Files
MicrOBU/obu-firmware/NOTES.md
T
Ashin Walpola d2fd222a62 Sign ITS messages on the ESP32-C5 with vanetza-idf, over USB or BLE
obu-firmware is now a port of the colleague's standalone VRU station
(microbu-esp32c5/firmware, kept beside this repository and gitignored): the
vanetza-idf C-ITS stack with the TS 103 097 security entity, credentials in
NVS, the station-link v1 protocol over the native USB port (frame type 0x10
in the existing 0xAA55 framing) and over a BLE GATT peripheral, and its
ITS-G5 radio adapter. The phone still builds CAM and VAM; the board adds
GeoNetworking/BTP and signs with the provisioned authorization ticket. The
private key never leaves the board. Builds with ESP-IDF 6.0.2 only, which
vanetza-idf pins for the radio's private driver ABI. The previous C firmware
stays on disk unbuilt; a full-flash backup of the bench board is kept in
firmware-backups/ (gitignored).

Changed against the colleague's firmware, marked MicrOBU: in the sources:
- Reception unchanged for the app. vanetza-idf drops what it cannot verify
  (unsigned traffic, every RSU), so each captured frame also goes through the
  previous gn_unwrap.c and reaches the phone as link opcode V2X_RX (0x85),
  whose body is the old SERIAL_MSG_V2X_RX payload.
- Unsigned transmission still possible, with the previous geonet.c header;
  the phone chooses per message.
- Console on UART0 (CH343 port); the native USB port carries only link frames.
- BLE advertising pauses while the USB link is in use: BLE and ITS-G5 share
  one RF front end.
- NVS 80 KB (app at 0x20000). At 24 KB, with Wi-Fi settings the previous
  firmware left behind, the BLE bond could not be stored and the phone had to
  pair on every connection.
- Bench fixes: the radio queue is drained before the first PoTi (no RX and
  ~177 queue drops before); the station loop waited pdMS_TO_TICKS(5) = 0
  ticks at 100 Hz and starved the idle task; the 2.4 KB RX capture buffer is
  off the Wi-Fi task stack; BLE notifications longer than the MTU are dropped
  instead of cut short, MTU 517; serial writes are skipped with no USB host.
- Manual country policy and TX-power read-back from the previous radio setup;
  logs for BLE encryption changes and the number of stored bonds.

Verified on the bench board (COM3) with the phone over USB and BLE: CAM and
VAM, signed and unsigned, go out; reception of the sim car and the RSU's
CAM/SPATEM/MAPEM continues; the board survives app restarts and reconnects.
See docs/06-signed-its-vam-ble.md.
2026-09-23 17:27:54 +02:00

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Markdown

# obu-firmware
## Since 2026-09-23: signed ITS on vanetza-idf
This firmware is a port of the colleague's standalone ESP32-C5 VRU station
(`microbu-esp32c5/firmware`, its own git repository kept beside this one and gitignored here).
From it: the vanetza-idf C-ITS stack (BTP, GeoNetworking, the TS 103 097 security entity with
credentials in NVS), the station-link protocol v1 (`link_protocol.*`, `link_service.*`) over the
native USB port (`serial_link.*`, frame type 0x10 in the same 0xAA55 framing as before) and over BLE
GATT (`simple_ble.*`), and the radio adapter (`c5_radio.*`, `otm_tx_custom.c`). Build with ESP-IDF
**6.0.2**; see FLASHING.md.
The phone builds CAM or VAM, configures the station, provisions credentials, sends PoTi and hands
each message over as a BTP-DATA.request; the firmware adds GN/BTP, signs with the authorization
ticket, and transmits. The phone side is `Esp32Link.kt` in the app.
Changed or added for this project (search for `MicrOBU:` in the sources):
- **Reception stays as it was.** vanetza-idf decapsulates with `itsGnSnDecapResultHandling =
STRICT`, so it drops unsigned traffic (the bench sim car) and everything signed under a root other
than the provisioned demo root (every RSU). Every captured frame therefore also goes through the
previous firmware's `gn_unwrap.c` and reaches the phone as link opcode `V2X_RX` (0x85), whose body
is exactly the old `SERIAL_MSG_V2X_RX` payload (`Station::forward_raw`). The app's receive side is
unchanged.
- **Unsigned transmission is still possible.** The colleague's station refuses unsecured requests.
Here a request with GN security profile 1 goes out with the previous firmware's `geonet.c` header
and the position of the last PoTi (`Station::unsecured_request`); the app's "Sign outgoing
messages" setting decides per message.
- **Console on UART0.** ESP_LOG stays on the CH343 bridge port (COM3 on the bench); the native port
carries only link frames. The colleague's single-port board routes the log into LOG frames there
(`CONFIG_MICROBU_LOG_OVER_LINK`, off here).
- **BLE pauses while USB is in use** (`CONFIG_MICROBU_BLE_USB_IDLE_MS`, 3 s): BLE and ITS-G5 share
the C5's one RF front end. Whether a live BLE connection disturbs 5.9 GHz is still unmeasured
(TODO.md).
- A serial write no longer stalls the station task when no USB host is present (BLE-only use).
- A notification longer than the ATT MTU is dropped instead of silently truncated.
- The Wi-Fi RX callback's 2.4 KB capture buffer is static rather than on the driver task's stack
(the previous firmware's commit 04b0076 fixed the same risk).
- Manual country policy and the TX-power read-back from the previous firmware's radio bring-up.
- The activity LED (GPIO27 on the colleague's XIAO board) is off unless configured.
Credentials: the app ships `assets/demo-chain.vcr`, a throwaway chain generated 2026-09-23 with the
colleague's `vidf_issue` (root `6E7D0374FB021901`, AA `B3312F29844299E0`, AT `B80B49387A4C12EB`
valid two years, permissions psid 36 SSP `010000` and psid 638 SSP `01`). The colleague's own demo
chain only grants psid 638 and so cannot sign CAMs. Not EU-registered: receivers that verify against
the EU trust list drop what it signs.
Time: the signature's generationTime comes from the PoTi timestamp, which follows the app's
`ItsTime` convention (UTC-based, no leap seconds). The colleague's VBS adds the 5 leap seconds.
Which one is right is the open question documented in `ItsTime.kt`.
## Earlier notes (Phase 2, superseded)
### OBU transmit firmware - Phase 2 (in progress: HLN-SV DENM beacon)
Started. See `docs/04-transmit-setup.md` in the project root for build/flash
steps and how to validate this against your own sniffer.
Implements one profile so far: **HLN-SV** (aftermarket stationary recovery
vehicle), causeCode 94 (stationaryVehicle), subCauseCode 0, active while the
hazard-light GPIO is grounded. No location/alacarte containers.
- `main/main.c` - entry point, the `phy_11p_set`/`phy_change_channel(5900,...)`
register hack, GPIO polling, TX loop
- `main/denm.c` / `.h` - ASN.1 UPER encoding of a minimal DENM
- `main/geonet.c` / `.h` - GeoNetworking Basic/Common/SHB headers + BTP-B
- `main/dot11p.c` / `.h` - 802.11 OCB (QoS Data, broadcast) frame + LLC/SNAP
Known gaps, tracked as TODOs in the source: no real GNSS (lat/long hardcoded
0), no real time source (detectionTime/referenceTime hardcoded 0, decodes as
2004-01-01), fixed (non-rotating) pseudonym MAC, SHB instead of GeoBroadcast
(no multi-hop forwarding), unsecured (no IEEE 1609.2 signing).