Ashin Walpola
0e9525162d
obu-firmware builds against vanetza-idf from microbu-esp32c5/external, but that tree was gitignored, so a clone of this repository could not build the firmware it ships. It is now committed here as ordinary files in its own folder, microbu-esp32c5/: the colleague's commit cf4b99f plus the V2X2MAP bridge's signature verification (--trust) used on the bench. Nothing is fetched from or pushed to the colleague's repository; this repository and its remotes carry everything. The folder's own .gitignore keeps build output, downloaded components and private key material out, as it did there; the committed file set is identical to that repository's tracked files. The ESP32-C5 is still flashed from obu-firmware/, which only takes vanetza-idf from microbu-esp32c5/, so the two stay separate folders. FLASHING.md says how to take a newer version of the colleague's tree (copy it over the folder, rebuild, test, commit).
34 lines
1.8 KiB
Markdown
34 lines
1.8 KiB
Markdown
# Security
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This is the security module of Vanetza. It implements the ETSI C-ITS security extension of the GeoNetworking protocol based on:
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- `vanetza::security::v2` namespace: [ETSI TS 103 097 v1.2.1](http://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_ts/103000_103099/103097/01.02.01_60/ts_103097v010201p.pdf)
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- `vanetza::security::v3` namespace: [ETSI TS 103 097 v1.3.1](https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_ts/103000_103099/103097/01.03.01_60/ts_103097v010301p.pdf)
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## Implemented Features
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Most features are implemented, including:
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- Security profiles including the CAM and DENM profile
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- Certificate requests for unknown certificates of other stations
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- Certificate validation for incoming messages
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## Missing Features
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There are a few missing features, but the overall implementation is in a working state to send and receive secured messages.
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It has been verified to work correctly by interoperability tests with other implementations.
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- Revocation checks for certificate authorities<br>
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Certificates of CAs can be revoked via CRLs. There will be a new standard for the corresponding protocol in May 2018. It will be a new version of [ETSI TS 102 941](http://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_ts/102900_102999/102941/01.01.01_60/ts_102941v010101p.pdf).
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- v2: region checks for polygonal and identified regions<br>
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There are `TODO` notes in the code of `region.cpp` within the `is_within()` functions. Implementing these checks is non-trivial.
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- v2: region consistency checks for regions other than circular and none region restrictions<br>
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There are `TODO` notes in the code of `region.cpp` within the `is_within()` functions. Implementing these checks is non-trivial.
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- v3: region checks for identified regions
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- Certificate requests<br>
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Currently there's no support to request authorization tickets from an authorization authority or to do an enrolment.
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