(0), strongWinds(1), damagingHail(2), hurricane(3), thunderstorm(4), tornado(5), blizzard(6)} (0..255)
AdverseWeatherCondition-AdhesionSubCauseCode ::= INTEGER {unavailable(0), heavyFrostOnRoad(1), fuelOnRoad(2), mudOnRoad(3), snowOnRoad(4), iceOnRoad(5), blackIceOnRoad(6), oilOnRoad(7), looseChippings(8), instantBlackIce(9), roadsSalted(10)} (0..255)
AdverseWeatherCondition-VisibilitySubCauseCode ::= INTEGER {unavailable(0), fog(1), smoke(2), heavySnowfall(3), heavyRain(4), heavyHail(5), lowSunGlare(6), sandstorms(7), swarmsOfInsects(8)} (0..255)
AdverseWeatherCondition-PrecipitationSubCauseCode ::= INTEGER {unavailable(0), heavyRain(1), heavySnowfall(2), softHail(3)} (0..255)
SlowVehicleSubCauseCode ::= INTEGER {unavailable(0), maintenanceVehicle(1), vehiclesSlowingToLookAtAccident(2), abnormalLoad(3), abnormalWideLoad(4), convoy(5), snowplough(6), deicing(7), saltingVehicles(8)} (0..255)
StationaryVehicleSubCauseCode ::= INTEGER {unavailable(0), humanProblem(1), vehicleBreakdown(2), postCrash(3), publicTransportStop(4), carryingDangerousGoods(5)} (0..255)
HumanProblemSubCauseCode ::= INTEGER {unavailable(0), glycemiaProblem(1), heartProblem(2)} (0..255)
EmergencyVehicleApproachingSubCauseCode ::= INTEGER {unavailable(0), emergencyVehicleApproaching(1), prioritizedVehicleApproaching(2)} (0..255)
HazardousLocation-DangerousCurveSubCauseCode ::= INTEGER {unavailable(0), dangerousLeftTurnCurve(1), dangerousRightTurnCurve(2), multipleCurvesStartingWithUnknownTurningDirection(3), multipleCurvesStartingWithLeftTurn(4), multipleCurvesStartingWithRightTurn(5)} (0..255)
HazardousLocation-SurfaceConditionSubCauseCode ::= INTEGER {unavailable(0), rockfalls(1), earthquakeDamage(2), sewerCollapse(3), subsidence(4), snowDrifts(5), stormDamage(6), burstPipe(7), volcanoEruption(8), fallingIce(9)} (0..255)
HazardousLocation-ObstacleOnTheRoadSubCauseCode ::= INTEGER {unavailable(0), shedLoad(1), partsOfVehicles(2), partsOfTyres(3), bigObjects(4), fallenTrees(5), hubCaps(6), waitingVehicles(7)} (0..255)
HazardousLocation-AnimalOnTheRoadSubCauseCode ::= INTEGER {unavailable(0), wildAnimals(1), herdOfAnimals(2), smallAnimals(3), largeAnimals(4)} (0..255)
CollisionRiskSubCauseCode ::= INTEGER {unavailable(0), longitudinalCollisionRisk(1), crossingCollisionRisk(2), lateralCollisionRisk(3), vulnerableRoadUser(4)} (0..255)
SignalViolationSubCauseCode ::= INTEGER {unavailable(0), stopSignViolation(1), trafficLightViolation(2), turningRegulationViolation(3)} (0..255)
RescueAndRecoveryWorkInProgressSubCauseCode ::= INTEGER {unavailable(0), emergencyVehicles(1), rescueHelicopterLanding(2), policeActivityOngoing(3), medicalEmergencyOngoing(4), childAbductionInProgress(5)} (0..255)
DangerousEndOfQueueSubCauseCode ::= INTEGER {unavailable(0), suddenEndOfQueue(1), queueOverHill(2), queueAroundBend(3), queueInTunnel(4)} (0..255)
DangerousSituationSubCauseCode ::= INTEGER {unavailable(0), emergencyElectronicBrakeEngaged(1), preCrashSystemEngaged(2), espEngaged(3), absEngaged(4), aebEngaged(5), brakeWarningEngaged(6), collisionRiskWarningEngaged(7)} (0..255)
VehicleBreakdownSubCauseCode ::= INTEGER {unavailable(0), lackOfFuel (1), lackOfBatteryPower (2), engineProblem(3), transmissionProblem(4), engineCoolingProblem(5), brakingSystemProblem(6), steeringProblem(7), tyrePuncture(8), tyrePressureProblem(9)} (0..255)
PostCrashSubCauseCode ::= INTEGER {unavailable(0), accidentWithoutECallTriggered (1), accidentWithECallManuallyTriggered (2), accidentWithECallAutomaticallyTriggered (3), accidentWithECallTriggeredWithoutAccessToCellularNetwork(4)} (0..255)
Curvature ::= SEQUENCE {
curvatureValue CurvatureValue,
curvatureConfidence CurvatureConfidence
}
CurvatureValue ::= INTEGER {straight(0), unavailable(1023)} (-1023..1023)
CurvatureConfidence ::= ENUMERATED {
onePerMeter-0-00002 (0),
onePerMeter-0-0001 (1),
onePerMeter-0-0005 (2),
onePerMeter-0-002 (3),
onePerMeter-0-01 (4),
onePerMeter-0-1 (5),
outOfRange (6),
unavailable (7)
}
CurvatureCalculationMode ::= ENUMERATED {yawRateUsed(0), yawRateNotUsed(1), unavailable(2), ...}
Heading ::= SEQUENCE {
headingValue HeadingValue,
headingConfidence HeadingConfidence
}
HeadingValue ::= INTEGER {wgs84North(0), wgs84East(900), wgs84South(1800), wgs84West(2700), unavailable(3601)} (0..3601)
HeadingConfidence ::= INTEGER {equalOrWithinZeroPointOneDegree (1), equalOrWithinOneDegree (10), outOfRange(126), unavailable(127)} (1..127)
LanePosition ::= INTEGER {offTheRoad(-1), innerHardShoulder(0),
innermostDrivingLane(1), secondLaneFromInside(2), outerHardShoulder(14) } (-1..14)
ClosedLanes ::= SEQUENCE {
innerhardShoulderStatus HardShoulderStatus OPTIONAL,
outerhardShoulderStatus HardShoulderStatus OPTIONAL,
drivingLaneStatus DrivingLaneStatus OPTIONAL,
...
}
HardShoulderStatus ::= ENUMERATED {availableForStopping(0), closed(1), availableForDriving(2)}
DrivingLaneStatus ::= BIT STRING (SIZE (1..13))
PerformanceClass ::= INTEGER {unavailable(0), performanceClassA(1), performanceClassB(2)} (0..7)
SpeedValue ::= INTEGER {standstill(0), oneCentimeterPerSec(1), unavailable(16383)} (0..16383)
SpeedConfidence ::= INTEGER {equalOrWithinOneCentimeterPerSec(1), equalOrWithinOneMeterPerSec(100), outOfRange(126), unavailable(127)} (1..127)
VehicleMass ::= INTEGER {hundredKg(1), unavailable(1024)} (1..1024)
Speed ::= SEQUENCE {
speedValue SpeedValue,
speedConfidence SpeedConfidence
}
DriveDirection ::= ENUMERATED {forward (0), backward (1), unavailable (2)}
EmbarkationStatus ::= BOOLEAN
LongitudinalAcceleration ::= SEQUENCE {
longitudinalAccelerationValue LongitudinalAccelerationValue,
longitudinalAccelerationConfidence AccelerationConfidence
}
LongitudinalAccelerationValue ::= INTEGER {pointOneMeterPerSecSquaredForward(1), pointOneMeterPerSecSquaredBackward(-1), unavailable(161)} (-160 .. 161)
AccelerationConfidence ::= INTEGER {pointOneMeterPerSecSquared(1), outOfRange(101), unavailable(102)} (0 .. 102)
LateralAcceleration ::= SEQUENCE {
lateralAccelerationValue LateralAccelerationValue,
lateralAccelerationConfidence AccelerationConfidence
}
LateralAccelerationValue ::= INTEGER {pointOneMeterPerSecSquaredToRight(-1), pointOneMeterPerSecSquaredToLeft(1), unavailable(161)} (-160 .. 161)
VerticalAcceleration ::= SEQUENCE {
verticalAccelerationValue VerticalAccelerationValue,
verticalAccelerationConfidence AccelerationConfidence
}
VerticalAccelerationValue ::= INTEGER {pointOneMeterPerSecSquaredUp(1), pointOneMeterPerSecSquaredDown(-1), unavailable(161)} (-160 .. 161)
StationType ::= INTEGER {unknown(0), pedestrian(1), cyclist(2), moped(3), motorcycle(4), passengerCar(5), bus(6),
lightTruck(7), heavyTruck(8), trailer(9), specialVehicles(10), tram(11), roadSideUnit(15)} (0..255)
ExteriorLights ::= BIT STRING {
lowBeamHeadlightsOn (0),
highBeamHeadlightsOn (1),
leftTurnSignalOn (2),
rightTurnSignalOn (3),
daytimeRunningLightsOn (4),
reverseLightOn (5),
fogLightOn (6),
parkingLightsOn (7)
} (SIZE(8))
DangerousGoodsBasic::= ENUMERATED {
explosives1(0),
explosives2(1),
explosives3(2),
explosives4(3),
explosives5(4),
explosives6(5),
flammableGases(6),
nonFlammableGases(7),
toxicGases(8),
flammableLiquids(9),
flammableSolids(10),
substancesLiableToSpontaneousCombustion(11),
substancesEmittingFlammableGasesUponContactWithWater(12),
oxidizingSubstances(13),
organicPeroxides(14),
toxicSubstances(15),
infectiousSubstances(16),
radioactiveMaterial(17),
corrosiveSubstances(18),
miscellaneousDangerousSubstances(19)
}
DangerousGoodsExtended ::= SEQUENCE {
dangerousGoodsType DangerousGoodsBasic,
unNumber INTEGER (0..9999),
elevatedTemperature BOOLEAN,
tunnelsRestricted BOOLEAN,
limitedQuantity BOOLEAN,
emergencyActionCode IA5String (SIZE (1..24)) OPTIONAL,
phoneNumber PhoneNumber OPTIONAL,
companyName UTF8String (SIZE (1..24)) OPTIONAL,
...
}
SpecialTransportType ::= BIT STRING {heavyLoad(0), excessWidth(1), excessLength(2), excessHeight(3)} (SIZE(4))
LightBarSirenInUse ::= BIT STRING {
lightBarActivated (0),
sirenActivated (1)
} (SIZE(2))
HeightLonCarr ::= INTEGER {oneCentimeter(1), unavailable(100)} (1..100)
PosLonCarr ::= INTEGER {oneCentimeter(1), unavailable(127)} (1..127)
PosPillar ::= INTEGER {tenCentimeters(1), unavailable(30)} (1..30)
PosCentMass ::= INTEGER {tenCentimeters(1), unavailable(63)} (1..63)
RequestResponseIndication ::= ENUMERATED {request(0), response(1)}
SpeedLimit ::= INTEGER {oneKmPerHour(1)} (1..255)
StationarySince ::= ENUMERATED {lessThan1Minute(0), lessThan2Minutes(1), lessThan15Minutes(2), equalOrGreater15Minutes(3)}
Temperature ::= INTEGER {equalOrSmallerThanMinus60Deg (-60), oneDegreeCelsius(1), equalOrGreaterThan67Deg(67)} (-60..67)
TrafficRule ::= ENUMERATED {noPassing(0), noPassingForTrucks(1), passToRight(2), passToLeft(3), ...
}
WheelBaseVehicle ::= INTEGER {tenCentimeters(1), unavailable(127)} (1..127)
TurningRadius ::= INTEGER {point4Meters(1), unavailable(255)} (1..255)
PosFrontAx ::= INTEGER {tenCentimeters(1), unavailable(20)} (1..20)
PositionOfOccupants ::= BIT STRING {
row1LeftOccupied (0),
row1RightOccupied (1),
row1MidOccupied (2),
row1NotDetectable (3),
row1NotPresent (4),
row2LeftOccupied (5),
row2RightOccupied (6),
row2MidOccupied (7),
row2NotDetectable (8),
row2NotPresent (9),
row3LeftOccupied (10),
row3RightOccupied (11),
row3MidOccupied (12),
row3NotDetectable (13),
row3NotPresent (14),
row4LeftOccupied (15),
row4RightOccupied (16),
row4MidOccupied (17),
row4NotDetectable (18),
row4NotPresent (19)} (SIZE(20))
PositioningSolutionType ::= ENUMERATED {noPositioningSolution(0), sGNSS(1), dGNSS(2), sGNSSplusDR(3), dGNSSplusDR(4), dR(5), ...}
VehicleIdentification ::= SEQUENCE {
wMInumber WMInumber OPTIONAL,
vDS VDS OPTIONAL,
...
}
WMInumber ::= IA5String (SIZE(1..3))
VDS ::= IA5String (SIZE(6))
EnergyStorageType ::= BIT STRING {hydrogenStorage(0), electricEnergyStorage(1), liquidPropaneGas(2), compressedNaturalGas(3), diesel(4), gasoline(5), ammonia(6)} (SIZE(7))
VehicleLength ::= SEQUENCE {
vehicleLengthValue VehicleLengthValue,
vehicleLengthConfidenceIndication VehicleLengthConfidenceIndication
}
VehicleLengthValue ::= INTEGER {tenCentimeters(1), outOfRange(1022), unavailable(1023)} (1..1023)
VehicleLengthConfidenceIndication ::= ENUMERATED {noTrailerPresent(0), trailerPresentWithKnownLength(1), trailerPresentWithUnknownLength(2), trailerPresenceIsUnknown(3), unavailable(4)}
VehicleWidth ::= INTEGER {tenCentimeters(1), outOfRange(61), unavailable(62)} (1..62)
PathHistory::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(0..40)) OF PathPoint
EmergencyPriority ::= BIT STRING {requestForRightOfWay(0), requestForFreeCrossingAtATrafficLight(1)} (SIZE(2))
InformationQuality ::= INTEGER {unavailable(0), lowest(1), highest(7)} (0..7)
RoadType ::= ENUMERATED {
urban-NoStructuralSeparationToOppositeLanes(0),
urban-WithStructuralSeparationToOppositeLanes(1),
nonUrban-NoStructuralSeparationToOppositeLanes(2),
nonUrban-WithStructuralSeparationToOppositeLanes(3)}
SteeringWheelAngle ::= SEQUENCE {
steeringWheelAngleValue SteeringWheelAngleValue,
steeringWheelAngleConfidence SteeringWheelAngleConfidence
}
SteeringWheelAngleValue ::= INTEGER {straight(0), onePointFiveDegreesToRight(-1), onePointFiveDegreesToLeft(1), unavailable(512)} (-511..512)
SteeringWheelAngleConfidence ::= INTEGER {equalOrWithinOnePointFiveDegree (1), outOfRange(126), unavailable(127)} (1..127)
TimestampIts ::= INTEGER {utcStartOf2004(0), oneMillisecAfterUTCStartOf2004(1)} (0..4398046511103)
VehicleRole ::= ENUMERATED {default(0), publicTransport(1), specialTransport(2), dangerousGoods(3), roadWork(4), rescue(5), emergency(6), safetyCar(7), agriculture(8), commercial(9), military(10), roadOperator(11), taxi(12), reserved1(13), reserved2(14), reserved3(15)}
YawRate::= SEQUENCE {
yawRateValue YawRateValue,
yawRateConfidence YawRateConfidence
}
YawRateValue ::= INTEGER {straight(0), degSec-000-01ToRight(-1), degSec-000-01ToLeft(1), unavailable(32767)} (-32766..32767)
YawRateConfidence ::= ENUMERATED {
degSec-000-01 (0),
degSec-000-05 (1),
degSec-000-10 (2),
degSec-001-00 (3),
degSec-005-00 (4),
degSec-010-00 (5),
degSec-100-00 (6),
outOfRange (7),
unavailable (8)
}
ProtectedZoneType::= ENUMERATED { permanentCenDsrcTolling (0), ..., temporaryCenDsrcTolling (1) }
RelevanceDistance ::= ENUMERATED {lessThan50m(0), lessThan100m(1), lessThan200m(2), lessThan500m(3), lessThan1000m(4), lessThan5km(5), lessThan10km(6), over10km(7)}
RelevanceTrafficDirection ::= ENUMERATED {allTrafficDirections(0), upstreamTraffic(1), downstreamTraffic(2), oppositeTraffic(3)}
TransmissionInterval ::= INTEGER {oneMilliSecond(1), tenSeconds(10000)} (1..10000)
ValidityDuration ::= INTEGER {timeOfDetection(0), oneSecondAfterDetection(1)} (0..86400)
ActionID ::= SEQUENCE {
originatingStationID StationID,
sequenceNumber SequenceNumber
}
ItineraryPath ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..40) OF ReferencePosition
ProtectedCommunicationZone ::= SEQUENCE {
protectedZoneType ProtectedZoneType,
expiryTime TimestampIts OPTIONAL,
protectedZoneLatitude Latitude,
protectedZoneLongitude Longitude,
protectedZoneRadius ProtectedZoneRadius OPTIONAL,
protectedZoneID ProtectedZoneID OPTIONAL,
...
}
Traces ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..7) OF PathHistory
NumberOfOccupants ::= INTEGER {oneOccupant (1), unavailable(127)} (0 .. 127)
SequenceNumber ::= INTEGER (0..65535)
PositionOfPillars ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..3, ...)) OF PosPillar
RestrictedTypes ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..3, ...)) OF StationType
EventHistory::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..23)) OF EventPoint
EventPoint ::= SEQUENCE {
eventPosition DeltaReferencePosition,
eventDeltaTime PathDeltaTime OPTIONAL,
informationQuality InformationQuality
}
ProtectedCommunicationZonesRSU ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..16)) OF ProtectedCommunicationZone
CenDsrcTollingZone ::= SEQUENCE {
protectedZoneLatitude Latitude,
protectedZoneLongitude Longitude,
cenDsrcTollingZoneID CenDsrcTollingZoneID OPTIONAL,
...
}
ProtectedZoneRadius ::= INTEGER {oneMeter(1)} (1..255,...)
ProtectedZoneID ::= INTEGER (0.. 134217727)
CenDsrcTollingZoneID ::= ProtectedZoneID
DigitalMap ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..256)) OF ReferencePosition
OpeningDaysHours ::= UTF8String
PhoneNumber ::= NumericString (SIZE(1..16))
END
asn1/cdd_2_2_1.asn
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asn1/denm_1_3_1.asn
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DENM-PDU-Descriptions {itu-t (0) identified-organization (4) etsi (0) itsDomain (5) wg1 (1) en (302637) denm (1) version (2)
}
DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
ItsPduHeader, CauseCode, Speed, InformationQuality, ReferencePosition, ClosedLanes, DangerousGoodsExtended, Heading, LanePosition, LightBarSirenInUse, RoadType, HeightLonCarr, PosLonCarr, PosCentMass, PositioningSolutionType, RequestResponseIndication, StationType, SpeedLimit, StationarySince, TimestampIts, WheelBaseVehicle, TurningRadius, PosFrontAx, PositionOfOccupants, Temperature, VehicleMass, VehicleIdentification, EnergyStorageType, ActionID, ItineraryPath, NumberOfOccupants, PositionOfPillars, RelevanceTrafficDirection, RestrictedTypes, Traces, TransmissionInterval, ValidityDuration, RelevanceDistance, EventHistory, TrafficRule, DeltaReferencePosition FROM ITS-Container {
itu-t (0) identified-organization (4) etsi (0) itsDomain (5) wg1 (1) ts (102894) cdd (2) version (2)
};
DENM ::= SEQUENCE {
header ItsPduHeader,
denm DecentralizedEnvironmentalNotificationMessage
}
DecentralizedEnvironmentalNotificationMessage ::= SEQUENCE {
management ManagementContainer,
situation SituationContainer OPTIONAL,
location LocationContainer OPTIONAL,
alacarte AlacarteContainer OPTIONAL
}
ManagementContainer ::= SEQUENCE {
actionID ActionID,
detectionTime TimestampIts,
referenceTime TimestampIts,
termination Termination OPTIONAL,
eventPosition ReferencePosition,
relevanceDistance RelevanceDistance OPTIONAL,
relevanceTrafficDirection RelevanceTrafficDirection OPTIONAL,
validityDuration ValidityDuration DEFAULT defaultValidity,
transmissionInterval TransmissionInterval OPTIONAL,
stationType StationType,
...
}
SituationContainer ::= SEQUENCE {
informationQuality InformationQuality,
eventType CauseCode,
linkedCause CauseCode OPTIONAL,
eventHistory EventHistory OPTIONAL,
...
}
LocationContainer ::= SEQUENCE {
eventSpeed Speed OPTIONAL,
eventPositionHeading Heading OPTIONAL,
traces Traces,
roadType RoadType OPTIONAL,
...
}
ImpactReductionContainer ::= SEQUENCE {
heightLonCarrLeft HeightLonCarr,
heightLonCarrRight HeightLonCarr,
posLonCarrLeft PosLonCarr,
posLonCarrRight PosLonCarr,
positionOfPillars PositionOfPillars,
posCentMass PosCentMass,
wheelBaseVehicle WheelBaseVehicle,
turningRadius TurningRadius,
posFrontAx PosFrontAx,
positionOfOccupants PositionOfOccupants,
vehicleMass VehicleMass,
requestResponseIndication RequestResponseIndication
}
RoadWorksContainerExtended ::= SEQUENCE {
lightBarSirenInUse LightBarSirenInUse OPTIONAL,
closedLanes ClosedLanes OPTIONAL,
restriction RestrictedTypes OPTIONAL,
speedLimit SpeedLimit OPTIONAL,
incidentIndication CauseCode OPTIONAL,
recommendedPath ItineraryPath OPTIONAL,
startingPointSpeedLimit DeltaReferencePosition OPTIONAL,
trafficFlowRule TrafficRule OPTIONAL,
referenceDenms ReferenceDenms OPTIONAL
}
StationaryVehicleContainer ::= SEQUENCE {
stationarySince StationarySince OPTIONAL,
stationaryCause CauseCode OPTIONAL,
carryingDangerousGoods DangerousGoodsExtended OPTIONAL,
numberOfOccupants NumberOfOccupants OPTIONAL,
vehicleIdentification VehicleIdentification OPTIONAL,
energyStorageType EnergyStorageType OPTIONAL
}
AlacarteContainer ::= SEQUENCE {
lanePosition LanePosition OPTIONAL,
impactReduction ImpactReductionContainer OPTIONAL,
externalTemperature Temperature OPTIONAL,
roadWorks RoadWorksContainerExtended OPTIONAL,
positioningSolution PositioningSolutionType OPTIONAL,
stationaryVehicle StationaryVehicleContainer OPTIONAL,
...
}
defaultValidity INTEGER ::= 600
Termination ::= ENUMERATED {isCancellation(0), isNegation (1)}
ReferenceDenms ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..8, ...)) OF ActionID
END
asn1/dsrc_2_2_1.asn
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asn1/mapem_2_2_1.asn
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/** draft 001 of the MAPEM-PDU-Descriptions module for TS 103 831 V2.2.1 integrating:
* initial revision based on ASN.1 files of [ISO TS 19091] and [SAE J2735]
*/
-- Note: the above information will be deleted before publication
--! @options: no-fields-header
MAPEM-PDU-Descriptions {
itu-t (0) identified-organization (4) etsi (0) itsDomain (5) wg1 (1) ts103301 (103301) mapem (1) version2 (2)
}
DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
/**
* Includes from ETSI-ITS-DSRC
*/
MapData
FROM ETSI-ITS-DSRC {
itu-t (0) identified-organization (4) etsi (0) itsDomain (5) wg1 (1) ts103301 (103301) dsrc (6) major-version-2 (2) minor-version-1 (1)
}
WITH SUCCESSORS
/**
* Include ETSI TS 102 894-2 (ETSI-ITS-CDD)
*/
ItsPduHeader
FROM ETSI-ITS-CDD {
itu-t (0) identified-organization (4) etsi (0) itsDomain (5) wg1 (1) 102894 cdd (2) major-version-4 (4) minor-version-1 (1)
}
WITH SUCCESSORS;
/**
* Map (lane topology) extended Message
* This DF includes DEs for the MAPEM: protocolVersion, the MAPEM message type identifier `messageID`,
* the station identifier `stationID` of the originating ITS-S and the Map data from ETSI-ITS-DSRC.
*
* @field header: The DE `protocolVersion` is used to select the appropriate protocol decoder at the receiving ITS-S.
* It shall be set to 2.
* The DE `messageID` shall be mapem(5).
* @field map: contains the MAP data as defined in ETSI-ITS-DSRC.
*
* @category: Basic Information
* @revision: V1.3.1
*/
MAPEM ::= SEQUENCE {
header ItsPduHeader,
map MapData
}
END
asn1/spatem_2_2_1.asn
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/** draft 001 of the SPATEM-PDU-Descriptions module for TS 103 301 V2.2.1 integrating:
* initial revision based on ASN.1 files of [ISO TS 19091] and [SAE J2735]
*/
-- Note: the above information will be deleted before publication
--! @options: no-fields-header
SPATEM-PDU-Descriptions {
itu-t (0) identified-organization (4) etsi (0) itsDomain (5) wg1 (1) ts103301 (103301) spatem (0) major-version-2 (2) minor-version-1 (1)
}
DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
/**
* Includes from ETSI-ITS-DSRC
*/
SPAT
FROM ETSI-ITS-DSRC {
itu-t (0) identified-organization (4) etsi (0) itsDomain (5) wg1 (1) ts103301 (103301) dsrc (6) major-version-2 (2) minor-version-1 (1)
}
WITH SUCCESSORS
/**
* Include ETSI TS 102 894-2 (ETSI-ITS-CDD)
*/
ItsPduHeader
FROM ETSI-ITS-CDD {
itu-t (0) identified-organization (4) etsi (0) itsDomain (5) wg1 (1) 102894 cdd (2) major-version-4 (4) minor-version-1 (1)
}
WITH SUCCESSORS;
/**
* Signal phase and timing extended Message
*
* Signal phase and timing extended Message Root
* This DF includes DEs for the SPATEM: protocolVersion, the SPATEM message type identifier `messageID`,
* the station identifier `stationID` of the originating ITS-S and the SPaT data from ETSI-ITS-DSRC module.
*
* @field header: The DE `protocolVersion` used to select the appropriate protocol decoder at the receiving ITS-S.
* It shall be set to 2.
* The DE `messageID` shall be spatem(4).
* @field spat: contains the SPaT data as defined in ETSI-ITS-DSRC.
*
* @category: Basic Information
* @revision: V1.3.1
*/
SPATEM ::= SEQUENCE {
header ItsPduHeader,
spat SPAT
}
END
capture/README.md
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# Sniffer board and capture tooling
How to put an ESP32-C5 on the ITS-G5 channel as a passive sniffer, pull its captures onto this
PC, and check what is on air. The sniffer firmware itself is the third-party
`its-g5-receiver-firmware` checkout beside this repo; only the tooling and these notes are ours.
| File | What it does |
|---|---|
| `live_capture.py` | Streams the device's captures into a growing `.pcap` while it runs. The usual choice. |
| `dump_pcap.py` | Pulls one capture out of the device's in-memory buffer after the fact. |
| `../obu-firmware/test/pcap_gn_tally.py` | Tallies GeoNetworking headers per station over a `.pcap`. |
One-time: `pip install pyserial` (present in Python 3.11 on the bench PC, so `py -3.11` works).
## Which port
The sniffer firmware's console, and with it the pcap stream, goes out **UART0** - the board's
USB-bridge port (a CH343, its own COM number), not the native USB-C port. A board with only one
USB-C port cannot be used as a sniffer for this reason. On the bench this has been COM5 and, after
a re-enumeration, COM8.
## Live capture (preferred)
```powershell
cd capture
py -3.11 live_capture.py COM8
```
It writes `recordings/capture_<timestamp>.pcap` next to itself, flushing after every packet, so
the file can be read while it grows. Stop it with Ctrl+C. Use `-o <dir>` to write elsewhere;
`recordings/` is gitignored, since captures are large and are data rather than source. Captures
taken before 2026-09-14 are still in `its-g5-receiver-firmware/recordings/`; the host tests read
both directories.
### The CR insertion, and why captures used to be corrupt
ESP-IDF's newlib console converts LF to CRLF on its way out, and that applies to every `0x0a` byte
of the **binary** pcap stream, not only to log text. Each inserted CR shifts everything after it,
so pcap record headers and captured frames alike come out corrupt, and the file stops being
parseable at the first occurrence.
Measured on 2026-09-14: a 787 KB capture parsed cleanly for only 82 of about 2000 records, and
DENMs appeared on nonsense BTP ports because their payloads contain `0x0a` often. `undo_crlf()` in
`live_capture.py` reverses it on the raw stream before any framing, which is exact; afterwards a
capture parsed to EOF and DENMs read as port 2002 again.
**Captures taken before 2026-09-14 are truncated at their first corrupted record.** Anything
measured from them is worth re-checking. `dump_pcap.py` reads the same console and has not been
given the same treatment yet.
## Checking a capture
```powershell
py -3.11 ..\obu-firmware\test\pcap_gn_tally.py recordings\capture_<timestamp>.pcap
```
One row per station, packet type, BTP port and GN lifetime. For the messages themselves, decode
the payloads with `asn1tools` against the modules in `../asn1/` and re-encode them: identical bytes
mean the message was read exactly, wrong bytes mean it was not. `obu-firmware/test/check_replay.py`
does this over a whole capture.
## Flashing the sniffer firmware
From the receiver checkout, with its **pinned** ESP-IDF (not the global 5.5.4 install):
```powershell
cd its-g5-receiver-firmware
git submodule update --init --recursive
.\esp-idf\install.bat
Set-ExecutionPolicy -Scope Process -ExecutionPolicy Bypass
.\esp-idf\export.ps1
idf.py set-target esp32c5
idf.py -p COM8 -b 921600 flash
```
Its `sdkconfig` for a bare board (nothing wired) needs SPI Ethernet off, and the pcap destination
set to Memory, both under `idf.py menuconfig`. Wired variants have ready-made configs in that
checkout: `sdkconfig.proto-w5500`, `sdkconfig.proto-enc28j60`, `sdkconfig.proto-spi-eppp`.
To reflash a board that already has a built image, without a toolchain terminal:
```powershell
cd its-g5-receiver-firmware\build
C:\Espressif\python_env\idf5.5_py3.11_env\Scripts\python.exe -m esptool --chip esp32c5 -p COM8 -b 921600 write_flash --flash_mode dio --flash_freq 80m --flash_size 16MB 0x2000 bootloader/bootloader.bin 0x8000 partition_table/partition-table.bin 0x1e000 ota_data_initial.bin 0x20000 its-g5-receiver-firmware.bin
```
## Pulling a capture after the fact
Only for the Memory destination, and the buffer is small (`SNIFFER_PCAP_MEMORY_SIZE`, 4096 bytes
by default) - a smoke test, not a session. In the device console (`idf.py -p COM8 monitor`, exit
with Ctrl+T then Ctrl+X):
```
sniffer -P
sniffer --stop
```
Then, with the port free:
```powershell
py -3.11 dump_pcap.py COM8
```
capture/dump_pcap.py
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Pulls a capture off the ITS-G5 receiver's in-memory pcap buffer over the existing USB serial
connection and saves it as a real .pcap file on this machine.
Requires the firmware to be built with:
Example Configuration -> Select destination to store pcap file -> Memory
Usage (typical):
1. Close idf.py monitor (only one program can hold the COM port at a time).
2. Run a capture on the device: `sniffer -P` ... let it run ... `sniffer --stop`
3. python dump_pcap.py COM5
The device has no access to this computer's filesystem, so it can't write here directly. Instead,
`pcap --dump` streams the raw pcap bytes back over the same serial link, wrapped in plain-text
markers ("===PCAP-DUMP-START:<len>===" ... raw bytes ... "===PCAP-DUMP-END==="). This script finds
those markers and writes just the raw bytes out as a .pcap file.
Install dependency once: pip install pyserial
"""
import argparse
import datetime
import re
import sys
try:
import serial
except ImportError:
print("Missing dependency. Install it with: pip install pyserial", file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(1)
START_RE = re.compile(rb"===PCAP-DUMP-START:(\d+)===\n")
END_MARKER = b"\n===PCAP-DUMP-END===\n"
def main():
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__, formatter_class=argparse.RawDescriptionHelpFormatter)
parser.add_argument("port", help="Serial port the device is on, e.g. COM5")
parser.add_argument("-b", "--baud", type=int, default=115200, help="Baud rate (default: 115200)")
parser.add_argument("-o", "--outdir", default="recordings", help="Output directory (default: ./recordings)")
parser.add_argument("-t", "--timeout", type=float, default=15.0, help="Seconds to wait for the dump to start")
args = parser.parse_args()
import os
os.makedirs(args.outdir, exist_ok=True)
print(f"Opening {args.port} @ {args.baud}...")
with serial.Serial(args.port, args.baud, timeout=1) as ser:
# Nudge the console in case there's stale input, then request the dump.
ser.reset_input_buffer()
ser.write(b"\r\n")
ser.write(b"pcap -f dump --dump\r\n")
print("Waiting for dump to start...")
buf = b""
match = None
deadline = datetime.datetime.now() + datetime.timedelta(seconds=args.timeout)
while datetime.datetime.now() < deadline:
chunk = ser.read(256)
if chunk:
buf += chunk
match = START_RE.search(buf)
if match:
break
if not match:
print("Timed out waiting for '===PCAP-DUMP-START:...===' marker.\n"
"Check that: the firmware is built with the Memory pcap destination, a capture was\n"
"actually taken ('sniffer -P' then 'sniffer --stop'), and no other program (like\n"
"idf.py monitor) is holding the serial port open.", file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(1)
length = int(match.group(1))
print(f"Dump starting, {length} bytes expected.")
# Anything after the marker in our buffer is already part of the payload.
payload = buf[match.end():]
remaining = length - len(payload)
while remaining > 0:
chunk = ser.read(min(remaining, 4096))
if not chunk:
print(f"Serial read timed out with {remaining} bytes still missing.", file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(1)
payload += chunk
remaining -= len(chunk)
# Drain (and sanity-check) the trailing end marker, but don't fail hard if it's not exact.
tail = ser.read(len(END_MARKER))
if tail != END_MARKER:
print("Warning: end marker didn't match exactly - payload may still be fine.", file=sys.stderr)
timestamp = datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y%m%d_%H%M%S")
outpath = os.path.join(args.outdir, f"capture_{timestamp}.pcap")
with open(outpath, "wb") as f:
f.write(payload)
print(f"Saved {len(payload)} bytes to {outpath}")
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
capture/live_capture.py
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Continuously listens on the ITS-G5 receiver's serial console and writes every captured packet into a
live-growing .pcap file, with no console commands needed on the device side.
The firmware streams every packet it captures out over the same serial connection the console runs on,
automatically, as soon as the sniffer is running (which happens on boot by default). Each packet is framed
with plain-text markers so this script can pull the binary pcap bytes out of the stream even though
regular log lines are interleaved with it:
===PCAP-LIVE-HEADER:<len>===\\n<24 raw bytes>\\n (sent once, the pcap global header)
===PCAP-LIVE-PKT:<len>===\\n<raw bytes>\\n (sent once per captured packet)
Usage:
python live_capture.py COM5
Runs until you press Ctrl+C. Writes to recordings/capture_<timestamp>.pcap, flushing after every packet
so you can open the file in Wireshark while it's still being written (use "File > Open" again, or
Wireshark's own "Follow" won't auto-refresh but re-opening will show the latest packets).
Install dependency once: pip install pyserial
"""
import argparse
import datetime
import os
import re
import sys
import time
try:
import serial
except ImportError:
print("Missing dependency. Install it with: pip install pyserial", file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(1)
# \r? because the ESP console emits CRLF: on Windows the markers arrive as
# "===PCAP-LIVE-PKT:310===\r\n", which never matched a bare \n and left the capture silently
# empty while the device was streaming perfectly well.
HEADER_RE = re.compile(rb"===PCAP-LIVE-HEADER:(\d+)===\r?\n")
PKT_RE = re.compile(rb"===PCAP-LIVE-PKT:(\d+)===\r?\n")
LINKTYPE_ETHERNET = 1
LINKTYPE_IEEE802_11_RADIOTAP = 127
def mac_str(b):
return ":".join(f"{x:02x}" for x in b)
def build_default_pcap_header(link_type):
"""Synthesizes the same 24-byte global pcap header the firmware would have sent, for when we
connect after the device's one-time header already went out (see the race note in main())."""
header = bytearray(24)
header[0:4] = bytes([0xD4, 0xC3, 0xB2, 0xA1]) # magic (LE bytes of 0xA1B2C3D4)
header[4:6] = (2).to_bytes(2, "little") # major version
header[6:8] = (4).to_bytes(2, "little") # minor version
header[16:20] = (0x40000).to_bytes(4, "little") # snaplen
header[20:24] = link_type.to_bytes(4, "little")
return bytes(header)
def summarize_packet(link_type, record_bytes, index):
"""Best-effort human-readable one-line summary of a captured packet, for live feedback.
record_bytes is the raw 16-byte pcap record header followed by the captured frame."""
seconds = int.from_bytes(record_bytes[0:4], "little")
microseconds = int.from_bytes(record_bytes[4:8], "little")
cap_len = int.from_bytes(record_bytes[8:12], "little")
frame = record_bytes[16:]
ts = f"{seconds}.{microseconds:06d}"
if link_type == LINKTYPE_IEEE802_11_RADIOTAP and len(frame) >= 24:
radiotap_len = int.from_bytes(frame[2:4], "little")
rssi = frame[8] - 256 if frame[8] >= 128 else frame[8]
station_id = int.from_bytes(frame[16:24], "little")
mac_frame = frame[radiotap_len:]
if len(mac_frame) >= 16:
dst = mac_str(mac_frame[4:10])
src = mac_str(mac_frame[10:16])
else:
dst = src = "?"
station = f"{station_id:012x}" if station_id else "unknown"
return (f"#{index:<5} [{ts}] len={cap_len:<5} rssi={rssi:>4}dBm "
f"station={station} {src} -> {dst}")
if link_type == LINKTYPE_ETHERNET and len(frame) >= 14:
dst = mac_str(frame[0:6])
src = mac_str(frame[6:12])
ethertype = int.from_bytes(frame[12:14], "big")
return f"#{index:<5} [{ts}] len={cap_len:<5} eth {src} -> {dst} type=0x{ethertype:04x}"
return f"#{index:<5} [{ts}] len={cap_len:<5} (unrecognized frame format)"
def undo_crlf(chunk, state):
"""Undo the CR the device console inserts before every LF.
ESP-IDF's newlib console converts LF to CRLF on its way out, and that happens to every 0x0A
byte of the binary pcap stream too, not only to log text. Each inserted CR shifts everything
after it, so pcap record headers and captured frames alike come out corrupt. This is the
"byte inserted mid-frame" seen in older recordings; with DENM traffic on air it wrecks most
of a capture (measured 2026-09-14: a 787 KB file parsed cleanly for only 82 records).
Dropping one CR immediately before each LF undoes it exactly, provided it is done on the raw
stream before any framing and a trailing CR is carried across read boundaries. CR and LF are
written as byte values here so the transformation cannot be confused with an escape.
"""
CR, LF = bytes([13]), bytes([10])
if state["pending_cr"]:
chunk = CR + chunk
state["pending_cr"] = False
if chunk.endswith(CR):
chunk = chunk[:-1]
state["pending_cr"] = True
return chunk.replace(CR + LF, LF)
def main():
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__, formatter_class=argparse.RawDescriptionHelpFormatter)
parser.add_argument("port", help="Serial port the device is on, e.g. COM5")
parser.add_argument("-b", "--baud", type=int, default=115200, help="Baud rate (default: 115200)")
parser.add_argument("-o", "--outdir", default="recordings", help="Output directory (default: ./recordings)")
args = parser.parse_args()
os.makedirs(args.outdir, exist_ok=True)
timestamp = datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y%m%d_%H%M%S")
outpath = os.path.join(args.outdir, f"capture_{timestamp}.pcap")
print(f"Opening {args.port} @ {args.baud}...")
print(f"Writing live capture to {outpath}")
print("Press Ctrl+C to stop.")
header_written = False
link_type = None
packet_count = 0
buf = b""
total_bytes = 0
last_status = time.monotonic()
printed_raw_preview = False
crlf_state = {"pending_cr": False}
with serial.Serial(args.port, args.baud, timeout=1) as ser, open(outpath, "wb") as outfile:
def read_bytes(n):
return undo_crlf(ser.read(n), crlf_state)
try:
while True:
chunk = read_bytes(256)
if chunk:
buf += chunk
total_bytes += len(chunk)
now = time.monotonic()
if now - last_status >= 2:
last_status = now
print(f"[diagnostic] {total_bytes} raw bytes received so far, "
f"{packet_count} packets recognized, header_written={header_written}")
if total_bytes > 0 and not printed_raw_preview and not header_written and not PKT_RE.search(buf):
# We're getting bytes but none of them look like our markers - show a preview
# so we can tell whether this is plain log text (markers just haven't shown up
# yet), garbage (baud/port mismatch), or something else entirely.
preview = buf[:200]
print(f"[diagnostic] no markers matched yet - raw preview: {preview!r}")
printed_raw_preview = True
elif total_bytes == 0:
print("[diagnostic] zero bytes received from the port at all - this points at "
"the wrong COM port, another program holding the port, or a port that "
"isn't actually wired to the console/sniffer output.")
# The device only sends the global header once, right when the sniffer first starts
# (typically within a second or two of boot). If this script connects even slightly
# late - very likely right after a fresh flash, since esptool itself resets the board -
# that header is already gone before we ever see it. Rather than blocking forever
# waiting for a header that's never coming, look for whichever marker shows up first.
header_match = None if header_written else HEADER_RE.search(buf)
pkt_match = PKT_RE.search(buf)
if header_match and (not pkt_match or header_match.start() < pkt_match.start()):
length = int(header_match.group(1))
buf = buf[header_match.end():]
while len(buf) < length:
buf += read_bytes(length - len(buf))
header_bytes = buf[:length]
outfile.write(header_bytes)
outfile.flush()
buf = buf[length:]
header_written = True
if length >= 24:
link_type = int.from_bytes(header_bytes[20:24], "little")
print(f"Got pcap global header (link type {link_type}) - device is streaming.\n")
continue
if not header_written and pkt_match:
link_type = LINKTYPE_IEEE802_11_RADIOTAP
outfile.write(build_default_pcap_header(link_type))
outfile.flush()
header_written = True
print("Note: missed the device's one-time pcap header (it was likely sent before "
"this script connected, e.g. right after a flash/reset) - assuming WLAN "
"radiotap capture and writing a default header instead.\n")
# fall through and process pkt_match below, don't discard this packet
if not pkt_match:
# Keep the buffer from growing unbounded while waiting for a marker, but don't
# discard anything - a marker could be split across reads.
if len(buf) > 65536:
buf = buf[-4096:]
continue
length = int(pkt_match.group(1))
buf = buf[pkt_match.end():]
while len(buf) < length:
buf += read_bytes(length - len(buf))
record_bytes = buf[:length]
outfile.write(record_bytes)
outfile.flush()
buf = buf[length:]
packet_count += 1
print(summarize_packet(link_type, record_bytes, packet_count))
except KeyboardInterrupt:
print(f"\nStopped. {packet_count} packets saved to {outpath}")
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
docs/01-requirements-traceability.md
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# Requirements traceability matrix
Maps every section of `V2X_MicrOBU_Android_App_Requirements_v15.pdf` (37 pages, chapters 0–13) to
its implementation and to the evidence that it works.
**Status as of 2026-08-25**, commit `cc35994`. Test counts refer to `app/src/test/` (41 tests,
0 failures); bench measurements refer to `05-obu-bench-test-2026-08-25.md`.
## How to read this
The project began against the **consider it CiT One OBU** and later added the **ESP32-C5** as a
second hardware path (requirements chapter 13). That transition is the single biggest source of
divergence in this table, and it is deliberate rather than drift: chapter 13 was written to describe
it. Where a requirement was authored assuming the CiT One, the ESP32-C5 path may satisfy it by a
different mechanism, satisfy it only partly, or make it inapplicable.
Status values:
| status | meaning |
|---|---|
| **Done** | implemented and exercised on both hardware paths |
| **Done (CiT One)** | implemented; applies only to the CiT One path by design |
| **Done (ESP32-C5)** | implemented; applies only to the ESP32-C5 path by design |
| **Partial** | implemented in part, with the remainder identified |
| **Backlog** | explicitly deferred in the requirements themselves |
| **Superseded** | the ESP32-C5 transition changed the answer; see the note |
| **Not started** | no implementation |
"Cited" means a source file names the section in a KDoc comment — 23 files do. Absence of a citation
is **not** absence of implementation; several well-covered areas were written before that convention
and are mapped here by inspection.
---
## 0. Project Context & Main Goal
| § | Title | Status | Implementation | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0.1 | Technological Innovation Context | n/a | context, not a requirement | — |
| 0.2 | Bicycle Safety Use Case Foundation (C2C-CC) | **Done** | `DenmUseCase.kt` *(cited)*, `UseCaseType.kt` | use cases 1.1/1.2 below |
**Note.** 0.2 is the origin of the project's central architectural rule: the CAM-based use cases
never generate DENM. `DenmUseCase.kt` records this, and it survived the ESP32 transition unchanged.
## 1. Phase 01 — Data Collection
| § | Title | Status | Implementation | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.1 | Test Intersections & Use Cases | **Done** | `UseCaseDetectionEngine.kt`, `UseCaseType.kt` *(both cited)* | IMA-S observed firing on hardware, 2026-08-25 |
| 1.2 | C2C-CC Use Case Mapping & Roadmap | **Done** | `UseCaseType.kt`, `UseCaseDetectionConfig.kt` *(both cited)* | 5 use cases enumerated: IMA-B, IMA-S, RTW-B, LTW-B, SMVA/BCW-B |
## 2. Functional Requirements
| § | Title | Status | Implementation | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2.1 | Screens & Features | **Done** | `ui/screens/` — Dashboard, Record, Trips, V2X, Settings | bench screenshots |
| 2.2 | User Interactions | **Done** | `UseCaseAlertPreferences.kt` *(cited)*, Settings screen | per-use-case toggles |
| 2.3 | Backend, Database & Login | **Partial** | `data/db/` (Room: sessions, trips, events, V2X messages) | no login/backend; local-only by design |
**Gap.** 2.3's backend and login have no implementation. Everything is on-device. Worth stating
explicitly in the thesis as a scope boundary rather than leaving it to be discovered.
## 3. Non-Functional Requirements
| § | Title | Status | Implementation | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | Android Version & Target Devices | **Done** | `minSdk 29`, `targetSdk 36` | runs on Pixel 9 Pro |
| 3.2 | Performance & Offline | **Done** | offline by construction on the ESP32-C5 path | 210 MB PSS, 43 threads, no GC pressure attributable to the app |
**ESP32-C5 note.** 3.2's offline requirement is *more* satisfied after the transition: the ESP32-C5
path needs no MQTT broker and no network at all.
## 4. Technical Requirements
| § | Title | Status | Implementation | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4.1 | Development Environment | **Done** | Gradle 8.10.2, AGP, Android Studio JBR | builds from CLI |
| 4.2 | Architecture | **Done** | `UseCaseDetectionEngine.kt` *(cited)*; MVVM + Hilt + repositories | pure-domain classes unit-tested without Android |
| 4.3 | Key Libraries | **Done** | Compose, Room, Hilt, osmdroid, usb-serial-for-android, Paho MQTT | — |
| 4.4 | Security Requirements (future) | **Backlog** | — | see note |
**Security note (4.4).** ETSI TS 103 097 message signing is not implemented and is out of scope. The
firmware rejects secured packets (GN `NextHeader=2`) rather than mis-parsing them; 75 such frames
were observed on the bench. The OBU under test runs `ItsGnSecurity = 0`, so this has not blocked
anything. **This is the most likely reviewer question and the answer should be pre-written.**
## 5. Design Requirements
| § | Title | Status | Implementation | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5.1–5.4 | Visual language, system bars, UX, wireframes | **Done** | Compose Material 3, edge-to-edge | screenshots |
| 5.5 | Alert Level Model (C2C-CC three-tier) | **Done** | `AlertLevel.kt`, `UseCaseDetectionConfig.kt`, `UseCaseDetectionEngine.kt` *(all cited)* | Info / Awareness / Warning; observed WARNING on hardware |
## 6. Sensor Data Streams (Phase 01)
| § | Title | Status | Implementation | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 6 | Sensor Data Streams | **Done** | `SensorRepository.kt`, `CamUseCaseRepository.kt` *(cited)* | GNSS, accel, gyro, magnetometer, barometer |
## 7. Recording Session & Data Export
| § | Title | Status | Implementation | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7.1 | Recording Mode | **Done** | `TripRecordingService.kt`, `RecordingScreen.kt` | — |
| 7.2 | CSV Export Format | **Done** | `CsvExporter.kt`, `TripExporter.kt` | export includes V2X messages and RSSI |
## 8. Connectivity
| § | Title | Status | Implementation | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 8.1 | Connection Phase Roadmap | **Superseded** | `ObuHardware.kt`, `TransportType.kt` | chapter 13 replaced the roadmap |
| 8.2 | Transport Methods Detail | **Partial** | `UsbSerialTransport.kt`, `UsbNetworkDetector.kt`, `MqttRepository.kt` | USB-C both paths; **Bluetooth not implemented** (13.9 keeps it open) |
## 9. Phase 01 Key Design Principles
| § | Title | Status | Implementation | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 9 | Key Design Principles | **Done** | pure-domain `domain/` packages, no Android imports | `EventDetectorTest`, `UseCaseDetectionEngine` unit-testable |
## 10. Phase 02 — OBU Communication (CAM-based use cases)
| § | Title | Status | Implementation | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10.1 | USB-C Wired Transport | **Done (CiT One)** | `UsbNetworkDetector.kt` (IP over USB tethering) | superseded on the ESP32-C5 path by USB serial |
| 10.2 | CAM Reception & Use Case Detection | **Done** | `Cam.kt`, `CamUseCaseRepository.kt`, `MqttViewModel.kt`, `MqttTopicViewerScreen.kt` *(all cited)* | 1244 CAMs decoded in 305 s, 0 failures |
| 10.2.1 | Detection Algorithm Detail | **Done** | `UseCaseDetectionEngine.kt`, `UseCaseDetectionConfig.kt` | IMA-S fired with TTC 4.8 s on hardware |
| 10.3 | Test and Verification Procedure | **Done** | `CamParser.kt`, `UseCaseDetectionConfig.kt`, `UseCaseDetectionEngine.kt` *(all cited)* | extended well beyond the original procedure — see chapter 14 below |
| 10.4 | New/Updated UI Elements | **Done** | `MqttTopicViewerScreen.kt` *(cited)* | alert panel, list/topics/map |
| 10.5 | Phase 02 Key Technical Decisions | **Done** | `DenmUseCase.kt` | DENM decoupled from sensor triggers |
**Transition note (10.1).** Phase 02 assumed IP-over-USB tethering to the CiT One. The ESP32-C5 path
uses a custom framed serial protocol over USB CDC instead. Both are "USB-C wired transport", but they
share no code. The requirement is satisfied twice, by different means.
## 11. Phase A — Trip Recording & Cyclist Event Detection
| § | Title | Status | Implementation | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 11.1 | Orientation-Independent Sensor Strategy | **Done** | `SensorRepository.kt` (magnitude-based) | — |
| 11.2 | Running Standard Deviation Event Detector | **Done** | `EventDetector.kt`, `RunningStats.kt` | **18 unit tests, 0 failures** |
| 11.3 | Trip Recording Architecture | **Done** | `TripRepository.kt`, `TripRecordingService.kt` *(cited)* | — |
| 11.4 | Data Model | **Partial — scope reduced** | `data/db/` Room entities *(cited)* | `detected_events` dropped in schema v5, see scope note |
| 11.5 | New UI Elements for Phase A | **Partial — scope reduced** | `TripHistoryScreen.kt`, `TripReviewScreen.kt` | event pins/counters removed by decision, see note |
| 11.6 | Phase A Success Criteria | **Partial** | — | needs a real ride; see Open Items |
**Correction note (11.2).** Four `EventDetectorTest` cases had been failing since the initial commit.
Investigation (2026-08-25) established the **detector was correct and the tests were wrong**: they
described stimuli the detector cannot physically see, because they ignored the settling time of the
rolling standard-deviation window. Tests corrected, assertions unchanged, detector untouched. This is
worth reporting — it is a finding about test design, not a defect.
**Scope note (11.5).** The event-detection UI — the live per-type counters on the recording screen,
the coloured event pins and detail sheet on the trip review map, and the event count on the trip
history card — was removed deliberately. A count of the rider's own braking events is not a goal of
this project. The detector itself still runs: it is the input to the CAM transmit-rate policy
(§ 13), which raises the beacon rate from 1 Hz to the elevated rate for five seconds after a
detected manoeuvre. That is now its only effect: the `detected_events` table was dropped in schema
v5 and the per-event rows removed from the trip CSV, so a detected manoeuvre is consumed and
discarded. `trips.eventCount` is kept as a single integer per ride, since dropping a SQLite column
means recreating the table.
**Defect note (11.2).** Two defects found while documenting the detector were fixed on 2026-09-07.
The nine threshold overrides in `TripRecordingService`'s constructor were promoted to
`DetectionConfig`'s defaults and the override deleted, so there is one configuration and
`EventDetectorTest` exercises the shipping thresholds rather than the superseded Phase A ones;
detector sensitivity is unchanged, and the synthetic stimuli were re-derived because several no
longer cleared the stricter real thresholds. `brakingHighConfidenceRate` was renamed
`brakingHighConfidencePeakDrop`: it was documented as a rate but has always been compared against
the peak cumulative speed drop. The name was corrected rather than the comparison, so detector
output is unchanged and the confidence assertions remain valid evidence.
## 12. Future Architecture & Open Design Questions
| § | Title | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| 12.1 | Multi-Vehicle Handling & Notification Limits | **Partial** | engine tracks per-station history; no notification cap |
| 12.2 | Intersection Ambiguity: Traffic-Light State | **Partial — advanced** | **SPATEM now decoded** (`SpatemUperCodec.kt`), see below |
| 12.3 | Shared-Road / Bike Lane Awareness Dataset | **Not started** | would need MAPEM lane geometry |
| 12.4 | Geo-Server for Crowdsourced Trajectory Data | **Not started** | related to the 2.3 backend gap |
| 12.5 | Geofencing Around High-Risk Intersections | **Not started** | — |
| 12.6 | Sensor Fusion Roadmap (Kalman Filter) | **Not started** | — |
| 12.7 | EventDetector Evolution | **Not started** | — |
**12.2 is the notable movement.** The requirements listed traffic-light state as future/backlog. It
is now partly delivered: SPATEM is received over the air and decoded to per-signal-group phase and
timing, validated against 79,042 real messages. What remains is the *association* problem — knowing
which signal group applies to the rider's lane — which needs MAPEM geometry (12.3). Worth presenting
as a backlog item advanced ahead of schedule, with the remaining half named precisely.
## 13. Phase 03 — ESP32-C5 Dual-OBU & Phone-Generated CAM
The transition chapter. Cited by **16 source files**, more than any other.
| § | Title | Status | Implementation | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 13.1 | ESP32-C5 as a Second OBU Option | **Done** | `obu-firmware/`, `ObuHardware.kt` | bench campaign T1–T9 |
| 13.2 | Transport: USB-C to ESP32 | **Done** | `SerialFrame.kt`, `serial_link.c` | 2868 frames / 305 s, 0 errors |
| 13.3 | Settings: OBU Hardware Selection | **Done** | `ObuHardwarePreferences.kt`, Settings | both paths selectable |
| 13.4 | DENM Trigger Retained for CiT One Only | **Done (CiT One)** | `MqttTopicViewerScreen.kt` gating | trigger hidden on the ESP32-C5 path |
| 13.5 | Phone-Generated CAM | **Done (ESP32-C5)** | `PhoneCamBuilder.kt`, `CamUperCodec.kt`, `CamTransmitLoop.kt` | **golden-byte test**; 26 own CAMs verified off-air by an independent decoder |
| 13.6 | Adaptive CAM Transmission Rate | **Partial** | `CamTransmitConfig.kt` | fixed 1 Hz pinger; adaptive rate not implemented |
| 13.7 | UI Updates: Map View & Dashboard | **Done** | `V2xLiveMapView.kt`, `DashboardScreen.kt` | screenshots |
| 13.8 | Detection Engine: Unchanged for Reception | **Done** | `UseCaseDetectionEngine.kt` | engine is transport-agnostic; confirmed by inspection — zero SPATEM/MAPEM references |
| 13.9 | Bluetooth Transport (Open Discussion) | **Not started** | — | remains open, as the requirement says |
**13.8 is the load-bearing claim of the transition** and it holds: the same detection engine serves
both hardware paths, fed by `CamUseCaseRepository` from either MQTT or serial. That is what makes the
ESP32-C5 a drop-in second OBU rather than a fork of the application.
---
## Beyond the requirements
Work delivered that chapter 13 does not cover, because it postdates v15 of the document. For a
publication these are contributions rather than scope creep, and they need their own section.
| area | what | evidence |
|---|---|---|
| DENM over-the-air receive | GeoBroadcast unwrapping, `DenmUperCodec` | 1885 DENMs cross-checked, 0 mismatches |
| SPATEM receive | `SpatemUperCodec`, live signal phase UI | 79,042 messages cross-checked, 0 mismatches |
| RSU CAM support | `rsuContainerHighFrequency` decoding | 611 RSU CAMs decoded on the bench |
| Verification methodology | independent ETSI oracle, golden bytes, real captures | three encoding bugs found that self-consistent tests structurally cannot catch |
## Open items
Ranked by what a reviewer is most likely to probe.
1. **11.6 Phase A success criteria** — needs a real ride. The bench proves reception; it cannot
prove the use case behaves correctly with two genuinely moving stations. This is the main
remaining evidence gap for the central claim.
2. **4.4 Security** — no message signing. Pre-write the answer.
3. **2.3 Backend & login** — not implemented; state as a scope boundary.
4. **13.6 Adaptive CAM rate** — fixed 1 Hz.
5. **8.2 / 13.9 Bluetooth** — not implemented; the requirements leave it open.
6. **12.2 remainder** — signal-group-to-lane association needs MAPEM.
## Known limitations carried deliberately
Documented decisions, not oversights. Each has its reasoning recorded in the commit history and in
`05-obu-bench-test-2026-08-25.md`.
- **512-byte serial payload cap.** ~70% of *road* RSU SPATEMs would be dropped. Accepted: the
intersection use case is CAM-driven and needs none of it, and raising the cap would put a
measured, zero-failure chain at risk for an add-on. CAM 26–211 B and DENM 402 B both fit.
- **No MAPEM decoder.** Nothing on air transmits it; it exists only in recorded drive data.
- **Secured messages rejected**, not mis-parsed.
- **No auto-reconnect** after USB re-enumeration; requires a manual Connect.
- **Station IDs rotate** (observed twice within one session), so they cannot identify a physical
unit over time.
docs/Architecture2.drawio
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docs/references.bib
+151
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@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
% MicrOBU standards and source references.
% Collected for the technical documentation and any later publication.
% Keep entry keys stable once cited.
@techreport{etsi_en_302_637_2,
author = {{ETSI}},
title = {Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Vehicular Communications; Basic Set of Applications; Part 2: Specification of Cooperative Awareness Basic Service},
institution = {European Telecommunications Standards Institute},
type = {{EN}},
number = {302 637-2},
note = {CAM encode and decode},
}
@techreport{etsi_en_302_637_3,
author = {{ETSI}},
title = {Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Vehicular Communications; Basic Set of Applications; Part 3: Specifications of Decentralized Environmental Notification Basic Service},
institution = {European Telecommunications Standards Institute},
type = {{EN}},
number = {302 637-3},
note = {DENM decode and the HLN-SV transmit profile},
}
@techreport{etsi_ts_103_301,
author = {{ETSI}},
title = {Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Vehicular Communications; Basic Set of Applications; Facilities layer protocols and communication requirements for infrastructure services},
institution = {European Telecommunications Standards Institute},
type = {{TS}},
number = {103 301},
note = {SPATEM and MAPEM},
}
@techreport{sae_j2735,
author = {{SAE International}},
title = {V2X Communications Message Set Dictionary},
institution = {SAE International},
type = {Standard},
number = {J2735},
note = {SPATEM and MAPEM message content},
}
@techreport{etsi_ts_102_894_2,
author = {{ETSI}},
title = {Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Users and applications requirements; Part 2: Applications and facilities layer common data dictionary},
institution = {European Telecommunications Standards Institute},
type = {{TS}},
number = {102 894-2},
note = {Common data dictionary for all messages},
}
@techreport{etsi_en_302_636_4_1,
author = {{ETSI}},
title = {Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Vehicular Communications; GeoNetworking; Part 4: Geographical addressing and forwarding for point-to-point and point-to-multipoint communications; Sub-part 1: Media-Independent Functionality},
institution = {European Telecommunications Standards Institute},
type = {{EN}},
number = {302 636-4-1},
note = {GeoNetworking Basic, Common and SHB headers; verified field by field},
}
@techreport{etsi_en_302_636_5_1,
author = {{ETSI}},
title = {Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Vehicular Communications; GeoNetworking; Part 5: Transport Protocols; Sub-part 1: Basic Transport Protocol},
institution = {European Telecommunications Standards Institute},
type = {{EN}},
number = {302 636-5-1},
note = {BTP-B header},
}
@techreport{etsi_ts_103_248,
author = {{ETSI}},
title = {Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); GeoNetworking; Port Numbers for the Basic Transport Protocol (BTP)},
institution = {European Telecommunications Standards Institute},
type = {{TS}},
number = {103 248},
note = {BTP destination ports 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004},
}
@techreport{etsi_ts_103_097,
author = {{ETSI}},
title = {Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Security; Security header and certificate formats},
institution = {European Telecommunications Standards Institute},
type = {{TS}},
number = {103 097},
note = {Message signing; not implemented in this project},
}
@techreport{ieee_802_11_ocb,
author = {{IEEE}},
title = {IEEE Standard for Information Technology; Telecommunications and Information Exchange between Systems; Local and Metropolitan Area Networks; Specific Requirements; Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications},
institution = {Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers},
type = {Standard},
number = {802.11},
note = {Operation outside the context of a BSS (OCB), the frame layer used by ITS-G5},
}
@techreport{c2ccc_wp_2324,
author = {{Car 2 Car Communication Consortium}},
title = {Bicycle Safety Use Cases},
institution = {Car 2 Car Communication Consortium},
type = {White Paper},
number = {C2CCC\_WP\_2324},
version = {1.0},
year = {2026},
month = {5},
note = {Source of the five in-scope use cases: IMA-B, IMA-S, RTW-B, LTW-B, SMVA/BCW-B},
}
@techreport{microbu_requirements_v15,
author = {{HAW Hamburg}},
title = {V2X MicrOBU Android App Requirements},
institution = {HAW Hamburg, Urban Mobility Lab},
version = {15},
note = {The requirements baseline, chapters 0 to 13, 37 pages},
}
@manual{considerit_mqtt_api_v6,
author = {{consider it GmbH}},
title = {CiT MQTT API Documentation},
version = {6},
year = {2025},
month = {2},
note = {The MQTT API used on the CiT One hardware path},
}
@manual{considerit_tx_use_cases_v4,
author = {{consider it GmbH}},
title = {CiT Transmit Use Cases},
version = {4},
year = {2025},
month = {2},
note = {Transmit use case definitions including HLN-SV, causeCode 94},
}
@misc{considerit_cits_parser,
author = {{consider it GmbH}},
title = {{C-ITS-Parser}},
howpublished = {\url{https://github.com/consider-it/C-ITS-Parser}},
note = {Commit f457426efc2486fac49a02fc9a1c8c7762d160e9, MIT licensed. Source of the seven vendored ASN.1 modules in \texttt{asn1/}},
}
@misc{asn1tools,
title = {{asn1tools}},
howpublished = {Python package, version 0.167.0},
note = {The independent ASN.1 implementation used as the verification oracle},
}
@misc{its_g5_receiver_firmware_txenabled,
author = {{opentrafficmap}},
title = {{its-g5-receiver-firmware\_txenabled}},
howpublished = {\url{https://codeberg.org/opentrafficmap/its-g5-receiver-firmware_txenabled}},
note = {Transmit-enabled fork of the receiver firmware; source of the raw transmit bypass in \texttt{tx\_custom.c}},
}
gradle/libs.versions.toml
+2
View File
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ kotlin = "2.1.0"
ksp = "2.1.0-1.0.29"
hilt = "2.56.2"
junit = "4.13.2"
json = "20240303"
hiltNavigationCompose = "1.2.0"
datastore = "1.1.1"
pahoMqtt = "1.2.5"
@@ -49,6 +50,7 @@ osmdroid = { group = "org.osmdroid", name = "osmdroid-android", version.ref = "o
androidx-core-splashscreen = { group = "androidx.core", name = "core-splashscreen", version.ref = "splashscreen" }
usb-serial-android = { group = "com.github.mik3y", name = "usb-serial-for-android", version.ref = "usbSerial" }
junit = { group = "junit", name = "junit", version.ref = "junit" }
json = { group = "org.json", name = "json", version.ref = "json" }
kotlinx-coroutines-test = { group = "org.jetbrains.kotlinx", name = "kotlinx-coroutines-test", version.ref = "coroutines" }
[plugins]
obu-cam-transmistter/NOTES.md
+46
View File
@@ -51,3 +51,49 @@ Known gaps, tracked as TODOs in the source: no real GNSS (lat/long hardcoded
0), no real time source (detectionTime/referenceTime hardcoded 0, decodes as
2004-01-01), fixed (non-rotating) pseudonym MAC, SHB instead of GeoBroadcast
(no multi-hop forwarding), unsecured (no IEEE 1609.2 signing).
## Running it as a bench beacon
This firmware needs no phone: it beacons a CAM every second by itself
(`TX_INTERVAL_MS`) from station `0x0BADC0DE` (195936478), stationType 5
(passengerCar), at the hardcoded bench position, under the fixed MAC
`02:00:00:00:00:01`, on 5900 MHz. That makes it the quickest way to put known,
repeatable traffic on air, and it is how the 4-bit `yawRateConfidence` encoding
was confirmed over the air on 2026-09-14.
A board with only one USB-C port is fine. This firmware's console is on UART0,
so such a board shows no log output, but nothing here needs the console.
Flash it from the toolchain terminal (ESP-IDF 5.5.4, see the table above):
```powershell
cd C:\Users\Ashin\AndroidStudioProjects\MicrOBU\obu-cam-transmistter
idf.py -p COM10 -b 921600 flash
```
Or flash the existing build without any toolchain terminal:
```powershell
cd obu-cam-transmistter\build
C:\Espressif\python_env\idf5.5_py3.11_env\Scripts\python.exe -m esptool --chip esp32c5 -p COM10 -b 921600 write_flash --flash_mode dio --flash_freq 80m --flash_size 2MB 0x2000 bootloader/bootloader.bin 0x8000 partition_table/partition-table.bin 0x10000 obu_firmware.bin
```
It starts beaconing as soon as it boots, so there is nothing to start by hand,
and unplugging it is how you stop it.
**It transmits under the same MAC as the phone's CAM pinger**, so on air the two
are told apart by station ID (195936478 here, 999999 for the pinger), never by
source address.
To see what it is sending, capture on the sniffer board and decode:
```powershell
cd capture
py -3.11 live_capture.py COM8
py -3.11 ..\obu-firmware\test\pcap_gn_tally.py recordings\capture_<timestamp>.pcap
```
The tally lists it as SHB / port 2001 / lifetime `0x05`. For the message itself,
decode the payload with `asn1tools` against `asn1/cam_1_4_1.asn` +
`asn1/cdd_1_3_1_1.asn`; re-encoding must return the identical bytes. On
2026-09-14, 72 of 72 frames did.
obu-cam-transmistter/main/cam.c
+6 -2
View File
@@ -117,9 +117,13 @@ int cam_encode(const cam_fields_t *f, uint8_t *buf, size_t buf_len)
bw_put_bits(&bw, 0, 1); // extension bit: value is in the root list
bw_put_bits(&bw, 2, 2); // unavailable(2)
// YawRate: YawRateValue(-32766..32767)->16 (offset from -32766),
// YawRateConfidence ENUM 8 values -> 3 bits
// YawRateConfidence ENUM with NINE values, degSec-000-01(0) .. unavailable(8)
// (cdd_1_3_1_1.asn) -> 4 bits. This wrote 3 bits with value 7, one bit short and the
// wrong symbol (7 is outOfRange), so every field after it shifted for any
// standards-compliant receiver. The app's CamUperCodec.kt fixed the same line on
// 2026-08-20; this copy was missed until 2026-09-11.
bw_put_bits(&bw, 32767 - (uint32_t)(-32766), 16); // yawRateValue: unavailable(32767)
bw_put_bits(&bw, 7, 3); // yawRateConfidence: unavailable(7)
bw_put_bits(&bw, 8, 4); // yawRateConfidence: unavailable(8)
// ---- LowFrequencyContainer ---- CHOICE { basicVehicleContainerLowFrequency,
// ... } - EXTENSIBLE, 1 root alternative (index needs 0 bits).
obu-cam-transmistter/main/geonet.c
+14 -4
View File
@@ -7,9 +7,9 @@ int geonet_wrap_shb(const uint8_t *its_payload, int its_len,
uint16_t btp_dest_port,
uint8_t *out, size_t out_len)
{
// GN Basic Header (4) + GN Common Header (8) + SHB source LPV (24)
// GN Basic Header (4) + GN Common Header (8) + SHB extended header (28)
// + BTP-B header (4) + ITS payload
int total = 4 + 8 + 24 + 4 + its_len;
int total = 4 + 8 + 28 + 4 + its_len;
if ((size_t)total > out_len) {
return -1;
}
@@ -19,7 +19,10 @@ int geonet_wrap_shb(const uint8_t *its_payload, int its_len,
// ---- GN Basic Header (4 bytes) ---- (EN 302 636-4-1 clause 9.6)
*p++ = (uint8_t)((1 << 4) | 1); // version=1, NextHeader=1 (Common Header, unsecured)
*p++ = 0x00; // reserved
*p++ = 0x83; // lifetime (~60s in the base/multiplier encoding) - tune if needed
// Lifetime: multiplier in the upper 6 bits, base in the lower 2 (0 = 50 ms, 1 = 1 s, 2 = 10 s,
// 3 = 100 s). 0x05 = 1 x 1 s, what real stations send their CAMs with. Was 0x83, commented as
// ~60 s but decoding to 32 x 100 s = 3200 s. See obu-firmware's geonet.c.
*p++ = 0x05;
*p++ = 1; // remaining hop limit = 1 (SHB single-hop; matches CAM in the Rust reference)
// ---- GN Common Header (8 bytes) ---- (clause 9.7)
@@ -43,7 +46,7 @@ int geonet_wrap_shb(const uint8_t *its_payload, int its_len,
*p++ = 1; // max hop limit = 1, matches basic header RHL (SHB single-hop)
*p++ = 0x00; // reserved
// ---- SHB extended header: Source Long Position Vector (24 bytes) ----
// ---- SHB extended header: Source Position Vector (24) + Reserved (4) = 28 bytes ----
// (clause 9.5.2). GN_ADDR (8 bytes) is itself structured, not a raw
// pseudonym (clause 9.5.1): bit0 M-flag(0=auto-derived), bits1-5 ITS-S
// type (5-bit), bits6-15 reserved(=0), then octets2-7 = MID, which is
@@ -71,6 +74,13 @@ int geonet_wrap_shb(const uint8_t *its_payload, int its_len,
*p++ = 0x00; *p++ = 0x00;
// Heading (16 bits, 0.1 degree units): 0 = due north / unavailable
*p++ = 0x00; *p++ = 0x00;
// Reserved (4 bytes) - clause 9.8.4: the SHB extended header is the 24-byte Source Position
// Vector FOLLOWED BY a 4-byte reserved field (media-dependent data), 28 bytes in total. These
// four bytes were missing, which is why a standards-compliant receiver read our CAM payload's
// first two bytes (0x02 0x02 = protocolVersion/messageID) as the BTP destination port and saw
// 514 instead of 2001 - confirmed against live air capture, 2026-08-13. Our own gn_unwrap.c
// had the identical off-by-four, so ESP32<->ESP32 worked and nothing else did.
*p++ = 0x00; *p++ = 0x00; *p++ = 0x00; *p++ = 0x00;
// ---- BTP-B header (4 bytes) ----
*p++ = (uint8_t)(btp_dest_port >> 8);
obu-firmware/main/cam.c
+6 -2
View File
@@ -122,9 +122,13 @@ int cam_encode(const cam_fields_t *f, uint8_t *buf, size_t buf_len)
bw_put_bits(&bw, 0, 1); // extension bit: value is in the root list
bw_put_bits(&bw, 2, 2); // unavailable(2)
// YawRate: YawRateValue(-32766..32767)->16 (offset from -32766),
// YawRateConfidence ENUM 8 values -> 3 bits
// YawRateConfidence ENUM with NINE values, degSec-000-01(0) .. unavailable(8)
// (cdd_1_3_1_1.asn) -> 4 bits. This wrote 3 bits with value 7, one bit short and the
// wrong symbol (7 is outOfRange), so every field after it shifted for any
// standards-compliant receiver. The app's CamUperCodec.kt fixed the same line on
// 2026-08-20; this reference copy was missed until 2026-09-11.
bw_put_bits(&bw, 32767 - (uint32_t)(-32766), 16); // yawRateValue: unavailable(32767)
bw_put_bits(&bw, 7, 3); // yawRateConfidence: unavailable(7)
bw_put_bits(&bw, 8, 4); // yawRateConfidence: unavailable(8)
// ---- LowFrequencyContainer ---- CHOICE { basicVehicleContainerLowFrequency,
// ... } - EXTENSIBLE, 1 root alternative (index needs 0 bits).
obu-firmware/main/geonet.c
+49 -26
View File
@@ -1,15 +1,29 @@
#include "geonet.h"
#include <string.h>
// GeoNetworking is big-endian throughout, unlike this project's serial framing.
static void put_be16(uint8_t **p, uint16_t v)
{
*(*p)++ = (uint8_t)(v >> 8);
*(*p)++ = (uint8_t)(v);
}
static void put_be32(uint8_t **p, uint32_t v)
{
*(*p)++ = (uint8_t)(v >> 24);
*(*p)++ = (uint8_t)(v >> 16);
*(*p)++ = (uint8_t)(v >> 8);
*(*p)++ = (uint8_t)(v);
}
int geonet_wrap_shb(const uint8_t *its_payload, int its_len,
const uint8_t mac[6], uint8_t station_type,
int32_t latitude_tenmicrodeg, int32_t longitude_tenmicrodeg,
const gn_lpv_t *lpv,
uint16_t btp_dest_port,
uint8_t *out, size_t out_len)
{
// GN Basic Header (4) + GN Common Header (8) + SHB source LPV (24)
// GN Basic Header (4) + GN Common Header (8) + SHB extended header (28)
// + BTP-B header (4) + ITS payload
int total = 4 + 8 + 24 + 4 + its_len;
int total = 4 + 8 + 28 + 4 + its_len;
if ((size_t)total > out_len) {
return -1;
}
@@ -19,7 +33,12 @@ int geonet_wrap_shb(const uint8_t *its_payload, int its_len,
// ---- GN Basic Header (4 bytes) ---- (EN 302 636-4-1 clause 9.6)
*p++ = (uint8_t)((1 << 4) | 1); // version=1, NextHeader=1 (Common Header, unsecured)
*p++ = 0x00; // reserved
*p++ = 0x83; // lifetime (~60s in the base/multiplier encoding) - tune if needed
// Lifetime: multiplier in the upper 6 bits, base in the lower 2 (0 = 50 ms, 1 = 1 s, 2 = 10 s,
// 3 = 100 s). 0x05 = 1 x 1 s, which is what every other station in
// its-g5-receiver-firmware/recordings sends its CAMs with. This was 0x83, commented as ~60 s but
// decoding to 32 x 100 s = 3200 s, beyond the 600 s itsGnMaxPacketLifetime a sender may use at
// all. A DENM would want a longer one (the captured GeoBroadcast DENMs use 0x79, 30 s).
*p++ = 0x05;
*p++ = 1; // remaining hop limit = 1 (SHB single-hop; matches CAM in the Rust reference)
// ---- GN Common Header (8 bytes) ---- (clause 9.7)
@@ -43,41 +62,45 @@ int geonet_wrap_shb(const uint8_t *its_payload, int its_len,
*p++ = 1; // max hop limit = 1, matches basic header RHL (SHB single-hop)
*p++ = 0x00; // reserved
// ---- SHB extended header: Source Long Position Vector (24 bytes) ----
// ---- SHB extended header: Source Position Vector (24) + Reserved (4) = 28 bytes ----
// (clause 9.5.2). GN_ADDR (8 bytes) is itself structured, not a raw
// pseudonym (clause 9.5.1): bit0 M-flag(0=auto-derived), bits1-5 ITS-S
// type (5-bit), bits6-15 reserved(=0), then octets2-7 = MID, which is
// defined to BE the link-layer (802.11) address - so this must match
// the source address dot11p_build_frame uses, not just "look similar."
uint8_t gn_addr[8];
gn_addr[0] = (uint8_t)((0 << 7) | ((station_type & 0x1F) << 2)); // M=0, ST=station_type, top 2 reserved bits=0
gn_addr[0] = (uint8_t)((0 << 7) | ((lpv->station_type & 0x1F) << 2)); // M=0, ST=station_type, top 2 reserved bits=0
gn_addr[1] = 0x00; // remaining 8 reserved bits
memcpy(&gn_addr[2], mac, 6); // MID = link-layer address
memcpy(&gn_addr[2], lpv->mac, 6); // MID = link-layer address
memcpy(p, gn_addr, 8); p += 8;
// Timestamp (4 bytes, ms since 2004-01-01 mod 2^32) - placeholder 0,
// same caveat as detectionTime in denm.c.
memset(p, 0, 4); p += 4;
// Latitude/Longitude (4+4 bytes, signed, big-endian, 1/10 microdegree) -
// fixed-width binary fields, not UPER bit-packed.
uint32_t lat_u = (uint32_t)latitude_tenmicrodeg;
*p++ = (uint8_t)(lat_u >> 24); *p++ = (uint8_t)(lat_u >> 16);
*p++ = (uint8_t)(lat_u >> 8); *p++ = (uint8_t)(lat_u);
uint32_t lon_u = (uint32_t)longitude_tenmicrodeg;
*p++ = (uint8_t)(lon_u >> 24); *p++ = (uint8_t)(lon_u >> 16);
*p++ = (uint8_t)(lon_u >> 8); *p++ = (uint8_t)(lon_u);
// PAI(1 bit) + Speed(15 bits), packed into 2 bytes: 0 = PAI false,
// speed 0 - which is actually correct semantics for a STATIONARY
// vehicle beacon, not just a placeholder.
*p++ = 0x00; *p++ = 0x00;
// Heading (16 bits, 0.1 degree units): 0 = due north / unavailable
*p++ = 0x00; *p++ = 0x00;
// TST (4 bytes): when the position below was acquired, ms, TimestampIts mod 2^32.
put_be32(&p, lpv->tst_ms);
// Latitude/Longitude (4+4 bytes, signed, 1/10 microdegree) - fixed-width binary fields, not
// UPER bit-packed like the CAM payload's own position.
put_be32(&p, (uint32_t)lpv->lat_tenmicrodeg);
put_be32(&p, (uint32_t)lpv->lon_tenmicrodeg);
// PAI (1 bit) + Speed (15 bits, signed, 0.01 m/s). Clamped, not masked: a 15-bit value that
// overflows wraps its sign bit and reads as travelling backwards at speed.
int32_t speed = lpv->speed_cms;
if (speed > 16383) speed = 16383;
if (speed < -16384) speed = -16384;
put_be16(&p, (uint16_t)(((lpv->pai ? 1u : 0u) << 15) | ((uint16_t)speed & 0x7FFFu)));
// Heading (16 bits, 0.1 degree from north, clockwise, 0..3599).
put_be16(&p, (uint16_t)(lpv->heading_decideg % 3600u));
// Reserved (4 bytes) - clause 9.8.4: the SHB extended header is the 24-byte Source Position
// Vector FOLLOWED BY a 4-byte reserved field (media-dependent data), 28 bytes in total. These
// four bytes were missing, which is why a standards-compliant receiver read our CAM payload's
// first two bytes (0x02 0x02 = protocolVersion/messageID) as the BTP destination port and saw
// 514 instead of 2001 - confirmed against live air capture, 2026-08-13. Our own gn_unwrap.c
// had the identical off-by-four, so ESP32<->ESP32 worked and nothing else did.
*p++ = 0x00; *p++ = 0x00; *p++ = 0x00; *p++ = 0x00;
// ---- BTP-B header (4 bytes) ----
*p++ = (uint8_t)(btp_dest_port >> 8);
*p++ = (uint8_t)(btp_dest_port & 0xFF);
*p++ = 0x00; *p++ = 0x00; // destination port info, unused for BTP-B
// ---- ITS payload (DENM UPER bytes) ----
// ---- ITS payload (CAM UPER bytes from the phone) ----
memcpy(p, its_payload, its_len);
p += its_len;
obu-firmware/main/geonet.h
+43 -29
View File
@@ -1,43 +1,57 @@
#ifndef GEONET_H
#define GEONET_H
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stddef.h>
// Wraps an ITS application payload (e.g. from denm_encode) with a minimal
// GeoNetworking Basic Header + Common Header + Single-Hop-Broadcast
// extended header (HeaderType=TSB(5), HeaderSubtype=SINGLE_HOP(0), per
// ETSI EN 302 636-4-1 table 9), then prepends a BTP-B header addressed to
// the DENM service port (2002).
// The variable content of a GeoNetworking Long Position Vector (ETSI EN 302 636-4-1 clause
// 9.5.2): who the sender is and where it was. This is the Source Position Vector every
// GeoNetworking packet from this firmware carries.
//
// `mac` is the 6-byte pseudonym/link-layer address - pass the SAME address
// you hand to dot11p_build_frame's src address, since GN_ADDR's MID field
// (the last 6 bytes of the 8-byte GN_ADDR) is defined to BE that
// link-layer address (EN 302 636-4-1 clause 9.5.1). `station_type` is the
// 5-bit ITS-S type from the same clause (5 = passengerCar) and gets packed
// into GN_ADDR alongside the address.
// Every field here used to be a compile-time constant: the bench coordinates, speed 0, heading 0,
// timestamp 0, passengerCar, and one fixed MAC. The phone never told the firmware where it was,
// so the GN layer described a stationary car parked at the bench while the CAM inside it
// described a moving cyclist somewhere else. The phone now supplies these values with each frame
// (SERIAL_MSG_CAM_TX_PV in serial_link.h) and this firmware only lays them out on the wire.
typedef struct {
// Pseudonym. Written into GN_ADDR's MID field here AND, by dot11p_build_frame, into the
// 802.11 source address. Clause 9.5.1 defines the MID as the link-layer address, so the two
// must be the same six bytes; taking both from this one field is what keeps them identical
// when the pseudonym rotates.
uint8_t mac[6];
// ITS-S type, TS 102 894-2 StationType (2 = cyclist). Only the low 5 bits fit in GN_ADDR.
uint8_t station_type;
// Position Accuracy Indicator.
bool pai;
// TST: the moment lat/lon were acquired, in ms, as TimestampIts modulo 2^32.
uint32_t tst_ms;
// 1/10 microdegree, signed.
int32_t lat_tenmicrodeg;
int32_t lon_tenmicrodeg;
// 0.01 m/s. The wire field is 15-bit signed, so this is clamped to -16384..16383 on encode.
int16_t speed_cms;
// 0.1 degree from north, clockwise. Wrapped into 0..3599 on encode.
uint16_t heading_decideg;
} gn_lpv_t;
// Wraps an ITS application payload (the CAM UPER bytes the phone built) in a GeoNetworking Basic
// Header + Common Header + Single-Hop-Broadcast extended header (HeaderType=TSB(5),
// HeaderSubtype=SINGLE_HOP(0), EN 302 636-4-1 table 9), then a BTP-B header addressed to
// `btp_dest_port`.
//
// `latitude_tenmicrodeg`/`longitude_tenmicrodeg` go into the Source Long
// Position Vector (clause 9.5.2) as plain 32-bit signed big-endian fields -
// NOT UPER bit-packed like the DENM payload's position fields, this is a
// fixed-width binary protocol. Pass the SAME values you gave denm_encode's
// eventPosition, so the GN-layer position and the DENM's own claimed
// position agree.
// Single-hop broadcast is the correct packet type for CAM, which ETSI defines as never forwarded,
// so it has no destination area and no sequence number. A future DENM transmit path would need
// GeoBroadcast (HeaderType=4) instead, which this function does not build.
//
// Deliberate simplification: real DENM dissemination normally uses
// GeoBroadcast (GBC, HeaderType=4) so RSUs/OBUs can forward it across an
// area - that needs a sequence number + geo-area fields this skeleton
// doesn't build yet. Single-hop broadcast is simpler and is the
// best-tested decode path in the receiver firmware you already have
// working (same extended header shape as CAM). Fine for a single-vehicle
// beacon; revisit if you need real multi-hop forwarding later.
// `lpv` supplies the Source Position Vector. Hand the SAME lpv->mac to dot11p_build_frame as its
// source address, or the GN and 802.11 layers will name two different senders.
//
// `btp_dest_port` is the BTP-B destination port for the service being carried
// (ETSI TS 103 248): 2001 = CAM, 2002 = DENM, 2003 = MAPEM, 2004 = SPATEM, ...
// `btp_dest_port` is the BTP-B destination port (ETSI TS 103 248): 2001 = CAM, 2002 = DENM,
// 2003 = MAPEM, 2004 = SPATEM.
//
// Returns bytes written, or -1 if out buffer too small.
// Returns bytes written, or -1 if the out buffer is too small.
int geonet_wrap_shb(const uint8_t *its_payload, int its_len,
const uint8_t mac[6], uint8_t station_type,
int32_t latitude_tenmicrodeg, int32_t longitude_tenmicrodeg,
const gn_lpv_t *lpv,
uint16_t btp_dest_port,
uint8_t *out, size_t out_len);
obu-firmware/main/gn_unwrap.c
+198 -35
View File
@@ -12,22 +12,146 @@
#define GN_BASIC_HEADER_LEN (4)
#define GN_COMMON_HEADER_LEN (8)
#define GN_SHB_EXT_HEADER_LEN (24) // Source Long Position Vector, geonet.c's SHB shape
#define BTP_B_HEADER_LEN (4)
// Extended-header lengths per GeoNetworking header type - see gn_unwrap.h for why these exact
// numbers, and why they must not be assumed equal.
#define GN_SHB_EXT_HEADER_LEN (28) // SO PV (24) + Reserved (4)
#define GN_GBC_EXT_HEADER_LEN (44) // SN(2) + Rsvd(2) + SO PV(24) + area(12) + Rsvd(4)
// Offsets of the destination-area fields within the GBC extended header.
#define GBC_AREA_LAT_OFFSET (28)
#define GBC_AREA_LON_OFFSET (32)
#define GBC_AREA_DIST_A_OFFSET (36)
#define GN_HEADER_TYPE_GBC (4) // GeoBroadcast
#define GN_HEADER_TYPE_TSB (5) // Topologically-Scoped Broadcast
#define GN_HEADER_SUBTYPE_SINGLE_HOP (0)
#define GN_NEXT_HEADER_COMMON (1) // unsecured: the Common Header follows
#define GN_NEXT_HEADER_SECURED (2) // a TS 103 097 envelope follows, Common Header inside it
#define GN_COMMON_NEXT_HEADER_BTP_B (2)
// Common Header field (clause 9.7): length of everything after the GeoNetworking headers, i.e.
// the BTP-B header plus the ITS payload.
#define GN_COMMON_PAYLOAD_LEN_OFFSET (4)
// IEEE 1609.2 / TS 103 097 envelope, COER encoded - see unwrap_secured().
#define IEEE1609DOT2_VERSION (3)
#define CONTENT_TAG_UNSECURED_DATA (0x80) // Ieee1609Dot2Content CHOICE, context tag 0
#define CONTENT_TAG_SIGNED_DATA (0x81) // context tag 1
#define SIGNED_PAYLOAD_HAS_DATA (0x40) // SignedDataPayload preamble: `data` present
#define BTP_DEST_PORT_CAM (2001) // ETSI TS 103 248
#define BTP_DEST_PORT_DENM (2002)
// NOTE the crossover: SPATEM is BTP port 2004 but ItsPduHeader messageID 4, while MAPEM is port
// 2003 and messageID 5. Port and messageID are NOT the same number - mixing them up routes every
// message to the wrong decoder on the phone.
#define BTP_DEST_PORT_SPATEM (2004)
static const uint8_t s_llc_snap_prefix[6] = {0xAA, 0xAA, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00};
bool gn_unwrap_cam(const uint8_t *frame, int frame_len,
const uint8_t **out_cam, int *out_cam_len)
static int32_t be32(const uint8_t *p)
{
if (!frame || frame_len < IEEE80211_HEADER_LEN) {
return (int32_t)(((uint32_t)p[0] << 24) | ((uint32_t)p[1] << 16) |
((uint32_t)p[2] << 8) | (uint32_t)p[3]);
}
static uint16_t be16(const uint8_t *p)
{
return (uint16_t)(((uint16_t)p[0] << 8) | (uint16_t)p[1]);
}
// COER length determinant (ITU-T X.696): a first byte below 0x80 is the length itself; otherwise
// its low 7 bits count the big-endian length bytes that follow. Two of them cover anything this
// radio can deliver. Returns how many bytes the determinant occupies, or 0 if it does not fit in
// `avail` or uses a form this does not read.
static int coer_length(const uint8_t *p, int avail, int *len)
{
if (avail < 1) {
return 0;
}
if (p[0] < 0x80) {
*len = p[0];
return 1;
}
const int n = p[0] & 0x7F;
if (n < 1 || n > 2 || avail < 1 + n) {
return 0;
}
int v = 0;
for (int i = 1; i <= n; i++) {
v = (v << 8) | p[i];
}
*len = v;
return 1 + n;
}
// Locates the GeoNetworking packet inside a secured one. `offset` points just past the Basic
// Header. Returns the offset of the inner Common Header and sets *inner_end to where the envelope
// says the inner packet ends - which lies beyond frame_len if the capture was cut short - or
// returns -1 for anything this does not unwrap.
//
// The envelope is an Ieee1609Dot2Data (IEEE 1609.2, profiled by TS 103 097 v1.3.1 and later),
// COER encoded. A signed message starts:
//
// 03 protocolVersion 3
// 81 content = signedData
// 00 hashId (sha256; any one-byte value is accepted - the hash is not checked)
// 40 tbsData.payload preamble: `data` present (bit 6)
// 03 80 <len> payload.data: an Ieee1609Dot2Data holding unsecuredData of <len> bytes, which
// are the Common Header, extended header, BTP-B header and ITS payload
// ... headerInfo, signer, signature: not read
//
// The inner packet comes first inside tbsData, so it is found without parsing the certificate
// or the signature, and its explicit length is what separates it from them. The shape is
// measured, not only read from the standard: all 157 signed frames in
// capture_20260817_171055.pcap have it (150 CAM, 7 GeoBroadcast DENM; <len> in all three COER
// forms), and asn1tools decodes every one of them to the same unsecuredData. A top-level
// unsecuredData (03 80 <len>, no signature at all) is accepted too.
static int unwrap_secured(const uint8_t *frame, int offset, int frame_len,
int *inner_end, bool *is_signed)
{
const uint8_t *p = frame + offset;
const int avail = frame_len - offset;
int i;
if (avail < 2 || p[0] != IEEE1609DOT2_VERSION) {
return -1; // includes the legacy TS 103 097 v1.2.1 envelope, protocolVersion 2
}
if (p[1] == CONTENT_TAG_SIGNED_DATA) {
if (avail < 6 ||
p[2] >= 0x80 || // hashId: a one-byte enumerated value
!(p[3] & SIGNED_PAYLOAD_HAS_DATA) || // signs only a hash of data sent elsewhere
p[4] != IEEE1609DOT2_VERSION ||
p[5] != CONTENT_TAG_UNSECURED_DATA) { // nested signing or encryption
return -1;
}
i = 6;
*is_signed = true;
} else if (p[1] == CONTENT_TAG_UNSECURED_DATA) {
i = 2;
*is_signed = false;
} else {
return -1; // encryptedData, certificate requests
}
int len;
const int used = coer_length(p + i, avail - i, &len);
if (used == 0) {
return -1;
}
i += used;
*inner_end = offset + i + len;
return offset + i;
}
bool gn_unwrap_its(const uint8_t *frame, int frame_len, gn_rx_t *out)
{
if (!frame || !out || frame_len < IEEE80211_HEADER_LEN) {
return false;
}
memset(out, 0, sizeof(*out));
uint8_t fc0 = frame[0];
uint8_t fc1 = frame[1];
@@ -36,8 +160,8 @@ bool gn_unwrap_cam(const uint8_t *frame, int frame_len,
bool to_ds = fc1 & 0x01;
bool from_ds = fc1 & 0x02;
// Only plain broadcast Data frames, no WDS - matches what dot11p_build_frame ever produces
// (and what real ITS-G5 hardware sends).
// Only plain broadcast Data frames, no WDS. Both QoS Data (what real ITS-G5 hardware sends,
// 26-byte header) and non-QoS Data (24-byte, what our own TX currently builds) are accepted.
if (type != IEEE80211_FC_TYPE_DATA || (to_ds && from_ds)) {
return false;
}
@@ -53,62 +177,101 @@ bool gn_unwrap_cam(const uint8_t *frame, int frame_len,
if (memcmp(frame + offset, s_llc_snap_prefix, sizeof(s_llc_snap_prefix)) != 0) {
return false;
}
uint16_t ethertype = ((uint16_t)frame[offset + 6] << 8) | frame[offset + 7];
if (ethertype != GN_ETHERTYPE) {
if (be16(frame + offset + 6) != GN_ETHERTYPE) {
return false;
}
offset += LLC_SNAP_HEADER_LEN;
// ---- GN Basic Header (4 bytes) ---- nothing here we need to validate for our purposes;
// just skip it. (version/NextHeader in byte0, lifetime in byte2, RHL in byte3.)
// ---- GN Basic Header (4 bytes) ----
if (frame_len < offset + GN_BASIC_HEADER_LEN) {
return false;
}
const uint8_t basic_next_header = frame[offset] & 0x0F;
offset += GN_BASIC_HEADER_LEN;
// The headers from here on must end before `limit`: the end of the frame, or for a secured
// packet the end of the envelope's inner packet if that comes first.
int limit = frame_len;
int envelope_end = -1;
if (basic_next_header == GN_NEXT_HEADER_SECURED) {
offset = unwrap_secured(frame, offset, frame_len, &envelope_end, &out->signed_unverified);
if (offset < 0) {
return false;
}
if (envelope_end < limit) {
limit = envelope_end;
}
} else if (basic_next_header != GN_NEXT_HEADER_COMMON) {
return false;
}
// ---- GN Common Header (8 bytes) ----
if (frame_len < offset + GN_COMMON_HEADER_LEN) {
if (limit < offset + GN_COMMON_HEADER_LEN) {
return false;
}
uint8_t next_header = (frame[offset + 0] >> 4) & 0x0F;
uint8_t header_type = (frame[offset + 1] >> 4) & 0x0F;
uint8_t header_subtype = frame[offset + 1] & 0x0F;
if (next_header != 2 /* BTP-B */) {
return false;
}
if (header_type != GN_HEADER_TYPE_TSB || header_subtype != GN_HEADER_SUBTYPE_SINGLE_HOP) {
// Not a single-hop-broadcast frame - e.g. GeoBroadcast (DENM-style dissemination) or
// something this project doesn't transmit/expect. Not an error, just not for us yet -
// see gn_unwrap.h's note on scope.
const int gn_payload_len = be16(frame + offset + GN_COMMON_PAYLOAD_LEN_OFFSET);
if (next_header != GN_COMMON_NEXT_HEADER_BTP_B) {
return false;
}
offset += GN_COMMON_HEADER_LEN;
// ---- SHB extended header (24 bytes) ---- skip straight past it, we don't need the
// sender's claimed position/speed/heading here (the CAM payload has its own, more precise
// versions of those same fields).
if (frame_len < offset + GN_SHB_EXT_HEADER_LEN) {
// ---- Extended header: length depends on the header type ----
int ext_len;
bool is_gbc = false;
if (header_type == GN_HEADER_TYPE_TSB && header_subtype == GN_HEADER_SUBTYPE_SINGLE_HOP) {
ext_len = GN_SHB_EXT_HEADER_LEN;
} else if (header_type == GN_HEADER_TYPE_GBC) {
// Subtype selects the area shape (0 circle, 1 rectangle, 2 ellipse). All three carry the
// same field layout - DistanceB and Angle are simply unused for a circle - so the length
// is the same and we don't need to branch on it.
ext_len = GN_GBC_EXT_HEADER_LEN;
is_gbc = true;
} else {
return false; // Beacon / GeoUnicast / GeoAnycast / multi-hop TSB - see header comment
}
if (limit < offset + ext_len) {
return false;
}
offset += GN_SHB_EXT_HEADER_LEN;
if (is_gbc) {
out->has_geo_area = true;
out->geo_area_lat_tenmicrodeg = be32(frame + offset + GBC_AREA_LAT_OFFSET);
out->geo_area_lon_tenmicrodeg = be32(frame + offset + GBC_AREA_LON_OFFSET);
out->geo_area_distance_a_m = be16(frame + offset + GBC_AREA_DIST_A_OFFSET);
}
offset += ext_len;
// ---- BTP-B header (4 bytes) ----
if (frame_len < offset + BTP_B_HEADER_LEN) {
if (limit < offset + BTP_B_HEADER_LEN) {
return false;
}
uint16_t dest_port = ((uint16_t)frame[offset + 0] << 8) | frame[offset + 1];
if (dest_port != BTP_DEST_PORT_CAM) {
return false; // e.g. DENM (2002) - not decoded by this project yet
}
offset += BTP_B_HEADER_LEN;
// ---- Whatever's left is the CAM UPER payload ----
int cam_len = frame_len - offset;
if (cam_len <= 0) {
uint16_t dest_port = be16(frame + offset);
if (dest_port != BTP_DEST_PORT_CAM && dest_port != BTP_DEST_PORT_DENM &&
dest_port != BTP_DEST_PORT_SPATEM) {
return false;
}
*out_cam = frame + offset;
*out_cam_len = cam_len;
// ---- ITS payload: exactly as long as the Common Header declares ----
// Not "whatever is left of the frame": see "Payload bounds" in gn_unwrap.h for the 8 trailing
// bytes every received frame carries and the signature that follows a secured packet.
if (gn_payload_len <= BTP_B_HEADER_LEN) {
return false; // no ITS payload at all
}
const int payload_start = offset + BTP_B_HEADER_LEN;
const int payload_end = offset + gn_payload_len;
if (envelope_end >= 0 && payload_end > envelope_end) {
return false; // the inner packet claims more than its envelope holds
}
out->truncated = payload_end > frame_len;
const int payload_len = (out->truncated ? frame_len : payload_end) - payload_start;
if (payload_len <= 0) {
return false;
}
out->btp_dest_port = dest_port;
out->payload = frame + payload_start;
out->payload_len = payload_len;
return true;
}
obu-firmware/main/gn_unwrap.h
+82 -25
View File
@@ -5,35 +5,92 @@
#include <stdbool.h>
// Inverse of geonet_wrap_shb() + dot11p_build_frame(): takes a raw 802.11 frame as delivered by
// the WiFi driver's promiscuous RX callback and strips 802.11 header -> LLC/SNAP -> GeoNetworking
// Basic/Common/extended header -> BTP-B header, leaving just the ITS payload (CAM UPER bytes)
// and the sender's station id (GN_ADDR MID).
// the WiFi driver's promiscuous RX callback and strips 802.11 header -> LLC/SNAP ->
// GeoNetworking Basic Header -> [security envelope] -> Common/extended header -> BTP-B header,
// leaving the ITS payload (a UPER message) plus the metadata the phone needs to know what it
// received.
//
// Deliberately narrow, matching what this project actually transmits: only handles the
// Single-Hop-Broadcast (TSB, HeaderType=5/Subtype=0) extended header shape, same as
// geonet_wrap_shb() builds - the same "best-tested decode path" rationale documented there.
// A real receiver would also need GeoBroadcast (HeaderType=4, used by DENM dissemination in
// real deployments) and possibly Beacon/GeoUnicast - out of scope for now since nothing this
// project talks to sends those. Extend header_type handling here if that changes.
// ---- Supported GeoNetworking header types --------------------------------------------------
// Two shapes, chosen by the Common Header's HeaderType, with DIFFERENT extended-header lengths:
//
// Only accepts BTP-B destination port 2001 (CAM, per ETSI TS 103 248) - other ports (e.g. 2002
// DENM) are silently rejected since the phone-side decoder only understands CAM right now.
// TSB/SINGLE_HOP (HT=5, HST=0) - 28 bytes: Source Position Vector (24) + Reserved (4).
// What CAM uses, and what geonet_wrap_shb() builds.
// GEOBROADCAST (HT=4) - 44 bytes: SeqNum (2) + Reserved (2) + SO PV (24) +
// GeoArea lat (4) + lon (4) + DistanceA (2) + DistanceB (2) + Angle (2) + Reserved (2).
// What DENM uses in practice - real RSUs and OBUs disseminate DENM by GeoBroadcast so it
// can be forwarded across an area, not by single-hop broadcast.
//
// Returns true and fills *out_cam / *out_cam_len (pointing INTO the input frame buffer, not a
// copy - valid only as long as `frame` is) if this was a well-formed, CAM-carrying SHB frame
// this project can decode. Returns false otherwise (wrong ethertype, wrong header type, wrong
// BTP port, truncated, or FCS/promiscuous-capture garbage - all common and expected on an
// open-air capture, not logged as errors by the caller).
// Both lengths are measured facts, not spec-table guesses: verified against live air capture on
// 2026-08-17 (its-g5-receiver-firmware/recordings/capture_20260817_171055.pcap) by locating the
// BTP port and ItsPduHeader and checking they agree. An earlier version of this file used 24 for
// the SHB case, four bytes short, which read the BTP port out of the Reserved field and silently
// dropped EVERY real CAM. Do not "simplify" these constants without re-measuring.
//
// No station id is extracted here on purpose: CAM's own ItsPduHeader.stationID (the first real
// field inside the UPER payload this function hands back, per cam.c) is already the meaningful
// application-level identifier - the Kotlin-side decoder reads it from there. The GN_ADDR MID
// this frame also carries is a separate, link-layer-only pseudonym; extracting and forwarding
// it too would just be a second, easily-confused "station id" for no benefit here.
// Beacon, GeoUnicast, GeoAnycast and multi-hop TSB are still rejected - nothing this project
// talks to sends them, and each has its own extended-header length that would need measuring.
//
// RSSI is NOT extracted here either - it comes from the promiscuous callback's own packet
// metadata (wifi_pkt_rx_ctrl_t.rssi in main.c), not from anything inside the frame bytes.
bool gn_unwrap_cam(const uint8_t *frame, int frame_len,
const uint8_t **out_cam, int *out_cam_len);
// ---- Secured packets -----------------------------------------------------------------------
// A Basic Header NextHeader of 2 means an ETSI TS 103 097 (IEEE 1609.2) envelope follows, with
// the Common Header onward inside it. Signed messages are unwrapped WITHOUT verifying the
// signature or the certificate - this firmware has no trust store - and are reported with
// signed_unverified set so the phone can tell. Most real traffic is signed: the 2026-08-17
// capture held 157 signed frames from 15 source MACs. Encrypted payloads, nested signing and the
// legacy v1.2.1 envelope are rejected. The layout is documented at unwrap_secured() in
// gn_unwrap.c. Before 2026-09-11 every secured packet was rejected.
//
// ---- Payload bounds ------------------------------------------------------------------------
// The payload is exactly as long as the Common Header's payload-length field says, minus the
// BTP-B header - not "the rest of the frame". After the message comes, in a signed packet, the
// signature; and every frame recorded through this chip's promiscuous RX API (~15 000 of them)
// ends in 8 more bytes that are not part of the 802.11 frame and not a valid FCS. Until
// 2026-09-11 those 8 bytes were forwarded to the phone as the tail of every message. UPER
// decoders stop where the message ends, which is why nothing visibly broke.
//
// ---- Accepted BTP-B ports (ETSI TS 103 248) ------------------------------------------------
// 2001 (CAM), 2002 (DENM) and 2004 (SPATEM). MAPEM (2003) and the rest are deliberately not
// accepted yet: the phone has no decoder for them, so forwarding would just burn serial
// bandwidth. Adding one is a one-line change here plus a decoder on the phone - the serial
// protocol itself is already generic (see SERIAL_MSG_V2X_RX in serial_link.h).
//
// SPATEM size caveat: SERIAL_LINK_MAX_PAYLOAD is 512, so a SPATEM whose UPER exceeds 498 bytes is
// counted as an oversize drop rather than forwarded. The bench RSU trigger emits ~58-byte SPATEMs
// and is unaffected, but real road RSUs measured 555 bytes median and 1243 max (2026-03-18 drive,
// 79k messages), i.e. roughly 70% would be dropped. Raising the cap is deliberately deferred: it
// also requires enlarging main.c's RX_FRAME_MAX_LEN.
//
// No FCS/CRC check here: the WiFi driver has already validated the frame.
typedef struct {
// BTP-B destination port, identifying the service: 2001 = CAM, 2002 = DENM, 2004 = SPATEM.
uint16_t btp_dest_port;
// ITS payload (UPER message bytes). Points INTO the caller's `frame` buffer - NOT a copy, so
// it is only valid while `frame` is.
const uint8_t *payload;
int payload_len;
// GeoBroadcast destination area, when this frame carried one (GEOBROADCAST only; false for
// TSB/SHB). This is the hazard's relevance area - for a DENM it says "this warning applies
// within DistanceA metres of this point", which is materially more useful on a map than the
// originator's own position.
bool has_geo_area;
int32_t geo_area_lat_tenmicrodeg;
int32_t geo_area_lon_tenmicrodeg;
uint16_t geo_area_distance_a_m;
// The packet arrived inside a TS 103 097 signed envelope. The signature was NOT checked.
bool signed_unverified;
// The frame ended before the payload its headers declare. On the board only main.c's
// RX_FRAME_MAX_LEN capture limit causes this (the driver drops frames that fail their FCS).
// payload/payload_len then cover just the part that arrived, so it must not be forwarded.
bool truncated;
} gn_rx_t;
// Returns true and fills *out if this was a well-formed, supported ITS frame - check `truncated`
// before using the payload. Returns false otherwise (wrong ethertype, encrypted or unsupported
// envelope, unsupported header type, unaccepted BTP port, headers cut short, or
// promiscuous-capture garbage) - all common and expected on an open-air capture, so the caller
// should treat false as "not for us", not as an error worth logging per frame.
bool gn_unwrap_its(const uint8_t *frame, int frame_len, gn_rx_t *out);
#endif
obu-firmware/main/main.c
+122 -35
View File
@@ -21,7 +21,9 @@
static const char *TAG = "obu-tx";
// Phase 03: CAM is no longer built on this chip. The phone fuses its own GNSS+IMU, UPER-encodes
// CAM itself, and hands the finished bytes down over serial_link (SERIAL_MSG_CAM_TX) - this
// CAM itself, and hands the finished bytes down over serial_link (SERIAL_MSG_CAM_TX_PV, together
// with the GeoNetworking position vector to send them under; plain SERIAL_MSG_CAM_TX from an app
// that predates it) - this
// firmware's job on transmit shrinks to "GeoNetworking/BTP-wrap + 802.11-wrap + key the PA the
// instant a CAM arrives." There is no on-chip transmit timer anymore; the phone's send cadence
// (1 Hz baseline, faster near intersections/events - all decided app-side) IS the air cadence.
@@ -41,26 +43,25 @@ static const char *TAG = "obu-tx";
#define TX_FREQ_MHZ 5900
// ---- CAM beacon profile (used for the GeoNetworking layer only now - see below) ----
#define STATION_TYPE 5 // passengerCar (TS 102 894-2 StationType) - matches gn_addr's ST field
#define STATION_TYPE 2 // cyclist (TS 102 894-2 StationType), legacy CAM_TX path only - see legacy_lpv()
#define BTP_PORT_CAM 2001 // BTP-B destination port for CAM (ETSI TS 103 248)
// Bench location, hardcoded since there's no GNSS module wired in yet and the unit is genuinely
// stationary here: 53°33'16.8"N 10°01'20.6"E, in 1/10-microdegree units. Used ONLY for the
// GeoNetworking Source Long Position Vector now (geonet_wrap_shb's own claimed position) - the
// CAM payload's own referencePosition comes from the phone's real GNSS and can legitimately
// differ from this bench placeholder until the GN layer is also given a real position source.
// TODO: feed this from the phone too (e.g. a lightweight position update piggybacked on
// SERIAL_MSG_CAM_TX, or a new small message type) instead of a fixed bench location.
// Bench location, 53°33'16.8"N 10°01'20.6"E, in 1/10-microdegree units. Used only by the legacy
// SERIAL_MSG_CAM_TX path (see legacy_lpv), which carries no position of its own. A current app
// sends SERIAL_MSG_CAM_TX_PV instead, and the GN Source Position Vector then comes from the
// phone's real fix, the same one the CAM payload's own referencePosition is built from.
#define BENCH_LATITUDE_TENMICRODEG 535546667
#define BENCH_LONGITUDE_TENMICRODEG 100223889
// Single source of truth for the pseudonym/link-layer address: used both as
// the 802.11 source MAC (Addr2) and as GN_ADDR's MID field, since the GN
// spec defines those as being the same address. Locally-administered bit
// set (0x02) per normal MAC convention. Fixed/non-rotating for now - real
// stacks rotate this every 5-15 min for privacy. Owned entirely by this firmware (not the
// phone) per the Phase 03 design decision - simplest given the phone never needs to know it.
static const uint8_t pseudonym_mac[6] = {0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01};
// Link-layer address for the legacy SERIAL_MSG_CAM_TX path only. Locally-administered bit set
// (0x02), per normal MAC convention.
//
// This reverses the Phase 03 decision that the pseudonym is owned entirely by this firmware. That
// was simplest while the address never changed, but a pseudonym only protects anyone if the
// 802.11 address, the GN_ADDR MID and the CAM's stationID all change together, and the phone owns
// the stationID. One identity needs one owner, so with CAM_TX_PV the phone sends the address with
// every frame and rotates it, and this constant is only what the legacy path falls back to.
static const uint8_t LEGACY_MAC[6] = {0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01};
// Undocumented libphy.a calls that push the radio into 802.11p OCB mode on
// the 5.9 GHz ITS-G5 band. See docs/04-transmit-setup.md for source + what
@@ -77,6 +78,7 @@ extern void phy_change_channel(int freq_mhz, int bw_mode, int sec_chan_offset, i
typedef struct {
uint8_t data[SERIAL_LINK_MAX_PAYLOAD];
int len;
gn_lpv_t lpv; // the Source Position Vector this CAM goes out under
} cam_tx_item_t;
static QueueHandle_t s_tx_queue;
@@ -87,6 +89,23 @@ static QueueHandle_t s_tx_queue;
// tx_radio_task below, off the UART parsing path entirely. xQueueSend with 0 timeout: if the
// radio task is somehow behind, drop this CAM rather than stall UART frame parsing - the next
// one is only ~1s (or less, at elevated rate) away regardless.
// Source Position Vector for the legacy SERIAL_MSG_CAM_TX path, which carries no position of its
// own. Everything here describes the bench, not the rider: a fixed point, standing still, at an
// unknown time, under a fixed address. That is exactly why the phone now sends CAM_TX_PV. Kept so
// an app that predates it still transmits what it always did, except that the station type now
// says cyclist to agree with the CAM inside.
static void legacy_lpv(gn_lpv_t *lpv)
{
memcpy(lpv->mac, LEGACY_MAC, sizeof(lpv->mac));
lpv->station_type = STATION_TYPE;
lpv->pai = false;
lpv->tst_ms = 0;
lpv->lat_tenmicrodeg = BENCH_LATITUDE_TENMICRODEG;
lpv->lon_tenmicrodeg = BENCH_LONGITUDE_TENMICRODEG;
lpv->speed_cms = 0;
lpv->heading_decideg = 0;
}
static void on_cam_tx_from_phone(const uint8_t *cam_uper, int cam_len)
{
if (cam_len <= 0 || cam_len > SERIAL_LINK_MAX_PAYLOAD) {
@@ -96,6 +115,42 @@ static void on_cam_tx_from_phone(const uint8_t *cam_uper, int cam_len)
cam_tx_item_t item;
item.len = cam_len;
memcpy(item.data, cam_uper, (size_t)cam_len);
legacy_lpv(&item.lpv);
if (xQueueSend(s_tx_queue, &item, 0) != pdTRUE) {
ESP_LOGW(TAG, "tx queue full, dropping CAM from phone");
}
}
static uint16_t le16(const uint8_t *p)
{
return (uint16_t)(p[0] | (p[1] << 8));
}
static uint32_t le32(const uint8_t *p)
{
return (uint32_t)p[0] | ((uint32_t)p[1] << 8) | ((uint32_t)p[2] << 16) | ((uint32_t)p[3] << 24);
}
// SERIAL_MSG_CAM_TX_PV: the phone's CAM plus the position vector to send it under. The prefix
// layout is documented at SERIAL_MSG_CAM_TX_PV in serial_link.h. Same speed constraint as
// on_cam_tx_from_phone: decode, queue, return.
static void on_cam_tx_pv_from_phone(const uint8_t *prefix, const uint8_t *cam_uper, int cam_len)
{
if (cam_len <= 0 || cam_len > SERIAL_LINK_MAX_PAYLOAD) {
ESP_LOGW(TAG, "on_cam_tx_pv_from_phone: bad length %d", cam_len);
return;
}
cam_tx_item_t item;
item.len = cam_len;
memcpy(item.data, cam_uper, (size_t)cam_len);
memcpy(item.lpv.mac, prefix, sizeof(item.lpv.mac));
item.lpv.station_type = prefix[6];
item.lpv.pai = (prefix[7] & 0x01) != 0;
item.lpv.tst_ms = le32(prefix + 8);
item.lpv.lat_tenmicrodeg = (int32_t)le32(prefix + 12);
item.lpv.lon_tenmicrodeg = (int32_t)le32(prefix + 16);
item.lpv.speed_cms = (int16_t)le16(prefix + 20);
item.lpv.heading_decideg = le16(prefix + 22);
if (xQueueSend(s_tx_queue, &item, 0) != pdTRUE) {
ESP_LOGW(TAG, "tx queue full, dropping CAM from phone");
}
@@ -116,8 +171,7 @@ static void tx_radio_task(void *arg)
// singleton, created once in app_main. Both wrap functions bounds-check against the size
// passed in and return <= 0 on overflow, so an oversized CAM is rejected, not written past.
static uint8_t gn_payload[SERIAL_LINK_MAX_PAYLOAD + 64];
int gn_len = geonet_wrap_shb(item.data, item.len, pseudonym_mac, STATION_TYPE,
BENCH_LATITUDE_TENMICRODEG, BENCH_LONGITUDE_TENMICRODEG,
int gn_len = geonet_wrap_shb(item.data, item.len, &item.lpv,
BTP_PORT_CAM, gn_payload, sizeof(gn_payload));
if (gn_len <= 0) {
ESP_LOGW(TAG, "geonet_wrap_shb failed (cam_len=%d)", item.len);
@@ -125,7 +179,9 @@ static void tx_radio_task(void *arg)
}
static uint8_t frame[SERIAL_LINK_MAX_PAYLOAD + 192];
int frame_len = dot11p_build_frame(gn_payload, gn_len, pseudonym_mac, frame,
// Source address from the same lpv the GN header was built from, so the 802.11 and
// GeoNetworking layers always name the same sender, including across a pseudonym change.
int frame_len = dot11p_build_frame(gn_payload, gn_len, item.lpv.mac, frame,
sizeof(frame), false);
if (frame_len <= 0) {
ESP_LOGW(TAG, "dot11p_build_frame failed (gn_len=%d)", gn_len);
@@ -154,8 +210,15 @@ static void tx_radio_task(void *arg)
// same pattern as the TX side and as the reference sniffer firmware (cmd_sniffer.c's
// queue_packet), this just copies the frame and queues it; gn_unwrap_cam() and the serial write
// both happen in rx_forward_task instead.
// Capture buffer per queued frame. 800 bytes because real traffic is much larger than our own
// TX: a CiT One CAM measures 286-355 bytes on air and its GeoBroadcast DENM measures 528
// (measured 2026-08-17). The previous 400 silently truncated every DENM mid-payload, which no
// amount of correct unwrapping downstream could have recovered from. Raise this before adding
// MAPEM, which is larger again.
#define RX_FRAME_MAX_LEN 800
typedef struct {
uint8_t data[400]; // generous vs. our own ~300-byte TX frames; longer frames are truncated
uint8_t data[RX_FRAME_MAX_LEN];
int len;
int8_t rssi;
} rx_item_t;
@@ -181,32 +244,56 @@ static void wifi_promisc_rx_cb(void *recv_buf, wifi_promiscuous_pkt_type_t type)
return;
}
rx_item_t item;
item.len = length > (int)sizeof(item.data) ? (int)sizeof(item.data) : length;
memcpy(item.data, packet->payload, (size_t)item.len);
item.rssi = packet->rx_ctrl.rssi;
// static, NOT a local: at RX_FRAME_MAX_LEN this struct is ~800 bytes, and this callback runs
// on the WiFi driver's own task - already several frames deep in the driver's call chain, on a
// stack of roughly 3.5 KB (CONFIG_ESP_WIFI_TASK_STACK_SIZE, left at its default). Putting
// ~23% of that stack in one local is a stack-overflow risk that only bites under real traffic,
// i.e. in front of an RSU rather than on the bench.
//
// Safe as a static because the promiscuous callback is only ever invoked from that one task,
// so there is no re-entrancy to guard against - the same reasoning serial_link.c uses for its
// static send buffers. rx_forward_task has its own separate copy below.
static rx_item_t s_cb_item;
s_cb_item.len = length > (int)sizeof(s_cb_item.data) ? (int)sizeof(s_cb_item.data) : length;
memcpy(s_cb_item.data, packet->payload, (size_t)s_cb_item.len);
s_cb_item.rssi = packet->rx_ctrl.rssi;
// 0 timeout: never block the WiFi driver's own task waiting for queue space.
xQueueSend(s_rx_queue, &item, 0);
// 0 timeout: never block the WiFi driver's own task waiting for queue space. xQueueSend copies
// the struct out before returning, so reusing s_cb_item on the next callback is fine.
xQueueSend(s_rx_queue, &s_cb_item, 0);
}
static void rx_forward_task(void *arg)
{
(void)arg;
rx_item_t item;
// Same reasoning as the callback: ~800 bytes is a fifth of this task's 4 KB stack. Only this
// task touches it, and it is fully overwritten by xQueueReceive before every use.
static rx_item_t item;
while (1) {
if (xQueueReceive(s_rx_queue, &item, portMAX_DELAY) != pdTRUE) {
continue;
}
const uint8_t *cam = NULL;
int cam_len = 0;
// Most promiscuously-captured frames are NOT CAM (management/control frames, other
// ITS-G5 traffic types, our own loopback if the driver echoes it) - gn_unwrap_cam
// returning false here is the common case, not an error.
if (gn_unwrap_cam(item.data, item.len, &cam, &cam_len)) {
serial_link_send_cam_rx(item.rssi, cam, cam_len);
// Most promiscuously-captured frames are NOT ITS traffic we handle (management/control
// frames, other message types, our own loopback if the driver echoes it) - gn_unwrap_its
// returning false here is the common case, not an error, so it isn't logged per frame.
gn_rx_t rx;
if (gn_unwrap_its(item.data, item.len, &rx)) {
if (rx.truncated) {
// Longer than the RX_FRAME_MAX_LEN bytes captured above, so it cannot be forwarded
// whole - and at that size it could not cross the serial link either. Counted as
// an oversize drop, as it was when the cut-off frame still reached
// serial_link_send_v2x_rx() and failed the size check there.
serial_link_note_oversize_drop(rx.btp_dest_port);
continue;
}
serial_link_send_v2x_rx(rx.btp_dest_port, item.rssi,
rx.has_geo_area, rx.signed_unverified,
rx.geo_area_lat_tenmicrodeg,
rx.geo_area_lon_tenmicrodeg,
rx.geo_area_distance_a_m,
rx.payload, rx.payload_len);
}
}
}
@@ -316,7 +403,7 @@ void app_main(void)
xTaskCreate(tx_radio_task, "tx_radio", 4096, NULL, 6, NULL);
xTaskCreate(rx_forward_task, "rx_forward", 4096, NULL, 5, NULL);
serial_link_init(on_cam_tx_from_phone);
serial_link_init(on_cam_tx_from_phone, on_cam_tx_pv_from_phone);
ESP_LOGW(TAG, "OCB @ %d MHz - TX/RX armed, driven by serial_link (no on-chip TX timer)",
TX_FREQ_MHZ);
obu-firmware/main/serial_link.c
+63 -16
View File
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ static const char *TAG = "serial_link";
#define SYNC1 0x55
static serial_link_cam_tx_cb_t s_on_cam_tx;
static serial_link_cam_tx_pv_cb_t s_on_cam_tx_pv;
// ---- Counters reported to the phone in every heartbeat (see SERIAL_MSG_STATUS in the header).
// Saturating rather than wrapping: "65535 drops" reads as "lots and still going", whereas a wrap
@@ -37,6 +38,13 @@ void serial_link_note_tx_failure(void)
bump(&s_tx_failures);
}
void serial_link_note_oversize_drop(uint16_t btp_dest_port)
{
bump(&s_oversize_drops);
ESP_LOGW(TAG, "port %u message larger than the RX capture buffer, total oversize drops %u",
btp_dest_port, s_oversize_drops);
}
// ---- CRC-16/CCITT-FALSE (poly 0x1021, init 0xFFFF, no reflect, no xorout) ----
// Bytewise (no table) - frames here are at most SERIAL_LINK_MAX_PAYLOAD + 3 bytes, so table
// lookup isn't worth the flash/RAM tradeoff. MUST match the Kotlin-side implementation exactly
@@ -112,30 +120,54 @@ static bool send_frame(uint8_t type, const uint8_t *payload, int len)
return wrote == (int)(sizeof(sync) + sizeof(head) + len + sizeof(crc_bytes));
}
bool serial_link_send_cam_rx(int8_t rssi, const uint8_t *cam_uper, int cam_len)
bool serial_link_send_v2x_rx(uint16_t btp_dest_port, int8_t rssi,
bool has_geo_area, bool signed_unverified,
int32_t geo_area_lat_tenmicrodeg,
int32_t geo_area_lon_tenmicrodeg,
uint16_t geo_area_distance_a_m,
const uint8_t *uper, int uper_len)
{
if (cam_len < 0 || cam_len > SERIAL_LINK_MAX_PAYLOAD - 1) {
if (uper_len < 0 || uper_len > SERIAL_LINK_MAX_PAYLOAD - SERIAL_V2X_RX_PREFIX_LEN) {
// Counted, not just logged: this log line goes to the flashing port, which nobody is
// watching during a phone bench session - so the symptom would be "that station just
// never shows up in the app" with no visible cause.
bump(&s_oversize_drops);
ESP_LOGW(TAG, "send_cam_rx: cam_len too large (%d), total oversize drops %u",
cam_len, s_oversize_drops);
ESP_LOGW(TAG, "send_v2x_rx: port %u payload too large (%d), total oversize drops %u",
btp_dest_port, uper_len, s_oversize_drops);
return false;
}
// static, not stack (515 bytes at MAX_PAYLOAD 512); only rx_forward_task calls this, and
// static, not stack (526 bytes at MAX_PAYLOAD 512); only rx_forward_task calls this, and
// send_frame's mutex covers the handoff onto the wire.
static uint8_t s_cam_rx_payload[SERIAL_LINK_MAX_PAYLOAD];
s_cam_rx_payload[0] = (uint8_t)rssi;
memcpy(s_cam_rx_payload + 1, cam_uper, (size_t)cam_len);
return send_frame(SERIAL_MSG_CAM_RX, s_cam_rx_payload, 1 + cam_len);
static uint8_t s_v2x_payload[SERIAL_LINK_MAX_PAYLOAD];
// Little-endian prefix, layout documented in serial_link.h - keep in lockstep with the app's
// SerialFrame.kt.
s_v2x_payload[0] = (uint8_t)(btp_dest_port & 0xFF);
s_v2x_payload[1] = (uint8_t)((btp_dest_port >> 8) & 0xFF);
s_v2x_payload[2] = (uint8_t)rssi;
s_v2x_payload[3] = (uint8_t)((has_geo_area ? 0x01 : 0x00) | (signed_unverified ? 0x02 : 0x00));
uint32_t lat = (uint32_t)geo_area_lat_tenmicrodeg;
uint32_t lon = (uint32_t)geo_area_lon_tenmicrodeg;
s_v2x_payload[4] = (uint8_t)(lat & 0xFF);
s_v2x_payload[5] = (uint8_t)((lat >> 8) & 0xFF);
s_v2x_payload[6] = (uint8_t)((lat >> 16) & 0xFF);
s_v2x_payload[7] = (uint8_t)((lat >> 24) & 0xFF);
s_v2x_payload[8] = (uint8_t)(lon & 0xFF);
s_v2x_payload[9] = (uint8_t)((lon >> 8) & 0xFF);
s_v2x_payload[10] = (uint8_t)((lon >> 16) & 0xFF);
s_v2x_payload[11] = (uint8_t)((lon >> 24) & 0xFF);
s_v2x_payload[12] = (uint8_t)(geo_area_distance_a_m & 0xFF);
s_v2x_payload[13] = (uint8_t)((geo_area_distance_a_m >> 8) & 0xFF);
if (uper_len > 0) memcpy(s_v2x_payload + SERIAL_V2X_RX_PREFIX_LEN, uper, (size_t)uper_len);
return send_frame(SERIAL_MSG_V2X_RX, s_v2x_payload, SERIAL_V2X_RX_PREFIX_LEN + uper_len);
}
bool serial_link_send_status(uint8_t status)
{
// [status:1][oversize_drops:2 LE][tx_failures:2 LE][rx_crc_errors:2 LE] - keep in lockstep
// with EspLinkStatus.parse() in the app's SerialFrame.kt.
uint8_t payload[7];
// [status:1][oversize_drops:2 LE][tx_failures:2 LE][rx_crc_errors:2 LE][capabilities:1] -
// keep in lockstep with EspLinkStatus.parse() in the app's SerialFrame.kt.
uint8_t payload[8];
payload[0] = status;
payload[1] = (uint8_t)(s_oversize_drops & 0xFF);
payload[2] = (uint8_t)((s_oversize_drops >> 8) & 0xFF);
@@ -143,6 +175,9 @@ bool serial_link_send_status(uint8_t status)
payload[4] = (uint8_t)((s_tx_failures >> 8) & 0xFF);
payload[5] = (uint8_t)(s_rx_crc_errors & 0xFF);
payload[6] = (uint8_t)((s_rx_crc_errors >> 8) & 0xFF);
// What this firmware accepts. The app reads it to decide whether it may send CAM_TX_PV, which
// is what lets a new app keep working against firmware that predates that message.
payload[7] = SERIAL_CAP_CAM_TX_PV;
return send_frame(SERIAL_MSG_STATUS, payload, sizeof(payload));
}
@@ -238,9 +273,19 @@ static void rx_task(void *arg)
uint16_t crc_calc = crc16_ccitt_false(crc_buf, (size_t)(3 + len));
if (crc_calc == crc_recv) {
if (type == SERIAL_MSG_CAM_TX && s_on_cam_tx) {
s_on_cam_tx(payload, len);
} else if (type != SERIAL_MSG_CAM_TX) {
if (type == SERIAL_MSG_CAM_TX) {
if (s_on_cam_tx) s_on_cam_tx(payload, len);
} else if (type == SERIAL_MSG_CAM_TX_PV) {
// A frame that is all prefix has nothing to transmit.
if (len > SERIAL_CAM_TX_PV_PREFIX_LEN) {
if (s_on_cam_tx_pv) {
s_on_cam_tx_pv(payload, payload + SERIAL_CAM_TX_PV_PREFIX_LEN,
len - SERIAL_CAM_TX_PV_PREFIX_LEN);
}
} else {
ESP_LOGW(TAG, "rx: CAM_TX_PV of %u bytes carries no CAM, ignoring", len);
}
} else {
ESP_LOGW(TAG, "rx: unexpected frame type 0x%02x from phone, ignoring", type);
}
} else {
@@ -255,9 +300,11 @@ static void rx_task(void *arg)
}
}
void serial_link_init(serial_link_cam_tx_cb_t on_cam_tx)
void serial_link_init(serial_link_cam_tx_cb_t on_cam_tx,
serial_link_cam_tx_pv_cb_t on_cam_tx_pv)
{
s_on_cam_tx = on_cam_tx;
s_on_cam_tx_pv = on_cam_tx_pv;
s_tx_mutex = xSemaphoreCreateMutex();
if (!s_tx_mutex) {
obu-firmware/main/serial_link.h
+95 -20
View File
@@ -28,22 +28,75 @@
// built by the phone (position/speed/heading/yaw rate baked in). On receipt the ESP32
// immediately GeoNetworking-wraps and transmits it - this IS the transmit clock now, there
// is no independent on-chip timer. See main.c's rx-driven tx path.
// SERIAL_MSG_CAM_RX (0x02), ESP32 -> phone: payload is [rssi:1 signed][CAM UPER bytes...] - a
// CAM received over the air, already stripped of its 802.11/LLC-SNAP/GeoNetworking/BTP-B
// framing by gn_unwrap.c. The phone never sees raw 802.11 frames. No station id is carried
// separately - CAM's own ItsPduHeader.stationID (the first field inside the UPER bytes) is
// already the meaningful identifier; see gn_unwrap.h for why a second one isn't added here.
// SERIAL_MSG_CAM_RX (0x02), ESP32 -> phone: SUPERSEDED by SERIAL_MSG_V2X_RX, no longer sent.
// The constant is kept so the numbering is not silently reused by a future message type.
// SERIAL_MSG_V2X_RX (0x04), ESP32 -> phone: any ITS message received over the air, already
// stripped of its 802.11/LLC-SNAP/GeoNetworking/BTP-B framing by gn_unwrap.c - the phone
// never sees raw 802.11 frames. Payload is a fixed 14-byte prefix followed by the UPER bytes:
//
// [0..1] btp_dest_port uint16 LE 2001 = CAM, 2002 = DENM (ETSI TS 103 248)
// [2] rssi int8 dBm, from the promiscuous RX metadata
// [3] flags uint8 bit0: geo area fields below are valid
// bit1: arrived signed (TS 103 097), signature NOT
// verified. An app that tests only bit0 ignores it.
// [4..7] geo_area_lat int32 LE 1/10 microdegree, GeoBroadcast destination area
// [8..11] geo_area_lon int32 LE 1/10 microdegree
// [12..13] geo_area_dist uint16 LE Distance A, metres (relevance radius for a circle)
// [14..] UPER message bytes - exactly the message. Before 2026-09-11 they were followed by
// the 8 bytes the chip's promiscuous RX appends (gn_unwrap.h, "Payload bounds").
//
// All prefix fields are LITTLE-endian, matching this framing's own length field - note the
// GeoNetworking wire format they came from is big-endian, so gn_unwrap.c converts.
// Generic on purpose: adding MAPEM/SPATEM later needs a decoder on the phone and one port in
// gn_unwrap.c, but no change to this protocol. No station id is carried separately - each
// message's own ItsPduHeader.stationID is the meaningful identifier.
// SERIAL_MSG_STATUS (0x03), ESP32 -> phone: heartbeat + counters, sent at 1 Hz so the phone can
// distinguish "link idle" from "link dead" independent of CAM traffic (the app's watchdog in
// UsbSerialTransport.kt declares the link dead after 3 missed beats). Payload is 7 bytes:
// [status:1][oversize_drops:2 LE][tx_failures:2 LE][rx_crc_errors:2 LE]
// UsbSerialTransport.kt declares the link dead after 3 missed beats). Payload is 8 bytes:
// [status:1][oversize_drops:2 LE][tx_failures:2 LE][rx_crc_errors:2 LE][capabilities:1]
// status 0 = ok. The counters are free-running totals since boot, saturating at 0xFFFF.
// capabilities is a bitmask of the SERIAL_CAP_* flags below. It was appended as byte 7 rather
// than inserted, so an app that predates it, and reads only the first 7 bytes, is unaffected.
// They exist because the alternative - ESP_LOGW on the flashing port - is invisible to the
// phone, which is the only thing watching during a bench session. Mirrored by EspLinkStatus
// in the app's SerialFrame.kt.
#define SERIAL_MSG_CAM_TX 0x01
#define SERIAL_MSG_CAM_RX 0x02
#define SERIAL_MSG_STATUS 0x03
#define SERIAL_MSG_CAM_TX 0x01
#define SERIAL_MSG_CAM_RX 0x02
#define SERIAL_MSG_STATUS 0x03
#define SERIAL_MSG_V2X_RX 0x04
#define SERIAL_MSG_CAM_TX_PV 0x05
// Size of the V2X_RX prefix documented above. Must match the app's SerialFrame.kt.
#define SERIAL_V2X_RX_PREFIX_LEN 14
// SERIAL_MSG_CAM_TX_PV (0x05), phone -> ESP32: a CAM together with the GeoNetworking Source
// Position Vector to transmit it under. Payload is a fixed 24-byte prefix, then the CAM UPER:
//
// [0..5] mac 6 bytes pseudonym: the 802.11 source address AND the GN_ADDR MID
// [6] station_type uint8 TS 102 894-2 StationType (2 = cyclist)
// [7] flags uint8 bit0: PAI, position accuracy indicator
// [8..11] tst uint32 LE ms at which lat/lon were acquired, TimestampIts mod 2^32
// [12..15] lat int32 LE 1/10 microdegree
// [16..19] lon int32 LE 1/10 microdegree
// [20..21] speed int16 LE 0.01 m/s
// [22..23] heading uint16 LE 0.1 degree from north, clockwise, 0..3599
// [24..] CAM UPER bytes
//
// Little-endian like the rest of this framing; geonet.c converts to GeoNetworking's big-endian.
// Every prefix field is something the phone already has when it builds the CAM, and none of it
// can be known on this chip, which has no GNSS and no clock source on the OCB channel. Before
// this message existed the GN header carried fixed placeholders instead (see main.c).
//
// A new type rather than a redefined CAM_TX, so app and firmware can be updated independently:
// - old app, new firmware: the app sends CAM_TX, which is handled exactly as before.
// - new app, old firmware: the app sends CAM_TX_PV only once the heartbeat advertises
// SERIAL_CAP_CAM_TX_PV, and an old heartbeat carries no such bit, so it stays on CAM_TX.
// Redefining CAM_TX would instead have double-wrapped every frame in one of those combinations
// and sent one with no GN header in the other, silently, since neither side checks versions.
#define SERIAL_CAM_TX_PV_PREFIX_LEN 24
// Capability bits, carried in byte 7 of the SERIAL_MSG_STATUS payload.
#define SERIAL_CAP_CAM_TX_PV 0x01
// USB Serial/JTAG has no baud rate or GPIO pins to configure - it's a fixed on-chip USB device
// controller wired directly to the native USB-C port's D+/D- lines in silicon. RX/TX buffer
@@ -65,21 +118,38 @@
// Raised from 160 to 512: 160 was reasoned from cam.c's 96-byte encode buffer, which only ever
// described OUR OWN minimal CAM. A third-party CAM off the air carrying a path-history or
// special-vehicle container comfortably exceeds it, and those stations would then never reach the
// phone at all. 512 clears any realistic CAM; the real upstream ceiling on the RX path is
// rx_item_t.data (400 bytes) in main.c, so nothing larger can get here anyway.
// phone at all. 512 clears any realistic CAM. Our own CAM is 43 bytes of UPER.
//
// This, not the radio side, is the ceiling on the RX path. main.c captures up to RX_FRAME_MAX_LEN
// (800) bytes per frame, sized for the CiT One's 528-byte DENM, so a larger ITS payload
// does arrive here. serial_link_send_v2x_rx() then drops anything above this minus its 14-byte
// prefix and counts it in the heartbeat's oversize-drop counter.
#define SERIAL_LINK_MAX_PAYLOAD 512
// Initializes the USB Serial/JTAG driver and its background RX-framing and 1 Hz heartbeat tasks.
// Call once from app_main, after nvs/event loop init. `on_cam_tx` is invoked (from the RX task's
// context - keep it fast, it blocks the next frame's parsing) whenever a complete, checksummed
// SERIAL_MSG_CAM_TX frame arrives from the phone.
// Call once from app_main, after nvs/event loop init. Both callbacks run in the RX task's context,
// so keep them fast: they block the next frame's parsing.
// on_cam_tx a complete, checksummed SERIAL_MSG_CAM_TX frame: bare CAM UPER.
// on_cam_tx_pv a complete, checksummed SERIAL_MSG_CAM_TX_PV frame, already checked to carry at
// least one CAM byte after its prefix: the 24-byte prefix, then the CAM UPER.
typedef void (*serial_link_cam_tx_cb_t)(const uint8_t *cam_uper, int cam_len);
void serial_link_init(serial_link_cam_tx_cb_t on_cam_tx);
typedef void (*serial_link_cam_tx_pv_cb_t)(const uint8_t *prefix,
const uint8_t *cam_uper, int cam_len);
void serial_link_init(serial_link_cam_tx_cb_t on_cam_tx,
serial_link_cam_tx_pv_cb_t on_cam_tx_pv);
// Sends a SERIAL_MSG_CAM_RX frame to the phone: rssi + the CAM UPER bytes gn_unwrap.c extracted
// from an over-the-air frame. Returns true if the frame was written to the UART (not an
// end-to-end ack - the phone may still drop it, e.g. serial buffer overrun).
bool serial_link_send_cam_rx(int8_t rssi, const uint8_t *cam_uper, int cam_len);
// Sends a SERIAL_MSG_V2X_RX frame: the metadata prefix plus the UPER bytes gn_unwrap.c extracted
// from an over-the-air frame. Pass has_geo_area=false and zeroes for the area fields when the
// source frame carried no destination area (i.e. it was single-hop broadcast, not GeoBroadcast).
// signed_unverified is gn_rx_t's flag of the same name; it sets bit1 of the prefix flags.
// Returns true if the frame was written to the USB endpoint - not an end-to-end ack, the phone
// may still drop it.
bool serial_link_send_v2x_rx(uint16_t btp_dest_port, int8_t rssi,
bool has_geo_area, bool signed_unverified,
int32_t geo_area_lat_tenmicrodeg,
int32_t geo_area_lon_tenmicrodeg,
uint16_t geo_area_distance_a_m,
const uint8_t *uper, int uper_len);
// Sends one SERIAL_MSG_STATUS heartbeat frame immediately (status byte + the current counters).
// Normally unnecessary to call by hand - serial_link_init() starts a task that does this at 1 Hz.
@@ -90,4 +160,9 @@ bool serial_link_send_status(uint8_t status);
// otherwise indistinguishable, from the phone's side, from one that transmitted fine.
void serial_link_note_tx_failure(void);
// Counts an ITS message that cannot be forwarded because it is too large, in the same heartbeat
// counter serial_link_send_v2x_rx() uses for its own size check. For main.c's rx_forward_task,
// whose capture buffer is smaller than the largest frames on air.
void serial_link_note_oversize_drop(uint16_t btp_dest_port);
#endif
obu-firmware/sdkconfig.old
-2509
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
obu-firmware/test/host/Makefile
+60
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
# Host-side tests for obu-firmware. See README.md: needs gcc and make on PATH (MSYS2 UCRT64), and
# asn1tools under `py -3.11` for the replay check.
#
# make build and run everything: chain, replay, fuzz
# make chain | replay | fuzz one of them
# make fuzz FUZZ_ITER=50000000 FUZZ_SEED=7 a longer or different fuzz run
# make clean remove build/
#
# The firmware sources are compiled straight from ../../main, never copied.
CC = gcc
PYTHON = python
PYTHON_ASN1 = py -3.11
FW = ../../main
BUILD = build
EXE = $(if $(filter Windows_NT,$(OS)),.exe,)
# Captures live in capture/recordings/ since 2026-09-14; older ones are still in the
# receiver checkout beside this repo.
RECORDINGS = $(wildcard ../../../capture/recordings/*.pcap ../../../its-g5-receiver-firmware/recordings/*.pcap)
FUZZ_ITER = 2000000
FUZZ_SEED = 1
# -Werror: these sources must stay warning-free on the host compiler too.
# UBSan in trap mode needs no runtime library, so it works on MinGW; a trap shows up as a crash.
CFLAGS = -std=c11 -O2 -g -Wall -Wextra -Wpedantic -Werror -I$(FW) \
-fsanitize=undefined -fsanitize-undefined-trap-on-error
FW_SRCS = $(FW)/geonet.c $(FW)/dot11p.c $(FW)/gn_unwrap.c
DEPS = test_util.c test_util.h $(FW_SRCS) $(wildcard $(FW)/*.h)
.PHONY: all check chain replay fuzz clean
all: check
check: chain replay fuzz
$(BUILD):
mkdir -p $@
$(BUILD)/%$(EXE): %.c $(DEPS) | $(BUILD)
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $< test_util.c $(FW_SRCS)
# The pcap goes through pcap_gn_tally.py as a second, independent parser of the same frames.
chain: $(BUILD)/test_chain$(EXE)
$(BUILD)/test_chain$(EXE) $(BUILD)/test_chain.pcap
$(PYTHON) ../pcap_gn_tally.py $(BUILD)/test_chain.pcap
replay: $(BUILD)/test_replay$(EXE)
ifeq ($(RECORDINGS),)
@echo "replay: no recordings in ../../../its-g5-receiver-firmware/recordings, skipped"
else
$(BUILD)/test_replay$(EXE) $(BUILD)/replay.tsv $(RECORDINGS)
$(PYTHON_ASN1) check_replay.py $(BUILD)/replay.tsv $(RECORDINGS)
endif
fuzz: $(BUILD)/fuzz_gn_unwrap$(EXE)
$(BUILD)/fuzz_gn_unwrap$(EXE) $(FUZZ_ITER) $(FUZZ_SEED) $(RECORDINGS)
clean:
rm -rf $(BUILD)
obu-firmware/test/host/README.md
+151
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
# Host-side tests for obu-firmware
**Status (2026-09-11):** the chain test, the capture replay and the fuzzer are written and pass;
results under "Running". Toolchain: MSYS2 UCRT64 gcc, Option B below (chosen and
installed 2026-09-11).
`geonet.c`, `dot11p.c` and `gn_unwrap.c` include nothing but standard C headers, so they compile
unmodified on a PC. That makes three things possible without a board: a TX -> RX round trip
through our own code, replaying real captures through the RX parser, and fuzzing the parser that
reads untrusted radio bytes. ESP-IDF only builds `main/` (and `components/`), so nothing under
`test/` ever affects the firmware image.
## Layout
```
obu-firmware/
├── main/ firmware sources; the tests compile these directly, never copies
└── test/
├── pcap_gn_tally.py GN header fields per station over .pcap captures (Python only)
└── host/
├── README.md this file
├── Makefile `make`: builds ../../main/{geonet,dot11p,gn_unwrap}.c + tests, runs them
├── test_chain.c geonet_wrap_shb -> dot11p_build_frame -> gn_unwrap_its, byte-checked
├── test_util.c/.h shared: guard page, crash report, pcap read/write
├── test_replay.c every recorded frame through gn_unwrap_its, results to a TSV
├── check_replay.py re-derives each result independently, then asn1tools on the messages
├── fuzz_gn_unwrap.c mutation fuzzer; each input ends against a no-access guard page, so
│ an over-read faults (no ASan on MinGW)
└── build/ compiler output; already ignored by the repo's `build/` rule
```
The repo's `vanetza/` folder is a gitignored reading copy only; it is not built. `check_replay.py`
reads the IEEE 1609.2 ASN.1 modules from it (they carry no licence header, so they are not copied
into `asn1/`). Without it, signed frames are still replayed but not checked independently.
## Running
From PowerShell, with MSYS2 on PATH for the session (Option B step 3):
```powershell
$env:PATH = "C:\msys64\ucrt64\bin;C:\msys64\usr\bin;$env:PATH"
cd C:\Users\Ashin\AndroidStudioProjects\MicrOBU\obu-firmware\test\host
make
```
`make` runs three things (`make chain`, `make replay`, `make fuzz` run one). A non-zero exit, or a
`CRASH ... during: <what>` line (from the fuzzer, followed by the input as hex), is a failure.
- **chain** (`test_chain.c`): frames built by the firmware's own TX code, checked byte by byte
against EN 302 636-4-1 and parsed back. Covers the CAM layout (non-QoS and QoS), Source Position
Vector edges, output-buffer bounds, a 512-byte payload through `main.c`'s buffer sizes,
hand-built GeoBroadcast frames in all three shapes, signed frames in all three COER length
forms plus a top-level unsecuredData, one-byte mutations that must be rejected or accepted, the
Common Header's payload length as the message boundary, the 8-byte RX trailer, and every
truncation length of each frame against the guard page. `pcap_gn_tally.py` then reads the
frames back as a second parser; `build/test_chain.pcap` opens in Wireshark too.
2026-09-11: 1731 checks, 0 failed.
- **replay** (`test_replay.c` + `check_replay.py`): every record in
`its-g5-receiver-firmware/recordings/*.pcap` through `gn_unwrap_its`, each cut to `main.c`'s
800-byte capture buffer as on the board. `check_replay.py` re-derives each result on its own
(its own GN/BTP parse; the security envelope decoded by asn1tools from the IEEE 1609.2 modules),
compares record by record, then decodes and re-encodes every distinct message with asn1tools -
a byte-identical re-encode is only possible when the message was cut at exactly the right byte.
Needs `py -3.11` with asn1tools. 2026-09-11: 15 145 records, 15 131 accepted (10 831 CAM,
4 300 DENM; 157 of them signed); C and Python agree on every record; 11 043 of the 11 106
distinct messages re-encode byte-identically. The other 63 fail the same way with the old 8
trailing bytes put back, so the boundary is not the cause: 5 are our own CAMs from before the
2026-08-20 yawRateConfidence fix, 56 come from the CiT One and 1 from another station (see
`TODO.md`), and 1 uses an extension asn1tools cannot re-encode.
- **fuzz** (`fuzz_gn_unwrap.c`): random edits of every recorded frame, each run against the guard
page; an over-read crashes, an accepted payload outside its input fails. Default 2 000 000
iterations (about 2 s); `make fuzz FUZZ_ITER=50000000 FUZZ_SEED=7` for a longer run.
2026-09-11: 50 000 000 iterations, no crash.
Not covered: `main.c` (serial prefix parsing, queues) and `serial_link.c`, which need ESP-IDF;
and the phone's encoder, whose bytes are opaque here (asn1tools and the app's golden test cover
it).
## Option A (not used): WSL2 + Ubuntu 24.04
Kept as the fallback if AddressSanitizer or libFuzzer are ever needed; Option B has neither.
1. In **PowerShell as Administrator**:
```powershell
wsl --install -d Ubuntu-24.04
```
Reboot if it asks. Ubuntu then opens and asks for a Linux username and password (separate from
the Windows account). Checked 2026-09-11: Hyper-V is already running on this PC, so no BIOS
change should be needed. If the install says virtualization is disabled, enable Intel VT-x /
AMD SVM in the BIOS.
2. Confirm it is WSL **2**: `wsl -l -v` should list `Ubuntu-24.04` with VERSION `2`.
3. Inside Ubuntu, the compilers:
```bash
sudo apt update
sudo apt install -y build-essential clang cmake ninja-build git pkg-config python3
```
4. Smoke test: the firmware sources compile on the host (expect no output):
```bash
cd /mnt/c/Users/Ashin/AndroidStudioProjects/MicrOBU/obu-firmware/test/host
cc -std=c11 -Wall -Wextra -fsyntax-only ../../main/geonet.c ../../main/dot11p.c ../../main/gn_unwrap.c
```
## Option B (chosen): native Windows gcc via MSYS2
Enough for the round-trip test, the capture replay and the guard-page fuzzer. No libFuzzer and no
AddressSanitizer with MinGW gcc, which is why the fuzzer uses a guard page instead.
1. In PowerShell: `winget install -e --id MSYS2.MSYS2` (installs to `C:\msys64`).
2. Open **MSYS2 UCRT64** from the Start menu and run `pacman -Syu`. If the window closes, reopen
it and run `pacman -Syu` again. Then:
```bash
pacman -S --needed mingw-w64-ucrt-x86_64-gcc make
```
3. **`C:\msys64\ucrt64\bin` must be on PATH.** Calling `C:\msys64\ucrt64\bin\gcc.exe` by its full
path alone exits 1 with no message, because gcc's compiler stages load their DLLs from that
folder. `make` lives on the MSYS side, in `C:\msys64\usr\bin`. Either work inside the
**MSYS2 UCRT64** shell, which has both, or put them on PATH for the current session:
```powershell
$env:PATH = "C:\msys64\ucrt64\bin;C:\msys64\usr\bin;$env:PATH" # PowerShell
```
```bash
export PATH=/c/msys64/ucrt64/bin:/c/msys64/usr/bin:$PATH # Git Bash
```
Adding them to the user PATH permanently also works; it was deliberately not done by setup.
4. Smoke test (expect no output):
```powershell
cd C:\Users\Ashin\AndroidStudioProjects\MicrOBU\obu-firmware\test\host
gcc -std=c11 -Wall -Wextra -fsyntax-only ../../main/geonet.c ../../main/dot11p.c ../../main/gn_unwrap.c
```
Installed on this PC 2026-09-11: MSYS2 20260611, gcc 16.2.0 (UCRT64), GNU Make 4.4.1. All three
firmware sources compile with `-std=c11 -O2 -Wall -Wextra -Wpedantic` and no warnings.
## Line endings
The repo runs with `core.autocrlf=true`, so Windows checkouts have CRLF line endings. C compilers
don't care; shell scripts run from WSL do (`bash: $'\r': command not found`). When the first `.sh`
file lands here, add `*.sh text eol=lf` to a root `.gitattributes` (none exists yet).
obu-firmware/test/host/check_replay.py
+253
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,253 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Independent check of test_replay's output. See README.md.
For every recorded frame this works out on its own what gn_unwrap_its should have produced -
GeoNetworking and BTP parsed here from EN 302 636-4-1, the TS 103 097 security envelope decoded by
asn1tools from the IEEE 1609.2 ASN.1 modules rather than by hand - and compares that with what the
C code did, record by record. Then it decodes every distinct extracted message with asn1tools and
re-encodes it. Only a message cut at exactly the right byte re-encodes to the same bytes, so this
is what proves that no trailer or signature bytes came along with it.
py -3.11 check_replay.py replay.tsv capture.pcap [capture.pcap ...]
Needs asn1tools (installed for Python 3.11 on this PC). Message modules come from the repo's
asn1/; the IEEE 1609.2 ones from asn1/ or, failing that, the gitignored vanetza/ checkout.
Exit status 1 if the C code and this disagree about any record.
"""
import collections
import pathlib
import struct
import sys
import asn1tools
ROOT = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parents[3]
PORT_NAMES = {2001: "CAM", 2002: "DENM", 2004: "SPATEM"}
# main.c's RX_FRAME_MAX_LEN: the most of any frame the board hands to gn_unwrap_its. test_replay
# cuts frames to it, so this does too.
RX_FRAME_MAX_LEN = 800
def compile_specs():
a = ROOT / "asn1"
uper = {
2001: asn1tools.compile_files([str(a / "cam_1_4_1.asn"), str(a / "cdd_1_3_1_1.asn")], "uper"),
2002: asn1tools.compile_files([str(a / "denm_1_3_1.asn"), str(a / "cdd_1_3_1_1.asn")], "uper"),
2004: asn1tools.compile_files(
[str(a / n) for n in ("spatem_2_2_1.asn", "mapem_2_2_1.asn", "dsrc_2_2_1.asn", "cdd_2_2_1.asn")],
"uper"),
}
names = ("IEEE1609dot2BaseTypes.asn", "IEEE1609dot2.asn")
for d in (a, ROOT / "vanetza" / "asn1"):
if all((d / n).exists() for n in names):
return uper, asn1tools.compile_files([str(d / n) for n in names], "oer"), d
return uper, None, None
def frames(path):
"""(record index, 802.11 frame) for every record, numbered the way test_util.c numbers them."""
d = pathlib.Path(path).read_bytes()
if len(d) < 24:
return
magic = struct.unpack("<I", d[:4])[0]
e = "<" if magic in (0xA1B2C3D4, 0xA1B23C4D) else ">"
link = struct.unpack(e + "I", d[20:24])[0]
if link not in (105, 127):
return
off, index = 24, 0
while off + 16 <= len(d):
incl = struct.unpack(e + "I", d[off + 8:off + 12])[0]
if incl > len(d) - off - 16:
break
pkt = d[off + 16:off + 16 + incl]
off += 16 + incl
if link == 127:
rl = pkt[2] | pkt[3] << 8 if len(pkt) >= 4 else len(pkt) + 1
if rl > len(pkt):
index += 1
continue
pkt = pkt[rl:]
yield index, pkt
index += 1
def open_envelope(sec, env):
"""(inner GeoNetworking packet, signed) of a TS 103 097 envelope per asn1tools, or None."""
try:
m = sec.decode("Ieee1609Dot2Data", env)
except Exception:
return None
if m["protocolVersion"] != 3:
return None
kind, content = m["content"]
if kind == "unsecuredData":
return content, False
if kind == "signedData":
data = content["tbsData"]["payload"].get("data")
if data and data["protocolVersion"] == 3 and data["content"][0] == "unsecuredData":
return data["content"][1], True
return None
def u16(b):
return int.from_bytes(b, "big")
def s32(b):
return int.from_bytes(b, "big", signed=True)
def expect(f, sec):
"""What gn_unwrap_its should report for frame f: None, or a dict matching test_replay's row.
Second value: how many bytes after the message the pre-2026-09-11 code would have forwarded."""
if len(f) < 24 or (f[0] >> 2) & 3 != 2 or f[1] & 3 == 3:
return None, None
o = 24 + (2 if f[0] & 0x80 else 0)
if f[o:o + 8] != b"\xaa\xaa\x03\x00\x00\x00\x89\x47" or len(f) < o + 12:
return None, None
nh = f[o + 8] & 0x0F
o += 12
if nh == 2:
if sec is None:
return "unchecked", None
opened = open_envelope(sec, f[o:])
if opened is None:
return None, None
region, signed = opened
elif nh == 1:
region, signed = f[o:], False
else:
return None, None
if len(region) < 8 or region[0] >> 4 != 2:
return None, None
ht, hst, pl = region[1] >> 4, region[1] & 0x0F, u16(region[4:6])
if ht == 5 and hst == 0:
ext, area = 28, None
elif ht == 4:
ext = 44
else:
return None, None
if len(region) < 8 + ext + 4:
return None, None
if ht == 4:
a = 8 + 28
area = (s32(region[a:a + 4]), s32(region[a + 4:a + 8]), u16(region[a + 8:a + 10]))
port = u16(region[8 + ext:8 + ext + 2])
if port not in PORT_NAMES or pl <= 4:
return None, None
start, end = 8 + ext + 4, 8 + ext + pl
if signed is not None and nh == 2 and end > len(region):
return None, None # the inner packet claims more than its envelope holds
payload = region[start:min(end, len(region))]
if not payload:
return None, None
old_extra = len(region) - end if nh == 1 else None
return dict(port=port, signed=signed, truncated=end > len(region), area=area, payload=payload), old_extra
def read_tsv(path):
rows = {}
with open(path, encoding="ascii") as fh:
next(fh)
for line in fh:
c = line.rstrip("\n").split("\t")
key = (c[0], int(c[1]))
if c[2] == "0":
rows[key] = None
else:
rows[key] = dict(port=int(c[3]), signed=c[4] == "1", truncated=c[5] == "1",
area=(int(c[7]), int(c[8]), int(c[9])) if c[6] == "1" else None,
payload=bytes.fromhex(c[10]))
return rows
def describe(r):
if r is None:
return "rejected"
return "port %d signed %s truncated %s area %s %d bytes" % (
r["port"], r["signed"], r["truncated"], r["area"], len(r["payload"]))
def main(argv):
if len(argv) < 2:
sys.exit(__doc__)
got = read_tsv(argv[0])
uper, sec, sec_dir = compile_specs()
if sec is None:
print("WARNING: IEEE 1609.2 modules not found; secured frames are not checked independently")
stats, extra, disagreements, messages = collections.Counter(), collections.Counter(), [], {}
for path in argv[1:]:
for index, f in frames(path):
key = (path, index)
stats["records"] += 1
stats["capped"] += len(f) > RX_FRAME_MAX_LEN
want, old_extra = expect(f[:RX_FRAME_MAX_LEN], sec)
if key not in got:
disagreements.append((key, "no row from test_replay"))
continue
have = got.pop(key)
if want == "unchecked":
stats["secured, unchecked"] += 1
continue
if want != have:
disagreements.append((key, "C: %s | independent: %s" % (describe(have), describe(want))))
continue
if want:
stats["accepted"] += 1
stats[PORT_NAMES[want["port"]]] += 1
stats["signed"] += want["signed"]
stats["truncated"] += want["truncated"]
if old_extra is not None:
extra[old_extra] += 1
messages.setdefault((want["port"], want["payload"]), key)
for key in got:
disagreements.append((key, "row from test_replay for a record this did not see"))
print("check_replay: %d records (%d cut to %d bytes), %d accepted (CAM %d, DENM %d, SPATEM %d; "
"%d signed, %d truncated)"
% (stats["records"], stats["capped"], RX_FRAME_MAX_LEN, stats["accepted"], stats["CAM"],
stats["DENM"], stats["SPATEM"], stats["signed"], stats["truncated"]))
if sec_dir:
print(" envelopes decoded with asn1tools using %s" % sec_dir.relative_to(ROOT))
print(" C vs independent parse: %s" % ("agree on every record" if not disagreements
else "%d DISAGREEMENTS" % len(disagreements)))
for key, why in disagreements[:15]:
print(" %s record %d: %s" % (pathlib.Path(key[0]).name, key[1], why))
outcome, failures = collections.Counter(), []
for (port, payload), key in messages.items():
name, spec = PORT_NAMES[port], uper[port]
try:
decoded = spec.decode(name, payload)
except Exception as e:
outcome[(name, "does not decode")] += 1
failures.append((key, name, len(payload), str(e)[:110]))
continue
try:
encoded = spec.encode(name, decoded)
except Exception as e:
# asn1tools decodes an alternative from a later module version (a CHOICE extension)
# as (None, None) and then cannot encode it back. Says nothing about where the message
# was cut, so it is reported apart from real mismatches.
outcome[(name, "decodes; uses a newer extension")] += 1
failures.append((key, name, len(payload), "cannot re-encode: " + str(e)[:90]))
continue
if encoded == payload:
outcome[(name, "re-encodes byte-identically")] += 1
else:
outcome[(name, "re-encodes differently")] += 1
failures.append((key, name, len(payload), "re-encoded to different bytes"))
print(" asn1tools on the %d distinct extracted messages:" % len(messages))
for (name, what), n in sorted(outcome.items()):
print(" %-6s %-28s %d" % (name, what, n))
for key, name, n, why in failures[:15]:
print(" %s record %d, %s %d bytes: %s" % (pathlib.Path(key[0]).name, key[1], name, n, why))
print(" bytes the pre-2026-09-11 code forwarded after each unsecured message: %s"
% dict(sorted(extra.items())))
return 1 if disagreements else 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main(sys.argv[1:]))

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