Ashin Walpola
d107534eb2
obu-firmware builds against the vanetza-idf C-ITS library, which until now came from the colleague's microbu-esp32c5 tree beside the repository and was not tracked here, so a clone of this repository could not build the firmware it ships. The library alone is now part of obu-firmware, as obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf: their external/vanetza-idf at commit cf4b99f, unchanged (9775 files; see its PROVENANCE.md). CMake takes it from there by default; -DVANETZA_IDF_DIR still points the build elsewhere. The rest of the colleague's tree (their own VAM firmware, PKI tooling, station-link Python tools, the V2X2MAP bridge) stays out of this repository and gitignored; nothing is pushed to their repository. NOTES.md, docs/06, TODO.md and the pcap verifier's usage line point at the new location.
2.9 KiB
independent-verifier-02: rehearsal on a twin of a real EU CCMS L0 root
The same procedure as independent-verifier-01,
this time under a root certificate that carries the exact appPermissions,
certIssuePermissions and region of a real root submitted to the EU CCMS L0
ECTL (vidf_issue root --like <real root>.oer with a throwaway key: the twin
differs from the real root only in key, name and validity). The real root's
public certificate itself is not part of this repository; the twin shows what
the library will do with a chain of that shape.
| File | Content |
|---|---|
TWIN_RCA.oer |
twin root: CPOC Protocol Release 3.0/3.3 permission profile (CAM 01FFFF/FF0000, DENM 02FFFFFFFF/FF00000000, TLM, RLT, IVI, TLC-R, GN-MGMT all, SCR 01C0/FF3F, TLC-S, VRU 01/FF, CP, POI; second group SCR 013E/FFC1; chain length 2, eeType app+enrol), identifiedRegion countryOnly 65535 (CPOC clause I.3.9) |
TWIN_AA.oer |
AA derived from the root by vidf_issue authority: the root's ranges with chain length 1, the root's region, appPermissions psid 623 ssp 0130 |
TWIN_AT.oer |
ticket: psid 638 (01), 141 (no SSP), 36 (01FFFC); region inherited from the AA |
TWIN_AT2.oer |
the same without psid 141 |
sut.pcap, sut2.pcap |
three CAM carriers each (capture_pcap.py; the DENM carrier is refused because the tickets carry no psid 37) |
c-its-standard.jsonl, c-its-nomgmt.jsonl |
c-its-pcap output |
Result
| Capture | Message signature | Certificate signatures | ee_permissions_valid |
security_authorized |
|---|---|---|---|---|
sut2.pcap (ticket without psid 141) |
verifies (3/3) | verify (3/3) | true | true (3/3 CAMs) |
sut.pcap (standard ticket) |
verifies (3/3) | verify (3/3) | false (c-its treats the SSP-less psid 141 as unsupported, see -01) | false |
vidf_issue refused a ticket with the DENM SSP 01FFFFFF under this root
(refusing to write a ticket the issuer cannot authorise): the root's DENM
range fixes the first octet to 02 (SSP version 2 of the CPOC 3.3 profile),
which IEEE Std 1609.2 6.4.30 makes binding for every subordinate.
vidf_issue verify TWIN_AT.oer TWIN_AA.oer TWIN_RCA.oer reports the three
signatures, the validity nesting, the region nesting and the permission
consistency as the library's verifier applies them.
What this run changed in the library
The upstream region consistency (is_within) knows no identifiedRegion
issuer, so every certificate under an EU root was "inconsistent" for the
receive-side verifier. The chain validator now applies IEEE Std 1609.2 clause
6.4.17 itself: identifier containment for identified regions (whole country,
regions, subregions), the upstream geometry for geometric issuers, and the
station's permissive_identified_region policy for a geometric region under an
identified one (no border database on the device). test_region_consistency
covers the three cases (873 host checks, 747 on the ESP32-C5).