Ashin Walpola
d107534eb2
obu-firmware builds against the vanetza-idf C-ITS library, which until now came from the colleague's microbu-esp32c5 tree beside the repository and was not tracked here, so a clone of this repository could not build the firmware it ships. The library alone is now part of obu-firmware, as obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf: their external/vanetza-idf at commit cf4b99f, unchanged (9775 files; see its PROVENANCE.md). CMake takes it from there by default; -DVANETZA_IDF_DIR still points the build elsewhere. The rest of the colleague's tree (their own VAM firmware, PKI tooling, station-link Python tools, the V2X2MAP bridge) stays out of this repository and gitignored; nothing is pushed to their repository. NOTES.md, docs/06, TODO.md and the pcap verifier's usage line point at the new location.
55 lines
2.0 KiB
C++
55 lines
2.0 KiB
C++
#pragma once
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#include "keys.hpp"
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#include <vanetza/common/byte_buffer.hpp>
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#include <vanetza/security/hash_algorithm.hpp>
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#include <string>
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namespace vanetza
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{
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namespace pki
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{
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class Certificate;
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class EncryptedData;
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class SecurityModule;
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using security::HashAlgorithm;
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/**
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* \brief Parameters for an InnerEcRequest / outer EtsiTs103097Data-Signed enrolment message.
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* \see TS 102 941 §6.2.3.2
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*/
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struct EnrolmentRequestParameters
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{
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std::string its_id; // canonical id (initial) or current EC HashedId8 (re-enrolment)
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PublicKey verification_key; // to be certified; private key in SecurityModule for POP signature
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PublicKey outer_signer_key; // signs outer Data-Signed; canonical key (initial) or current EC verification key (re-enrolment)
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HashAlgorithm hash_algo = HashAlgorithm::SHA256; // POP and outer signatures
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const Certificate* outer_signer_certificate = nullptr; // null → signer=self; non-null → signer=digest of this cert
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};
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/**
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* \brief Build the signed (but not yet encrypted) enrolment request payload.
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*
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* Layered signatures: outer EtsiTs103097Data-Signed (signed with outer_signer_key;
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* signer=self for initial enrolment, digest(outer_signer_certificate) for re-keying)
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* wraps EtsiTs102941Data{enrolmentRequest=InnerEcRequestSignedForPop}, which is
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* the OER-encoded InnerEcRequest signed with verification_key (signer=self) as POP.
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* Exposed for testing; production code should call build_enrolment_request().
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*/
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ByteBuffer build_signed_enrolment_request(SecurityModule& security, const EnrolmentRequestParameters& parameters);
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/**
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* \brief Build the EA-encrypted enrolment request.
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*
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* Call .encode() on the result for the OER bytes to POST. The ECIES context
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* held in the returned EncryptedData is also needed to decrypt the EA's
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* response (same symmetric key via pskRecipInfo).
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*/
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EncryptedData build_enrolment_request(SecurityModule& security, const EnrolmentRequestParameters& parameters,
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const Certificate& ea_certificate);
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} // namespace pki
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} // namespace vanetza
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