MicrOBU/obu-firmware/external/vanetza-idf/docs/idf/standards.md

Standards and interface traceability

The design baseline is ETSI Release 2. Version numbers below are explicit; references are not a declaration that the implementation has passed conformance testing. Comments use the local traceability IDs in this table; these IDs are not identifiers assigned by ETSI. Primitive names and clause references identify the actual standard contracts.

ID	Binding/behavior	Source	Implementation
IF-IN-001	AL_DATA.request, including R2 bandwidth, transceiver mode and datastream ID	EN 303 797 V2.1.1, Annex B.2	access.hpp, access.cpp
IF-IN-002	AL_DATA.indication, CBR/RSSI/channel/receiver metadata	EN 303 797 V2.1.1, Annex B.2	access.hpp, Stack::indicate
IF-NF-001	BTP-DATA.request, conditional parameters, BTP header creation	TS 103 836-5-1 V2.1.1, clauses 7, 8.2 and Annex A.2	stack.hpp, Stack::request
IF-NF-002	BTP-DATA.indication and header removal	TS 103 836-5-1 V2.1.1, clause 8.3 and Annex A.3	Stack::Impl::indicate
IF-NF-ARCH	NF-SAP / GeoAware SAP placement	TS 102 723-11 V2.0.0, clause 5 incorporates V1.1.1	nf_sap.hpp provides the named BTP request and indication binding; remaining parameter gaps are recorded in the assessment
IF-GN-001	R2 GN processing and transport/core service	TS 103 836-4-1 V2.2.1, clauses 9/10 and Annex J	Upstream router port; R2 changes incomplete
IF-GN-002	GN-DATA.request/.indication N-SAP: raw SDU, no assumed upper-layer header	TS 103 836-4-1 V2.2.1 clause 9.3; EN 302 636-4-1 clause 9.3 heritage	stack.hpp/stack.cpp, Stack::request(GnRequest)/on_receive_gn. SHB and GBC only, matching IF-GN-001; requires the Common Header next_header "Any" case, absent upstream (fixed in vanetza/geonet/common_header.cpp)
IF-G5-NET	ITS-G5 media-dependent GN/DCC-MCO behavior	TS 103 836-4-2 V2.1.1, clauses 5–7	Upstream GN helpers; integrated behavior pending
IF-FAC-001	R2 ASN.1 message definitions	TS 103 900 V2.3.1 (CAM), TS 103 831 V2.3.1 (DENM), TS 103 300-3 V2.3.1 (VAM), TS 102 894-2 V2.4.1 (CDD)	Explicitly named R2 wrappers and selected generated ASN.1 sources
IF-GN-003	GN address configuration: AUTO, MANAGED (CORE_MMT) and ANONYMOUS (MID from the security entity's identifier), MID rewrite on identifier change	TS 103 836-4-1 V2.2.1 clauses 10.2.1.2 to 10.2.1.4, Annex J.2 (security context information), Annex K (CORE_MMT)	Stack::Impl subscribes to the identifier change when itsGnLocalAddrConfMethod is ANONYMOUS; Stack::set_address for MANAGED; mn_sap.hpp CORE_MMT_response_apply
IF-SN-001	SN-ENCAP.request/.confirm, SN-DECAP.request/.confirm with ITS-AID, permissions, context information and the report codes of Table 27 (SUCCESS only after verification)	TS 102 723-8 V2.0.0 clause 5 incorporates V1.1.1 Tables 10 to 27	sn_sap.hpp (SN_ENCAP_request_submit, SN_DECAP_request_submit), security::SecurityEntity; the router calls the same entity (Router::encap_packet with the additive context_information plumbing)
IF-SN-002	SN-IDCHANGE-SUBSCRIBE/-EVENT/-UNSUBSCRIBE/-TRIGGER, SN-ID-LOCK/-UNLOCK; two-phase commit PREPARE/COMMIT/ABORT/DEREG, lock 0..255 s, response timeout	TS 102 723-8 V1.1.1 clauses 5.2.5 to 5.2.10 and 6.3; TS 102 940 V2.1.1 clause 6.5 (every identifier-holding layer subscribes and derives its identifier from the HashedId8)	id_change.hpp (IdChangeService, IdChangeHook, IdChangeResponder), security::IdentityManager; the GN core is a subscriber (IF-GN-003)
IF-SF-001	SF-IDCHANGE-*/SF-ID-LOCK/-UNLOCK for the facilities layer; VRU basic service stops VAM generation on PREPARE, resumes with the new StationId after COMMIT, locks in elevated-hazard situations; SF-SIGN/-VERIFY/-ENCRYPT/-DECRYPT/-ENCAP/-DECAP as parameter types only	TS 102 723-9 V1.1.1 Tables 2 to 27, clause 4.1.5 (one entity serves several layers); TS 103 300-3 V2.3.1 clause 5.3.5	sf_sap.hpp, served by the same IdChangeService instance as IF-SN-002; the subscriber may run in another task, process or device, the library defines no transport
IF-SEC-001	Security encapsulation/decapsulation boundary	TS 102 723-8; TS 103 097 and TS 102 941 for security profiles/trust	security::SecurityEntity injected into the router: SN-ENCAP signing and, with VIDF_SECURITY_VERIFY (default on), SN-DECAP verification (IF-SEC-004); without it SN-DECAP reports Configuration_Problem (GAP-SEC-001)
IF-SEC-004	Verification of received signed messages: protocol version, profile structure per ITS-AID, hashId/signature consistency, signer lookup (inline certificate or learned digest), ticket validity, permissions for the ITS-AID, chain to a provisioned trust anchor with every certificate signature verified, chain permission consistency (chain-length window and eeType of every ancestor's PsidGroupPermissions, SSP within the BitmapSspRange/opaque range, omitted SSP only under all, subordinate CA ranges nested in the issuer's, reported as INCONSISTENT_CHAIN), region consistency of every link (identified regions by identifier containment, geometric ones by geometry, a geometric region under an identified one by policy), ticket region against the position, message signature; generationTime plausibility and replay per VerificationPolicy; P2P certificate distribution (request unknown AT/AA digests, learn an AA from requestedCertificate); learned certificates and replay window bounded	TS 103 097 V2.2.1 clauses 5.2, 7.1.1 to 7.1.3 (structure, P2P rules); IEEE Std 1609.2 clause 5.2 (SPDU validity), 5.1.2 with 6.4.28 to 6.4.30 (chain consistency: PsidGroupPermissions, SubjectPermissions, SspRange/BitmapSspRange), 6.4.17 and 6.4.21 to 6.4.24 (GeographicRegion, IdentifiedRegion), 5.3.1 (hashing with the signer certificate); TS 102 940 V2.1.1 clause 6 (trust chain root, AA, AT); TS 102 723-8 V1.1.1 Table 27 (report codes)	security.hpp: check_profile(), verify_certificate_signature(), VerificationPolicy, SecurityEntity::decapsulate_packet; security.cpp consistency::chain_consistent(), region_within() (public: chain_permissions_consistent, region_within); upstream DefaultCertificateValidator, CertificateCache, DefaultLocationChecker; ported verify flow of upstream StraightVerifyService::verify(v3)
IF-SEC-002	Signing profiles: CAM (signer digest, certificate once per second or on request), DENM (certificate, generationLocation), generic/GN-MGMT, VAM individual (1 s, new CAM signer) and cluster (500 ms via context information) with SSP {0x01}; certificate profiles for AT/AA/root/EC checked when a ticket is provisioned; hashing with the signer certificate hash; refusal without a valid ticket, permission or trust anchor	TS 103 097 V2.2.1 clauses 5.2, 7.1.1 to 7.1.3, 7.2.1 to 7.2.4; IEEE Std 1609.2 clause 5.3.1; TS 103 300-3 V2.3.1 clauses 6.5.2 and 6.5.3; TS 102 965 V2.4.1 Table A.1 (ITS-AIDs)	security.hpp: Ts103097SignHeaderPolicy, CertificatePool, TrustConfiguration, SecurityEntity::encapsulate_packet; upstream v3::StraightSignService, DefaultCertificateValidator
IF-SEC-003	ECDSA over NIST P-256, brainpoolP256r1 (SHA-256) and brainpoolP384r1 (SHA-384); compressed point recovery; key pair generation	IEEE Std 1609.2 clauses 5.3.1, 5.3.3, 6.3.38/6.3.39, 6.4.36; FIPS 186-4 D.1.2.3; RFC 5639 clauses 3.4/3.6	backend_mbedtls.hpp (PSA Crypto of mbedTLS 3.6/4.1), ecc.hpp (decompression, y = rhs^((p+1)/4) as p = 3 mod 4 for all three curves); upstream BackendOpenSsl on the host
IF-SEC-005	Provisioned credentials: root/CA certificates and tickets with keys as one bundle, applied through the entity's own checks; storage interface with file and ESP-IDF NVS implementations; the transport is the application's	TS 102 940 V2.1.1 clause 6 (what a station holds: root, EA/AA, tickets), TS 102 941 V2.2.1 (life cycle; storage and transport not standardised), TS 103 097 V2.2.1 clause 6 (COER certificates), IEEE Std 1609.2 clause 6.4.36 (curves of the private scalars)	credentials.hpp/credentials.cpp (Credentials, encode/decode, apply, CredentialStore, FileCredentialStore), nvs_credential_store.hpp (CONFIG_VANETZA_IDF_NVS_CREDENTIALS); test application diagnostic command 9, tools/credential_bundle.py, serial_sut.py --bundle
IF-PKI-002	Root CA trust list and revocation list: building (FullCtl with EA/AA/DC entries, CRL), verification as an ITS-S (signed by the RCA whose certificate is the signer, psid 624/622 with the RCA's CTL/CRL appPermissions, every EA/AA entry issued by that RCA with a verifying signature), application to the trust configuration (authorities) and to the chain validator (revocations by issuer)	TS 102 941 V2.2.1 clauses 6.3.2 to 6.3.6, A.2.7 (RcaCertificateTrustListMessage, CertificateRevocationListMessage, CtlFormat), Annex D Tables D.1/D.2 (DC GET interface), Table B.3 (CTL SSP); TS 102 965 V2.4.1 Table A.1 (622, 624); TS 103 097 V2.2.1 clause 7.2.3 (root appPermissions)	pki.hpp: build_rca_ctl, build_crl, parse_rca_ctl, parse_crl, apply; TrustConfiguration::revoke/clear_revocations; vidf_issue ctl/crl/inspect, tools/local_dc.py, tools/fetch_trust_lists.py
IF-PKI-001	EnrolmentRequest/Response and AuthorizationRequest/Response with proof of possession, ECIES key encapsulation, AES-128-CCM, request hash, pskRecipInfo decryption of the response	TS 102 941 V2.2.1 clauses 6.2.3.2 and 6.2.3.3, Annex A.2; TS 103 097 V2.2.1 clauses 5.2/5.3; IEEE Std 1609.2 clauses 5.3.5 (ECIES, KDF2, HMAC tag 128 bit) and 5.3.8 (CCM, nonce 12, tag 16); TS 102 965 V2.4.1 Table A.1 (623)	pki.hpp/pki.cpp with ecies_openssl.cpp (host) and ecies_mbedtls.cpp (PSA); VIDF_PKI off by default; no transport, CTL/CRL or scheduling (GAP-PKI-001)
IF-MN-001	CORE_MMT.request/.response (time, position vector, GN address, TC mapping) from the N&T management entity; MN-GET/MN-SET of the DCC N-Params; MN-COMMAND/-REQUEST envelope	TS 103 836-4-1 V2.2.1 Annex K; EN 302 890-2 V2.1.1 clause 5.5.2; TS 102 723-4 V1.1.1 clause 5; TS 103 175 V1.1.1 clause 8.3 and Table 10	mn_sap.hpp, management.cpp: CORE_MMT_response_apply(Stack&, ...), NetworkParameterProvider; no DCC values are invented (ErrStatus 250 "unsupported" when no provider)
IF-MF-001	MF-SET of the DCC F-Params (channel number, available resource); MF-COMMAND/-REQUEST with ErrStatus 5 for an undefined number	TS 102 723-5 V2.0.0 clause 5 incorporates V1.1.1; TS 103 175 V1.1.1 clause 8.4, Tables 11 to 13, clause 6.5	mf_sap.hpp: FacilitiesParameterSink implemented by the facilities layer of the application
IF-MI-001	MI-SET/MI-GET of the DCC I-Params (52 to 57) with MAC-ID and CommandRef; ErrStatus 5 for an undefined command	TS 102 723-3 V1.1.1 clauses 5.2.3, 7 and 8, Tables 5 to 8; TS 103 175 V1.1.1 clause 8.2, Table 5	mi_sap.hpp: AccessParameterProvider implemented by the access adapter; channel load and transmit timing are read from nowhere else

Facility schemas can be traced directly to the input ASN.1 files under asn1/release2/ and each generated header's source notice. The source manifest pins the upstream revision and records compiled source hashes. facilities validates PDU syntax/identity; it does not claim all service-level normative requirements are implemented.

EN 303 797 Annex B and BTP Annex A describe internal service interfaces. The C++ representations, names, units, ownership, optional-value representation and buffer limits are this library's bindings. The convenience API uses data.size() for Length; the named NF request has an explicit length and rejects a mismatch with fl_sdu.size(). Omitting CBR/RSSI means a test adapter has no observation; it is a known gap if the selected access conformance profile requires that measurement.

TS 102 723-10 specifies IN-UNITDATA primitives with CommandRef, DP-ID and status. Those are distinct from the AL_DATA example in EN 303 797. This library uses the latter and does not claim to implement the former by renaming fields. BLE/USB serialization is outside either ETSI service primitive.

Comment convention of the port headers: every type, primitive binding and public function that represents a standardised object carries the standard, edition and clause or table it comes from in the comment immediately above it; members and helpers of such a type (accessors, bookkeeping, overrides of an upstream interface, using aliases of another header's types) are covered by the comment of the type or of the header they alias, and implementation details (private members, Impl classes) carry none. The same convention applies to the pre-existing stack.hpp/access.hpp.

The SN/SF/MN/MF/MI bindings are C++ representations of the primitives named above. Their subscribers, providers and sinks may live in the same task, in another task or process, or on another device; the library defines no transport for them and no serialization other than SN_ENCAP_request_submit's owned packet. Identifiers are HashedId8 values of the ticket in use (TS 102 940 V2.1.1 clause 6.5); the GN MID takes the least significant six octets with the locally administered bit set and the group bit cleared.

The R2 GN V2.2.1 edition introduces TRANSP_CORE/CORE_GAGH and MCO/ALI handling beyond the older router's model. The interface and behavior gap must be closed before claiming conformance to that edition. A pinned R2 facility ASN.1 codec does not make every lower layer R2-compliant.